De officiis

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De officiis - 15th century manuscript with illumination by Giovanni Ricciardo di Nanno (detail)

De officiis ( Of the duties or of the dutiful action ) is a philosophical late work by Marcus Tullius Cicero . It was made in 44 BC. And is one of the standard works of ancient ethics . It briefly deals with the duties of daily life, especially those of a statesman.

With officium , Cicero has reproduced the Greek καθῆκον (kathēkon) , which means something like what is to come and, in the technical sense, duty . De officiis is written in letter form to Cicero's son Marcus and not, like many of Cicero's philosophical writings, in dialogue form. The work consists of three books, the first dealing with honorable behavior, the second dealing with duties that are useful to humans, and the third giving situations in which these can come into conflict with one another. In the first and third books he also refers to the four cardinal virtues and the oikeiosis doctrine, which is an important part of Stoic ethics and is the main basis for Cicero. He refers in particular to Panaitios of Rhodes and his main work On Duties , but also draws on other ancient philosophers such as Poseidonios and Plato .

History of origin

The work was created in the autumn or winter of 44 BC. After the death of Gaius Julius Caesar . Cicero had sharply criticized Mark Antony in his first Philippine speech , especially because of his claim to succeed Caesar as emperor . As a result, Cicero had to flee Rome to his estate. Withdrawn there, he worked on Laelius de amicitia (Laelius on friendship) and De officiis .

The addressee of the work, his son Marcus, studied philosophy with the Peripatetic Kratippos for a year in Athens while De officiis was being written . In contrast to his father, he is said not to have been very hardworking, but to have enjoyed life instead of deepening his studies in politics and philosophy. Cicero is said not to have approved this. According to “De officiis” , Cicero wanted to give him some instructions, although he “had more than enough instructions (from Kratippos)”. His aim was not to present the stoic ideal of the doctrine of duties, but to give practical instructions using numerous examples.

De officiis alludes in some parts to the political situation at the time it was written. At the beginning of the third book, Cicero also speaks in detail about his retirement, which led him to write philosophical works. He compares his retirement to that of Scipio Africanus , who claimed that he was "never less inactive than when he was inactive and less lonely than when he was lonely". However, his retirement was voluntary, Scipio occasionally withdrew "into solitude as in a harbor"; However, due to the political situation, Cicero was denied the opportunity to return to public life.

content

first book

Cicero recommends that his son of the same name, who devotes himself to philosophical studies in Athens, like his father himself in Greece, should not let his occupation with the Latin language tear off. For this purpose he sent him these books, the tendency of which did not differ too much from what the son was learning from Kratippos (1–2). No Greek had achieved equal fame in public speech and in philosophical presentation, except perhaps Demetrios of Phaleron . Nevertheless, the great philosophers and orators of the classical era could have done so if they had only wanted to (3–4).

What is honorable or what is shameful is a topic that is common to all philosophers. But not all schools could sensibly incorporate the concept of duty in their theoretical structure. In these books, Cicero wants to orientate himself on the Stoics, but reserves the right to choose and make his own judgment (5-6). In a first dichotomy , Cicero announces that he will examine the concept of duty in two respects: on the one hand, with regard to its connection with the highest good , and then with regard to the expression of the concept in rules and rules of life (7). In a further definition he identifies the Greek καθόρθωμα with the rectum , the absolute duty, and then defends the use of the word officium for the Greek μέσον καθῆκον , the average duty that can be rationally justified (8).

Panaitios had established a threefold consideration that precedes any intended action:

  • 1. Is it honorable or not?
  • 2. Is it useful or not?
  • 3. Is there a conflict between honesty and usefulness?

Cicero wants to orient himself on this in the disposition of his discussion, but wants to continue his own investigation (9-10):

  • 4. To what degree is it honorable?
  • 5. To what extent is it useful?

In addition to the basic functions of all life, self-preservation and reproduction, there is an awareness of the past and future in humans . This reason made him want to live in human society . Likewise specifically human is the interest in truth , which arouses in him a thirst for research and makes people strive for independence (11-13). The perception of beautiful and harmoniously ordered things arouses in people the desire to realize the same harmony in their thoughts and actions. From all this, the honorable is composed, which can always be traced back to one of the four virtues (later referred to as cardinal virtues), which are now to be examined individually:

  • the wisdom ( prudentia , para. 18-19)
    Right judgment requires care and time. Too much effort should not be wasted on things that are difficult to understand, complicated and, moreover, not vital.
    In the interest of a practical doctrine of duties, Cicero devotes very little space to this virtue: “To allow oneself to be dissuaded from carrying out deeds by one's interest in the truth is a violation of duty. For all the glory of virtue rests on activity. "(I, 19)
  • the justice ( iustitia , para. 20-60)
    Cicero now discusses the closely related virtues of justice and generosity, which have their common origin in the claims of fellow men on the individual. Not harming anyone without need is one of the most important principles of justice (20–23). The main motives of those who inflict injustice on others are fear, greed and lust for power. In the assessment, it is important to differentiate whether passion or calculation has triggered an injustice (24–27). The endeavor not to commit injustices, however, often results in another form of injustice, in that the withdrawal from the conflict neglects standing up for those who are under protection (28–30).
    Although reliability is an elementary trait of justice (23), things that are in themselves just could violate the principle of justice if, for example, keeping a promise would harm the person to whom it was made under changed circumstances. Malicious literal interpretation of the wording of a law or contract should also be seen as fraud (31–33).
    Justice must also be maintained in armed conflicts; Violence is only justified as long as no conversation is possible. Roman generals could boast of having taken in defeated opponents into a special protection relationship. In general, warfare requires meticulous observance of the provisions of fetal law in order to be justified (34–36). Basically, the greatest possible mildness is appropriate. Unlike struggles for the survival of a people, wars for power and influence alone should not be fought too bitterly. There is also room for acts of generosity and loyalty to the enemy (37–40).
    Justice should also be exercised against the weakest, the slaves. Hypocrisy is even worse than brute force (40).
    Even charity and generosity falls in Cicero under the heading of justice. Charity should also not be associated with disadvantages for anyone and must take special care to do what is due to everyone. The examples Sulla and Caesar (42–43) showed how fatal it is to take one thing in order to be generous to others . Those who are charitable beyond their own means are wasting goods that are due to their relatives. The most common motive for this is vanity (44).
    When doing charities, one should pay attention to the merits of the recipient. In doing so, the yardstick for fellow human beings should not be set too high. A modest demeanor should be seen as a positive sign. The persistence of the proven inclination should also be taken into account (45–47). Benefit received would have to be replied in abundance. However, the circumstances and need should also be taken into account here (48–49).
    For orientation about the graduation of social reality, Cicero divides people's areas of life according to their proximity. First of all, man is different from animals through language and reason and is thus connected to all people. He shared with them the gifts of nature. How one promotes the other without suffering any loss oneself can be made clear from the picture of lighting a fire (50–52). Closer and closer connections among people arise through common ethnicity and language , through political association and through kinship . Families are to a certain extent the germ cells of citizenship, descendants from secondary lines correspond to the colonies of the cities. Togetherness in cult helps to strengthen the community (53–55). The closest connection between people arises in the friendship of good men (viri boni), who combine through similar character to achieve common goals in mutual advancement (55–56). The most emotionally significant community, however, is the res publica , for which everyone gives his life without hesitation (57).
    At the end of these discussions, Cicero names the hierarchy of social reality. The top priority would be the hometown and the parents, then the children and relatives. The shaping of common life in word and deed has its place in friendships (58). The yardstick of all favors that one can do to others is the neediness and the individual situation of the recipient. All of these rules do not want to remain theory but to be implemented in practice (59–60).
  • the valor and magnanimity ( fortitudo and magnanimitas , para. 61-92)
    This cardinal virtue should especially be shared by those people who take on leadership positions in the state. Cicero defines it as “a virtue fighting for justice”, but it can also be dangerous, namely when it occurs without justice. In this chapter he portrays himself as the ideal statesman who combines justice and greatness of soul. In Caesar he sees a vir magnanimus , but who runs the state like an animal (belua) without justice . Finally, he summarizes the tasks for a statesman and philosopher.
  • the moderation ( temperance / moderatio , para. 93-151)
    Cicero understands this virtue as the inner harmony of the soul. It is fundamentally related to the nature of man (but not of gods and sages). Part of it in particular (but also to all other virtues) is what is decent (decorum), which is supposed to moderate the desires and instincts of man. Cicero's so-called persona ( role ) teaching also falls into this category . It consists of the following four roles / personae :
    1. the general role determined for each person by the decorum
    2. the role of nature in the individual
    3. the role determined by career choice
    4. the role of the personality who is in harmony with the environment

Finally, as a conclusion, Cicero remarks that the duties towards the community are more important than those towards the individual and that the harmonious, just personality must be in the foreground.

second book

In this much shorter book (89 paragraphs) Cicero deals with the question of what is useful for humans . In the foreword (prooemium) he discusses the question of utility in principle and justifies his philosophical stance to only deal with situations in the present work that appear to him to be likely.

Then he remarks that utility and honesty can only be separated theoretically and not practically, since according to the stoic ideal everything that is honest is useful and vice versa.

In the following, Cicero then states, among other things, that almost all human achievements would be inconceivable without the help of others. It is therefore necessary to win them over to his ideas. The rest of the book deals mainly with ways of gaining sympathy with others, although Cicero is of the opinion that fear is an unsuitable aid in this regard. As an example, he first mentions Greek tyranny , but he also mentions Rome as a more recent example. He describes Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix and Gaius Iulius Caesar as Roman tyrants .

The usefulness of fame is discussed in the following paragraphs. First, Cicero explains how it can be obtained, namely through beneficence, reliability, and also through admiration for superior virtue. In what follows he names righteousness as a prerequisite for fame; he starts from this highest virtue .

That charity and generosity can also be useful is the subject of the next section. After a general discussion, Cicero deals with generosity especially in the organization of competitions and gladiatorial fights . One should be generous in this, but not suspect greed. Then he summarizes that you shouldn't spend too much just to appear generous.

In contrast, he does not relate charity to money, but primarily to the concrete performance of services for the benefit of the individual. One must pay particular attention to his needs, whereby a statesman should be charitable not only to a few, but to society as a whole . Famous examples from Roman and Greek history are also taken up here.

Then it is briefly explained that it is important to take care of your own health and wealth. In the end, he already anticipates the third book, in which he shows the conflict between useful and duty .

Third book

In the third book (121 paragraphs), Cicero essentially enumerates the areas where the honorable and the useful can come into conflict, whereby he mainly orientates himself on Poseidonios , since Panaitios , although he had announced it, in his three books " περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος (perí tū kathēkontos) “has not dealt with.

In the Proemium he begins to complain about his exile, which is the cause of his retirement (which also gives him time to write his work) and compares him to that of Scipio maior , who was voluntary.

Then he discusses the conflict between the useful and the honorable theoretically. In the preliminary remarks he again states that the officia perfecta (κατορθώματα) is only due to the "wise" (this is the stoic ideal of human perfection) and the gods, but that people should practice the officia media (καθήκοντα) to get as close as possible to the ideal.

Now Cicero presents the standards for assessing these conflicts along the lines of Poseidonios. First of all, he justifies his strong reference to Stoic ethics by stating that it appears to him to be the best, since it does not identify anything that is dishonorable as useful. He then claims that one should not harm one's fellow human beings, who should have the same right to share in the community, under any circumstances in order to secure advantages for themselves. This is followed by the request not to move away from the community and live in peace, especially as a very talented person, but rather to serve society all the more. Cicero also warns that this, as a natural instinct, should not only be limited to relatives or fellow citizens, but should be applied to all people. But there are also exceptions to this rule: B. not blameworthy if a wise man takes something away from a man who is useless for nothing in order to survive, since he himself can still contribute much to the common good. It is also okay to rob a tyrant (he takes Phalaris of Akragas as an example ) of his clothes, and even to kill him.

In the following paragraphs Cicero deals with the practical interpretation of these conflicts, especially in war. First he discusses this in principle, then practical examples are mentioned. In the preliminary remarks to this section, Cicero defends Panaitios, who has ignored this subject, because he suspects that Panaitios succumbed to some kind of suffering. Then the content of the book is summarized.

The next section uses examples from the early Roman and mythical-Greek times to explain that injustice can never be of use. Neither obvious nor hidden - here Cicero is referring to the example of Gyges - injustice leads to benefit, although there are also undecided cases (here Cicero mentions the example of Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus , whose authority was withdrawn by his fellow combatant Brutus). In addition, there should be no limitless commitment, neither for friends nor for the fatherland.

Then Cicero deals with the injustice that arises from the formal and legally covered concealment of the truth. Here he gives three examples: first, the expensive selling of grain in famine-stricken Rhodes , although the trader knows that large quantities of grain are being delivered from Alexandria , and second, the example of the house, which looks very bad inside but good outside and then sold at a high price, and another one in which a wealthy Roman in Syracuse is deceived by fake fishing in the ponds of a park he wants to buy.

Individual examples from history and politics are also given. First, the example of the will of the rich Roman Lucius Minucius Basilus , forged by the Greeks , is given. In it, influential people like Marcus Licinius Crassus or Quintus Hortensius Hortalus are deliberately named as heirs, who ensure that the will is recognized as correct. Then Gaius Marius' illegally acquired consulate is briefly discussed as an example of ambitio (striving for influence). Then the evils of tyranny are cited again, and Gaius Julius Caesar is given as an example. In the following section, Cicero gives some examples on a subject of the Hekaton . At the end he summarizes everything again briefly.

Then Cicero goes back briefly to the cardinal virtues already mentioned . In the closing words he admonishes his son, to whom the work is directed, and expressly rejects hedonism , especially that of the Cynics . In the last paragraph he says goodbye to his son and hopes (in vain) to see him again soon.

Greek sources Ciceros

The Greek word καθῆκον (kathēkon) , reproduced by Cicero as officium , has meant circumstance or contemporary action since ancient times, and then also duty in philosophy . Cicero successfully defended this translation against the objections of Titus Pomponius Atticus , who generally criticized the rendering of Greek philosophical terms in Latin. In one of his letters to Atticus he writes:

“By the way, I have no doubt that we refer to what the Greeks call καθῆκον with officium . Why shouldn't that also be a wonderful fit for constitutional terms? Let's say consulum officium , senatus officium . So it fits great. Or do you know something better? "

Plato

Plato was the first to deal extensively with the cardinal virtues that form the basis of duties (καθήκοντα). He dealt extensively with the subject, especially in the dialogues Symposium , Gorgias and especially in the Politeia . The is justice the highest virtue, which all parts of the soul is, the wisdom , the virtue of reasonable (λογιστικόν, logistikón ), the bravery (θυμοειδές, the virtue of muthaften thymoeidés ) and the moderation virtue of the desiring part ( ἐπιθυμητικόν , epithymētikón ), which should be kept in check. Plato's comparison with a horse-drawn carriage is well known, depicting the sensible part of the soul as a charioteer, the brave part as willing and the desiring part as unwilling horse.

Older stoa

The treatment of καθήκοντα has a long tradition in the Stoa , which Zeno is said to have started from Kition . The chronicler Diogenes Laertios claims that Zeno introduced duty ( officium , καθῆκον ) as a philosophical term, and quotes him that it is “the natural thing in life”. He also explains the origin of the word and goes on to claim that "the designation (was) taken from the fact that it (the duty) is directed as a (literally descending ) demand on certain people". Zeno and other representatives of the older Stoa (especially Chrysippos of Soli ) basically provided the two "extreme values", on the one hand the (completely) correct action (καθόρθωμα; recte factum ) and on the other hand the offense (crime) ( ἁμάρτημα (hamártēma) , peccatum are), and the mean values ( τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας , ta metaxy ARETES kai kakías ) that are accessible for everyone: the dutiful (officium) and the wrongful act ( contra officium ; παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον , pará to kathēkon ) against The former are represented as goods, the latter as evils.

Ariston von Chios, on the other hand, did not go into the “mean values” and describes the honestum as the only value . Pyrrhon and Erillus of Carthage are of the same opinion . Ariston also found that one should not publish "philosophical textbooks" and withdrew to principles (δόγματα), because whoever is just no longer needs.

However, Ariston's views were unpopular with most of the Stoics. Seneca elaborates on the arguments that various Stoics used against him. Cicero also criticizes him in De officiis (I, 5–6), where he wonders where one would find “someone who would call himself a philosopher without giving any prescriptions about the duties (officia) ” and claims that "Ariston's opinion (...) had long since failed".

Medium stoa

Panaitios of Rhodes , the first representative of the middle Stoa and Cicero's most important model for the first two books De officiis , on the other hand, said that regulations in the field of ethics are very important, that practical instruction that affects everyone is important, not that Ideal of a sage. Help for certain everyday situations was particularly important to him. He wanted to achieve that everyone could live “according to nature” ( κατὰ φύσιν , katá phýsin ). He counters the accusation that his ethics have two goals, namely to achieve the stoic ideal on the one hand and to concentrate precisely on these "mean values" on the other hand with the remark that Cicero has handed down to us in De officiis I, 6: "( ...) Prescriptions that conform to nature can only be given either by those who say that honesty alone, or by those who say that it is worth striving for especially for its own sake. ” In his (no more This question is most detailed in the books " περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος ", but omits the part in which the conflicts between the honorable and the useful are mentioned, although he had announced it in his last book (of three). With this, Panaitios on the one hand preserved the stoic values, but with regard to the ideas of instruction, turned clearly in the direction of Peripatos and the academy . Hans-Ulrich Wiemer and others assume that Panaitios wanted his work to be aimed primarily at young Greek aristocrats who intended to pursue a political career.

In a sense, Poseidonios continued Panaitios' work and is used as a source by Cicero in Book III. He essentially represented the views of Panaitios, but nothing has come down from him. He was Cicero's direct teacher and attended his philosophy school, founded in Rhodes , to listen to his lectures, which were largely based on Panaitios.

Lore history

The manuscripts of De officiis - unlike some of the other philosophical writings of Cicero - are particularly numerous. The MS handwriting became the basis for the later editions . D'Orville 77 of the Bodleian Library (Oxoniensis Dorvillianus 77) from the 10th century. An illuminated manuscript from 1450 is in the possession of the Saxon University and State Library in Dresden. The first edition in book printing ( editio princeps ), together with other philosophical writings, was published in 1465 by Johannes Fust and Peter Schöffer in Mainz in folio format. The basic print edition followed in Venice in 1470 by Wendelin von Speyer in 4 ° format. The first annotated edition was also published in Venice in 1535.

reception

The literature on the καθήκοντα (duties) had been widespread in the Greek Stoa . Cicero's work De officiis was also widely read and found admirers and imitators. The first echoes can be found in Cicero himself, especially in the Philippine speeches against Mark Antony , in which he repeatedly urges him to keep the officia .

Even after Cicero there were many authors and philosophers who deal with the duties (officia) , whereby Cicero's work was an important model for many of them, since it is the only surviving work of this kind from antiquity.

Antiquity

According to Seneca, the Caesar murderer Marcus Junius Brutus wrote a work of the same name, probably in Greek, which has, however, been lost. The poet Ovid knew the work, as can be deduced from his works. Valerius Maximus often made use of Cicero's sources, especially De officiis , when compiling his collection of anecdotes . Seneca the Younger , as an avowed Stoic, also wrote a work on the doctrine of duty, which is lost. In his surviving writings there are often echoes of De officiis . Pliny the Elder was enthusiastic about Cicero's writing: "As you know, you have to learn these books about duties by heart, not just read them daily," he writes in the foreword to his natural history. Aulus Gellius pays great attention to Cicero's treatise in his Noctes Atticae , published around 175 AD .

The beginning of De officiis in the manuscript Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vaticanus Palatinus lat. 1534, fol. 1r (15th century)
De officiis I, 147-148 in the German translation by Johann von Schwarzenberg , Augsburg 1531, fol. 35v

Lactantius was the first Christian who dealt more intensively with De officiis . He has quoted or alluded to Cicero 24 times in his work. In late antiquity, Ambrosius , the bishop of Milan, dealt with the subject in more detail in his De officiis ministrorum , written after 386 . This book provides the first coherent account of Christian ethics . In this he essentially follows the example of Cicero, also builds up his work in the same way, only replacing Roman examples with Christian ones. It is said that he adapted ethics in de officiis for use in the church. His pupil Augustine also referred to De officiis , especially in his De ordine .

Middle Ages and Early Modern Times

The work received attention in scholasticism . Thomas Aquinas in particular quotes in his Summa Theologica (II q. 61a 4.5) from De officiis as an authority (I, 68.71) to confirm his conception of bravery. The late scholastic Marsilius of Padua also resorts to De officiis several times in his work Defensor pacis .

Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374) highly valued the work of Cicero. He was particularly enthusiastic about Cicero's language: "A certain magic of his words and their euphoria, so that everything else I read or heard seemed unpolished and full of discord."

At that time the work was regarded as a model work of Latin prose and enjoyed great popularity. Baldassare Castiglione (1478–1529) used it many times in his Cortegiano . Thus, through his work, Cicero's ethics influenced the ideal of a gentleman .

Erasmus von Rotterdam (1465–1536) particularly valued De officiis , as he openly admits: “I don't know how others fare. Marcus Tullius used to vote me, especially when he talks about the good life (De officiis) , in such a way that I cannot doubt that that heart from which these thoughts flow has filled some deity ”.

Hugo Grotius (1583–1626) often referred to De iure pacis et belli De officiis in his work , for example when dealing with the right to give everyone their own (cuique suum) .

Modern

In philosophical era of enlightenment found De officiis well received. In his Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata , for example, Spinoza wrote the oikeiosis doctrine, which was developed by Cicero et al. a. is explained in De officiis , used as a basis. The work was also often read in England, for example Shaftesbury's ideal of harmonious personality is largely based on De officiis . Voltaire (1694–1778) and Frederick the Great considered De officiis to be the greatest book on morality at all and held Cicero in high regard. Jean-Jacques Rousseau , on the other hand, remarked that “it is not necessary to know De officiis of Cicero in order to be a good man”. In Immanuel Kant could prove through interpretation of his works that he was so deeply influenced by any ancient philosophers like Cicero, especially De Officiis , which he in the then popular translation of the philosopher Christian Garve knew. Kant linked his concept of duty to Cicero / Panaitios.

After Kant, de officiis was understood less and less , also because of imperialism , since Cicero repeatedly emphasizes that anything that is not honorable is also not useful (and this cannot always be reconciled with imperialist interests) and especially because Cicero always again sees humanitas (humanity) as the quality of an ideal leader and statesman. Friedrich Hegel was critical of Cicero because he has completely different ideas about the state and law (as an ideal he imagines a monarchy , Cicero a republic ), the historians Wilhelm Drumann and Theodor Mommsen valued not only de officiis , but also other works Ciceros not very much because he idealized the Roman Republic as opposed to individual rule and, in her opinion, did not recognize the signs of the times in his political ideas.

Even after the First World War , De officiis received less and less philosophical attention. Due to its outstanding style and as a significant secondary source in the history of philosophy , it is and has always been an important work in the classical literary canon.

Text editions and translations

  • Olof Gigon (Ed.): MT Ciceronis De officiis libri III . Orell Füssli, Zurich 1944 or 1945 . Zurich 1950.
  • Karl Büchner (ed.): MT Cicero: From right action. Artemis, Zurich / Stuttgart 1964 (bilingual)
  • Heinz Gunermann (Ed.): MT Cicero: De officiis / Of dutiful action . Stuttgart: Reclam 1976, ISBN 3-15-001889-7 (bilingual, with commentary)
  • Michael Winterbottom (Ed.): MT Cicero: De officiis . Clarendon Press, Oxford / New York 1994, ISBN 0-19-814673-6 .
  • Rainer Nickel (Hrsg.): From dutiful action. De officiis. Latin - German. Artemis & Winkler, Düsseldorf 2008. De Gruyter, Berlin 2011.

literature

  • Julia Annas : Cicero on Stoic moral philosophy and private property. In: Miriam Griffin , Jonathan Barnes (eds.): Philosophia togata. Essays on philosophy and Roman society. Clarendon, Oxford 1989, 151-173 (New edition. Ibid. 1996, ISBN 0-19-815085-7 ).
  • Maria Becker: The cardinal virtues in Cicero and Ambrosius: De officiis. Schwabe, Basel 1994, ISBN 3-7965-0953-3 ( Chrēsis 4), (also: Münster (Westphalia), Univ., Diss., 1992).
  • Klaus Bringmann : Studies on the late Cicero. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1971, ISBN 3-525-25120-3 ( Hypomnemata 29), (At the same time: Habil.-Schrift, Univ. Marburg).
  • Andrew Dyck: A Commentary on Cicero De officiis , Ann Arbor (Michigan): The Univ. of Michigan Press 1996, ISBN 0-472-10719-4
  • Manfred Erren : What is Cicero talking about in “De officiis”? In: Würzburg Yearbooks for Classical Studies. NF 13, 1987, ISSN  0342-5932 , pp. 181-194.
  • Paolo Fedeli : Il "De officiis" di Cicerone: problemi e atteggiamenti della critica moderna. In: Hildegard Temporini , Wolfgang Haase (Hrsg.): Rise and decline of the Roman world. (ANRW). History and culture of Rome as reflected in recent research. Part 1: Philosophy and Sciences, Arts. From the beginnings of Rome to the end of the republic. Volume 4. de Gruyter, Berlin et al. 1973, ISBN 3-11-004570-2 , 357-427.
  • Irene Frings: Structure and sources of the Prooemium for the 1st book Ciceros de officiis. In: Prometheus. 19, 1993, ISSN  0391-2698 , pp. 169-182.
  • Hans Armin Gärtner : Cicero and Panaitios. Observations on Ciceros De Officiis. Winter, Heidelberg 1974, ISBN 3-533-02366-4 ( session reports of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Philosophical-Historical Class. 1974, 5).
  • O. Gigon : Comments on Ciceros De officiis. In: Peter Steinmetz : Politeia and Res Publica. Contributions to the understanding of politics, law and the state in antiquity. Dedicated to the memory of Rudolf Stark. Steiner, Wiesbaden 1969, pp. 267-278 ( Palingenesia. 4, ISSN  0552-9638 ).
  • MT Griffin, EM Atkins (Eds.): Cicero. On duties. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 1991, ISBN 0-521-34835-8 ( Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought ).
  • Willibald Heilmann : Ethical reflection and Roman reality in Cicero's De officiis. An attempt at the sociology of literature. Steiner, Wiesbaden 1982, ISBN 3-515-03565-6 ( Palingenesia 17), (Also: Frankfurt a. M., Univ., Habil.-Schr.).
  • Douglas Kries: On the Intention of Cicero's “De Officiis”. In: The Review of Politics. 65, 4, 2003, ISSN  0034-6705 , pp. 375-393.
  • Eckard Lefèvre : Panaitios' and Cicero's doctrine of duties. From a philosophical treatise to a political textbook. Steiner, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-515-07820-7 ( Historia. Individual writings 150).
  • AA Long: Cicero's politics in the De officiis. In: André Laks , Malcolm Schofield (eds.): Justice and generosity. Studies in Hellenistic social and political philosophy proceedings of the sixth Symposium Hellenisticum. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 1995, ISBN 0-521-45293-7 , pp. 213-240.
  • Max Pohlenz : Cicero, De officiis III. Weidmann, Berlin 1934 ( News of the Society of Sciences in Göttingen, Philosophical-Historical Class. Section 1: Classical Studies. NF 1, 1, ZDB -ID 503971-x ), (Reprinted in: Max Pohlenz: Kleine Schriften. Edited by Heinrich Dörrie Volume 1. Olms, Hildesheim 1965, pp. 253-291).
  • Max Pohlenz: Ancient leadership. Cicero de officiis and the ideal of Panaitios. Teubner, Leipzig et al. 1934 ( New ways to antiquity. 2nd row: Interpretations 3, ZDB -ID 846593-9 ), (reprint. Hakkert, Amsterdam 1967).
  • Klaus Bernd Thomas: Text-critical investigations into Cicero's writing “De officiis”. Aschendorff, Münster 1971 ( Orbis antiquus 26, ISSN  0078-5555 ), (At the same time: Münster, Univ., Diss., 1968).
  • Michael Winterbottom: The Transmission of Cicero's De Officiis. In: The Classical Quarterly. NS 43, 1, 1993, ISSN  0009-8388 , pp. 215-242.

Web links

Wikisource: De officiis (lat.)  - Sources and full texts
Wikiquote: De officiis  - Quotes

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος (perí toū kathēkontos) .
  2. ↑ De officiis I, 1.
  3. ↑ See Egon Gottwein: Commentary .
  4. ↑ De officiis I, 1.
  5. ↑ See Gottwein .
  6. ↑ De officiis III, 1-6.
  7. ↑ De officiis III, 5.
  8. ↑ De officiis III, 1; Cicero mentions Marcus Porcius Cato as the one who passed this quote on.
  9. ↑ De officiis III, 2.
  10. ↑ It is said that educated people approached Cicero with the accusation that he was not consistent enough, to which he replied that everything that appeared to him to be "likely" was worthy of his treatment. ( De officiis II, 7f.).
  11. ↑ Epistulae ad Atticum 16, 14, 3.
  12. ↑ Plato, Politeia 438d-441c, 443c-445e.
  13. ^ Plato, Phaedrus 246a-247c, 253c-254e.
  14. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 7.107.
  15. ↑ Seneca , especially Letters 89 and 94, serves as the source for the views of the older Stoa .
  16. ↑ Seneca, Epistulae 94, 11.
  17. ↑ Epistulae 94, 1-18.
  18. ↑ Much has come down to us from Cicero , especially de legibus 1, 37, 54.
  19. ↑ De officiis III, 7-8.
  20. ↑ Cicero praises this in De officiis I, 1.
  21. ^ Gunermann, Cicero De officiis p. 430.
  22. ↑ Online inventory of the D'Orville manuscripts ( Memento of the original from January 14, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bodley.ox.ac.uk
  23. ↑ Mscr. Dresden. Dc. 120 ( online ).
  24. ↑ GW 6921. - The ISTC names over 50 copies of the print in 43 libraries, half of the copies are printed on parchment, ie luxury copies ( catalog ).
  25. ↑ GW 6926. - The ISTC names 38 copies in over 30 libraries ( catalog ).
  26. ↑ Vera Binder: Cicero, Marcus Tullius. In: Manfred Landfester (ed.): History of ancient texts. Lexicon of authors and works (= Der Neue Pauly . Supplements. Volume 2). Metzler, Stuttgart / Weimar 2007, ISBN 978-3-476-02030-7 , pp. 148-164.
  27. ↑ Carl Atzert. Handwritten notes on De officiis . In: Rheinisches Museum 68 (1913).
  28. ↑ praefatio ad naturae historiam, 22.
  29. ↑ The passage Gellius 1.31.1 essentially corresponds to De officiis I, 8.
  30. ↑ Laubmann / Brandt: Index auctorum, 248f.
  31. ↑ The doctrine of decorum can be found in I, 8, 25, the assessment of professions ( de officiis I, 150) in II, 4, 12.
  32. ↑ In 1, 19, 13 he cites off. 1, 23; in 1, 1, 4 off. 1, 22; in 1, 4, 2 off. 1, 11.
  33. ^ Friedrich Klingner, Cicero and Petrarca, In: Röm.Geisteswelt 600ff.
  34. ↑ especially 1.126–151; 3, 75.99.
  35. ↑ Erasmus, Epistulae 28.18.
  36. ↑ De iure pacis et belli I, 2, 5 corresponds to Off. 1, 11 .
  37. ↑ See G. Gawlik, Cicero and the Enlightment. In: Studies on Voltaire and the 18th Century.
  38. ^ Encyclopédie de la Pléiade , Vol. I, 767.
  39. ↑ On this, Klaus Reich, Kant and the Ethics of the Greeks, Tübingen 1935, 14ff.
  40. ↑ a b Gunermann, after-effects of De officiis , In: MTCicero: Vom dutgemäßigtelac, Reclam 1976, p. 446.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on October 23, 2008 .