Principle of benevolent interpretation
The principle of benevolent interpretation requires that ideas that are argued against are presented in the best possible light. In philosophy and rhetoric in particular, all statements by discourse partners should be understood as rational and, in the event of differences of opinion, in their best possible, strongest sense. The aim of this methodological principle is to avoid ascribing irrationality, fallacies or falsehoods to the statements of others , if a conclusive, rational interpretation is also possible. According to Simon Blackburn, "it forces the listener to maximize the truth and rationality in the utterances of the other." Arguments that deliberately violate the principle of benevolent interpretation can be counted among the straw man arguments .
history
Precursors of the principle were already used in scholasticism , for example in the prologue to Petrus Abelardus ' compilation Sic et non :
We find occasionally in the scriptures of the saints something discrepant with the truth. It is due to piety, humility and charity [caritas], which “believes everything, hopes everything, endures everything,” that one does not lightly suspect defects in those whom they lovingly embrace, and that these passages are either not reliably translated or corrupted, or admitted that they were not properly understood.
Neil L. Wilson named the principle of charity in 1958/1959 . The main area of application was the determination of the reference of proper names, i.e. the question of which person or object the name refers to:
How should we proceed if we want to find out what meaning someone associates with a particular name? [...] Suppose someone (whom I would like to call "Charles") makes exactly five claims that contain the name "Caesar". [...]
(1) Caesar has conquered Gaul. (Gc)
(2) Caesar has crossed the Rubicon. (Rc)
(3) Caesar was murdered on the Ides of March. (Mc)
(4) Caesar was addicted to the ablative absolutus. (Ac)
(5) Caesar was married to Boadicea . (Bc)
[...] And so we orientate ourselves on what can be called the principle of benevolent interpretation [Principle of Charity]. As a reference object for the name, we choose the object that makes as many of Charles' utterances true as possible.
Willard Van Orman Quine and his student Donald Davidson use different formulations in the context of their conceptions of radical translation and radical interpretation. Quine formulates the maxim of the translation as follows: "The maxim of translation underlying all this is that assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language. […] The common sense behind the maxim is that one's interlocutor's sillyness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation - or, in the domestic case, linguistic divergence. ”Davidson occasionally spoke of the principle of rational adaptation , which he like summarized: "The words and thoughts of others make the most sense when we interpret them in a way that we can best agree with them."
It will - e.g. B. by Daniel Dennett and Richard Grandy - also discussed whether the principle is best understood as the principle of humanity , according to which we should ascribe to the speakers to be interpreted "those propositional attitudes that we would expect we would train them ourselves under the given circumstances ”. This explicitly includes that we can and should ascribe false beliefs to others if their epistemic situation makes it plausible that they have acquired these beliefs. For example, it is likely that someone who looks at a clock that says four o'clock will develop the conviction that it is four o'clock - even if the interpreter knows that the clock is half an hour ahead.
Web links
Individual evidence
- ^ Normand Baillargeon: Intellectual Self-Defense . Seven Stories Press 2007, p. 78. Original: "we have to keep in mind the principle of charity according to which we must present the ideas we are contesting in the most favorable light."
- ^ Simon Blackburn: The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy . Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, p. 62.
- ↑ Original: "it constrains the interpreter to maximize the truth or rationality in the subject's sayings."
- ↑ Oliver Scholz: Understanding and Rationality . Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2001.
- ↑ Pierre Abelard: Sic et non ( Memento of the original from November 14, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ^ Neil L. Wilson: Substances without Substrata . In: The Review of Metaphysics . 12, No. 4, June 1959, pp. 521-539.
- ↑ Donald Davidson [1974]: Ch. 13: On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . In: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation . Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984.
- ^ Willard Van Orman Quine: Word and Object . MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1960, p. 59f.
- ↑ Original: "principle of rational accommodation"
- ↑ Original: "we make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement"
- ↑ Richard Grandy: Reference, Meaning, and Belief . In: The Journal of Philosophy . 70, No. 14, August 1973, pp. 439-452.
- ^ Daniel Dennett: Mid-Term Examination . In: The Intentional Stance . MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1989, p. 343.
