Pluralism (philosophy)

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In philosophy , pluralism refers to positions that assume a multitude of fundamental and irreducible levels or forms of knowledge in the world. On the one hand, pluralisms differ from monistic theories, such as physicalism , which considers the level of physical events to be the only fundamental one. However, pluralistic theories also differ from dualism , which proceeds from two basic levels - the physical and the mental.

Pluralistic theories often vary greatly in their metaphysical and ontological background assumptions. While ontological pluralisms postulate a multitude of fundamental entities in the world , relativistic pluralisms reject the idea of ​​an ontology and claim a multitude of systems of description or language games . “Pluralism” cannot therefore be perceived as a unified position in philosophy.

Logical pluralism

Immanuel Kant commented on pluralism: “The logical egoist considers it unnecessary to test his judgment against the understanding of others; as if he didn't need this touchstone (criterium veritatis externum) at all. ”“ Egoism can only be countered by pluralism, that is the way of thinking: not to deal with the whole world in oneself, but to consider and accept as a mere citizen of the world cautious. ”“ If one compares one's insights with those of others and decides the truth from the relationship of agreement with other reason, that is logical pluralism. ”Kant describes a one-sided scholar as a Cyclops. "He is an egoist of science, and he still needs an eye that makes him look at his object from the point of view of other people ..."

Ontological pluralism

Ontological pluralisms are characterized by the assumption of a large number of fundamental entities. They explain that there are not just basic physical objects , properties and events . Rather, numerous nonphysical entities existed in the world, such as consciousness , numbers , meanings , moral or aesthetic properties. A modern form of ontological pluralism can be found, for example, with the scientific theorist John Dupré . Theories of "strong emergence " are also comparable .

Ockham's razor is often used to argue against such an inflationary ontology . "Occam's razor" is understood to mean the principle of ontological thrift, which means that one should postulate as few fundamental entities as possible. Ontological pluralists can argue against this objection that Occam's razor is only applicable if ontologically more economical alternatives are available that have the same explanatory potential. However, this is not the case, since monistic or dualistic theories cannot do justice to the existence of numerous entities.

Another objection to ontological pluralisms is that the same difficulties arise as with dualism. It is often argued against dualism that it cannot explain the causal interaction between physical and mental states. This problem of mental causation is applicable in a generalized variant to pluralism: If there are many nonphysical entities, one has to explain where and how they affect the physical world. Such an explanation could not be given, however, since the physical occurrence itself always has purely physical causes, so there is no room at all for non-physical causality. Ontological pluralists respond to this objection by asserting that sufficient physical causes are not found everywhere , or by declaring that physical determinacy does not conflict with nonphysical causes.

Relativistic pluralism

The idea of ​​relativistic pluralism is closely linked to Nelson Goodman's work . Goodman argues in his work that the idea of ​​a world in itself is meaningless because one cannot abstract from human perspectives and describe a world beyond perspective. Rather, there is a multitude of perspectives, such as the perspective of physics, aesthetics or the mental.

However, if one cannot step behind these individual perspectives, the idea of ​​a world beyond human perspectives is also pointless. One must therefore recognize that each way of describing corresponds to a world of its own. Since these worlds only come into being through the active use of language, one can speak of a world creation . The persuasiveness of relativistic pluralism essentially depends on the coherence of relativism. The postulate of several man-made worlds is often critically questioned.

Pragmatic pluralism

William James developed the cognitive position of pragmatism against the idealistic positions widespread at the time. He wants to do justice to the fact of the often contradicting experiences and looks for practical, generally convincing solutions, because pluralism is relativism , i. H. Loss of generally binding public rationality . That is why compromise and mediation are inseparable from the philosophy of pluralism. Important aspects for the appreciation of philosophical ideas and their consequences can be derived not only from abstract thinking, but also from everyday life.

Hilary Putnam , who describes his late philosophy as “pragmatic pluralism” and “conceptual pluralism”, tries to formulate an intermediate position between ontological and relativistic pluralism. Putnam rejects an inflationary ontology and claims that one should not assume a plurality of fundamental entities, but a multitude of perspectives. However, according to Putnam, this plurality of perspectives does not lead to the creation of a multitude of worlds, as Goodman claims. Rather, there is only one world that can be described in different ways.

Putnam's "universe" with three individuals

Putnam tries to clarify this position through the phenomenon of conceptual relativity . Putnam discusses conceptual relativity with the following example: He asks us to imagine a universe with three indivisible individuals (see illustration). Now one can give different answers to the question of how many objects there are in the universe. If one is of the opinion that only individuals are objects, then there are three objects in the universe: X1, X2, X3. On the other hand, if one asserts that conjunctions of individuals also represent objects, there are seven objects: X1, X2, X3, X1 + X2, X1 + X3, X2 + X3, X1 + X2 + X3. Putnam argues that there is no right answer to the question of how many objects really exist in the world . The answer depends on the perspective or on the system of terms used. Various systems of terms are available with equal rights.

According to Putnam, conceptual relativity shows that there are different perspectives on the world that are equally legitimate and fundamental, and none of which can be considered the actual description of the world. This conception is a pluralism because it implies a multitude of equally fundamental perspectives. However, Putnam faces the challenge of having to show that the rejection of a fundamental perspective does not lead to fundamental relativism.

Pluralism as a general attitude

Pluralism means practically, recognizing and letting a multiplicity apply, be it views, religions and cultures, ways of life and customs. The pluralism of world views means the existence of very different political or religious convictions within an ethnic group or a state . This acceptance of plurality can take various forms. Is the other accepted only tolerantly, perhaps seen as different, reinterpreted and assimilated, or really recognized as something different, understood as having equal rights and actively protected. Monism as the opposite of pluralism is the conviction that everything is to be derived from a comprehensive principle of a supernatural or natural nature, to be explained and evaluated as a whole: religion and state, education and science, public and private life. They are manifestations of the one spirit, the one God, the one idea of ​​society. In this monism lies the claim to truth and exclusivity, which can increase to intolerance against other convictions, to dogmatism and fundamentalism and in the extreme to aggressive totalitarianism . Since in this system all divergent views must act as a negation of the one and unconditionally prevailing principle, there is no real place for freedom rights and individualism.

Sandkühler (1996) explains: “Not only in the world of social interests and values, but also in the world of ideas and knowledge - including world views, theories and sciences - there is a 'conflict of cultures' because perspectivity is not one is a hidden a priori , a general and necessary condition of experience, knowledge and theorization. So the problem of the coexistence (and the incommensurability ) of cultures already arises for epistemology, and already here, especially in politics, it is about freedom and order, the individual and the general law. ”“ In philosophy and others Forms of the construction of a world view, pluralism has largely asserted itself as a matter of course against system claims and monisms or dualisms; But only in a few philosophies it is explicitly justified theoretically (ontological, epistemological, methodological). "..." Pluralism is of course also confronted with the skeptical question of whether it inevitably turns into the horror of arbitrariness and relativism. Whoever answers the question in the affirmative sees in the concept of pluralism the philosophical increase from an everyday irrationalism to ontological, epistemological and methodological anything goes. "

From a critical-rationalist point of view, pluralism is a general scientific understanding. In principle, a plurality of theories that are mutually related to criticism is accepted and the dogmatic claim to truth of each individual theory is rejected. "And those who are against pluralism should know what they are talking about and check whether they really want to forego everything that they think they have to reject as an anti-pluralist."

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Anthropology in a pragmatic way. In: Wilhelm Weischedel (Hrsg.): Writings on anthropology, philosophy of history, politics and pedagogy 2. Immanuel Kant edition in twelve volumes (= volume 12). Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1983, p. 409.
  2. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Anthropology in pragmatic terms , 1983, p. 411.
  3. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. In: Prussian Academy of Sciences (ed.): Collected writings (= volume 24). Reimer, Berlin, 1966, p. 428.
  4. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Reflections. In: Prussian Academy of Sciences (Hrsg.): Collected writings (= Volume 15). Reimer, Berlin 1923, p. 395 ff.
  5. ^ John Dupré: The Disorder of Things . Harvard University Press, Harvard 1993
  6. ↑ Heil / Mele (eds.): Mental Causation , Oxford University Press, 1995, ISBN 019823564X
  7. ^ Nelson Goodman: Ways of Worldmaking . Hackett, Indianapolis 1978. (German) ways of world production . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt / M. 1984
  8. ↑ William James: Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Mindsets. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2001, ISBN 3-534-12999-7
  9. ^ Hilary Putnam: Ethics without Ontology . Harvard University Press, Harvard 2004, p. 21, ISBN 0674018516 .
  10. ↑ Hilary Putnam (2004), p. 48.
  11. ↑ Hilary Putnam: truth and convention . In: Hilary Putnam: Realism with a Human Face . Harvard University Press, Harvard 1990. ISBN 0674749456 .
  12. ↑ Hans Jörg Sandkühler: Unity of knowledge: on the debate about monism, dualism and pluralism. Series of publications / Center for Philosophical Foundations of Science, Volume No. 17. Universitäts-Buchhandlung, Bremen 1996, ISBN 3-88722-360-8 , p. 23.
  13. ↑ Hans Jörg Sandkühler: Unity of knowledge: on the debate about monism, dualism and pluralism . 1996, p. 9.
  14. ↑ Helmut Spinner: Pluralism as a model of knowledge. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt a. M. 1974, ISBN 3-518-07632-9 , p. 241.

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