Christine Korsgaard

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Christine Korsgaard at Amherst College in 2010

Christine Marion Korsgaard (* 1952 in Chicago ) is an American philosopher who deals in particular with questions of ethics and has made influential contributions to the reinterpretation of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant .

Career

Korsgaard graduated from the University of Illinois with a BA in 1974 . She then studied at Harvard until 1979 with John Rawls, among others . In 1978 she was a lecturer at MIT and 1979–1980 at Yale University . Your Ph.D. graduated from Harvard in 1981. This was followed by teaching activities at the University of California in Santa Barbara (1980–83), in Berkeley (1989) and Los Angeles (1990) as well as in Chicago (1983–1991). In 1990 she was appointed professor. In 1991 she moved to Harvard. There she headed the Department of Philosophy from 1995 to 2002 and was appointed Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy in 1999.

Korsgaard is a member of the American Philosophical Association, the North American Kant Society, the Hume Society and the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. She was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001 and the British Academy in 2015.

In 2004, Korsgaard received an honorary doctorate (LHD: Doctor of Humane Letters; Latin: Litterarum humanarum doctor) from the University of Illinois.

Teaching

Korsgaard is primarily concerned with moral philosophy and its history, practical reason (Kant), personal identity and the relationship between humans and animals.

She has written four books so far.

In “The Sources of Normativity” (1996), an elaboration of her Tanner Lectures on Human Values ​​from 1992, she examines the history of ideas about the foundations of obligation in modern moral philosophy , taking a constructivist position based on Kant , according to which normative truths are the result of voluntary activity. Practical identity is a self-interpretation from which specific reasons and obligations arise. Normativity arises from the belief that a particular course of action is the most convincing solution to a problem. If you act differently, you violate your beliefs about what is right. Due to the reflective structure of the human mind , one forms a self-concept that is responsible for recognizing reasons for action as binding. You develop priorities and values ​​in terms of content , which you use as a guide and which are decisive in ensuring that you consider an action to be correct and consciously decide on it.

The second book "Creating the Kingdom of Ends" (1996) is a collection of thirteen essays on Kant's ethics. The main focus is on the preconditions for deliberation and decision-making processes. The work is thematically divided into two areas: In the first part, Korsgaard defends Kant's ethics with regard to decision-making problems and in the second part the author consults other classical authors, such as Aristotle, Hume and Moore, in order to secure her position beyond the Kantian discourse .

In “The Constitution of Agency” (2008) Korsgaard presents some essays on practical reason and moral psychology. Among other things, she advocates the thesis that the principles of practical reason determine human action. By acting in accordance with the categorical imperative and according to the principle of instrumental reason, man gains the ability to control himself. According to Korsgaard, it is not egoism that guides action, but man's striving for the good . She argues that there is agreement between Aristotle 's virtue ethics and Kant 's ethics of duty insofar as both understand actions as determined by reason and for both the moral good is the goal of action. Both the Kantian maxims and the Aristotelian logos are expressions of reason.

Korsgaard distinguishes between action and behavior. In contrast to the pure act (“I lie”), an act (“I lie to earn more money”) is associated with a self-set purpose. The mode of action is the bearer of moral value, while the action is only subject to moral judgment. This distinguishes Kant ( maxims ) and Aristotle ( virtue ) from consequentialism, which is decisive for utilitarianism , for example .

"So if one assumes with Kant and Aristotle that the object of morality is the mode of action as a whole, then consequentialism is obviously not a moral theory, but a kind of technological vision, a moral substitute, a socio-technical project."

Her latest work “Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity” (2009) is an extension of her Locke Lectures from 2002. In this book, Korsgaard deals with the fundamentals of moral agency. For them, moral principles and principles of practical reason are generally determining for the ability to act and at the same time determining for one's own identity. As a rational being, man is aware of the principles of his actions. For him, an action is good if the agent causes it himself. The normative power of the principles of practical reason arises from the fact that the act of volition determines that the principles must be followed. Man binds himself to principles such as the categorical imperative or the recognition of the autonomy of the person.

Korsgaard defends her constructivism by analogy with Wittgenstein's private language argument . Just as words only acquire meaning through communication with third parties, reasons also only develop their normative power in public. Reasons that are accepted presuppose an "I". “My reasons are part of my practical identity; I construct my practical identity so that my existence does not precede my reasons for saying it. [...] This does not imply a third-person perspective, but rather the assumption of a plural first-person perspective , [...] With this plural first-person perspective, we are concerned with justification and not explanation . “Explanation refers to the object, to being ; Justification is about the ought and takes place against subjects .

Works (selection)

literature

  • Christopher W. Gowans: Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64 No. 3 (May, 2002), pp. 546-570.
  • JB Schneewind: Korsgaard and the Unconditional in Morality in Ethics, Vol. 109 No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 36-48.
  • Hannah Ginsborg: Korsgaard on Choosing Nonmoral Ends in Ethics, Vol. 109 No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 5-21.
  • Joshua Gert: Korsgaard's Private-Reasons Argument in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64 No. 2 (March 2002), pp. 303-324.
  • John Brunero: Korsgaard on Motivational Skepticism in The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 38 No. 2 (2004), pp. 253-264.
  • Kirsten B. Endres: Practical reasons. A comparison of three paradigmatic theories , ontos, Frankfurt 2003, ISBN 3-937202-22-6 ( online )

supporting documents

  1. ↑ Interview with Christine Korsgaard, in: Herlinde Pauer-Studer (ed.): Constructions of practical reason, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, 36-66, here 41/42
  2. ↑ Interview with Christine Korsgaard, in: Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Ed.): Constructions practical reason, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, 36-66, here 47
  3. ↑ Interview with Christine Korsgaard, in: Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Ed.): Constructions of practical reason, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, 36-66, here 44

Web links

personal data
SURNAME Korsgaard, Christine
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Korsgaard, Christine Marion (full name)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION American philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH 1952
PLACE OF BIRTH Chicago , Illinois