As tyranny ( ancient Greek τυραννίς tyrannís "rule of a tyrant, unlimited, arbitrary rule, tyranny") is a form of rule of ancient Greece , which in the 7th century BC. BC and was widespread in Greek populated regions of the Mediterranean until the Hellenistic era. Its characteristic is the unrestricted sole rule of a ruler, the "tyrant" (Greek τύραννος týrannos , Latin tyrannus ) over a city-state ( polis ), sometimes also over a larger territory. The basis for this was not conventional legitimation, but only the factual possession of power, mostly based on violence, which in some cases the popular assembly had approved. Many rulers who came to power through a coup wanted to found a dynasty , but the inheritance of the leadership position often failed in the generation of their sons. A distinction is traditionally made in ancient studies between the "older tyrannies" of the 7th century BC. Until the year 461 BC And the "younger tyranny", which emerged in the late 5th century outside of the Greek heartland and was still practiced in the age of Hellenism.
In the epoch of older or “ archaic ” tyranny, the term “tyrant” was not yet judgmental for an autocratic ruler. However, after the removal of the local tyranny in 510 BC, Athens dominated . A sharply negative attitude, and in the following time the relevant terms received strongly negative connotations . The state-theoretical concepts that were introduced in the 4th century BC in particular contributed to this . Were developed by the philosophers Plato and Aristotle . In the epoch of the Greek classical period and in Hellenism, the exercise of tyrannical power was abhorred in wide circles. “Tyranny” became a battle term used to denounce the rule of a ruler as illegitimate and oppressive. Successful resistance against a tyrant in the name of an aristocratic or democratic "freedom" brought fame. The overthrow or murder of a tyrant was glorified as a feat.
With the Romans, a very negative assessment of the monarchy has dominated since the forcible elimination of the Roman monarchy . As the influence of Greek culture increased, the traditional anti-monarchical sentiments of the Roman republicans combined with the Greek criticism of tyranny in educated circles. In the Middle Ages and in the early modern period , the anti-tyranny of major ancient authorities had a profound effect and influenced debates about tyrannicide.
In contrast to the unifying ancient theories, modern research emphasizes the variety of forms of "tyrannical" rule in the Greek world of states. She examines the connections between the concentration of political power and social and economic conditions. The constitutional relevance of the older tyranny and the numerous fierce power struggles for autocracy in the archaic period are particularly intensely discussed . According to one line of research, it is only about constitutionally relatively insignificant personal disputes within a thin aristocratic leadership class. According to another interpretation, the tyrants weakened the power of the aristocratic clans and thus unwittingly paved the way for a socially rising middle class. The assumption that tyranny was a necessary prerequisite for the further development of state institutions, especially for the later development of Attic democracy, is controversial .
Etymology and conceptual history
The word tyrannos is the Graecized form of an expression that the Greeks used around the middle of the 7th century BC. Adopted as a loan word from a language in Asia Minor . In which way and through which transformation process this happened is unclear and controversial in research. According to the prevailing hypothesis today, the starting point of the etymological development was the title tarwanis , which is attested in inscription in hieroglyphic Luwian . The original meaning of this word was “judge” or “the righteous”, apparently with the connotation of social justice and upholding the rights of the weaker. The title tarwanis is used for the first time in the successor states of the early 12th century BC. BC the collapsed Hittite empire . There the term had three meanings. Firstly, it was an additional title for the rulers who called themselves kings, secondly a title of autonomous non-royal rulers and thirdly the designation for the hereditary office of very high-ranking “servants” who were connected to the ruling family through marriage. It happened that such a "servant" appeared as a usurper and disempowered his royal master.
According to the dominant doctrinal opinion, the link in conveying the Luwian term into Greek was its use in the Kingdom of Lydia in western Asia Minor, whose language, like Luwian, belongs to the Anatolian languages and whose culture was linked to Greek. There had around 685/680 BC The courtier Gyges murdered King Sadyattes I (Kandaules), assumed the royal office and founded the Mermnaden dynasty. Gyges apparently carried the title tarwanis , which may already have been hereditary in his family. Gyges was a usurper, but this circumstance does not seem to have played a role in the adoption of his title as a loan word in Greek, because initially the Greeks called every single ruler tyrannos , also an undoubtedly legitimate ruling king. The original defining characteristic of Greek tyranny, sole rule, was not necessarily viewed negatively, but tyrannos was never used as a title or self-designation ; In contrast to the Luwian and Lydian language usage, the expression in the Greek-speaking area was not considered so honorable that it would have been suitable for self-expression.
The oldest evidence for the Greek word tyrannis can be found in the poetry of the 7th century BC. At first, there was no implicit disreputation associated with it, but in the early 6th century there was also a strongly derogatory use of tyrannos . In the course of the "archaic" epoch, which lasted up to 500 BC. The concept of tyranny took on clear contours. From the 6th century onwards, it was primarily understood to be a form of government in which an individual rules a state in which such sole rule is not actually intended. By the 4th century BC Chr. Tyrannos and the words derived from it were used both in a pejorative and neutral sense, but the negative implications dominated over time. Increasingly, tyranny was associated with the connotations of a lack of legitimation, the destruction of the legitimate state order, arrogance, arrogance and violence. Wealth and a sometimes critically assessed luxury were associated with the ideas from the start.
In the 4th century the philosophical, journalistic and colloquial language usage moved the moral meaning of the words tyrann, tyrannis and tyrannical to the fore in such a way that they hardly said anything about the constitutional issue, the disregard of the conventional state order. It was no longer the lack of legitimacy but the harsh and arbitrary handling of an office or rule that made the "tyrant" in the first place. This shift in meaning solidified in the following centuries. It was now customary to revile politicians or traditional rulers who were unpopular because of the way they wielded power or because of their character as tyrants. In this sense, undoubtedly legitimate kings like Philip II of Macedonia and Alexander the Great as well as officials, governors or occupation commanders were denigrated as tyrants by opponents.
The plural tyrannoi was sometimes used to brand a group that was accused of exercising tyrannical arbitrariness. The first and best-known example of this use of the term is the body of the " Thirty ", a group of oligarchical politicians who seized power in Athens after the defeat in the Peloponnesian War and who in 404/403 BC. Exercised a reign of terror in the city. This group is reviled as "thirty tyrants" in opposing sources. This is not about autocracy, rather it is only about the idea of arbitrariness, injustice and cruelty that was associated with the word tyrannos . Allegedly a radical wing of the oligarchs openly admitted that as a group they intended to behave like a tyrant would.
In the Etruscan language , the name of the goddess of love Turan means "mistress" according to a controversial hypothesis. An etymological connection with tyrannos has been suggested, but this assumption is very doubtful.
The Latin noun tyrannus , the Latinized form of the Greek tyrannos , has been used since the 2nd century BC. Occupied. When the Romans adopted the Greek term, it usually implied a negative valuation. In Latin tyrannus usually denotes the unjust, characterfully evil owner of illegally presumed power. However, there is also a neutral use on various occasions; so with Virgil for the hero Aeneas and with Ovid for the god Neptune . In late antiquity , Roman usurpers were often referred to as tyrants, such as the counter-emperors against Gallienus , who are characterized as " thirty tyrants " in the late antique Historia Augusta , alluding to the group of Athenian oligarchs .
The elder tyranny
The older tyranny is also referred to as "archaic" because its period largely falls into the "archaic epoch" of Greek history, the early period, which dates back to around 500 BC. Lasted. The violence-based autocracy spread in many areas of the Greek settlement area, both on the Greek mainland and in the Aegean Sea , on the west coast of Asia Minor and in the Greek-populated parts of Sicily and the southern Italian mainland. It was probably more widespread than the tradition, which is poor in some areas, suggests. In the late 6th and early 5th century BC Tyranny was gradually removed almost everywhere where it still existed, most recently in the 460s in the Italian area, where it was still after 500 BC. Had experienced a heyday.
Sources on older, “archaic” tyranny are abundant, but only a small part of them is contemporary. The scanty sources from the archaic epoch are lyric poetry and dedicatory inscriptions; historiography did not begin until later. Among the narrative representations, the accounts of the historian Herodotus , written in the 5th century, have the greatest weight; in the 4th century BC The philosopher Aristotle put together further material. Since the narrative sources emerged long after the events and their information is based on oral tradition, their credibility is sometimes very questionable. The authors of the late-produced notes have projected facts, ideas and judgments of their own time into the past; In addition, legendary material is also used in the late tradition. Hence, the image of the older tyranny they convey is partially skewed and falsified. Much of the news about alleged acts of the tyrants may be late inventions based on stereotypes about the tyrant nature.
The individual tyrants
In Corinth in the 7th century BC Establish a tyrant dynasty that ruled the city-state for more than seven decades. Its founder was the respected, wealthy nobleman Kypselos , who fought against the rival Bakchiads . At that time the Bakchiads dominated the city politically and economically, they reserved the most prestigious offices and functions. Kypselus succeeded in eliminating the leading personalities of the hostile family, although he did not shrink from murdering the city's top official, and rose to the rulership level. He apparently met with approval from his peers, who disliked the Bakchiads' monopoly on power, and the townspeople also seem to have welcomed his coup. He ruled for thirty years and apparently did not find it necessary to institutionalize his royal-like position. Inner peace favored the boom in trade and industry. The rule of Kypselus was so well established that he did not have to rely on mercenaries to secure it and could even do without a bodyguard. It was different for his son and successor Periander , who encountered strong aristocratic resistance. Apparently a new generation of aristocrats was no longer ready to submit. Periandros got himself a bodyguard and acted ruthlessly against opposition nobles; they were killed or driven away. His rule was not seriously threatened, however, he died unchallenged at the age of eighty. His nephew and successor Psammetichos had less support; after three years he was overthrown by hostile nobles. This ended the tyrant dynasty. Their opponents took revenge for the repression by destroying the houses of the tyrants and confiscating their goods.
The first attempt to establish a tyranny in the then aristocratic ruled city of Athens dared - probably in the thirties of the 7th century BC. BC - a rich nobleman named Cylon . After gaining great fame as an Olympic champion , he tried to seize power through a poorly prepared coup. With a group of companions he occupied the castle of Athens, the Acropolis . The rebels were besieged, starved and forced to surrender by troops of the ruling aristocrats. The brutality of the conflict is evidenced by the fact that the victors lured putschists who had fled out of a religious asylum center with the assurance of impunity and then killed them.
The influential, rhetorically gifted nobleman Peisistratos made a new attempt . He had already distinguished himself as a general when he 561/560 BC. Reached for power. First, Peisistratos mobilized support in the popular assembly, which granted him a bodyguard after he had theatrically complained about an alleged assassination attempt by his noble enemies. Then he and his followers occupied the Acropolis, but then powerful aristocratic groups allied against him and drove him from Athens. Around 557/556 BC He went to Eretria , where he assembled a strong force of mercenaries and nobles who were eager for glory to conquer his hometown. After a victory over an apparently less motivated army of its aristocratic opponents, Peisistratos was able to 546/545 BC. Occupy Athens without a fight and establish its tyranny.
Peisistratos secured his rule primarily through a powerful force, which consisted partly of foreigners and partly of loyal Athenians. He also had the sons of prominent aristocrats held hostage. Some of his opponents went into exile. He was able to win over a large part of the rest of the upper class through clever incentives by offering fields of activity and opportunities for advancement to the nobles who remained in the country. However, it largely robbed them of the opportunities for glamorous self-representation with which they could have increased their reputation and their following. The tyrant barely intervened in the structures of the state, leaving the institutions intact. The most important office, the archonate , he filled with reliable followers. By introducing a new arbitration system, he probably wanted to gain sympathy among the rural population and at the same time reduce the influence of unreliable aristocratic families in the countryside. The inner peace during his long reign made economic prosperity possible.
After the death of Peisistratos in 528/527 BC His sons Hippias and Hipparchus succeeded him, with Hippias as the elder taking over the leadership. The dynasty of the Peisistratiden came to an end in the second generation. In 514 BC Hipparchus fell victim to an assassination attempt. Hippias, who had previously sought a compromise with previously oppositional genders, reacted with severe repression directed against the stubborn nobility. The activities of Kleisthenes , an influential nobleman who worked in exile to eradicate tyranny, ultimately became his undoing . Kleisthenes moved the Spartans to a military intervention, which 511/510 BC. Chr. Hippias drove out of Athens. This ended the tyranny in Athens. Their overthrow had been the concern of aristocratic groups, the people had hardly participated in it.
In Syracuse , the most important Greek city in Sicily, tyranny was established around 485 BC. Built by the troop leader Gelon . Gelon came from Gela , an important city on the south coast of Sicily, where he lived as early as 491/490 BC. After the death of the local tyrant as his successor. Anarchy had set in in Syracuse after the people drove the Gamoren, oligarchic landowners, from the city. The chased oligarchs turned to the ruler of Gela and asked for military help. Gelon took this opportunity and appeared with his force before Syracuse. There he met no resistance. He occupied the city, but instead of restoring the former oligarchy, he established himself as a tyrant.
Even before the capture of Syracuse, Gelon had a number of cities under his control, which belonged to Gela's sphere of influence and were ruled by his governors or by dependent tyrants. After moving his residence to Syracuse he was the most powerful Greek ruler of his time; his empire and alliance system encompassed almost all of eastern Sicily. He had a significant force and a fleet. With a large-scale resettlement policy, he carried out a massive reshaping of demographic conditions. He was concerned with increasing the population of his capital. Numerous citizens of other cities were forced to move to Syracuse. Thousands of mercenaries also received Syracuse citizenship.
The Syracuse state system was formally democratic under Gelon's rule; People's assemblies were held that had legislative powers. The tyrant apparently did not hold any of the highest offices in the city, but acted formally as a simple citizen who submitted proposals to the popular assembly. The city population was not disarmed, in the war the citizens fought together with Gelon's mercenaries. When the tyrant decided to wage a great war against the Carthaginians in western Sicily, he brought about a resolution of the popular assembly. The war ended in 480 BC. With the decisive victory of Gelon in the battle of Himera . After the peace agreement, his territory and his alliance system extended over almost all of Sicily.
After Gelon's death in 478/477 BC His brother Hieron I succeeded him. Hieron had less authority than his glorious predecessor and believed that he could only maintain his position by introducing new repressive measures. He also ordered extensive resettlements. Whole cities were depopulated. As Hieron 467/466 BC Died, his brother Thrasybulus took his place. This relied on his mercenaries and, according to the sources, introduced a reign of terror with arbitrary executions, banishes and confiscations. The harshness of the repression alienated him from the citizenship and led to an uprising. Only eleven months after taking office, Thrasybulus was expelled. This ended the tyranny and democracy was introduced in Syracuse.
In addition to the leading powers Athens and Corinth, numerous smaller city-states also experienced times of tyranny. There, too, it was rich, prominent members of the landed nobility who forcibly asserted themselves against the heads of competing families and achieved sole rule. Some of them succeeded in founding a dynasty. The dynasty of the Orthagorids , which came to power in Sikyon in the 7th century, was particularly long-lived ; it is said to have stood its ground for a hundred years.
The most important among the tyrants of the smaller states was Polycrates , who in the second half of the 6th century BC. Ruled on the island of Samos . With its luxury and pomp it aroused the imagination of contemporaries, and its dramatic fate provided posterity with popular narrative material. Polykrates, who came from one of the leading families, took possession of the island's capital Samos together with his two brothers in a coup d'état, then eliminated the brothers and rose to become the sole ruler. He relied on both his local followers and a large force of foreign mercenaries. He also found widespread support among the island's rural population, as he provided the Sami people with a considerable income with his dreaded pirate fleet. The raids of the Sami fleet served to finance the mercenary army and were also intended to secure the loyalty of the able-bodied Sami to the tyrant. However, he had to deal with a dangerous uprising by part of the fleet that rival nobles had instigated. A joint intervention by Sparta and Corinth, who attacked Samos with an invading force, was able to repel Polycrates, because the well-fortified island capital turned out to be impregnable. The audacity and success of the Sami pirate fleet made the tyrant famous. Finally, the Persian satrap Oroites lured him into a trap, captured him and had him cruelly killed. Posterity was deeply impressed by the discrepancy between the brilliant display of power and the pathetic end of Polycrates.
Further tyrannical rule existed for a time in Epidauros , Phleius and Megara , on the Thracian Chersonese and on the islands of Naxos , Kos and Chios , on Euboia in the cities of Chalkis and Eretria and on Lesbos in the city of Mytilene . It is uncertain whether Pheidon of Argos and other powerful aristocrats in Argos can also be counted among the tyrants.
Greek cities on the west coast of Asia Minor, including Miletus and Ephesus , also came under tyranny. In the course of the expansion of the Persian Empire , in some places in Thrace and Asia Minor, Greek tyrants were forced to recognize Persian suzerainty; others only took control of their hometowns with Persian assistance and were then completely dependent on the Persian great king . In Ionia , the Persians were able to deploy and remove tyrants at will. The completely dependent tyrants had to obey the great king in army . They probably took part in the Persian Wars , the failed campaigns to subjugate the independent states of Greece in the early 5th century BC. BC, part on the Persian side.
In the Greek settlement areas of Sicily and the southern Italian mainland, a series of tyranny arose. It all started with a general named Panaitios , who took power in his hometown of Leontinoi in Sicily, supposedly as early as the end of the 7th century BC. BC In Akragas built around 570 BC Chr. Phalaris a regiment of terror; he is said to have tortured his enemies to death in the legendary " Bull of Phalaris ", a torture system. For posterity, Phalaris became the model of a cruelly furious tyrant. Other cities that came under tyrant rule include Gela , Himera and Selinus in Sicily, Rhegion , Sybaris and Croton in Calabria and Kyme in Campania . Tyranny did not reach its greatest spread until the first half of the 5th century BC. At that time, many Sicilian cities were ruled by tyrants who were under the suzerainty of Syracuse. The collapse of Syracuse tyranny in 466/465 BC In the following years BC led to the overthrow of the local tyrants in the cities of the Syracuse Empire. With the elimination of the Rhegion dynasty in 461 BC. The last archaic tyranny of the Greek settlement area ended.
The character of the elder tyranny
Tyrannical rule played an important role in Greece and Asia Minor as well as in Magna Graecia , the Greek-populated parts of Sicily and the southern Italian mainland. As a result of the differences in political and social conditions, tyranny in the west of the Greek settlement area took on a somewhat different form than in the east. Eastern and western tyrants shared a pronounced need for prestige, which was shown, among other things, in their strong interest in sporting victories in competitions throughout Greece . Imitation of kingship with monarchical splendor should help to legitimize the rule and to stabilize it permanently. However, it was only possible in exceptional cases to secure long-term power for the descendants of a dynasty founder. The tyrant dynasties were usually short-lived, mostly they were overthrown in the second generation.
Greece and Asia Minor
Research has established that the social origins of the archaic tyrants of Greece and Asia Minor came from the landed nobility. No one, as was later believed, rose from a lowly background. Some of them traced their descent to well-known characters from the mythical prehistory. In some cases, they held important offices before they were tyrannized. The family wealth made it possible for them to develop luxuriously. War campaigns rich in fame and loot, victories in the prestigious chariot races and glamorous festivals contributed to self-expression and to the consolidation of rule. This purpose was also served by alliances with foreign rulers and important heads of families, which one liked to strengthen through marriage. Some tyrants were celebrated by court poets. Decisive for the seizure and securing of power were the militant followers of the tyrants, their noble companions (hetairoi) and friends (philoi) . The acquisition of new followers in the ruling class was therefore a priority task for the aristocratic who aspired to sole power. However, the loyalty of the followers could only be relied on as long as there was a good chance of success. The following could quickly break up.
The most common means of taking power was the coup d'état, the surprising access by the armed supporters of the usurper to central points in the city. The city castle, the acropolis, was of strategic importance . In some cases, foreign allies provided military assistance. The use of foreign mercenaries was in the 7th century BC. Still uncommon in the 2nd century BC, but in the following century they played an essential or even decisive role in coups d'état and in securing permanent power. Their advantage was that they were more reliable than the unstable followers, whose loyalty depended on the domestic political situation. Mercenaries were also needed for raids and wars. Pay was financed in different ways; The means to achieve this were taxes, raids or the exploitation of natural resources. Tyrants who had the support of the population were also able to use local soldiers who were capable of military service. However, mobilizing armed citizens who did not belong to his own followers was risky for a ruler; it was therefore mostly avoided in the 6th century.
The relationship between the tyrants and the local aristocratic ruling class was delicate and of central importance for maintaining power. Since the monarch owed his position exclusively to a successful act of violence, he had no generally recognized legitimation; any other prominent nobleman could dispute his presumptuous precedence. A tyrant often had numerous rivals and enemies in the local aristocracy, some of whom offered passive resistance at home and waited for an opportunity to overthrow, others lived in exile and tried to mobilize foreign support for the overthrow of the tyrant. The tyrants reacted to opposition activities with harsh repression. But they were dependent on the willingness of parts of the nobility to cooperate, because without sufficient acceptance in the ruling class they could not rule. One important means by which they obtained approval was the allocation of offices and prestigious duties. In this way, the tyrants mainly rewarded and promoted aristocrats whose families, because of their relatively poor reputation and wealth, appeared to them to be less suspect than the most important families.
For the tyrants, their relations with the broad non-aristocratic strata of the population were of subordinate importance, because the power struggles took place only within the aristocratic upper class. In no known case has a usurper of the archaic era relied on disadvantaged, dissatisfied masses in order to assert himself as a “popular friend” against the nobility. However, the acceptance of the tyranny in the urban population and among the farmers in the surrounding countryside was an essential factor of stability. Some tyrants enjoyed great popularity among the people. The suppression of their aristocratic competitors led to a general weakening of the aristocracy and thus eased the economic pressure that weighed on the rural population. The result was social and economic improvements for the peasants, some of whom rose to relative prosperity under the rulers and were better able to safeguard their interests.
The growing social weight of broader strata during the tyrant regime contributed in the long term to the decline of the old aristocratic world. But this development was probably not intended by the tyrants, who only thought in terms of conventional nobility values. A well thought-out economic and social policy of the archaic tyrants is not recognizable. As legislators and reformers, they hardly appeared; they also refrained from incorporating a monarchical element constitutionally into the state order. They did not try to put the state on a new footing and develop a future-oriented program. Usually they formally left the existing structures of the state untouched and limited themselves to controlling the institutions with their personnel policy.
A difference between the tyranny in archaic Greece and Asia Minor and that in Magna Graecia, the western, Italian part of the Greek settlement area, is that the power struggles in the west were not exclusively determined by the values and norms of aristocratic society. Rather, the broad urban population was given some weight in politics; she was able and ready to take up arms to protect her interests. Social tensions offered tyranny aspirants an opportunity to make pacts with one side or the other. Panaitios von Leontinoi, the earliest tyrant named in the sources, is said to have prevailed against the oligarchy of landowners by taking advantage of a social contradiction: As a general, he is supposed to stir up the less well-equipped, lightly armed men against the mounted aristocrats and carry out his coup with them to have. Gelon seized power in Gela and later in Syracuse, posing as the savior of the regimes overthrown by popular uprisings. The tyrant Aristodemos von Kyme posed as a popular leader against the aristocratic landlords. It is reported that he had given the people the prospect of annulment of debts and redistribution of the land in order to reach a popular resolution to legitimize their sole rule.
In Sicily, the rivalries between the noble families were apparently less pronounced than in the east of the Greek world. There seems to have been a relatively great willingness in principle among the upper class there to accept the leadership role of an energetic usurper. The tendency to concentrate power in the early 5th century was reinforced by a peculiarity of the Sicilian situation, the military confrontation with the Carthaginians. The requirements of the struggle against the Carthaginians favored the monarchical form of government and the emergence of the large, tyrannically ruled Syracusan state.
The younger tyranny
After the fall of the older tyranny, the states of the Greek settlement area remained free of tyrannical tyranny for decades in the 5th century, apart from a few exceptions in peripheral areas and tyranny-like concentrations of power in Thessaly . The city-states took precautionary and defensive measures against the machinations of ambitious politicians who sought a tyrannical position. Athens, as the leading sea power and by far the strongest member of the Attic League, did not tolerate the emergence of tyrannical rule in its sphere of influence. The Athenians also fought despotic rule in the 4th century. In Eretria they fell in 341 BC. With a military intervention the local tyrant. The now ruling Eretrian Democrats then passed a law that provided severe penalties for attempting a coup and offered rewards for tyrant killers. It also included provisions for organizing resistance after a tyrannical takeover.
In the leading city-states of Greece - Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Corinth - were in the 5th and 4th centuries BC. The existing state order was consolidated and supported by such a broad consensus that threats from potential usurpers could not be passed or averted. In smaller states, however, in the 4th century, leaders who were either real tyrants or assumed a position similar to a tyrant occasionally prevailed. The transition between an extraordinarily powerful but legal office and an illegal tyranny was fluid. Pure tyranny with a significant development of regional power could only establish itself in two areas of the Greek world, in Sicily and in Thessaly. These two tyrannies are primarily meant when the "younger tyranny" is mentioned, which began in the late 5th century BC. BC and in Sicily in the 3rd century BC. Experienced a heyday.
The younger tyranny was established in Sicily in 405 BC. BC through the takeover of power by Dionysius I , a political agitator, in the previously democratic city of Syracuse. Dionysius had initially distinguished himself in the popular assembly as a spokesman for the masses and agitated against the distinguished, wealthy upper class. He rose to the position of tyrant gradually. First he got the people's assembly to remove the incumbent generals and was elected to the new general college. Then, faced with the military threat posed by the Carthaginians, he obtained his election as general with extraordinary powers. He expanded his bodyguard into a private militia, secured the loyalty of the army, especially the mercenaries, and thus achieved a de facto monarchical position, whereby democracy was formally maintained.
Dionysius I became a prime example of a tyranny. Posterity's image of tyrants was strongly influenced by his personality and the anecdotes that circulated about him. As lord of Syracuse, he took control of most of Sicily and also reached north to the Italian mainland. With that he created a large territorial state and the strongest Greek military power of his time. In devastating wars, Dionysius fought against the Carthaginians with varying degrees of success. He made Syracuse the largest city and most powerful fortress in the Greek world at that time. A new upper class emerged from his favorites and officers, who took the place of the nobles who had been killed or expelled. The core of this was formed by the tyrant's family and the families by marriage with them; this was the group of people to whom he entrusted the most important political, diplomatic and military tasks. After his death in 367 BC The change of power to his son Dionysius II , whom he had designated as his sole successor, was carried out smoothly.
Dionysius II, who had not been prepared for his role as ruler, could not preserve his father's legacy. He did not have the authority of the founder of the dynasty and could only rely on his mercenaries. The influential politician Dion , who was related to the ruling family and exiled to Greece by Dionysius II, returned in 357 BC. BC returned with a mercenary force and overthrew the tyrant against whom the urban population of Syracuse rose. In heavy fighting, Dion's troops and the Syracusans prevailed against the tyrant's mercenaries, but Dion was suspected of striving for tyrannical rule himself. This earned him the enmity of the strong democratic-minded forces and brought him into increasing isolation. Finally, the democratic officer Callippus let him in 354 BC. Assassinate.
Kallippus ensured a democratic state order in Syracuse. In other cities in Sicily and the mainland, he tried with varying degrees of success to eliminate the tyrannical rule. When he undertook a campaign for this purpose, Hipparinos , a half-brother of Dionysius II and Dion's nephew, used this opportunity to take Syracuse in one stroke and make himself a tyrant. In doing so, he overlooked Dionysius II's claim, which he had by no means given up. After further turmoil, Dionysius succeeded in conquering Syracuse and again taking over sole rule. However, his sphere of influence was limited to this city; Local rulers came to power in other cities in his former empire.
The situation changed fundamentally when the anti-tyrant city of Corinth intervened militarily after Syracuse opponents of Dionysius had asked for help. The Corinthians sent in 344 BC. A fleet under the capable general Timoleon . Its task was both to fight the Carthaginians and to free the Sicilian cities from their tyrants. Dionysius was forced to surrender and exiled to Corinth. There he spent the rest of his life as a private citizen. Timoleon eliminated tyranny almost everywhere in Sicily. As a liberator, he gained an extraordinary reputation for the tyrants were hated.
In Thessaly were in the 5th century BC. BC traditional noble families set the tone, but the commercial and trading population of the cities increasingly gained political importance. The city of Pherai with its port Pagasai was an important economic center . Lycophron of Pherai established a tyranny there in the late 5th century . He tried in vain to unite all of Thessaly under his suzerainty. In the early 4th century Pherai was under the rule of the tyrant Jason , who expanded his foreign policy influence with a large-scale alliance policy. Jason was elected Tagos , commander of the troops of the Thessalian League. With that he legally stepped to the head of all Thessalians. As commander in chief of the Thessalian armed forces, he pursued a military expansion policy with the aim of integrating neighboring peoples into his sphere of influence. He succeeded with the Macedonian king Amyntas III. and to conclude alliances with the Molossian king Alketas I , with which they accepted his hegemony . However, he did not create territorial rule as in contemporary Sicily. The basis of his power was a powerful mercenary army. At the height of his successes, Jason saw himself as commander-in-chief of an all-Greek armed force in a joint offensive against the Persian Empire. However, his bold plans met with little approval in the independent Greek states; rather, he was feared as the future tyrant of an empire encompassing all of Greece. Hence, Jason’s assassination in 370 B.C. Relief and five escaped assassins found enthusiastic reception in Greek cities.
The murder was followed by turmoil, which ended with the seizure of power by Jason's nephew and son-in-law Alexander von Pherai the following year. In contrast to Jason, who exercised his sovereignty in moderation and respected the internal autonomy of the Thessalian cities, Alexander strove for absolute power. In doing so, he created numerous enemies. The sources often speak of his cruelty; in ancient times he was considered one of the most nefarious tyrants in history. Against the repression the oppressed Thessalians sought help in Thebes, which at that time was at the height of its power under the leadership of the important statesman and general Epameinondas . The Thebans intervened and pushed Alexander's troops back in changeable battles until he was finally limited to Pherai and Pagasai. In this situation he switched to piracy to obtain the necessary funds. Eventually Alexander was born in 358 BC. At the instigation of his wife Thebe, a daughter of Jason, murdered by two of her brothers. Thebe's eldest brother then took over the rule. In the period that followed, the tyrant dynasty, which continued to pursue an expansive foreign policy, came into conflict with the rising Macedonian Empire. In 352 BC BC the Macedonian king Philip II forced the last tyrant of Pherai, Lycophron II , to surrender.
In Corinth built around 366/365 BC The mercenary leader Timophanes, a member of the local oligarchical upper class, was a tyranny for a few months, relying on his mercenaries. He is said to have exercised a reign of terror and was eventually killed by supporters of the old system of government. His brother Timoleon, who later became famous as the conqueror of the Sicilian tyrants, was privy to the murder plan and approved of it. Timoleon's decision to favor the fight against tyranny over family loyalty attracted attention and was controversial. For posterity, the dramatic event was later embellished like a legend; it was alleged that the future liberator of Sicily killed his brother himself.
Eastern state system
Alexander the Great took a demonstratively anti-tyrannical stance towards the Greek city-states. He ordered the abolition of all tyranny; citizens should live according to their own laws in the future. Overthrown and arrested tyrants should be turned over to their fellow citizens for trial. However, Alexander did not proceed in this way consistently. In Pellene the famous wrestler Chairon was able to set up a tyranny with Macedonian help. In Herakleia Pontike , Alexander left the ruler Dionysius , who was the head of an established dynasty there, unmolested. Alexander transferred rulership over Messene to a couple of brothers who had ruled there before he was raised to the king, but were then driven out; whether this is a tyranny is unclear.
After the disintegration of the created by Alexander the Great Alexander Empire occurred in the successor states often establishing local tyrannies that can be described as tyrannical or tyrannisähnlich. For the Hellenistic age, the distinction between illegal tyranny and legal office is difficult, since the terms "tyrant" and "tyranny" were used more polemically and related more to the general fact of political oppression than to a specific constitutional phenomenon. Such “tyrants” were not always tyrants without legal authority; duly appointed senior officials or prominent citizens, who played a decisive role in their cities thanks to their wealth and high reputation, and even leaders of robber gangs are named in the sources as "tyrants". Hellenistic kings transferred cities to their favorites as a reward for valuable services rendered, thereby giving them a tyrannical position. The countless military conflicts, in which mercenaries were often used, favored adventurers who wanted to establish their own rule based on the model of the Diadoch kings, even if only in the small framework of a single town. In the 1st century BC During the Roman rule in the Greek-speaking East there were tyrants or tyrant-like personalities as city lords. They were partly favored and partly eliminated by the Romans.
A tyrannically ruled territorial state emerged again in Sicily. There Agathokles , the son of a wealthy master craftsman, took advantage of the sharp contrast between oligarchs and democrats in his hometown of Syracuse. He began his rise as an officer, then got rich through marriage and made a name for himself as a speaker in the popular assembly on the side of the then opposition Democrats. As a regularly elected general, Agathocles led in 316/315 BC Through a coup d'etat against the ruling oligarchs. He lured the leading oligarchs into a trap and had them killed immediately.
In fact, Agathocles became a tyrant, but he made it a point not to be regarded as such. Formally, the state order was democratic. The legal basis of the rule of the new ruler was a mandate from the people's assembly: the people had elected him sole general with unlimited authority (strategós autokrátor) and “guardian of peace” and given him general “care for the state”. The power of attorney was unlimited and represented a monarchical element in the Syracuse state system. The difference between this type of state control and a tyranny of the usual style was demonstrated by Agathocles by doing without a bodyguard. Later he assumed the title of king, following the example of the diadochi, but even as king he remained formally the highest official in the community. In contrast to Dionysius I, he did not appear as an autocrat in foreign policy ; not he personally, but only the citizenry was the subject under constitutional law and contractual partner of the external enemies and allies.
With a bold policy of expansion, Agathocles continued the tradition of Dionysius I. He waged a long, costly war against the Carthaginians and brought almost the entire Greek part of Sicily and parts of Calabria into his power. While he appeared in Syracuse as a citizen of an autonomous community, he ruled outside the capital as an absolute monarch and treated the areas he conquered as his private property. He did not succeed in founding a dynasty, however; it failed because of a dispute in his family. After his death in 289 BC His empire dissolved, and the cities that were subject to him made themselves independent.
The necessity of a tight consolidation of the Greek forces for the fight against the Carthaginians and the Mamertines further favored the monarchical principle and the political and military leadership of the Greek cities through Syracuse. A Syracuse officer named Hieron was able to defend himself in 275/274 BC. Chr. With his troops - mostly mercenaries - take possession of his hometown and establish a new tyranny. The citizenry legalized the coup by electing Hieron as the sole authorized commander in chief of the armed forces. This also gave him command of the troops of the Sicilian cities allied with Syracuse. After military successes in the war against the Mamertines, Hieron settled in 269 BC. Proclaim from the army to be king. As such, he also ruled unreservedly over the formerly formally autonomous cities. Hieron ruled until his death in 215 BC. BC and founded a new dynasty, which came to an end in the year after his death with the murder of his hated young grandson and successor Jerome. The citizens of Syracuse viewed kingship as a tyranny, and the hatred of the dynasty was so great that after the overthrow all members of the ruling family who could be caught were killed. With that the empire broke apart.
Features of the younger tyranny
The distinction between “older” and “younger” tyranny is modern, there is no such separation in the sources. It has its reason both in the almost tyrantless interim period, which lasted more than half a century, and in the difference in social and political conditions. The conflicts over the older tyranny were largely shaped by the values and norms of a conservative aristocratic world, with the tyrants being attacked as violators of the traditional order. In the time of the younger tyranny, another factor came to the fore: the social and political contradictions in the citizenships of the Greek city-states. The tyrants no longer came exclusively from the noble families as they had previously; climbers could also become sole rulers.
In the autonomous cities there had been a leveling of class differences, the citizenships had gained considerable self-confidence and the people demanded political participation. Democratic and oligarchic forces were constantly fighting against each other. Potential autocrats were perceived as opponents by both democrats and oligarchs and were viewed with suspicion. The opposition between the aspirants of tyranny and the oligarchs was usually sharper than that between the masses of the people, who tended to be democratic, because the oligarchs were the ones who had the most to lose in establishing a tyranny. Disadvantaged broader strata, on the other hand, could in some cases benefit from favorable economic conditions under the regime of an autocratic ruler. Moreover, if the oligarchy were eliminated, they could hope for an alleviation of the often blatant economic inequality. For this reason, demagogues striving for tyranny often stylized themselves as champions of popular interests against an oligarchic clique. After a successful takeover, they then proceeded with massive repression against the oligarchs. But it also happened that tyrants, who had been installed by foreign powers and had little support from the urban population, followed a relatively oligarch-friendly course.
Popular with the popular masses was the demand for a new division of the land, which was gladly taken up by demagogic aspirants of tyranny. But there is no known case in which a tyrant has kept such a promise after taking power. In some cities, important assets of the disempowered oligarchs were confiscated and distributed among important supporters of the tyrant. As the nouveau riche they became part of the upper class. They were just as hated by the mass of the poor as the oligarchic rich ruling before the overthrow.
Ancient representations, analyzes and evaluations
In the sources of up to about 500 BC During the archaic period there are different assessments of tyranny. The ambivalence of tyranny is evident in the main characteristics that are associated with it: on the one hand, an immense wealth, luxury, fame and the favor of the gods, on the other hand, unrestrained lust for power and possession. The intensification of power associated with the tyrannical autocracy was perceived as novel and rejected by conservative circles. These demanded reflection on the values of an aristocratic past on which their counter-concept was based.
The term tyranny is first documented by Archilochus , a poet of the 7th century BC. Archilochus put disparaging words into the mouth of the craftsman Charon: "I don't care about the possessions of the gold-rich Gyges, I have never been envious, and I am not angry about the work of the gods, I do not wish for great tyranny." The poet's distancing presupposes that tyranny was generally considered desirable at the time. Another poem by Archilochus, which has only survived in fragments, speaks of the great fame associated with sole rule; whoever is in tyranny will "be the envy of many people". Here a woman is addressed, apparently the wife of the Lydian usurper Gyges, who was previously married to his murdered predecessor. With Archilochos, a later common theme is in the foreground: the connection of the fame and fortune of the tyrant with envy and resentment.
With the poet Alkaios , who in the early 6th century BC Chr., There is talk of autocracy in a clearly negative sense: "Tyrant" is a battle word against a political opponent. The aristocratic poet complains that the "tyrant" Pittakos in Mytilene seized power amid the cheers of the population and achieved the long-awaited fame. According to this representation, Pittakos defied the aristocratic norm when he came to power and now “devours” the community. His rule has no purpose but itself.
The Athenian statesman and poet Solon , who in the early 6th century B.C. Was active, dealt in his poetry with the problem of autocracy, which he viewed as a serious threat to the community. Characteristics of the tyrants are insatiable greed and outrageous arrogance. Solon turned against his aristocratic comrades who dreamed of tyranny and despised him because, as the leading statesman of Athens, he did not seize unlimited power. According to his description, they considered him foolish and discouraged because he did not use his chance when he had already caught the "prey" but did not close the net. Solon put the words in the mouth of such an ambitious nobleman: “If I had gained power and immeasurable wealth, and had ruled the Athenians as a tyrant for only one day, then I would accept that my skin would be pulled over my ears afterwards and my sex will be wiped out. "
In some poems of the "Corpus Theognideum", the collection of poems handed down under the name of Theognis von Megara , violent criticism of "the bad" is made. This means nobles who, from a conservative point of view, disregard the traditional norms of aristocratic class ethics. They are accused here of their lust for power and corruption corrupting the people and disrupting the state. Their excesses lead to violent party fighting and tyranny. A state ruined by such evildoers is like - according to the poet - a ship whose good helmsman has been removed and which is then swallowed up by a wave - tyranny. The "people-devouring" tyrant is a monster who must be eliminated by all means. In the opinion of the poet, one can kill him as long as one is not bound to him by an oath of loyalty. Here, for the first time in literary tradition, the conviction is expressed that tyrannicide is legitimate under divine law.
The poet and philosopher Xenophanes also identified himself as an opponent of the "hated tyranny". He indicated that the tyranny in his hometown of Colophon was a result of the decadence of his fellow citizens, who “learned the useless vanities from the Lydians”. The poet Simonides von Keos , who lived around the tyrant Hipparchus in Athens in the late 6th century , took a different perspective . He took it for granted that the position of tyrant should be highly enviable and desirable.
In the "classical" heyday of Greek culture, which began in the early 5th century BC Until the beginning of Hellenism in the late 4th century BC. Lasted, a very negative assessment of tyranny prevailed in Greece. The influence of the culturally leading and for a long time also politically dominant great power Athens was decisive. Since the fall of the Peisistratides, public opinion there has been decidedly anti-tyrant. A passionate hatred of tyrants asserted itself in the democratically-minded urban population. Athenian rhetors , dramatists and philosophers condemned despotic arbitrariness and servitude of the citizens. In practice, however, the emphatic rejection of tyranny was largely limited to the national system. The need for “freedom” in one's own state did not rule out good relations with foreign tyrants, and despotic rule was considered appropriate for non-Greek, “barbaric” peoples, as they were slavish. In addition, the Greeks of the classical period did not perceive all known tyrants as monsters. The archaic monarch Pittakos of Mytilene, whom his opponents considered a tyrant, was counted by posterity among the " Seven Wise Men ", a group of personalities from the "good old days" who were considered astute advisors and authors of wise rules of life and were held in high regard enjoyed. There was still considerable fascination with the fame that a successful ruler could achieve.
A main element of the criticism of tyrants was the accusation of hubris , presumptuousness and arrogant self-overestimation and delusion, which was seen as a result of possessing absolute power. The tyrant was seen as a prisoner of his own hubris, which separates him from society and arouses the hatred to which he ultimately falls victim.
Since the fall of the Peisistratid dynasty, the murder of Peisistratos' son Hipparchus has been glorified in Athens as an act of liberation. It was overlooked that the two murderers, Harmodios and Aristogeiton , had acted primarily for personal motives and the political goal had been secondary to them. The fame of the "liberators" was not diminished by the fact that they had by no means eliminated the tyranny, because the surviving tyrant Hippias had continued to rule after their attack. The two assassins were stylized as exemplary freedom fighters and honored posthumously by the state, especially by erecting statues on the agora . For posterity, their act became the model of commendable tyrannicide; in Athens, which had become democratic, she was counted among the city's most important heroes and benefactors. The Scolia , in which they were famous, testify to their popularity . They were depicted on vases and coins; the vase pictures show the two men partly during the assassination attempt. In the 4th century BC The descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton enjoyed special, prestigious state privileges.
After the end of the Peisistratiden rule in Athens the broken court was introduced and 488/487 BC. First applied. It was based on the legal provision that the people's assembly had to decide every year whether there was one among the citizens who could be trusted to intend to become a tyrant. If necessary, this citizen was then banned for ten years. Voting was done with pottery shards; each voter wrote on a piece of glass the name of the man he suspected. The person with the highest number of votes was then banished if the quorum of 6,000 votes was reached. Since the suspect could not be proven and he was only banished on suspicion, it was not a punishment, but a precautionary measure. Concrete steps to establish a tyranny, however, were considered a criminal offense. One of these charges was called tyrannídos graphḗ ("written charge of tyranny"). If a defendant was found guilty, not only he himself, but also his descendants fell into atimia , that is, they were deprived of the protection of the law, and anyone could kill them with impunity. The defense was later made a general duty: after a popular resolution of 410 BC. Every citizen had to take an oath to kill everyone who rose to the status of a tyrant or who aided in such an undertaking, and everyone who held an office under a tyrant when the opportunity arose. One calls this oath after the author of the popular resolution the "oath of demophantos". Every popular assembly began with a curse on potential tyrants. Another law to prevent tyranny, the "Eucrates Law", was passed by the Athenians in 336 BC. A.
Despite the democratic sentiments and intense hostility to tyrants of the Athenians, the city of Athens itself became in the 5th century BC. Chr. In a figurative sense referred to as "tyrant" because they exercise a compulsory rule over other city-states. Not only did foreign critics accuse this, but also the democratic Athenian politicians Pericles and Kleon spoke openly of the tyrannical rule of Athens over its allies.
The famous poet Pindar , who wrote himself 476–475 / 474 BC. Chr. Stayed in Sicily, celebrated the wealth, luck and fame of the tyrants there and praised them for those deeds he found laudable. Although he denounced the arbitrariness and cruelty of the long dead ruler Phalaris, the question of the legitimacy of a tyranny did not arise for him. In his home country Thebes, his attitude earned him the charge of being tyrannical.
Character traits of the “typical” tyrant were in the foreground on the theater stage: arrogance, fearfulness, lack of self-control, greed and infidelity.
Aeschylus , the first of the three most famous Greek tragedy poets , presented 458 BC. BC depicts the mythical king Aigisthus in his Oresty , who murdered his predecessor Agamemnon and usurped his throne, as a model of a tyrant. This dramatic figure shows the characteristic traits that belong to the tyrant image of the classical period. Aigisthos is presumptuous and despotic on the one hand, and cowardly on the other. The chorus, which expresses the poet's opinion, expresses his conviction that tyranny is unbearable and that it is better to die than to endure it. In the tragedy The Fettered Prometheus , attributed to Aeschylus, Zeus , the father of the gods, is portrayed as a tyrant with the typical characteristics of such a man.
Tyrannical sentiments are also an important theme in Sophocles' tragedies . It is a haughty attitude and overconfidence that is associated with delusion, for example in King Creon in the tragedy Antigone . Creon is a legitimate monarch, but falls into tyrannical arrogance when pursuing a legitimate concern, is afraid of the continuation of his rule and treats the state as his property. The life of such a ruler, marked by fear and mistrust, is not desirable from Sophocles' point of view.
Euripides also painted a dark tyrant picture. He was particularly interested in the psychological characterization of the tyrant personality, emphasizing their unconditional will to power. According to his account, the life of a tyrant is outwardly brilliant, but sorrowful and filled with fear and worry. However, Euripides did not rule out the possibility of a good tyrant.
The comedy poet Aristophanes mocked what he saw as the exaggerated fear of the Athenians of the establishment of a new tyranny and made fun of the cult that was practiced with the famous murderers of tyrants.
Herodotus' work of history , completed in the late 5th century, is the main source of the older tyranny. The historian brought together a wealth of news and often anecdotal stories, some of which have fabulous features. In principle, Herodotus rejected tyranny; he often emphasized the great value of freedom. However, he sometimes showed admiration for the drive, boldness and success of individual tyrants. For Herodotus, central aspects of unrestricted ruling power are the associated lawlessness and the lack of accountability, which inevitably spoil the character of the ruler. Tyranny also has a corrupting effect on the morality of the community.
Thucydides , who at the beginning of the 4th century BC BC completed his historical work, judged soberly about the tyranny. He pointed to the motives of greed and lust for fame, but approved of the Peisistratides efficiency ( aretḗ ) and cleverness. Thucydides suspected the cause of the emergence of tyranny as a historical phenomenon in the boom in the economy and the resulting increase in state income. He also assumed a connection with the turn to seafaring. Yet he did not see tyranny as a dynamic factor. Rather, he believed that the tyrants' primary concern was their personal well-being; hence their aversion to risk prevented them from undertaking significant deeds and caused conditions to stagnate. A particular concern of Thucydides was the thorough debunking of the Athenian tyrannicide myth. According to his account, the murder of Hipparchus was committed for a questionable private motive and politically only worsened the situation.
Sophistry and philosophy
In sophistry , a controversial but influential educational movement of the 5th century, tyranny was viewed from a new angle. Among the sophists, the view was widespread that social norms and laws were arbitrary determinations made by people without being based on objective circumstances. This removed the basis of the common criticism of tyranny that it violated the nomos , a system of traditional behavioral and legal norms considered sacrosanct. In this sense - if Plato's account is correct - the sophist Thrasymachus expressed himself . He saw no reason to consider tyranny to be in principle worse than other forms of government, because every state order and legislation only serves the interests of the respective rulers. Although tyranny is unjust, it enables the unjust ruler to achieve his goal in life, the attainment of the highest happiness ( eudaimonia ). - The noble Athenian Callicles , who was influenced by sophistic ideas and whose worldview is only known from Plato's dialogue with Gorgias , achieved a radical reevaluation of the generally recognized values . Callicles glorified tyranny because it was the expression of the natural claim of the strong - and thus the better - to rule over the mass of the weak. The democratic state based on the rule of law is based on the unnatural idea of the equality of citizens and disregards the natural master's right of the stronger and more able.
The writer Xenophon , a companion and admirer of the philosopher Socrates , reports on the definition of the tyranny that Socrates gave. According to his rendering of the Socratic conception, the difference between kingship and tyranny is that kingship is in accordance with the will of the people and the laws of the state, while a tyrant rules against the will of the people, illegally and arbitrarily. In his literary dialogue Hieron Xenophon had the wise poet Simonides and the tyrant Hieron I of Syracuse discuss the question of whether a tyrant leads a more successful, admirable life than a citizen. Xenophon wanted to fight the popular belief that the tyrant is happy. In a dialogue, Hieron gives a sobering description of the burden and misery of his life, which is far more unhappy than that of a simple citizen. He points out the dire compulsions to which he is subject and expresses suicidal thoughts. For the sake of his safety, he was locked up like a prisoner, he was surrounded by enemies and found everywhere in enemy territory. He could not give up his power, however, because otherwise he would have to take responsibility for his acts such as robbery and executions. So there is no way back for him, he has gotten into a hopeless situation.
For Plato , the characteristic that marks tyranny and makes it reprehensible is the lack of understanding of the unrestricted ruler. One gains insight into what is ethically and politically correct through philosophy, which imparts the necessary basic knowledge. A tyrant does not have that. A true statesman, on the other hand, who follows philosophical principles and knowledge, governs optimally and creates an ideal state. Then there is sole rule, but no tyranny. Such a discerning sole government is superior to law-abiding, including following the best possible laws, because no set of rules can provide the best solution for every possible problem, whereas the philosophical statesman is able to do so. If a ruler has the general knowledge that enables him to always make correct decisions, then he can rightly claim to be above the law and to be independent of the consent of the ignorant ruled. Thus, such power is not necessarily bad and tyrannical. Unrestricted power is not in itself reprehensible, but only in the case of tyranny, because a ruler normally lacks the expertise and character qualifications required for his position.
Plato's judgment of tyranny was very negative. He saw in it a phenomenon of decay, a "disease" of the community that was the result of the decline of a democratically governed state. The weakness inherent in democracy, an exaggeration of the idea of freedom, ultimately leads to the opposite, total lack of freedom in a tyranny. In Dialogue Politeia , Plato described the typical development process and course of a tyrant rule from his point of view. Above all, he dealt with the temperament and character of the ruler. The latter presume to rule over others without being master of himself. The tyrannical man has become a wolf. His soul is completely dominated by bad and wild desires and fear; their condition corresponds to that of the state he ruled. The tyrant lived as if in a frenzy and demanded unlimited satisfaction of his desires. He obtained the financial means necessary for his way of life by robbing his subjects. Since his helpers are also inevitably bad people, he cannot have real friends, but is only surrounded by insincere flatterers. His slavish dependence on his harmful desires makes him extremely unfree, and his insatiability always leaves him unsatisfied. Therefore, the tyrant is not only the worst and most hated, but also the most unhappy person. With this assessment, Plato turned against the conventional, popular opinion that the tyrant is a particularly happy person. He was not alone in this; the question of whether a tyrant was happier than his subjects occupied the educated at the time and was usually answered in the negative by them.
Despite his devastating analysis of tyranny, Plato found it conceivable that a tyrant, under the influence of a philosopher, could convert himself to good and open himself to philosophical instruction. Then such a good-willed ruler could even become a philosopher himself and realize an ideal state under the guidance of his teacher, because his abundance of power gave him the opportunity to do so. In vain tried Plato himself to take on the role of the philosophical adviser to tyrants. He traveled to Sicily in order to influence the Syracusian ruler Dionysius II in the spirit of his ideal of philosophical rule, but failed because of the circumstances at the tyrant's court.
Aristotle treated tyranny in his theory of the state. He condemned it as a state contrary to nature and, like Plato, regarded it as a phenomenon of decay. However, he rejected Plato's model; He thought it was too schematic and said that it did not do justice to the variety of phenomena, because tyranny did not only result from the decline of a democracy, but could also arise from the corruption of a kingship or an oligarchy. As a breeding ground for the emergence of a tyranny, Aristotle identified the antagonism, which results from a great social inequality and is incompatible with a political community consciousness of the citizens.
Aristotle regarded not only the sole rule of a despot but also oppression by a collective as a tyranny. He said that an extreme oligarchy or democracy is also a form of tyranny. The hereditary kingship with some non-Greek peoples is legal, but despotic and in this respect similar to the Greek tyranny.
According to the constitutional doctrine of Aristotle, tyranny is the worst of all forms of government and unacceptable to the free. It combines the evils of oligarchy and democracy: the greed for money, the mistrust and the anti-popular attitude of the oligarchs and the hostility of the egalitarian democrats towards outstanding fellow citizens. A ruler is to be described as a tyrant if he rules without accountability and without the consent of the people and exercises his power for his own benefit and not for the benefit of the ruled. Aristotle did not call the subjects of such a ruler "citizens" but "ruled" or "residents". He saw the difference to royalty in the fact that the king strives for high esteem, the tyrant for wealth and lust, and that the king's bodyguard consists of citizens and that of the tyrant of mercenaries. According to the Aristotelian doctrine, it is characteristic of tyranny that the conditions in a domestic community, in which the head of the family rules unconditionally and the house slaves obey, are transferred to the coexistence of rulers and rulers in the state. Man, who is by nature a political being, is prevented from participating in politics as a citizen and thus from realizing what he is supposed to be according to his disposition.
Aristotle listed a number of measures a tyrant could use to secure his position. These include the elimination of possible rivals, the suppression of community-building initiatives and activities, intimidation by a spy system, the creation of personal hostility and social tensions, the targeted impoverishment of the population through tax pressure and through the mobilization of resources for major projects and military confrontation with foreign enemies. Among the destructive effects of the tyrannical repression, Aristotle considered particularly serious that it also seriously harmed privacy. It destroys trust and friendship among people, makes them strangers to one another and thus robs them of decisive dimensions of being human. Aristotle saw the aim of the tyrant in the demoralization and stunting of individuals and the disintegration of society, whose cohesion would be destroyed by his measures.
Aristotle saw a common feature of tyranny and democracy in the fact that both flatterers were held in high esteem. The demagogue is a flatterer of the people who want to be “sole ruler”, and thus corresponds to the creeps who flatter the tyrants.
The model-like description of the domination strategies of tyrants in Aristotle partly does not correspond to the empirical findings that result from the other sources; "Totalitarian" interventions to this extent by historical Greek tyrants are not known.
Despite his fundamental rejection of tyranny, Aristotle put together a series of pieces of advice for tyrants on how they could soften their tyranny and thereby gain acceptance. Through moderation, voluntary self-restraint, prudent action and a dignified demeanor, a tyrant can approximate his image in public to that of a respected king. It should also give the impression of piety and martial prowess. It is particularly important to avoid dishonorable humiliation, because the need for revenge of honorable humiliated people is a great danger for the tyrant. The rulers should carry out honors themselves, but punishments should be carried out by officials and the courts.
Aristotle also went into more detail about the elimination of tyranny. It is usually overthrown either by the intervention of foreign powers or by quarrels within the ruling clan or by an attack. Frequent motives for assassinations are anger, hatred, contempt and fear of punishment; only rarely is the desire for fame the motivation. Most of the time, the attackers want revenge, not the need to gain power themselves. The heirs of the founders of tyrant dynasties are lacking in authority because they have achieved nothing; Their low reputation offers an incentive to get rid of them. It is noticeable that Aristotle only cites personal motives for murdering a tyrant. He apparently did not take into account superpersonal goals such as the desire for freedom of the community.
Hellenism, Roman Republic and Roman Imperial Era
General judgment on tyranny
In the Greek-speaking world, during the epoch of Hellenism, the moral concept of tyrant, which had prevailed in the classical period, dominated over the political and constitutional concept. A tyrant was described as someone who, as a ruler, behaved in a way that corresponded to the common ideas of despotic arbitrary rule. The constitutional position did not matter. The image of tyrants was mainly shaped by the traditions of those in power from a distant past. In terms of details, it corresponded to the typology that had developed in the classical period. It was widely believed that tyrants were inhuman monsters, indecent and uneducated, unscrupulous and hateful.
Fear of a tyrannical usurpation is testified by an inscribed law of the democratically ruled city of Ilion in Asia Minor from the early 3rd century BC. The drastic provisions that were made there reveal a passionate hatred of tyrants. The city, which had had bad experiences with the tyranny, introduced strong incentives with the law to prevent or eliminate a new autocracy. In particular, the inscription contains detailed information about the reward and honor of tyrant murderers. The punishment of those who participated in the repression under a tyrant was precisely defined. In particular, officials who had enriched themselves at the expense of citizens should be held accountable. Anyone who was jointly responsible for the execution of a citizen under the dictatorship had to be regarded as a murderer. But if a tyrant's helpers overthrew him, they were promised not only impunity for participating in the tyranny, but also a financial reward of a talent in silver for each of them.
The Latin loan word tyrannus was used in political polemics by the Romans of the late Republican period . This branded opponents who were presumed to disregard the applicable law and wanted to gain an illegitimate exceptional position. Such criticism was directed primarily against Caesar . Therefore, his murder was considered a tyrannicide and thus a glorious act in republican-minded circles. In the case of educated Romans, the hostility to tyrants they borrowed from Greek literature was combined with the traditional Roman hatred of the monarchy that was ingrained throughout the people. The loathing of the monarchy was nourished by the legendary tradition of despotism in the distant prehistoric times of Roman royalty. “King” and “tyrant” were therefore not - as for the Greeks - opposing, but similar or identical terms for the majority of the Romans in the republican era.
The traditional condemnation of tyranny continued in the literature of the Roman Empire. Since the Roman Empire was finally transformed into a monarchical state, the political and constitutional aspect of the republican criticism of tyranny had lost its relevance; the imperial discourse revolved around moral considerations. The intellectual confrontation with the repression under an arbitrary rule in view of the despotism of individual emperors repeatedly received a relevance. Until late antiquity , the morally determined typology of the tyrant remained largely constant. A remnant of the constitutional concept of tyranny was shown in the fact that late antique sources referred to unsuccessful counter-emperors who could not prevail in the power struggle as tyrants in order to identify them as usurpers .
It has often been said that a tyrant is not only vicious, but also cowardly and fearful and does not tolerate hardship. He indulged in luxury and had fallen into a cruelty-associated softness. The popular notion that he would also commit sex crimes fit into this picture. Another topos was that the tyrant lived in constant fear of assassins and hated him everywhere; therefore no one is more unhappy than him. The widespread abhorrence of tyranny was combined with a high degree of appreciation for the violent removal of a tyrant in both the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. Timoleon's participation in the conspiracy to murder his brother by tyrant appeared to his biographers Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch as praiseworthy.
Historiography and State Theory
A number of works by Hellenistic historians that dealt extensively with tyranny or individual tyrants have not been preserved or have only survived in fragments. The histories of Timaeus of Tauromenion , a history of Magna Graecia up to the death of Agathocles, had a strong impact in later historiography . The aristocratically minded Timaeus hated tyranny and painted a very negative picture of the Sicilian tyrants, with the exception of Gelon. A sharp critic of tyranny was also the historian Polybius , who in the 2nd century BC. Chr. Wrote his histories . He found that the very word "tyrant" encompassed all human shamefulness. Anyone who kills a tyrant will receive recognition and honor from all those who understand. Polybius included tyranny in his theory of the cycle of different constitutions that replaced one another as a phenomenon of decay of the hereditary kingship, but also as a product of a degenerate democracy in which the masses submit to a ruler.
The Roman politician and state theorist Marcus Tullius Cicero was fundamentally critical of the monarchy, because he was of the opinion that a just royal rule could always turn into an unjust tyrannical one. The separation of powers in the mixed constitution of the Roman Republic serves to prevent this danger . In its 51 BC When he completed the state-theoretical work De re publica and in the ethics treatise De officiis , Cicero resorted to violent polemics. He described the tyrant as the most hideous, disgusting, gods and people most hated of all living things. Since such a person does not want a legal community for himself with his own fellow citizens and with humanity as a whole and rejects any kind of humanity, he cannot actually be called human. Although it has a human form, its inhumanity makes it worse than the most terrible beasts. There is no communion between the despot and humanity, rather a complete lack of relationship, and it is honorable to kill him. Of all glorious deeds, the killing of a tyrant is the most beautiful. Cicero derived their justification from natural law . He not only referred to the dictator Caesar as a tyrant, but also other political opponents such as Publius Clodius Pulcher , whose murder he wanted to justify as a tyrannicide.
Rhetoric, fictional and popular philosophical literature
The Hellenistic and imperial schools of philosophy and philosophical currents unanimously condemned tyranny. For the Platonists and Aristotelians , the relevant statements of their school founders were groundbreaking. The Cynics cultivated the ideal of the inwardly free, wise philosopher who does not allow himself to be intimidated and who confronts any ruler with confidence. The Stoics particularly stood out when denouncing despotism . Legendary portrayals of the confrontation of an evil tyrant with a fearless, intellectually superior philosopher were popular. It was said that the pre-Socratic Zenon von Elea was arrested as a conspirator and then bit off his tongue during interrogation and spat it in the face of the perpetrator. The motif of the bitten off tongue also appears in other tyrant stories; in one of them the Pythagorean Timycha is the heroine. It was known from the 4th century BC. Tale from the Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias , who proved themselves brilliantly when the tyrant of Syracuse put their friendship to the test. In the legendary biography of the philosopher Apollonios of Tyana , which Flavius Philostratos wrote in the 3rd century, Emperor Domitian is the tyrant whom the philosopher competently resists. In popular philosophical literature, the despots' fear of the intellectual superiority of the philosophers was incorporated into the character image of the typical tyrant.
The most important sources for the stoic point of view are the works of the Stoic Seneca († 65), who not only expressed his view as a philosopher, but also as a stage poet. In his philosophical writings he characterized the tyrant as a slave to passions, a robber and a ravenous beast, and in several tragedies he presented the public with the horror of individual mythical despots. In Seneca's opinion, murdering a tyrant is a boon for the murdered person, because for him death, which prevents him from further crimes, is a cure.
The unknown author of the drama Octavia also wanted to denounce the tyranny . He represented the emperor Nero as a bloodthirsty monster in the sense of the common image of tyrants. In his epic De bello civili, the poet Lukan († 65) endowed Caesar with tyrant characteristics. Lukan's Caesar portrait was created under the impression of Nero's hated arbitrariness.
The rule of tyrants was a popular topic in imperial rhetoric . In the 2nd century politicians who were unpopular in Greek-speaking countries were rhetorically vilified as "tyrants". The speaker Dion Chrysostom , who presented the two forms of government as allegorical female figures, offered an effective portrayal of the contrast between royalty and tyranny . Dion Chrysostom vividly described the tyrant's unhappy state of mind. Only death can redeem the ruler from his misery.
Speech exercises on tyranny and tyrannicide played a major role in rhetoric lessons during the imperial era, although this subject was politically sensitive in principle . The justification of the murder was about depicting the despot's wickedness in an “exaggerated manner of speaking” in order to impress the audience. In declamations , the rhetoricians practiced the art of court speech by discussing fictitious disputes, which were mostly connected with the pursuit of tyranny or with its overthrow, in particular with the murder of tyrants and their reward.
The rhetorician and satirical writer Lukian of Samosata created original literary adaptations of the material in the 2nd century . His witty, bitingly mocking underworld dialogue Die Niederfahrt or Der Tyrann is about the experiences of the murdered tyrant Megapenthes ("Wretched Realm"), who shows his usual arrogance and lust for power on the crossing into the realm of the dead . After a failed attempt to escape, Megapenthes has to start the journey across the Styx River into the realm of the dead. He desperately tries to buy a temporary return to his earthly kingdom through bribery, because he absolutely wants to finish his plans there. The goddess of fate, Klotho , refuses this wish, but lets him know what will become of his previous sphere of influence. He must now learn that posterity will condemn him; his statues will be smashed, his son has already been murdered and his worst enemy has seized power and appropriated his possessions and his daughter. - Lukian illuminates tyranny from a different, unusual perspective in a rhetorical-satirical work, the Phalaris speech . It is a fictional self-portrayal of the tyrant Phalaris von Akragas, notorious for his cruelty. Envoys of this tyrant bring his legendary torture system, the " Bull of Phalaris ", as a consecration gift to Delphi and there, on behalf of their master, give the speech that explains his point of view. Here the despot appears as a benevolent ruler who was forced to seize power in order to forestall the criminal plans of his enemies and to save the state. He punishes punishments with deep regret under the coercion of circumstances, and in view of the wickedness of his opponents, the death sentences are fair. As a benign, sensitive person, Phalaris suffers more than the punished when he has to punish. He would rather die himself than have someone wrongly executed. - In addition, Lukian wrote the declamation Der Tyrannenmörder , a fictional court case that the murderer makes to justify his claim to the reward.
The unknown author of the fictional Phalaris letters also lets the tyrants of Akragas have their say. Here Phalaris claims that he is reluctant to rule, would rather be a subject than a tyrant, and suffer badly from his bad reputation. But he had to submit to the fate that the tyrant role had intended for him. Unfortunately, his serious endeavors for friendship had repeatedly been disappointed.
As with the non-Christian authors of the imperial era, moral considerations were in the foreground among the ancient church writers. On the one hand, the Christians condemned the immorality of an injustice regime, on the other hand they saw themselves bound by the emphatic admonition of the apostle Paul that every government was appointed by God and therefore had a right to obedience ( Rom. 13 : 1-7 EU ). In the 3rd century the church writer Origen approved conspiracies for the purpose of eliminating a usurper. The very influential late antique church father Augustine defined in his main work De civitate dei the tyrant following Cicero as an unjust king and declared that the tyrants were "very bad and nefarious kings". In making these statements, he was guided by purely moral considerations. Only in the smaller treatise De bono coniugali did Augustine address the legal side. There he casually characterized tyranny as a perversion which, because of its illegality, deserves no praise even when a usurper treats his subjects mildly. The principle of legality also applies to a legitimate royal rule; their legality is not objectionable even if the king raged with tyrannical cruelty.
The Christian emperor Nero, who was abhorred because of his persecution of Christians , was the model of a tyrant in the moral sense . However, Augustine recalled that rulers like Nero had been given state control by God's providence. This happened whenever God, in view of the conditions among people, had decided that they deserved tyranny.
In the 5th century, the church historian Sozomenos reported the death of the pagan emperor Julian , who was hated by Christians. Julian had died by throwing a spear in a battle against the Persians. According to tradition, it was not a Persian but a Christian Roman soldier who threw the spear. Sozomenos remarked that this soldier probably acted on the model of the famous Greek murderers of tyrants. He has done a courageous act that deserves no blame.
Medieval and early modern reception
Early and High Middle Ages
In the Latin-speaking world of scholars of the early and high Middle Ages , the authoritative state-theoretical works of antiquity, in particular the politics of Aristotle, were unknown. The relevant statements of Augustine were groundbreaking for the reception of tyranny. In the early 7th century, the scholar Isidore of Seville, in his encyclopedia Etymologiae, adopted Augustine's statement that tyrants are the very bad and nefarious kings. He cited debauchery and cruelty as characteristics of tyrannus . The Etymologiae became one of the most important handbooks of the Middle Ages. Thus the concept of moral tyrant became very popular. Pope Gregory the Great wrote in the late 6th century: "In the real sense, the tyrant is called who exercises rule in the community in disregard of the law (non iure) ." This sentence was often quoted in the Middle Ages.
Jonas von Orléans, in his prince mirror, probably written in 831, determined the tyrant as an impious, unjust and cruel ruler. This definition is also in the files of several Franconian synods of the 9th century. Hinkmar von Reims wrote that a ruler could become a tyrant without gentleness, patience and true love; in any case, without these qualities he would lack the qualification to be a king.
The question of whether resistance against a tyrannical ruler was legitimate was judged differently. From the biblical idea emphasized by Augustine that every existing rule is willed by God, the fundamental denial of a right of resistance can be derived. This position was represented, for example, in the early 12th century by the monk Hugo von Fleury , who believed that one must endure all the misdeeds of a tyrant. However, some writers, including important popes, disagreed. In 864 Pope Nicholas I stated that those in power who do not rule “according to the law” (iure) are more likely to be tyrants than kings. They should be resisted (resistere) . In the 11th century the charge of tyranny was common; Pope Gregory VII raised him against King Philip I of France and above all against Henry IV , who, as a tyrant, had forfeited his right to the dignity of the king. A staunch supporter of the impeachment of tyrannical rulers was the scholar Manegold von Lautenbach , who emerged as a journalistic opponent of Henry IV in the investiture controversy. He argued that the people had raised a king above them not to give him an opportunity to be tyrannical but to protect them from the tyranny of others. Therefore, the king should be deposed if he develops into a tyrant who acts with extreme cruelty against his subjects.
The subject became more topical when Roger II of Sicily was crowned king in 1130 and thus founded a new kingdom after he had previously ruled the island as a count. His opponent Bernhard von Clairvaux reviled him as a tyrant. The historian Otto von Freising also represented this assessment , who in his world chronicle presented Roger's government as a renewal of ancient tyranny; the current ruler commits his cruel deeds along the lines of the Sicilian tyrants of antiquity.
The English scholar John of Salisbury was the first medieval state theorist to discuss in detail the question of the justification of tyrannicide. In doing so, he took up Cicero's considerations. In his 1159 completed treatise Policraticus , which is mainly devoted to the subject of the abuse of power, the chilling fate of Roman and biblical "tyrants" are cited. For John, a tyrant is the one who abolishes “the laws” - what is meant is justice in a natural legal sense. This can be a usurper or a legitimate, but morally bad prince. In John's words, it is not only permissible but also just to kill such an unjust ruler. It is even an ethical duty to take action against him. The tyrant has committed a majesty crime against the law to which he is subject and thus removed himself from the legal order. With the thesis that the tyrant is an enemy of the general public, John resorted to the ancient Roman concept of the public enemy, the hostis publicus . However, he emphasized that people who had sworn to be loyal to the ruler should not break the oath. In this way he effectively restricted the possibility of eliminating a tyrant, because in the feudal medieval social order the greats who were considered for violent action against the king were usually bound to him by an oath. In addition, given the danger that his position could be interpreted as encouraging poisoning, conspiracy, and rioting, John seems to have shied away from the consequences of his boldness, for he recommended prayer for God's intervention as a superior alternative to tyrannicide. The contradictory nature of his statements has led to different interpretations in modern research. In contrast, Johannes' younger contemporary Giraldus Cambrensis took a clear position in favor of tyrannicide; this is an honorable and rewarding act.
In the Byzantine Empire , the state-theoretical discussion of tyranny received little attention. In the second half of the 11th century, Archbishop Theophylact of Ohrid expressed himself in detail in his Paideía basilikḗ ( Education for Princes ) , a pamphlet for his pupil, the future Emperor Constantine X. Theophylact painted a gloomy picture of the tyrant based on the platitudes of ancient criticism in the tyranny.
Late Middle Ages and Early Renaissance
In the 13th century, previously unknown writings by Aristotle on ethics and politics became available to Western scholars; the Nicomachean ethics were available in Latin translation from 1246/1247, politics from around 1260/1265. These works by the ancient philosopher became authoritative textbooks in university teaching. They shaped the scientific occupation of late medieval scholastics with questions of state theory. The relevant explanations of Aristotle gained a decisive influence on the development of the tyrannical discourse. The Aristotelian thesis that a tyrant differs from a right-wing king in that he is only concerned about his personal well-being and not about the common good, became the starting point of many debates on this topic.
Stories about the notorious ancient tyrants Phalaris and Dionysius I of Syracuse were known from the Facta et dicta memorabilia , a collection of "memorabilia" compiled by the ancient Roman writer Valerius Maximus . From there, such material found its way into the “Exempla” literature, the medieval collections of edifying stories, which included the Gesta Romanorum , which was widespread in the late Middle Ages . From the middle of the 15th century the collection of Phalaris letters in Latin translation was in circulation; Pseudo-Phalaris became the most printed Greek letter author. The letters were mostly believed to be authentic texts by the historical tyrant, and their thoughts on public life were dealt with.
Definition and description of tyranny
Groundbreaking was the reception of Aristotle by the leading theologian Thomas Aquinas († 1274), who expressed himself above all in his prince's mirror on kingship on tyrannical rule. Like Aristotle, Thomas considered this form of government the worst of all. In his description of their characteristics and effects, he followed the relevant explanations of Aristotle and expanded them with theological considerations. As for the definition, Thomas remarked that there is a tyranny with regard to the way in which the position is acquired, that is, from the point of view of usurpation, and one from the point of view of the abuse of a legally legitimate rule.
Aegidius Romanus dealt in detail with tyranny in his work De regimine principum , written in 1277/1279 , the most widespread medieval prince mirror. The representation in the politics of Aristotle served him as a basis . Aegidius listed ten measures with which a tyrant tries to preserve his rule and thereby seriously damage the common good. One of the main concerns of such a ruler is to keep his subjects as uneducated and unenlightened as possible, because he is afraid of educated people who can see through his worthlessness and incite the people against him. The prohibition of associations and social gatherings in which friendships could develop, which would then form a breeding ground for conspiracies, was also important to him. To secure his power he needed and encouraged suspicion and discord among the citizens. Another means of preventing conspiracies is the impoverishment of the people, because those who are preoccupied with the care of their daily bread are not in a position to devote themselves to political endeavors. In addition, the tyrant always occupies the people with the defense of external enemies and is therefore constantly in battle with foreign powers in order to distract the subjects from the oppression of his tyranny.
The lawyer Bartolus von Sassoferrato wrote a treatise on tyranny in 1355/1357. Like Thomas Aquinas, he distinguished between two types of tyrant: the usurper (tyrannus ex defectu tituli) and the tyrannically ruling legitimate ruler (tyrannus ex parte exercitii) . In addition, Bartolus added a further distinction: there is the "obvious" tyrant, whose lawlessness is clearly evident, and the "veiled", who creates a basis for himself within the framework of the applicable law through powers and conceals his true power.
The problem of resistance
In the late Middle Ages, opinions diverged widely on the question of how to deal with an existing tyranny. A moderate position took Thomas Aquinas, who took a cautious position on the right of resistance. He made a distinction between legitimate resistance to a tyrant and inadmissible riot. He asserted that the tyrant nourished discord among the people and was thus the rebel himself. Therefore, action should be taken against him, but care must be taken not to cause greater damage than that which results from maintaining the status quo. A failed attempt to overthrow the tyrant would only worsen the lot of the subjects. Thomas recommended tolerating "mild" tyranny; only when the extent of the repression became unbearable should measures be taken against it. The intervention should then be left to the responsible higher-ranking officials; Thomas probably meant the pope, the emperor or king or the liege lord of the tyrant. The subordinates of an unjust ruler have the right to be deposed only if they have elected him. If he is appointed by a higher authority, only this may intervene against him. In particular, a subject should not assume the right to kill his tyrannical but legitimately ruling oppressor.
Skepticism about resistance to a tyrannical government was widespread. Some authors made do with the hope that one could admonish the tyrant through criticism, give him good advice and thus lead him back to virtue. Warning signs that a violent overthrow threatens if the oppression is not ended should make the errant ruler realize that he must change his behavior. Among the authors who relied on admonition are Raymundus Lullus and the influential theologian Johannes Gerson .
The scholarly discourse on the theory of the state became extremely explosive at the beginning of the 14th century, when the antagonism between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV of France intensified. In this conflict, the French Dominican Johannes Quidort of Paris , a partisan of the king, described the Pope as an enemy of the state (hostis rei publicae) in 1302 . In doing so, John started from the doctrine of tyrants of Thomas Aquinas, but avoided explicitly calling the Pope a tyrant. He granted the French king the right to use force against Boniface. This then happened the following year, when the king arranged for the Pope to be imprisoned in the " Assassination attempt at Anagni " in order to force him to abdicate.
The criticism of tyranny in the power struggle between Pope John XXII was instrumentalized by the media . and Ludwig the Bavarian as well as in the simultaneous dispute between the Pope and Franciscan theologians in the poverty struggle . In these conflicts anti-pope publicists invoked the right of resistance, but without addressing the question of tyrannicide. The state theorist Marsilius of Padua , who was on Ludwig's side, took, as was customary at the time, the Aristotelian theory of the state as the starting point for his considerations. In his remarks on the legitimacy of claims to power in the Defensor Pacis , he was primarily concerned with the principle of popular sovereignty . Aristotle's statement that the tyrant lacks the approval of the people offered a starting point. According to Marsilius, the will of the people legitimizes the rule of a monarch. However, as Aristotle noted, a tyrant rules against the will and interests of the people. Therefore, a tyrannical ruling monarch himself removes the legal basis of his position, which the people either delegated to him by an act of elections or granted by implicit consent. A pope has no such legal basis from the outset, because the people have not given him any secular power. Therefore, in principle, he cannot lay claim to political decision-making power. The more a government detaches itself from the consent of its subordinates and the legal order that serves the good of the people, the more tyrannical it is. Unelected rulers are therefore problematic, because their subjects are less willing to obey and there is a tendency to abuse power. Their measures are less geared towards the common good than those of the elected leaders. Hereditary monarchs may believe that they can do injustice with impunity, while elected rulers are indebted to their voters who have trusted them because of their known virtue. For Marsilius, this is an important advantage of the elective monarchy over the hereditary monarchy . The Franciscan Wilhelm von Ockham , a bitter opponent of the Pope, also started out from the Aristotelian doctrine of tyranny. He designated John XXII. as a bloodthirsty tyrant, justifying his disobedience and resistance. According to Ockham's judgment, any claim to unrestricted power must be rejected, because the subjects thereby become slaves of the ruler, and this is incompatible with human dignity (dignitas humani generis) . According to Ockham's theory of the state, the deposition and arrest of a king by his subjects can be legitimate on the basis of natural law (ex iure naturali) .
The conflict over the right to resist gained new topicality in the early 15th century through the journalistic dispute over the political murder of Duke Ludwig von Orléans . He was murdered in Paris in 1407 at the instigation of his cousin and rival, Duke John Fearless of Burgundy. The deed was popular with the Parisian population, who viewed Ludwig as a tyrant, and viewed it as an act of liberation. The theologian Jean Petit received the order from the Burgundian side to carry out the murder before King Charles VI. to justify the murdered man's brother. To this end he gave a speech in which he accused Ludwig of high treason. Petit argued that a traitor is as such a tyrant. Anyone can kill a tyrant of his own accord, without commissioning a higher authority, and that is a meritorious act. In support of his theses, the speaker quoted Aristotle, Cicero, John of Salisbury and Thomas Aquinas. His explanations were distributed as a journalistic text by the Burgundian side.
The opposing camp then launched a counter-attack, which was carried out by Johannes Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris. Gerson emerged as the main opponent of Petits and raised sharp objections to the justification of vigilante justice. He brought the issue before the Council of Constance in order to obtain a condemnation of Petit's theses as contrary to faith. However, this request met with objections or rejection from the majority of the council participants. First there was a compromise: on July 6, 1415, the council did not reject Petit's entire teaching, but only an exaggerated version of the approval of the murder of tyrants. According to this version, declared offensive and dangerous by the council, every tyrant may be killed by any of his vassals or subjects, whereby a judicial determination of guilt is not required and even insidiousness and oath breaking are permissible. But Gerson was not satisfied with that, he demanded the condemnation of all of Petit's main theses. One of the main arguments against Petit was that he had expanded the term tyrant in such a way that any abuse of power was sufficient to establish a tyranny. As a result, everyone is allowed to commit an assassination attempt at their own discretion, and that leads to anarchy. The other side asserted, however, that the council was not competent because it was not a question of faith but a worldly problem about which one could have different opinions. This view prevailed. So Gerson failed with his request. Despite his harsh condemnation of Petit's view, Gerson did not reject tyrannicide in principle, but rather approved it under strict conditions.
The questions of whether Caesar was a tyrant and whether one should consider his murderers Cassius and Brutus as meritorious heroes of freedom or as despicable traitors were eagerly discussed in the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance . Thomas Aquinas found that Cicero had rightly approved the murder because Caesar was a usurper. Even humanists such as Giovanni Boccaccio and Poggio Bracciolini joined the view of the caesar hostile tradition. From this perspective, Cassius and Brutus appeared as benevolent patriots. But it was also widespread that their deed was a shameful betrayal of a ruler to whom Divine Providence had entrusted the government. Dante gave a boost to this assessment by placing the two Caesar murderers together with Judas Iscariot as traitors in the lowest area of hell in his commedia . Visual artists took up Dante's description; the three "arch traitors" Judas, Brutus and Cassius were depicted together on various occasions. The condemnation judgment in the Commedia was controversial. The well-known humanists Leonardo Bruni and Cristoforo Landino , who admired Brutus as the slayer of tyrants, chose the path of reinterpretation. They understood the characters "Caesar" and "Brutus" in Dante's poem as timeless literary patterns that should not be equated with historical figures. On the other hand, Dante's assessment found approval from the Florentine humanist and statesman Coluccio Salutati , who outlined his considerations in his Tractatus de tyranno , written between 1392 and 1400 . Salutati stated that Caesar was neither a usurper nor an oppressor, but rather that he had lawfully ruled and acted in the service of the state's welfare. Therefore, there is no justification for his murder. Regarding the fundamental problem of the right of resistance, Salutati stated that a usurper could kill any private person at any time. If, on the other hand, it is a question of a tyrannical but legitimate ruler, no one is authorized to take violent action against him at their own discretion. The elimination of such a tyrant must either be preceded by a judgment by the superior sovereign or, if one is lacking, by an act of will of the people. Also Cyriacus of Ancona and Guarino da Verona defended Caesar and condemned the murder of tyrants.
The thoughts of the Florentine humanist Alamanno Rinuccini (1426–1499), who followed on from Cicero's republican concept of freedom, were shaped by the tradition of the anti-monarchical love of freedom. For him, the politician Lorenzo il Magnifico , who held a position similar to a monarch in Florence, was a tyrant. Therefore, in his 1479 dialogue De libertate , Rinuccini praised the assassination attempt on Lorenzo and his brother, which the participants in the Pazzi conspiracy had carried out the previous year. He saw in the conspirators freedom fighters who should be placed alongside the classic models Brutus and Cassius.
Early modern age
In the early modern period, the debates about tyranny and tyrannicide began with the ancient definitions, descriptions and evaluations, or at least referred to the classics. In the world of the Renaissance humanists, the tyrant image of the ancient sources was decisive. The basic texts included Plato's analysis in the Politeia , the typology of forms of government in Aristotle's politics and the tyrannical criticism of Cicero's doctrine of duty in De officiis ; Cicero's main work on state theory, De re publica , was lost. In addition, another strand of tradition asserted itself, based on a biblically and theologically sound understanding of the relationship between authorities and subjects. However, in the course of the early modern period, the importance of traditional concepts declined. The fighting terms "tyrant" and "tyranny" broke away from their ancient roots, they were also used imprecisely and in a figurative sense and depoliticized. The discussions about the binding of princes to the law, about the delimitation of a legitimate rule from “tyranny” or “despotism” and about the right of resistance were increasingly shaped by the thoughts of modern state theorists. These authors put their own models in place of the ancient doctrines of state and form of government. The ancient authorities and examples continued to be cited, but took a back seat in the state-theoretical discourse.
In the 16th century the Aristotelian tradition remained alive, not to regard “unjust” rulers as princes but - regardless of their legal legitimacy - as tyrants. By this designation they were opposed to the “just” princes as their opposite. Some authors, especially the “ Monarchomachen ” (“monarch fighters”), stuck to the Aristotelian idea that there was a direct opposition between “king” and “tyrant”. However, the well-known state theorists Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Jean Bodin († 1596) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) turned against this view and terminology .
Machiavelli pleaded for the abolition of the distinction between the good "king" and the bad "tyrant". Instead, he made a distinction between inherited rule and rule newly won through efforts or luck. With the new ruler (principe nuovo) he made a subdivision into four types according to the type of ascent. In addition to examples from the recent past, he also used ancient examples such as the tyrant Agathocles. In contrast to the ancient and medieval classifications, in Machiavelli's model neither the legal legitimacy of the assumption of power nor the moral quality of the exercise of power serve as a distinguishing feature, nor is the satisfaction of the ruled a criterion; only the factual circumstances that made it possible to take office are important. Therefore, the traditional category of illegally established and / or cruelly tyranny falls away. The system does not recognize such a "bad" form of government per se. In his main work Il principe Machiavelli did not use the term "tyrant" at all, but did use it in his Discorsi . There he condemned tyranny - what is meant is a mode of government that prevents prosperity - and classified Caesar, whom he judged very negatively, among the tyrants. He was not offended by the usurpation, but by the fact that Caesar's measures had ruined state finances and the prosperity of the citizens, among other things. In the Principe, Machiavelli took up Xenophon's Hieron and the politics of Aristotle. He took a wealth of statements from these works, but used them contrary to the normative intention of the ancient authors.
Jean Bodin's system also deviates significantly from the conventional constitutional classification of ancient origin, because he refrained from contrasting the “good” forms of government with forms of decay - including tyranny - as independent types of rule. Bodin did not see a classification criterion in the quality of the exercise of power.
A firm advocate of tyrannicide was the humanist Gerolamo Cardano (1501–1576). In his treatise on tyrants and the killers of tyrants , he rejected the view that one should not kill a ruler because God would let him have his way. Against this he objected that God also created dangerous and harmful animals; just like this one may also kill a tyrant.
Thomas Hobbes as a staunch monarchist believed that the Aristotelian definition of tyranny was useless. He called for the complete abolition of the distinction between royalty and tyranny. There is no independent form of government called "tyranny", rather "tyrant" is just a polemical term used by dissatisfied subjects for an unpopular monarch. The rejection of sole rule is based only on fear of a strong government. One of the most common causes of rebellion against the monarchy is the reading of ancient anti-tyrant writings, by which unreasonable people let themselves be impressed.
The heroization of the ancient tyrant murderers was still widespread in the early modern period. It provided samples for proponents of violent resistance to refer to. In addition, there was the high reputation of antityrant ancient authors. The Scottish Protestant humanist George Buchanan took the view in 1579 in his dialogue De jure regni apud Scotos that anyone should kill an unjust ruler. This is a meritorious act that rightly receives public recognition and reward. The authorities Buchanan relied on were Cicero, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and Seneca. The combative Catholic Gulielmus Rossaeus shared this opinion from his point of view; In 1590 he found that a ruler who had converted to Protestantism was a tyrant and as such could be killed by private individuals. This can be derived from natural law, as Cicero already recognized. That was also the point of view of the brightest Greeks. In 1599, the Jesuit Juan de Mariana discussed in his treatise De rege et regis institutione the question of whether the use of armed force against a tyrant who had legitimately got into office was permissible, and after thorough investigation he answered yes under certain conditions. Mariana made a list of ancient tyrants, including Caesar, who were killed, pointing out that their killers were still in fame and reputation. This judgment of posterity is an expression of a sense inherent in human nature for the distinction between the honorable and the shameful. In England, the Republican John Milton took a stand in his writings The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649) and Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio (1651). Milton referred extensively to ancient literature, with particular reference to Cicero. He strongly advocated his conviction that the tyrant, as a wild beast and enemy of humanity, stood outside of human order and therefore deserved death.
The widely respected and admired antityrant fighters offered confirmation and encouragement not only to theorists of violent resistance, but also to assassins. Brutus, in particular, was worshiped. As early as 1476, the conspirator Girolamo Olgiati, who was involved in the murder of Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza in Milan , referred to Brutus and Cassius as models after his arrest. Olgiati's teacher, the humanist Cola de 'Montani, had inspired him to admire the ancient heroes who would have freed their homelands from tyranny. Pietro Paolo Boscoli, who was involved in a conspiracy against the Medici then ruling in Florence in 1513 , stated that his intense preoccupation with Brutus had motivated him. The most famous assassin of the Renaissance, Lorenzino de 'Medici , who murdered Duke Alessandro de' Medici in 1537 , wanted to gain fame as the new Brutus. In his justification he described Alessandro as a monster who had surpassed Nero, Caligula and the tyrant Phalaris of Akragas; he compared himself to Timoleon, the anti-tyrant.
In early modern fiction, motifs from the subject area of tyrannical oppression and the conflicts it generated were used frequently and in a variety of ways. Some authors took up ancient materials; Caesar and the disreputable Roman emperors were particularly suitable as tyrannical protagonists.
The satirist Traiano Boccalini published 1612-1613 his satire Ragguagli di Parnaso . In this work, the author describes an episode in an imaginary realm on Mount Parnassus . A crowd of early modern monarchs and princes besieged the villa of Aristotle with a large army. They want to force the thinker to withdraw from politics his definition that a ruler is a tyrant who is more interested in his personal benefit than in the common good. You don't like that this definition applies to each of them. A rushed army of poets tries in vain to rescue the besieged from danger. Only the intervention of Duke Federico da Montefeltro , a famous condottiere and patron of the arts , resolves the conflict. The Duke quickly moves the philosopher, half dead from fear, to the requested revocation. Aristotle changes his definition to the effect that the tyrants were a certain class of ancient people, of which we have lost all trace today.
Friedrich Hölderlin expressed himself enthusiastically about the tyrant murderers Harmodios and Aristogeiton. Friedrich Schiller chose in two ballads, The Ring of Polycrates (1797) and The Guarantee (1798), subjects from the ancient Greek legend of tyrants. Both poems highlight the inner loneliness of the tyrant. The couple , Damon and Phintias, are glorified in the guarantee . Damon, whom Schiller named Möros in the original version of the ballad - following the ancient handbook Genealogiae - is the noble assassin who tries in vain to murder the tyrant Dionysius in Syracuse. In the ring of Polykrates , the legendary tyrant Polykrates of Samos appears as the darling of the gods, because luck has always favored him so far. Only the oppressive premonition of his host indicates that the autocrat, who is used to success, is about to face a sudden turn of fate and a terrible end.
In modern antiquity, the older, “archaic” tyranny is the subject of intense debate. Numerous interpretations have been put forward that can be roughly divided into two directions. The older line of research sees in the tyrants the advocates of large, previously disadvantaged social groups, who demanded political participation and wanted to break the monopoly of power of an exclusive aristocratic class. According to the counter-opinion, which has received much approval in recent times, the conflicts over archaic tyranny are to be interpreted as power struggles within the aristocratic elite, in which the bourgeoisie was hardly involved; The bourgeois "middle class" had a right to political participation before the 5th century BC. Chr. Not. Another controversial question is whether the noble comrades of a tyrant basically regarded him as one of their own despite all opposition or whether the tyranny was seen as an unforgivable betrayal of the norms and interests of the nobility. - Younger tyranny as a historical phenomenon has received less attention in research. Its general systematic investigation has been neglected into the early twenty-first century, although more extensive source material is available for its time than for the older Tyrannis.
Modern research on tyranny began with the habilitation thesis that Wilhelm Drumann presented in 1812. In this study of the nature and character of Greek tyranny, Drumann put the traditional negative assessment as usurpation on a scientific basis. He defined the tyrant as a citizen who, by means of force or cunning against the will of the people, has achieved sole rule. Four decades later, Hermann Gottlob Plaß published his extensive, groundbreaking study in 1852, The Tyrannis in its two periods among the ancient Greeks . He introduced the current distinction between older and younger tyranny. According to his portrayal, the typical tyrant was a noble demagogue who, as a "friend of the people", relied on oppressed sections of the population against his own peers in order to seize power. The tyranny was hostile to tradition; Its political significance lies in the fact that it was directed against the aristocracy and thus helped democracy to break through. Some of Plaß's considerations are still relevant in more recent research. His interpretation found approval with Eduard Meyer , who said that the archaic tyrants were mostly ambitious nobles who had come up "at the head of the demos"; As a rule, they would have established their monarchy “as leaders of the popular parties in the struggle with the nobility”.
In 1898 the first volume of Jacob Burckhardt's Greek Cultural History was published posthumously. In Burckhardt's judgment, tyranny was "one of the most inevitable forms of the Greek idea of the state" and "every talented and ambitious Greek had a tyrant". The wide spread of the phenomenon proves that it must have corresponded to a "relative necessity". Burckhardt understood tyranny as the "death disease of the aristocracy". In general, the polis had absolute power over the citizens, and the tyrant did nothing more than the polis allowed himself at any time; he represented the polis “roughly like Napoleon did the revolution”.
As early as the 19th century, attempts were made to identify economic developments as the cause of the emergence of tyranny. Georg Busolt pointed to the boom in trade, shipping and industry and the introduction of coinage; In Greece, tyrannical rule first emerged "on the main trade route, on the isthmus". A strong version of the economic hypothesis was put forward by Percy N. Ure in 1922. He saw in the archaic tyrant entrepreneurs, representatives of a nouveau riche capitalist class who, after the introduction of the coinage system, would have used their dominance in trade, industry and commerce to seize political power. The origin and basis of the tyrant power is commercial. As capable businessmen, the autocratic rulers would have ensured prosperity and progress and pursued a wise policy of job creation. Ures' modernizing point of view met with rejection in the professional world, but individual ideas from his economic interpretation of the phenomenon of tyranny found supporters in later research.
In the thirties and forties of the 20th century, a favorable, and in some cases decidedly positive, assessment of the older tyranny asserted itself. The image of the statesmanlike tyrant was painted not only in the ancient studies of the Third Reich, but also in a number of publications by English-speaking researchers. He was portrayed as a far-sighted people's leader who represented the interests of the impoverished, oppressed and disenfranchised and reacted sensibly to social, economic and political crises (“people's leader theory”). According to a different approach, he was the political representative of the hoplites , a rising class of wealthy citizens who went to war as heavily armed ("hoplite theory"). Models with such evaluative evaluations were represented by Martin Persson Nilsson (1936), Malcolm MacLaren Jr. (1941) and Thomas Lenschau (1948). Fritz Schachermeyr took a National Socialist perspective , among other things in his article on Peisistratos in Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Antiquity Science (1937). He described this tyrant as a true patriot, who was "undoubtedly one of the leading figures of the Nordic kind." Peisistratos had achieved what the older tyranny had strived for in general: a “new total and representative state idea”, promotion of cultural interests by the state and economic balance.
An attempt to update the ancient concept of tyranny was made by Leo Strauss in 1948 with his monograph On Tyranny , in which he interpreted Xenophon's Hieron . There Strauss put forward the thesis that the specific character of modern dictatorships cannot be understood as long as one has not understood the elementary, “natural” form of tyranny, the ancient tyranny. The classical analysis of tyranny has a timeless validity. Therefore it is necessary to fall back on the political science of the ancient classics. In state-theoretical discourse it is legitimate to speak of tyranny in the traditional judgmental sense, although this does not meet the requirement of scientific freedom from values. However, this thesis met with the contradiction of Eric Voegelin and Alexandre Kojève . Voegelin complained that the classic ancient concept of tyranny was too narrow. It could not do justice to the phenomenon of " Caesarism ", which appeared after the final collapse of a republican state order.
Helmut Berve provided an important impetus, first in 1954 in his essay Characteristics of Greek Tyranny and then in 1967 in his monograph Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks . He did not consider the tyrants to be far-sighted statesmen. In Berve's account, they were selfish, power-hungry politicians who were ruthless and raped the community. The tyrant was the opponent of the polis, the autonomous state. He broke the ties to tradition and law, ruled "against the will of the citizens arbitrarily and for their own benefit" and was in fundamental opposition to "already the rules and customs of aristocratic society, but completely to the rule of law of the educated polis". For Berve, the criterion that distinguishes a tyrant from a senior official or king is not the extent of the power or the severity of the repression, but the unlawful exceeding of the powers which the polis has granted its ruler. This is the classic ancient defining feature of tyranny, on which the terminology of research has to be oriented. Berve saw an essential difference between ancient tyranny and modern dictatorship "despite striking similarities" in the fact that the tyrant "is not the carrier of social, political, national or quasi-religious ideas, but to a certain extent only an individual". None of the known tyrants have pursued non-personal goals. However, there was a need for a Greek ruler to prove his regime legitimate. Hence the tyrants were innovative; they would have promoted technical progress and strived for economic prosperity and social equilibrium. In doing so, they would have had positive effects for their states.
In his words, Berve reckoned that his monograph "could be accused of backward positivism". This assumption was true, but his “individualistic” approach was also well received, for example by Robert Drews (1972) and Stefan von der Lahr (1992). Building on Berve's results, von der Lahr emphasized the sharp contrast between the tyrant and the aristocratic state. Although the tyrant had a number of partisans among the aristocracy, he was an outlawed outsider for the conservative aristocratic society, an enemy that it opposed as a social group. This resistance was not only an expression of personal rivalries, but of a fundamental nature. Von der Lahr thus contradicted Michael Stahl's (1987) view of the relationship between the tyrant and the traditional ruling class. After Stahl's reconstruction of the social context, the achievement of a position of dominance did not "per se run counter to the order of aristocratic coexistence". A usurper did not suddenly enter a qualitatively new relationship with his peers through his victory, but acted within the conventional social order. His special position appeared to the aristocrats as a generally tolerable phenomenon.
In addition to the “individualistic” interpretation, the alternative interpretative approaches remained relevant: While Claude Mossé (1969), Gerd Zörner (1971) and Claudia de Oliveira Gomes clung to the “people's leader theory”, Mary White (1955) and Antony Andrewes (1956 ) and John Salmon (1977) the "hoplite theory". They said that the archaic usurpers had relied on the dissatisfied “middle-class hoplite soldiers”, a new, growing middle class that had emerged as a result of economic development. According to the hoplite theory, the dynamic bourgeoisie rebelled against the static monopoly of power of an aristocratic ruling class and demanded political participation. To this end, it supported the establishment of tyranny, which then served the interests of the hoplites by weakening the nobility and promoting the economy. The tyrant strengthened his bourgeois supporters until they had prevailed against the nobility so effectively that they no longer needed the sole ruler. Then the tyranny was removed from the forces on which it relied. Oswyn Murray (1982) combined the popular leader and the hoplite theory; the hoplites were the most important part of the armed people, without whom they would have been powerless. - Criticism came from, among others, George L. Cawkwell (1995), who considered both the popular leader theory and the hoplite theory to be completely wrong.
Historians, who started out from the Marxist view of history, gave the economic conditions a decisive importance. Analyzes of this kind were presented by Pavel Oliva (1956, 1960) and Hans-Joachim Diesner (1960). What they have in common is the emphasis on the role of class struggle and slavery . Oliva believed that the older tyranny was anti-aristocratic and therefore a progressive phenomenon. The development of a production characterized by slave labor initially led to the enrichment of the nobility. In the course of time, however, a new, up-and-coming class of industrialists and traders has formed, who have rebelled against the impermeable noble ruling class. Their instrument was the older Tyrannis. This smashed the system of aristocracy and thus gave the emerging slave-holding society a new direction. Ultimately, however, the tyranny had been removed by the social forces that had strengthened it politically and economically, since it was no longer needed by them. Diesner came to a partially different assessment. For him, too, the starting point was the contrast between the land-owning nobility and the “money nobility”, the rapidly growing new class of rich merchants and traders. The money nobility has economically pushed back the nobility and gradually overthrown it. The tyrants also rose in the struggle against the aristocracy. In doing so, the older tyranny often did not rely on the money nobility, but on the poorer classes, for whom it had provided economic advantages. In doing so, she unintentionally paved the way for the “democracy of the slave owners”. Thus it is more progressive than the nobility regime. The tyrants contributed a great deal to the consolidation of the slave-holding state, which, however, often only experienced a stormy political and economic boom after the end of their rule. Diesner considered the younger tyranny to be a "reactionary" phenomenon. They claimed a steadily growing part of the national product for the luxury and security of the ruler and with their actions aroused a growing opposition to which they finally succumbed. - In more recent research the objection to the Marxist approach is that it assigns an order of magnitude and importance to the economy that it demonstrably did not have at the time.
Konrad H. Kinzl came to a new kind of assessment . In an essay published in 1979, he denied that there was any “older tyranny” as a clearly defined form of government. It is a mistake to use the term tyranny to try to “force an abundance and variety of different political phenomena into the straitjacket of a simplifying, pseudo-juristic term”. In truth, one is dealing with "the various manifestations of various nobility regimes".
In 1993 Volker Fadinger put forward a different interpretation . According to his hypothesis, the origin of Greek tyranny can be found in the ancient Orient . It was a centralized monarchy with a strong sacral character and consolidated itself with an "apparatus of force borrowed from the Middle Eastern kingdoms". There are significant similarities between it and the rulership system of the monarchies of the Near East and Egypt. The tyrants tried to compensate for their lack of legality with a sumptuous court ceremony based on oriental models and wanted to be perceived as earthly representatives of the divine order of the cosmos.
According to a widespread view, represented by Fritz Gschnitzer , among others , the older tyranny was not a certain stage in the development of the Greek constitutions, but a temporary interruption in normal constitutional development. In 1996 Victor Parker turned against this point of view, according to which tyranny "is to be seen as a dead arm in the evolution of the constitutions". He interpreted the emergence of the older tyranny as a late consequence of the fall of the archaic kingship. The royal houses of the " dark centuries " and the early Archaic times perished in bitter power struggles and were replaced by aristocracies. However, they made themselves so hated that a return to the old form of government seemed sensible and desirable. Therefore, the early archaic tyrants managed to establish themselves as the new autocratic rulers. They are to be understood as successors to kings; at least in some cases they would have presented themselves as legitimate kings. Thus the older tyranny should be seen as the last offshoot of the monarchical principle.
In 1996 Loretana de Libero published her habilitation thesis on archaic tyranny. She pointed out that “the main theses developed in almost two hundred years of scientific discussion continue to stand side by side on an equal footing”. It was not possible to conclusively refute one of the approaches or to convincingly confirm it with comprehensive arguments. According to de Libero's interpretation, archaic tyranny is a “genuinely aristocratic form of rule”. It emerged from the competition for priority between noble peers. However, once a tyrant had come to power, he had to put an end to the traditional aristocratic disputes over power and prestige in order to secure his position. This resulted in a paradox: the archaic tyrant was deeply rooted in the aristocratic world and legitimized his priority by referring to noble values such as efficiency, wealth and fame, but at the same time he deprived his peers of the common noble foundation. With that he brought about the collapse of the aristocratic self-image. By monopolizing the aristocratic spheres of activity in his hands, he without intending to weaken the aristocratic structures. New, non-aristocratic forces benefited from this. Aristocrats were mainly responsible for eliminating tyranny, but when it disappeared, the archaic aristocratic world was no longer able to survive.
Greg Anderson examined the period before the late 6th century BC in an article published in 2005. He advocated not calling the early politicians called tyrannoi in the sources "tyrants", as this term, based on later ideas, was inappropriate for the early tyrannoi . In reality there was no strict distinction between “illegitimate” tyrannoi and “legitimate” state leaders . During this time, tyrannoi were described as particularly successful politicians who emerged from the oligarchical mainstream and held leadership positions. They did not seek to overthrow the existing state order, but rather exercised their power within the framework of the established oligarchical system.
In an article published in 2010, Karl-Wilhelm Welwei turned against the research opinion that archaic tyranny was a necessary prerequisite for the “further development of the beginnings of an institutional structure” of the polis. In 1987 Michael Stahl had taken the view that the tyrannical concentration of power in Athens had been “indispensable in a certain phase” as a transitory stage. According to Welweis, however, the overcoming of personal power through institutional organizational structures took place in a long process in which tyranny played a subordinate role.
Max Weber viewed the Greek “city tyranny” as a product of the class struggle and class antagonism. He said that the ruling tyrants usually had the small peasants, a nobility allied with them and parts of the urban middle classes to themselves. They would have promoted new emotional cults such as the Dionysus cult and weakened the nobility. The tyranny thus had an effect in favor of the balance of classes; often it was its forerunner. In his rule typology Weber counted the ancient tyranny to the type of “ charismatic rule ”. He distinguished this from the “rational” rule, which is bound to a stable set of legal regulations, and the “traditional” rule based on the belief in the sanctity of old traditions. For Weber, charismatic rule is based on the special importance that his followers personally accord to the ruler due to his extraordinary achievements and qualities. This meaning is the basis of loyalty relationships that depend on the individual “ charisma ” of the ruler. Such relationships are only tied to the person, not to their family, and therefore end at the latest with the death of the charismatic leader. However, there is also a “hereditary charism” based on the belief that leadership qualities are hereditary. This belief is the prerequisite for the hereditary monarchy. Loyalty to an established dynasty is not a charismatic phenomenon, but one of the traditional type; the personal charisma of the monarch can be completely absent.
Weber pointed out that the ideal types do not usually appear “pure” historically. In this sense, Marc Hofer stated in 2000 with regard to the Sicilian tyrants that they owed their position not only to charisma but also to stable rules of tradition. The traditional aspect shows itself in the role of the tyrant family and kinship relationships and in the dynastic succession. On the other hand, the relationships between the tyrants and the people, the mercenaries and, in some cases, their followers are charismatic. The mixture of traditional and charismatic elements founded the success of the tyranny, but at the same time prevented the regime from lasting long after the death of the charismatic bearer. The founding of the dynasty failed because of the lack of transferability of the tyrannical charism to the descendants.
- Martin Dreher : The Greek tyranny as a monarchical form of rule. In: Stefan Rebenich (ed.): Monarchical rule in ancient times. De Gruyter, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-11-046145-9 , pp. 167-187
- Hella Mandt: tyranny, despotism. In: Basic historical concepts . Volume 6, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1990, ISBN 3-12-903900-7 , pp. 651-706, here: 651-674
- Henning Ottmann : History of Political Thought. Volume 1/1, Metzler, Stuttgart / Weimar 2001, ISBN 3-476-01630-7 , pp. 70-79
- Helmut Berve : The tyranny among the Greeks. 2 volumes, Beck, Munich 1967,
- Giovanni Giorgini: La città e il tiranno. Il concetto di tirannide nella Grecia del VII – IV secolo ac Giuffrè, Milano 1993, ISBN 88-14-03468-0
- Sian Lewis: Greek Tyranny. Bristol Phoenix Press, Exeter 2009, ISBN 978-1-904675-27-3
- Konrad H. Kinzl (Ed.): The Elderly Tyrannis up to the Persian Wars. Contributions to Greek tyranny (= ways of research . Volume 510). Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1979, ISBN 3-534-07318-5
- Loretana de Libero : The Archaic Tyranny. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-515-06920-8 (partly also: Göttingen, University, habilitation thesis, 1995)
- Nino Luraghi : Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia. Olschki, Florence 1994, ISBN 88-222-4238-6
- James F. McGlew: Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece. Cornell University Press, Ithaca / London 1993, ISBN 0-8014-2787-8
- Kathryn A. Morgan (Ed.): Popular Tyranny. Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece. University of Texas Press, Austin 2003, ISBN 0-292-75276-8
- Claudia de Oliveira Gomes: La cité tyrannique. Histoire politique de la Grèce archaïque. Presses universitaires de Rennes, Rennes 2007, ISBN 978-2-7535-0497-4
- Victor Parker: From King to Tyrant. A reflection on the origin of the older Greek tyranny. In: Tyche 11, 1996, pp. 165-186.
- Michael Stahl : Aristocrats and Tyrants in Archaic Athens. Investigations into tradition, social structure and the formation of the state. Steiner, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-515-04501-5
- Ivan Jordović: Beginnings of Younger Tyranny. Precursors and first representatives of tyranny in the late 5th century BC Chr. (= European university publications. Series 3: History and its auxiliary sciences. Vol. 1017). Lang, Frankfurt am Main et al. 2005, ISBN 3-631-53806-5 (also: Bochum, University, dissertation, 2004).
- Michael Hillgruber : “Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis.” The ancient efforts to justify tyrannicide. With an outlook on their aftermath in the Middle Ages and early modern times. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2004, ISBN 83-231-1734-9
- Nino Luraghi: To Die like a Tyrant. In: Nino Luraghi (Ed.): The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 2013, pp. 49–71
- Michael W. Taylor: The Tyrant Slayers. The Heroic Image in Fifth Century BC Athenian Art and Politics. 2nd, revised edition. Ayer, Salem 1991, ISBN 0-88143-113-3
- David A. Teegarden: Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against Tyranny. Princeton University Press, Princeton / Oxford 2014, ISBN 978-0-691-15690-3
- Robert von Friedeburg : Tyrannis. In: The New Pauly (DNP). Volume 15/3, Metzler, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-476-01489-4 , Sp. 685-694.
- Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2001, ISBN 2-13-051567-3
- Konrad H. Kinzl: Archaic Greek Tyranny Reconsidered
- Nino Luraghi : One-Man Government. In: Hans Beck (Ed.): A Companion to Ancient Greek Government , Malden 2013, pp. 131–145, here: 135 f.
- Alexander Uchitel: The Earliest Tyrants: From Luwian Tarwanis to Greek Τύραννος. In: Gabriel Herman, Israel Shatzman (ed.): Greeks between East and West , Jerusalem 2007, pp. 13–30, here: 13–26; Franco Pintore: Serums, tarwanis, týrannos. In: Onofrio Carruba et al. (Ed.): Studi orientalistici in ricordo di Franco Pintore , Pavia 1983, pp. 285–322, here: 285–290, 297–307. See Victor Parker's hypothesis: Τύραννος. The Semantics of a Political Concept from Archilochus to Aristotle. In: Hermes 126, 1998, pp. 145-172, here: 145-149; Parker considers Phrygian origin to be plausible and suspects origin in the Balkans.
- Alexander Uchitel: The Earliest Tyrants: From Luwian Tarwanis to Greek Τύραννος. In: Gabriel Herman, Israel Shatzman (ed.): Greeks between East and West , Jerusalem 2007, pp. 13–30, here: 26–28; Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 35–38. See Giovanni Giorgini: La città e il tiranno , Milano 1993, pp. 54 f., 75 f.
- James L. O'Neil: The Semantic Usage of tyrannos and Related Words. In: Antichthon 20, 1986, pp. 26-40 (with an overview of the history of research, p. 26). See Victor Parker: Τύραννος. The Semantics of a Political Concept from Archilochus to Aristotle. In: Hermes 126, 1998, pp. 145-172; Greg Anderson: Before Turannoi Were Tyrants: Rethinking a Chapter of Early Greek History. In: Classical Antiquity 24, 2005, pp. 173-222; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 3–6.
- Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 383 f.
- Kurt Raaflaub : The discovery of freedom , Munich 1985, pp. 301–303; James L. O'Neil: The Semantic Usage of tyrannos and Related Words. In: Antichthon 20, 1986, pp. 26-40, here: 33. For the self- image of the thirty see Xenophon, Hellenika 2,3,16.
- Raymond Bloch : Aphrodite / Turan. In: Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae (LIMC), Vol. 2.1, Zurich / Munich 1984, pp. 169–176, here: 169; Pierre Chantraine : Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots , 2nd revised edition, Paris 2009, p. 1106.
- Friedrich-Karl Springer: Tyrannus. Investigations on the political ideology of the Romans , Cologne 1952, pp. 3–6 (to take over the word from the Greek), 29–32 (for neutral use), 101–111 (for late antique use).
- For a few exceptions see Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 182–188.
- For the legendary tradition, see Carmine Catenacci: Il tiranno e l'eroe , Rom 2012, pp. 38–206.
- Eberhard Ruschenbusch : On the genesis of the tradition about the archaic period of Greece and the 5th and 4th centuries BC. Chr. In: Historia 41, 1992, pp. 385-394; Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 11 f .; Harry W. Pleket : The Archaic Tyrannis. In: Talanta 1, 1969, pp. 19-61, here: 19-21.
- Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp : The archaic Greece , Munich 2015, pp. 224–229; Harry W. Pleket: The Archaic Tyrannis. In: Talanta 1, 1969, pp. 19-61, here: 33-38, 46 f .; Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 137–178. See Winfried Schmitz's reception in historiography : Kypselos and Periandros. Murderous despots or benefactors of the city? In: Bernhard Linke et al. (Ed.): Zwischen Monarchie und Republik , Stuttgart 2010, pp. 19–49, here: 29–47.
- The dating is controversial; see Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 44; Pedro Barceló : Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 121-124.
- Brian M. Lavelle: Fame, Money, and Power , Ann Arbor 2005, pp. 36-41; Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 45–49.
- On dating see Brian M. Lavelle: Fame, Money, and Power , Ann Arbor 2005, pp. 213 f.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 52–62, 65, 81. Brian M. Lavelle: Fame, Money, and Power , Ann Arbor 2005, pp. 89–154 provides a detailed description.
- Brian M. Lavelle: The Sorrow and the Pity , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 109-114.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 65–75, 80 f., 86 f., 123. Cf. Michael Stahl: Aristokrats und Tyrannen im archaischen Athens , Stuttgart 1987, pp. 182–187.
- Kurt Raaflaub: The discovery of freedom , Munich 1985, pp. 112–118; Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 116-123, 131 f.
- Nino Luraghi: Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia , Firenze 1994, pp. 273-288; Marc Hofer: tyrants, aristocrats, democrats , Bern 2000, pp. 83–89; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 140 f.
- Nino Luraghi: Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia , Firenze 1994, p 288-304; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 141-143. On resettlement policy, see Kathryn Lomas : Tyrants and the polis: migration, identity and urban development in Sicily. In: Sian Lewis (ed.): Ancient Tyranny , Edinburgh 2006, pp. 95–118, here: 97, 101, 107.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 143–147.
- Kathryn A. Morgan: Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century BC , Oxford 2015, pp. 56-60; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 147–152.
- Shlomo Berger: Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy , Stuttgart 1992, p. 36 f.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 180–387, offers a thorough description of the individual tyrannical rule. See also Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: The Greek Polis , 2nd, revised edition, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 82–85. Cf. on the Orthagorids Victor Parker: The Dates of the Orthagorids of Sicyon. In: Tyche 7, 1992, pp. 165-175.
- Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp: The archaic Greece , Munich 2015, pp. 230–237; Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 253, 259-271, 281-285. See the different presentation of the takeover of power by Aideen Carty: Polycrates, Tyrant of Samos , Stuttgart 2015, pp. 127, 222.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 218 f., 225–230, 232–234, 236–243, 247 f., 311 f., 314, 329 f., 351 f.
- On Pheidon see Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 112–115.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 207-217.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 355, 364 f., 367, 372 f., 381, 414-417.
- Nino Luraghi: Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia , Firenze 1994, pp. 11-20.
- Vinko Hinz: Nunc Phalaris doctum protulit ecce caput , Leipzig 2001, pp. 25–41, 47 ff .; Franklin L. Ford: The political murder , Hamburg 1990, p. 55 f .; Nino Luraghi: Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia , Firenze 1994, pp. 36-49.
- Nino Luraghi: Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia , Firenze 1994, p 51-272; Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 128–141, 153–163.
- Nino Luraghi: One-Man Government. In: Hans Beck (Ed.): A Companion to Ancient Greek Government , Malden 2013, pp. 131–145, here: 138 f.
- See Anthony J. Podlecki: Festivals and Flattery: the early Greek Tyrants as Patrons of Poetry. In: Athenaeum 58, 1980, pp. 371-395, here: 394 f.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 391-394.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 394–398.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 398-400.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 400-402; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 75, 165 f.
- Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: The Greek Polis , 2nd, reviewed edition, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 80, 86-89; Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp: Archaic Greece , Munich 2015, p. 253 f.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 128 f., 137, 140 f., 160; Shlomo Berger: Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy , Stuttgart 1992, pp. 57 f., 63-65; Marc Hofer: tyrants, aristocrats, democrats , Bern 2000, p. 133.
- Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 128 f.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 181–191.
- David A. Teegarden: Death to Tyrants! , Princeton 2014, pp. 57-84.
- Thomas Lenschau: Tyrannis. In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Vol. 7 A / 2, Stuttgart 1948, Col. 1821–1842, here: 1834–1839; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 219 f.
- Brian Caven: Dionysius I. War-Lord of Sicily , New Haven / London 1990, pp. 50-58; Ivan Jordović: Beginnings of the Younger Tyrannis , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 245–255; Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 222-226, 236-238.
- Brian Caven: Dionysius I. War-Lord of Sicily , New Haven / London 1990, pp. 154-185; Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 226–235, 242–244, 249–251. On the source criticism, see Lionel J. Sanders: Dionysius I of Syracuse and Greek Tyranny , London 1987, pp. 174–176.
- Marta Sordi: La Sicilia dal 368/7 al 337/6 a. C. , Rome 1983, pp. 6-45; Helmut Berve: Dion , Mainz 1957, pp. 27–141.
- Kai Trampedach : Platon, the Academy and contemporary politics , Stuttgart 1994, p. 123 f .; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 272-276.
- For the chronology, see Richard JA Talbert: Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily 344-317 BC , London 1974, pp. 47-49.
- Marta Sordi: La Sicilia dal 368/7 al 337/6 a. C. , Rome 1983, pp. 52-80; Hans Erich Stier : Timoleon. In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Vol. 6 A / 1, Stuttgart 1936, Sp. 1276-1291; Richard JA Talbert: Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily 344-317 BC , London 1974, pp. 42 f., 87-115.
- For the research discussion on the question of whether Lycophron was actually the tyrant of Pherai, see Ivan Jordović: Beginnings of the Younger Tyrannis , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 267–270.
- Sławomir Sprawski: Jason of Pherae , Kraków 1999, pp 15, 23, 58-62, 115-118; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 285–289.
- John R. Ellis: Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism , London 1976, pp. 77-83; Sławomir Sprawski: Alexander of Pherae: infelix tyrant. In: Sian Lewis (ed.): Ancient Tyranny , Edinburgh 2006, pp. 135-147; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 289-294.
- Hans Erich Stier: Timophanes. In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Vol. 6 A / 2, Stuttgart 1937, Col. 1307; Henry D. Westlake: Timoleon and his relations with tyrants , Manchester 1952, pp. 59-61; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 304 f.
- David A. Teegarden: Death to Tyrants! , Princeton 2014, pp. 139-141.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 307 f.
- Waldemar Heckel : Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great , Malden 2006, p. 113 f .; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 320–322.
- See also Hermann Wankel : Demosthenes, speech for Ctesiphon over the wreath , 2nd half volume, Heidelberg 1976, p. 1252 f.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 383–385, 427–429, 435–440.
- Caroline Lehmler: Syrakus under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 36–39; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 21–33.
- Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 33–45, 72 f.
- Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 62–64, 68–77.
- Caroline Lehmler: Syrakus under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 50–59; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 462-474.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 219 f., 332 f., 343, 373–377.
- A general overview is provided by Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 373–379. Ivan Jordović argues for less weighting of the role of social opposites: Beginnings of the Younger Tyrannis , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 11 f., 255–262, 278–293, 315–317.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 375 f.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 37.
- Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 105-107, 110.
- Archilochus, fragment 22 after the count by Ernst Diehl .
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 23-27; Jenny Strauss Clay: Archilochus and Gyges: An Interpretation of Fr. 23 West. In: Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 24, 1986, pp. 7-17.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 28–30, 320–328; Justus Cobet : King, leader, lord; Monarch, tyrant. In: Elisabeth Charlotte Welskopf (Ed.): Investigations of selected ancient Greek social type terms , Berlin 1981, pp. 11–66, here: 50, 52.
- Solon, fragment 33 based on the count by Martin Litchfield West . See Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 30–32; Justus Cobet: King, leader, lord; Monarch, tyrant. In: Elisabeth Charlotte Welskopf (ed.): Investigations of selected ancient Greek social type terms , Berlin 1981, pp. 11–66, here: 51. Cf. Elizabeth Irwin: Solon and Early Greek Poetry , Cambridge 2005, pp. 205–261.
- Stefan von der Lahr: Poets and Tyrants in Archaic Greece , Munich 1992, pp. 96–101, 110–122, 152–161; Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 97-99; Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 32–35.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 35 f.
- Antony Andrewes: The Greek Tyrants , London 1956, pp. 23-27; Vincent J. Rosivach: The Tyrant in Athenian Democracy. In: Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 30, 1988, pp. 43-57; Kurt A. Raaflaub: Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy. In: Kathryn A. Morgan (Ed.): Popular Tyranny , Austin 2003, pp. 59–93, here: 59–77.
- Stefano Jedrkiewicz: Il tirannicidio nella cultura classica. In: Pierangelo Catalano, Giovanni Lobrano (eds.): Antichità e rivoluzioni da Roma a Constantinopoli a Mosca , Rom 2002, pp. 3–26, here: 6–9, 12–15.
- Heinrich Schlange-Schöningen : Harmodios and Aristogeiton, the murderers of tyrants from 514 BC. Chr. In: Alexander Demandt (Ed.): Das Attentat in der Geschichte , Cologne 1996, pp. 15–37, here: 30 f .; Franklin L. Ford: The political murder , Hamburg 1990, pp. 48–54; Brian M. Lavelle: The Sorrow and the Pity , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 50-58; Egon Flaig : Political Forgetting. The slayer of tyrants - a cover memory of the Athenian democracy. In: Günter Butzer, Manuela Günter (Hrsg.): Kulturelles Vergessen: Medien - Rituale - Orte , Göttingen 2004, pp. 101–114.
- Michael W. Taylor: The Tyrant Slayers , 2nd, revised edition, Salem 1991, pp. 1-5.
- Michael Hillgruber: “Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis” , Toruń 2004, pp. 4–15; David A. Teegarden: Death to Tyrants! , Princeton 2014, pp. 30-53; James McGlew: Fighting tyranny in fifth-century Athens: democratic citizenship and the oath of Demophantus. In: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 55-2, 2012, pp. 91-99; Julia L. Shear : The Oath of Demophantos and the Politics of Athenian Identity. In: Alan H. Sommerstein, Judith Fletcher (Eds.): Horkos , Exeter 2007, pp. 148–160.
- David A. Teegarden: Death to Tyrants! , Princeton 2014, pp. 85-112; Martin Ostwald : The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion. In: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 86, 1955, pp. 103-128, here: 119-128.
- Wolfgang Schuller : The city as a tyrant - Athens rule over its allies , Konstanz 1978, pp. 10-12.
- Cecil Maurice Bowra : Pindar , Oxford 1964, pp. 117-137; Kathryn A. Morgan: Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century BC , Oxford 2015, pp. 1-22, 119-121; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 191 f.
- Diego Lanza: Il tiranno e il suo pubblico , Torino 1977, pp. 45-64.
- Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 193 f.
- Robert Bees: Zur Dating des Prometheus Desmotes , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 194-231.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 194 f. See Richard Seaford: Tragic Tyranny. In: Kathryn A. Morgan (ed.): Popular Tyranny , Austin 2003, pp. 95–115, here: 104–106; Giovanni Giorgini: La città e il tiranno , Milano 1993, pp. 193-211.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 200–202; Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 138-143. See Giovanni Giorgini: La città e il tiranno , Milano 1993, pp. 245-262.
- Victor Ehrenberg : Aristophanes and the People of Athens , Zurich / Stuttgart 1968, p. 345 f .; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 198 f. Cf. Carmine Catenacci: Aristofane e la tirannide. In: Franca Perusino, Maria Colantonio (eds.): La commedia greca e la storia , Pisa 2012, pp. 55–78; Giovanni Giorgini: La città e il tiranno , Milano 1993, pp. 239-245; Michael W. Taylor: The Tyrant Slayers , 2nd revised edition, Salem 1991, pp. 85-92.
- See on Herodotus' view Michael Stahl: Tyrannis and the problem of power. In: Hermes 111, 1983, pp. 202-220, here: 202 f., 217-220; Carolyn Dewald: Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus. In: Kathryn A. Morgan (Ed.): Popular Tyranny , Austin 2003, pp. 25-58; Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 178-182; Kenneth H. Waters: Herodotus on Tyrants and Despots , Wiesbaden 1971, pp. 1-42.
- Gregory Crane : Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity , Berkeley 1998, pp. 149 f .; Hartmut Leppin : Thukydides and the constitution of the polis , Berlin 1999, pp. 63–68; Pedro Barceló: Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1993, pp. 183-186, 201 f.
- Michael W. Taylor: The Tyrant Slayers , 2nd, revised edition, Salem 1991, pp. 78-85.
- Ivan Jordović: Beginnings of the Younger Tyrannis , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 70–82, 99–116; Joachim Dalfen : Plato: Gorgias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2004, pp. 132-137, 276, 284; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 202-204.
- Xenophon, Memorabilia 4,6,12.
- See Roberta Sevieri: The Imperfect Hero: Xenophon's Hiero as the (Self-) Taming of the Tyrant. In: Christopher Tuplin (Ed.): Xenophon and his World , Stuttgart 2004, pp. 277–287, here: 282–284.
- See Friedo Ricken : Plato: Politikos. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2008, pp. 179–192, 204–209, 255; Giovanni Giorgini: La città e il tiranno , Milano 1993, pp. 324-327.
- Plato, Politeia 579c.
- Plato Politeia 566a.
- Plato, Politeia 563e-588a. See Richard D. Parry: The Unhappy Tyrant and the Craft of Inner Rule. In: Giovanni RF Ferrari (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic , Cambridge 2007, pp. 386-414.
- See also Giovanni Giorgini: Plato and the Ailing Soul of the Tyrant. In: Silvia Gastaldi, Jean-François Pradeau (eds.): Le philosophe, le roi, le tyran , Sankt Augustin 2009, pp. 111–127.
- Roger Boesche: Theories of Tyranny from Plato to Arendt , University Park 1996, pp. 51-60.
- See also Alfred Heuss : Aristotle as theoretician of totalitarianism. In: Antike und Abendland 17, 1971, pp. 1–44, here: 15 f.
- Aristotle, Politics 1295b – 1296a, 1305a, 1308b. See Hella Mandt: Doctrine of Tyrannies and Right of Resistance , Darmstadt 1974, p. 33.
- Aristotle, Politics 1312b.
- Aristotle, Politics 1285a. Cf. Alfred Heuss: Aristotle as theoretician of totalitarianism. In: Antike und Abendland 17, 1971, pp. 1–44, here: 12–15.
- Aristotle, Politics 1310b – 1311a.
- Aristotle, Politics 1279a-b, 1295a, 1313a.
- See also Andreas Kamp: The Aristotelian Theory of Tyrannis. In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 92, 1985, pp. 17–34, here: 19 f.
- Aristotle, Politics 1311a.
- Heinz-Gerd Schmitz: The dark side of politics , Berlin 2005, pp. 34–40; Hella Mandt: Doctrine of Tyranny and Right of Resistance , Darmstadt 1974, pp. 42–53.
- Aristotle, Politics 1313a – 1314b. See Alfred Heuss: Aristotle as theoretician of totalitarianism. In: Antike und Abendland 17, 1971, pp. 1–44, here: 1–6, 18–25; Roger Boesche: Aristotle's 'Science' of Tyranny. In: History of Political Thought 14, 1993, pp. 1-25, here: 4 f., 10-17.
- Aristotle, Politics 1313b – 1314a.
- Andreas Kamp: The Aristotelian theory of tyranny. In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 92, 1985, pp. 17–34, here: 21–29.
- Aristotle, Politics 1311a – b, 1314a – 1315b.
- Aristotle, Politics 1311a – 1312b.
- Helmut Berve: Characteristics of the Greek tyranny. In: Historische Zeitschrift 177, 1954, pp. 1–20, here: 18.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 476-484.
- David A. Teegarden: Death to Tyrants! , Princeton 2014, pp. 173-214; Hans Friedel: The murder of tyrants in legislation and popular opinion of the Greeks , Stuttgart 1937, pp. 82–97.
- Mischa Meier : (Not) a tyrannicide. The death of Julius Caesar 44 BC Chr. In: Georg Schild, Anton Schindling (Ed.): Politische Morde in der Geschichte , Paderborn 2012, pp. 11–36, here: 15 f., 23–25, 28–32, 35.
- Jean Béranger: Tyrannus. In: Revue des Études latines 13, 1935, pp. 85–94; Friedrich-Karl Springer: Tyrannus. Studies on the political ideology of the Romans , Cologne 1952, pp. 4–6, 58–77; Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 477 f., 484.
- Joachim Szidat : Usurper tanti nominis. Emperor and usurper in late antiquity (337-476 AD) , Stuttgart 2010, p. 27 ff .; Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 477, 482, 492 f .; Friedrich-Karl Springer: Tyrannus. Studies on the political ideology of the Romans , Cologne 1952, pp. 81–111.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 479, 483.
- Cornelius Nepos, Liber de excellentibus ducibus exterarum gentium 20.1.
- Plutarch, Timoleon 4.4-5.2.
- Polybios, Historien 2, 59 f.
- Polybios, Histories 6.4; 6.7; 6.9. See Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, pp. 137–141.
- Cicero, De re publica 1.69; 2.41-43; 2.47 f.
- Cicero, De re publica 2.48.
- Cicero, De officiis 3.32.
- Cicero, De officiis 3.19. For more on Cicero's view, see Ernst Reibstein : People's sovereignty and freedom rights , Vol. 1, Freiburg / Munich 1972, pp. 125–128; Michael Hillgruber: “Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis” , Toruń 2004, pp. 29–38.
- Raban von Haehling : Rex and Tyrannus. In: Uwe Baumann (Ed.): Basileus and Tyrann , Frankfurt 1999, pp. 13–33, here: 20 f .; Christian Sigmund: 'Kingship' in the political culture of late republican Rome , Berlin 2014, pp. 84–97, 183–190; Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, pp. 157-160.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 493–498.
- Michael Hillgruber: “Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis” , Toruń 2004, pp. 38–41.
- Jan-Wilhelm Beck : 'Octavia' Anonymi: Timely praetexta or timeless tragoedia? , Göttingen 2004, pp. 32-34.
- On the subject of tyrants in Lukan see Jan Radicke : Lucans poetic technique , Leiden 2004, pp. 61 f., 111, 117, 119, 218 f., 228 f., 239, 288, 326 f., 332–334, 341 f ., 344, 429, 484 f., 487.
- Nigel M. Kennell: Herodes Atticus and the Rhetoric of Tyranny. In: Classical Philology 92, 1997, pp. 346-362.
- Dion Chrysostom, Speeches 1.66–84.
- Dion Chrysostom, Speeches 6: 35-59.
- Raffaella Tabacco: Il tiranno nelle declamazioni di scuola in lingua latina. In: Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino. II. Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche , Series 5, Vol. 9, 1985, pp. 1-141, here: 1 f. (Summary); Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 502-507.
- The editor Jacques Bompaire offers a brief introduction : Lucien: Œuvres , Vol. 2, 2nd edition, Paris 2003, pp. 259–265; critical edition with French translation pp. 268–298.
- Critical edition with French translation by Jacques Bompaire: Lucien: Œuvres , Vol. 1, Paris 1993, pp. 1-20.
- On Lukian's handling of the Tyrannis material see Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. 499–501.
- See Vinko Hinz: Nunc Phalaris doctum protulit ecce caput , Leipzig 2001, pp. 99-109; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. 501 f.
- Origen, Contra Celsum 1,1. See Michael Hillgruber: “Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis” , Toruń 2004, pp. 45–47; Carlo Nardi: Note sul tirannicidio nella patristica. In: Prometheus 20, 1994, pp. 77-88, here: 78-82.
- Augustine, De civitate dei 2.21.
- Augustine, De civitate dei 5:19.
- Augustinus, De bono coniugali 14. See Andreas Andelfinger: The development of the concept of tyrant in the philosophical-theological literature of the Middle Ages and its ancient sources , Munich 1920, p. 12 f.
- Augustine, De civitate dei 5:19. On the position of Augustine Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, pp. 220–223.
- Sozomen, Historia ecclesiastica 6,2,1-2.
- Isidore, Etymologiae 9,3,20. Cf. Hans Hubert Anton : Fürstenspiegel and Herrscherethos in der Karolingerzeit , Bonn 1968, p. 58 and note 63.
- Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job 12:38.
- Jürgen Miethke : The murder of tyrants in the later Middle Ages. In: Gerhard Beestermöller , Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven (eds.): Peace ethics in the late Middle Ages , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 24–48, here: 26 f.
- Jonas von Orléans, Admonitio (De institutione regia) 3.
- See Andreas Andelfinger: The development of the concept of tyrant in the philosophical-theological literature of the Middle Ages and its ancient sources , Munich 1920, p. 26 and note 1.
- Hinkmar of Reims, De divortio Lotharii regis et Theutbergae reginae , Praefatio. On the doctrine of tyranny in the 9th century, see Hans Hubert Anton: Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherethos in der Karolingerzeit , Bonn 1968, pp. 395–403.
- Hugo von Fleury, Tractatus de regia potestate et sacerdotali dignitate 1,4. See Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, p. 249 f.
- Nikolaus I, letter to Bishop Adventius von Metz of September 17, 864, ed. by Ernst Perels , Monumenta Germaniae Historica . Epistolae , Vol. 6, 2nd edition, Berlin 1974, p. 299, lines 37-39.
- Jürgen Miethke: The murder of tyrants in the later Middle Ages. In: Gerhard Beestermöller, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven (ed.): Friedensethik im Spätmittelalter , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 24–48, here: 28–31.
- Manegold von Lautenbach, Liber ad Gebehardum 30.
- Otto von Freising, Chronica 2.19; 7.23. See Helene Wieruszowski : Roger II of Sicily, Rex-Tyrannus, in Twelfth-Century Political Thought. In: Speculum 38, 1963, pp. 46-78, here: 55-57.
- John of Salisbury, Policraticus 8:17. See Richard H. Rouse, Mary A. Rouse: John of Salisbury and the doctrine of tyrannicide. In: Max Kerner (Ed.): Ideologie und Herrschaft im Mittelalter , Darmstadt 1982, pp. 241–267, here: 243 f.
- Richard H. Rouse, Mary A. Rouse: John of Salisbury and the doctrine of tyrannicide. In: Max Kerner (Ed.): Ideologie und Herrschaft im Mittelalter , Darmstadt 1982, pp. 241–267; Jan van Laarhoven: You shalt not slay a tyrant! The so-called theory of John of Salisbury. In: Michael Wilks (ed.): The World of John of Salisbury , Oxford 1984, pp. 319–341, here: 319–333; Kate Langdon Fohan: Salisburian Stakes: The Uses of 'Tyranny' in John of Salisbury's Policraticus. In: History of Political Thought 11, 1990, pp. 397-407; Jürgen Miethke: The murder of tyrants in the later Middle Ages. In: Gerhard Beestermöller, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven (ed.): Friedensethik im Spätmittelalter , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 24–48, here: 37–40.
- Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, p. 256.
- Maria Koutlouka: La tyrannie dans la philosophie byzantine du XI e siècle. In: Actes du Colloque La tyrannie. May 1984 , Caen 1984, pp. 53-60, here: 56-60; Wilhelm Blum: Byzantinische Fürstenspiegel , Stuttgart 1981, pp. 44–46. For the image of the "tyrant" in the representation of usurpers by Byzantine historians see Lia Raffaella Cresci: Appunti per una tipologia del τύραννος. In: Byzantion 60, 1990, pp. 90-129.
- See on this development Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, pp. 265–267.
- Ernst Walser: Collected studies on the intellectual history of the Renaissance , Basel 1932, p. 197; Vinko Hinz: Nunc Phalaris doctum protulit ecce caput , Leipzig 2001, pp. 417-420.
- Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi , distinctio 44, quaestio 2, articulus 2.
- Andreas Andelfinger: The development of the concept of tyrant in the philosophical-theological literature of the Middle Ages and its ancient sources , Munich 1920, pp. 61-66.
- See Diego Quaglioni: Politica e diritto nel Trecento italiano , Firenze 1983, pp. 8-14; Ernst Reibstein: Popular Sovereignty and Freedom Rights , Vol. 1, Freiburg / Munich 1972, pp. 143–148; Angel Sanchez de la Torre: La tyrannie dans la Grèce antique , Bordeaux 1999, pp. 187-190.
- Jürgen Miethke: The murder of tyrants in the later Middle Ages. In: Gerhard Beestermöller, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven (ed.): Peace ethics in the late Middle Ages , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 24–48, here: 40–44.
- Jürgen Miethke: Resistance / Resistance Law. I. Old Church and Middle Ages. In: Theologische Realenzyklopädie , Vol. 35, Berlin 2003, pp. 739–750, here: 746 f.
- Jürgen Miethke: The murder of tyrants in the later Middle Ages. In: Gerhard Beestermöller, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven (Eds.): Peace ethics in the late Middle Ages , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 24–48, here: 44–46.
- See Vasileios Syros: The Reception of Aristotelian Political Philosophy in Marsilius von Padua , Leiden 2007, pp. 143–170; Jeannine Quillet: La philosophie politique de Marsile de Padoue , Paris 1970, pp. 118–121; Ernst Reibstein: Popular Sovereignty and Freedom Rights , Vol. 1, Freiburg / Munich 1972, p. 32 f.
- Jürgen Miethke: The murder of tyrants in the later Middle Ages. In: Gerhard Beestermöller, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven (Eds.): Peace ethics in the late Middle Ages , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 24–48, here: 33–35.
- Bernard Guenée: Un meurtre, une société , Paris 1992, pp. 189-201, 238; Friedrich Schoenstedt: The murder of tyrants in the late Middle Ages , Berlin 1938, pp. 12-25; Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, pp. 319–321. On Petit's ancient authorities, see Alfred Coville: Jean Petit. La question du tyrannicide au commencement du XV e siècle , Paris 1932, pp. 181-183, 213, 216 f.
- Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, pp. 321-325. Bernhard Bess: The doctrine of the murder of tyrants at the Council of Constance offers detailed descriptions . In: Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 36, 1916, pp. 1–61 and Alfred Coville: Jean Petit. La question du tyrannicide au commencement du XV e siècle , Paris 1932, pp. 503–558.
- Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, pp. 326–328.
- See Michael Hillgruber: “Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis” , Toruń 2004, p. 51 f.
- On Boccaccio's position see Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, p. 294.
- Linda Simonis: Brutus (Marcus). In: Historische Gestalten der Antike (= Der Neue Pauly. Supplements , Vol. 8), Stuttgart 2013, Sp. 193–206, here: 198.
- Manfredi Piccolomini: The Brutus Revival. Parricide and Tyrannicide During the Renaissance , Carbondale 1991, pp. 56-62.
- See on these controversies Jean-Louis Fournel, Jean-Claude Zancarini: «Ôtez-moi Brutus de la tête! » In: Jean-Claude Zancarini (ed.): Le Droit de résistance. XII e -XX e siècle , Fontenay-aux-Roses 1999, pp. 47-69, here: 50-53; Alois Riklin : Giannotti, Michelangelo and the Tyrannenmord , Bern / Vienna 1996, pp. 79–83; to Salutati Edeltraud Werner: Of tyrants and princes. In: Uwe Baumann (ed.): Basileus and Tyrann , Frankfurt 1999, pp. 55–80, here: 59–68.
- Manfredi Piccolomini: The Brutus Revival. Parricide and Tyrannicide During the Renaissance , Carbondale 1991, pp. 73-78. See Vito R. Giustiniani: Alamanno Rinuccini 1426–1499 , Cologne / Graz 1965, pp. 243–248.
- Robert von Friedeburg: Tyrannis. In: Der Neue Pauly (DNP), Vol. 15/3, Stuttgart 2003, Col. 685-694, here: 689-693; Merio Scattola: Doctrine of tyranny. In: Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit , Vol. 13, Stuttgart 2011, Sp. 853-858; Jürgen Hüllen: Tyranny. II. In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Vol. 10, Basel 1998, Sp. 1611–1618, here: 1615. For the use of the term in German, see Wolfgang Stammler : Kleine Schriften zur Sprachgeschichte , Berlin 1954, pp. 67–72.
- Hella Mandt: Tyrannis, Despotie. In: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , Vol. 6, Stuttgart 1990, pp. 651–706, here: 669 f., 672–674; Jürgen Hüllen: Tyranny. II. In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Vol. 10, Basel 1998, Sp. 1611–1618, here: 1612 f.
- Stefano Saracino: Tyrannis und Tyrannenmord bei Machiavelli , Munich 2012, pp. 19, 28, 45, 57–124; Edeltraud Werner: Of tyrants and princes. In: Uwe Baumann (ed.): Basileus and Tyrann , Frankfurt 1999, pp. 55–80, here: 68–79.
- Hella Mandt: Tyrannis, Despotie. In: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , Vol. 6, Stuttgart 1990, pp. 651–706, here: 672 f.
- Mario Turchetti: Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours , Paris 2001, p. 364 f.
- See Benedikt Wolfers: "Talkative Philosophy". Thomas Hobbes' Critique of Aristoteles , Würzburg 1991, pp. 105–113, 122–127.
- Robert Lauer: Tyrannicide and Drama , Stuttgart 1987, p 41st
- Eckehard Quin: Personal rights and right of resistance in the Catholic resistance teaching of France and Spain around 1600 , Berlin 1999, pp. 309-315.
- Nicole Reinhardt: Juan de Mariana: Biblical exegesis and tyrannicide. In: Andreas Pečar , Kai Trampedach (ed.): The Bible as a political argument , Munich 2007, pp. 273–294, here: 289 f.
- Martin Dzelzainis (ed.): John Milton: Political Writings , Cambridge 1991, pp. XIII f., XX, XXV, 16 f., 94 f., 144, 162–176, 192.
- Oscar Jászi, John D. Lewis: Against the Tyrant , Glencoe 1957, pp. 37-39; Monique Cottret: Tuer le tyran? Le tyrannicide dans l'Europe modern , Paris 2009, pp. 33-38; Manfredi Piccolomini: The Brutus Revival. Parricide and Tyrannicide During the Renaissance , Carbondale 1991, pp. 62-67, 76-89.
- See the history of motifs Elisabeth Frenzel : Motives of world literature. A lexicon of longitudinal sections of the history of poetry (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 301). 6th, revised and supplemented edition, Stuttgart 2008, pp. 689–700.
- Traiano Boccalini: Ragguagli di Parnaso 1.76.
- Heinrich Schlange-Schöningen: Harmodios and Aristogeiton, the murderers of tyrants from 514 BC. Chr. In: Alexander Demandt (Ed.): Das Attentat in der Geschichte , Cologne 1996, pp. 15–37, here: 15 f.
- See Ernst Gegenschatz: The 'Pythagorean Guarantee' - on the history of a motif from Aristoxenus to Schiller . In: Peter Neukam (Ed.): Encounters with New and Old , Munich 1981, pp. 90–154, here: 144–151.
- Rahel B. Beeler: "The meaning of speech was dark". On the poetology of Schiller's ballad poetry , Würzburg 2014, pp. 261–291.
- Nino Luraghi: One-Man Government offers brief overviews . In: Hans Beck (Ed.): A Companion to Ancient Greek Government , Malden 2013, pp. 131–145, here: 137 f. and Stefan von der Lahr: Poets and Tyrants in Archaic Greece , Munich 1992, pp. 1–5.
- Ivan Jordović: Beginnings of the Younger Tyrannis , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 1–3, 10.
- Wilhelm Drumann: De tyrannis Graecorum dissertatio , Halle 1812, p. 7. Cf. Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 12.
- Hermann Gottlob Plaß: The tyranny in its two periods among the ancient Greeks , Bremen 1852 (2nd, unchanged edition Leipzig 1859). See Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 12 f.
- Eduard Meyer: Geschichte des Altertums , Vol. 3, 2nd, revised edition, Stuttgart 1937, pp. 563 f., 573, 583.
- Jacob Burckhardt: Greek cultural history , vol. 1, Darmstadt 1956 (first published in 1898), p. 166.
- Georg Busolt: Greek History , Vol. 1, 2nd, revised edition, Gotha 1893, pp. 626–631.
- Percy N. Ure: The Origin of Tyranny , Cambridge 1922, pp. 1-26, 290-306. Cf. Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 13 f.
- Martin P. Nilsson: The Age of the Early Greek Tyrants , Belfast 1936, pp. 10, 20 f., 23 f.
- Malcolm MacLaren: Tyranny. In: Allan Chester Johnson et al. (Ed.): The Greek Political Experience. Studies in Honor of William Kelly Prentice , Princeton 1941, pp. 78–92, here: 82–84, 89–92.
- Thomas Lenschau: Tyrannis. In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Bd. 7 A / 2, Stuttgart 1948, Sp. 1821–1842, here: 1824–1831.
- Fritz Schachermeyr: Peisistratos. In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Vol. 19/1, Stuttgart 1937, Col. 156–191, here: 159 f.
- Leo Strauss: On Tyranny , Chicago / London 2000 (revised new edition; first published in 1948), pp. 22-25.
- See Leo Strauss: On Tyranny , Chicago / London 2000 (revised new edition), pp. 178–185 (on Voegelin), 185–212 (on Kojève), 213-325 (correspondence from Strauss and Kojève).
- Helmut Berve: Characteristics of the Greek tyranny. In: Historische Zeitschrift 177, 1954, pp. 1-20.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. X, 4; Helmut Berve: Characteristics of the Greek tyranny. In: Historische Zeitschrift 177, 1954, pp. 1–20, here: 1 f., 7–12.
- Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, pp. IX f., 9 f .; Helmut Berve: Characteristics of the Greek tyranny. In: Historische Zeitschrift 177, 1954, pp. 1–20, here: 8 f., 15–17.
- Helmut Berve: The Tyrannis among the Greeks , Vol. 1, Munich 1967, p. XII.
- See for example the criticism in Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 15 f. and Gerd Zörner: Kypselos and Pheidon von Argos , Marburg 1971, pp. 18 f., 77 f. Cf. Michael Stahl: Aristocrats and Tyrants in Archaic Athens , Stuttgart 1987, p. 1 f.
- Robert Drews: The First Tyrants in Greece. In: Historia 21, 1972, pp. 129-144.
- Stefan von der Lahr: Poets and Tyrants in Archaic Greece , Munich 1992, p. 119.
- Stefan von der Lahr: Dichter und Tyrannen im archaischen Greece , Munich 1992, pp. 106-109, 118-122, 128 f., 130-133, 152, 155-161.
- Michael Stahl: Aristocrats and Tyrants in Archaic Athens , Stuttgart 1987, pp. 133-136.
- Claude Mossé: La tyrannie dans la Grèce antique , Paris 1969, p 2, 6, 46, 88 f, 134-137, 203 f..
- Gerd Zörner: Kypselos and Pheidon von Argos , Marburg 1971, pp. 58–61, 208 f.
- Claudia de Oliveira Gomes: La cité tyrannique , Rennes 2007, pp. 53–56.
- Mary White: Greek Tyranny. In: The Phoenix 9, 1955, pp. 1-18.
- Antony Andrewes: The Greek Tyrants , London 1956, pp. 31-42.
- John Salmon: Political Hoplites? In: The Journal of Hellenic Studies 97, 1977, pp. 84-101, here: 84, 95-101.
- Oswyn Murray: The early Greece , Munich 1982, pp. 180-184.
- George L. Cawkwell: Early Greek tyranny and the people. In: The Classical Quarterly 45, 1995, pp. 73-86. See Filippo Canali De Rossi: La tirannide in Grecia antica , Rome 2012, pp. 3–6.
- Pavel Oliva: La tyrannie, première forme de l'état en Grèce, et son rôle historique. In: Pavel Oliva: Opera minora , Vol. 1, Prague 2007, pp. 36–47 (first published in 1956) and The importance of early Greek tyrannis. In: Klio 38, 1960, pp. 81-86.
- Hans-Joachim Diesner: Greek Tyrannis and Greek Tyrants , Berlin 1960.
- Hans-Joachim Diesner: Greek Tyrannis and Greek Tyrants , Berlin 1960, pp. 6-11.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 15.
- Konrad H. Kinzl: Considerations on the older tyranny. In: Konrad H. Kinzl (Hrsg.): The older Tyrannis up to the Persian Wars, Darmstadt 1979, pp. 298-325, here: 298, 315 f. See also Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 23, 37 f.
- Volker Fadinger: Greek Tyranny and Old Orient. In: Kurt Raaflaub (ed.): Beginnings of political thinking in antiquity , Munich 1993, pp. 263–316, here: 293, 307–311.
- Fritz Gschnitzer: Greek Social History , 2nd, extended edition, Stuttgart 2013, p. 113.
- Victor Parker: From King to Tyrant. A reflection on the origin of the older Greek tyranny. In: Tyche 11, 1996, pp. 165-186, here: 165 f.
- Victor Parker: From King to Tyrant. A reflection on the origin of the older Greek tyranny. In: Tyche 11, 1996, pp. 165-186.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 17.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 412.
- Loretana de Libero: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 412 f.
- Greg Anderson: Before Turannoi Were Tyrants: Rethinking a Chapter of Early Greek History. In: Classical Antiquity 24, 2005, pp. 173-222. Compare with Nino Luraghi: Anatomy of the Monster: The Discourse of Tyranny in Ancient Greece. In: Henning Börm (Ed.): Antimonarchic Discourse in Antiquity , Stuttgart 2015, pp. 67–84, here: 68 f., 80.
- Michael Stahl: Aristokrats und Tyrannen im archaischen Athen , Stuttgart 1987, p. 260. Loretana de Libero also judges in this sense: Die archaische Tyrannis , Stuttgart 1996, p. 134.
- Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: A tyranny as a preliminary stage of democracy? Reflections on the tyranny of Peisistratus . In: Bernhard Linke et al. (Ed.): Zwischen Monarchie und Republik , Stuttgart 2010, pp. 51–66, here: 66.
- Max Weber: Economy and Society , Part 5: Die Stadt (= Max Weber: Complete Edition , Vol. I / 22-5), Tübingen 1999, pp. 222–225.
- Max Weber: Economy and Society. Sociology (= Max Weber: Complete Edition , Vol. I / 23), Tübingen 2013, p. 535.
- Max Weber: Economy and Society. Sociology (= Max Weber: Gesamtausgabe , Vol. I / 23), Tübingen 2013, pp. 453 f., 490–493, 497–502.
- Marc Hofer: Tyrannen, Aristokrats, Demokrats , Bern 2000, pp. 136–142, 204–211.