Agathocles of Syracuse

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Drawing of a bust presumably representing Agathocles. Vatican Museums , Sala dei Busti

Agathokles ( Greek Ἀγαθοκλῆς Agathoklḗs ; * 361 BC or 360 BC in Thermai in Sicily ; † 289 BC in Syracuse ) was from 316 BC. Chr. Tyrant of Syracuse and 305/304 v. Until his death king of a Sicilian empire created by him.

Agathocles began his ascent in Syracuse as an officer, then he made a name for himself as a politician on the side of the supporters of democracy and fought against the oligarchic city ​​government. Under pressure from his opponents he had to go into exile, whereupon he worked as a mercenary leader. Finally he was able to get his homecoming through and was elected general. A few years later, he took power in a coup . In fact, he became a tyrant, but the democratic constitution remained formally in force.

Agathocles waged a long, costly war against the Carthaginians , who ruled part of Sicily. In a bold campaign, he attacked them with an invasion force in the North African core area of ​​their empire. After initial success, however, he had to break off the company and finally make peace on the basis of the conditions before the outbreak of war. Then he took the title of king. He succeeded in bringing almost the entire Greek part of Sicily and parts of Calabria into his power. At times he came close to his goal of rule over the whole of Magna Graecia , but his attempt to found a dynasty failed because of a dispute in his family. After his death, opposing forces came to power.

Origin and youth

Agathocles was a son of Karkinos, who came from Rhegion . Karkinos had been banished from his hometown, whereupon he settled in Thermai and married a citizen of that town. Thermai, located on the north coast of Sicily, belonged to the western part of the island, which was then under the rule of the Carthaginians . When Agathocles was around 18 years old, the family moved to Syracuse. With this, Karkinos followed a call from the general Timoleon , who had removed the tyrannical rule in Syracuse. Timoleon was looking for new citizens for the depopulated city, which had suffered badly from the frequent chaos of war. So Karkinos received Syracuse citizenship. According to the sources, he was a simple potter, and Agathocles learned his father's craft. In reality, however, Karkinos must have been a wealthy man who owned a pottery workshop. Later, Agathokles did not conceal his origins from the artisan milieu, but instead confessed to it and used it as ruler for his self-expression. Demonstrative modesty and closeness to the people was an essential element of his appearance.

Agathocles began his military career in Timoleon's time. He proved himself first as a soldier, then as an officer. Later, after Timoleon's health-related resignation from the general office in 337 BC. BC, Agathocles took part in a campaign against Akragas ( Agrigento ) and won the favor of the general ( Strategos ) Damas, who promoted him to Chiliarch . After Damas' death he married his widow. This made him one of the richest men in Syracuse, which gave him a good starting point for his political advancement.

After Timoleon's resignation, the traditional sharp contrast between the democrats and the supporters of the oligarchy came to the fore again in Syracuse . The oligarchs had the upper hand, they ruled the city as the hetairie of the "six hundred". Agathocles' older brother Antandros was elected general, so he must have had good relations with the ruling circles. Agathocles, on the other hand, appeared as a speaker in the popular assembly and distinguished himself on the side of the opposition Democrats. But with the power relations at that time he could not rise. After a successful campaign on the Italian mainland, he was not granted the honor of valor that he believed he deserved. Now he turned openly against the rulers and publicly accused the leading oligarchs Sosistratos and Herakleides of seeking tyranny . However, he was unable to assert himself with this charge; on the contrary, the two oligarchic leaders consolidated their power. This made Agathocles' position in Syracuse untenable and he was forced to leave the city. But that doesn't have to mean that he was formally banned.

Twice exile and homecoming

Agathocles went to southern Italy and lived the life of a mercenary leader. In doing so, he created an independent power base as a prerequisite for a return. His first military coup was a failure: He tried to take possession of the important city of Croton in Calabria by force, probably in connection with local democrats, but failed completely and had to flee to Taranto with a few surviving supporters . The Tarentines accepted him among their mercenaries, but distrusted him because of his ambition and activities, which led to his dismissal. He then rallied democratic fighters who had been driven from their cities by the oligarch party. An opportunity arose in Rhegion, his father's hometown. The Democrats were in power there, but the city was attacked by troops of the Syracuse oligarchs who wanted to help their local like-minded people seize power. Apparently Agathocles achieved a great success; the attack was repulsed and the position of Sosistratos and Herakleides in Syracuse was weakened to such an extent that there was an overthrow there. The Democrats came back to power and drove the ruling class of the opposing party out of town. The displaced supporters of the oligarchy allied themselves with the Carthaginians. Thanks to this development, Agathocles was able to around 322 BC. Return home.

In the following battles against the allied Carthaginians and oligarchs, Agathocles stood out. At first he did not succeed in gaining a leading position in the city. Rather, the Syracusans, who apparently mistrusted his ambition, decided to request a general from Corinth , the mother city of Syracuse. This should take over the supreme command and save the city following the example of Timoleon and bring about an external and internal peace. Corinth sent Akestorides , who ensured a reconciliation with the exiled oligarchs and a peace treaty with the Carthaginians and banished Agathocles. The radical democrats had to give way and moderate oligarchs came to power. Akestorides tried in vain to get Agathocles out of the way with an assassination attempt. The exiled Agathocles raised a private army, for which his fortune was apparently sufficient. He made use of the fact that the Syracusans were viewed as oppressors in other cities, and appeared successfully as an advocate of the interests of these cities against Syracuse. He was able to take Leontinoi and even dared to attack Syracuse. The situation became so dangerous for the oligarchical rulers there that they called on the Carthaginians for help.

In this situation, Agathocles' diplomatic skill proved its worth. He negotiated with the Carthaginian commander Hamilcar and persuaded him to withdraw. Allegedly, the two generals even concluded a personal alliance, since they both sought sole rule in their hometowns. After losing the Carthaginian allies, Syracuse was isolated. The citizens, apparently unwilling to fight for the oligarchs, decided to allow Agathocles to return home. He swore to seek no tyranny and was thereupon 319/318 BC. Elected general by the Syracusans.

Coup

The position of Agathocles within the city of Syracuse was initially that of a regular general with limited powers. His official title was general and keeper of peace . He had, however, as to the other fortified places of its sphere of influence Strategos Autocrator an unrestricted military command and the official title that used to be the legal basis for the tyranny of Dionysius I. had formed. In Syracuse he was resisted by the still existing oligarchic group of the Six Hundred. It took Agathocles three years to prepare for the elimination of these opponents. In doing so, he made use of the contrast between the non-Greek Sikelern and the Syracusans as well as the social tensions between the poor urban population and the wealthy. Under the pretext of military defensive measures against external enemies, he was able, without arousing suspicion, to assemble a powerful force consisting of Sikeli and Greek fighters who were personally devoted to him and ready to overthrow.

Finally, in 316/315 BC, Agathocles dared to The decisive step. At a meeting to which he had invited leading figures of the opposing party, he accused the forty or so oligarchs present of planning an attack against him and had them arrested. His gunmen demanded that the guilty be punished, whereupon he had those arrested killed immediately. The trumpeters blew the signal to fight, and a general slaughter began in the city, to which the nobles and their partisans fell victim. Their homes were ransacked. Allegedly more than 4,000 people were killed who were only suspect because of their belonging to the upper class. More than 6,000 are said to have escaped from the city even though the gates were locked. Most of them fled to Agrigento. By losing their property, they were deprived of the financial basis for future hostile activities.

Agathocles then called a popular assembly in which he appeared as the savior of democracy from the machinations of the oligarchs and at the same time announced his resignation from his office and retreat into private life. His supporters, however, vehemently demanded that he take over the leadership of the state. He then declared himself ready to become a general again, but only if he could exercise the office this time without colleagues, i.e. as the sole general with unlimited power (strategós autokrátor) . The people elected him as they wanted and at the same time gave him a general "care for the state" (epiméleia tes póleos) . He then offered the prospect of debt relief and land distribution, two traditionally popular items on the agenda.

Constitutional position

Syracuse coin with Arethusa from the time of Agathocles

The extraordinary powers Agathocles received were not limited in time, nor were they based on an extraordinary threat from external enemies or a civil war situation. They meant the introduction of a strong and permanent monarchical element into the constitution. As an unrestricted general, Agathokles was allowed to raise civil troops, recruit mercenaries, probably also write extraordinary war taxes, and at least carry out all necessary armaments on land and at sea at his discretion. In addition, there were civil powers within the framework of “welfare for the state”. In the event of war he was automatically the commander in chief. The combat deployment of citizen troops still required a popular resolution. As before under the tyrant Dionysius I, the democratic constitution formally continued to exist and the popular assembly continued to meet.

In fact, the coup d'état of 316/315 marked the beginning of tyrannical rule. However, it was not a tyranny under constitutional law ; rather, Agathocles was the legally elected head of the Syracuse state, his extraordinary powers were legitimized by a democratic resolution. Since the exact extent of the powers granted by the people to Agathocles is not known, it is difficult to assess whether he kept within the scope of his competence with all of his subsequent coercive measures, in particular the brutal raising of money to finance the warfare, or whether in some cases he arbitrarily exceeded them . In contrast to the typical tyrant behavior, he did not get a bodyguard and did not value aloofness. Even later, when he assumed the title of king, this situation did not change; constitutionally he remained the highest official in the state. While Dionysius I had concluded treaties in his own name and the allies were allied with him personally, under Agathocles only the citizenry was subject to constitutional law and contractual partner of the opposing powers and the allies.

Military expansion

Agathocles' action space in southern Italy

First, Agathocles dealt with the subjugation of the enemy cities in the Greek part of Sicily. The centers of resistance were Agrigento, Gela and Messina . These three cities, in which many oligarchic-minded refugees from Syracuse had found refuge, formed an alliance on the initiative of Agrigento. The Agrigenes brought a king's son named Akrotatos from Sparta as their general , because they feared that a local commander might rise to the level of a tyrant. However, the Spartan did not prove himself, but only triggered an internal conflict on the side of his own forces and then fled. On the other hand, the Syracusans failed to take Messina. Neither side was able to record a decisive success. Since the Carthaginians saw a threat in the Syracuse expansion efforts, they intervened in favor of the threatened cities. The Carthaginian commander Hamilkar brokered a peace in 314/313 that established the autonomy of all Greek cities outside the Carthaginian sphere of influence, but granted hegemony to the Syracusans . The recognition of the claim to hegemony was a major success of Agathocles; in Carthage Hamilcar was criticized for this concession.

Now Agathocles was able to expand his power, relying on the hegemony clause in the treaty that was advantageous for Syracuse. Since there was no strong Carthaginian force stationed in Sicily, he saw himself unhindered. He was able to take control of numerous cities and fortified towns and to arm them on a massive scale. In Messina in 313/312 his supporters prevailed against the oligarchs, so that he and his troops could move in without a fight. The city of Tauromenion on the east coast also fell into his hands. He had his opponents killed everywhere. Then he turned against Agrigento.

War against Carthage

The oligarchs who had fled Syracuse had found themselves in a threatening position due to the successes of Agathocles. Therefore their leader, Deinocrates, was forced to ask Carthage for help. Only now did the Carthaginians realize the extent of the danger; they charged Hamilcar for his negligence and started the war.

First phase of the war (311 to summer 310)

The Carthaginians opened the fight in 311 with the dispatch of a fleet that forced Agathocles to withdraw from Agrigento. First, the Syracuse troops fought successfully against the oligarchs, whose army suffered a defeat near Galaria in the area of ​​today's Caltagirone . The Carthaginians initially did not risk an open field battle, but in 310 they dispatched a larger army of over 14,000 men on a superior fleet of 130 warships. In the meantime Hamilkar had died. The Carthaginian force was under the command of a new general, also called Hamilcar. On the crossing, the Carthaginians suffered heavy losses from a storm; 60 ships sank. After landing, however, Hamilkar was able to replenish his army by recruiting mercenaries and by uniting with the troops of his Greek allies. In the Gela area he opposed Agathocles with superior forces. He had about 45,000 men. In June 310 there was the battle of Himeras , which the Carthaginians finally won after initial successes by the Greeks; Agathocles lost 7,000 men. The slingshots from the Balearic Islands played an important role on the Carthaginian side . For Agathocles, the change of front of numerous cities and towns, which now sided with the victor, was more fatal than the losses in the battle. Thus the Carthaginian general took control of all of Sicily with the exception of Syracuse; Agathocles had to retreat to Syracuse and be besieged there.

Second war phase (summer 310 to 309)

Because of the superiority of the Carthaginian fleet, Agathocles could not prevent the blockade of Syracuse. As a result, he threatened to find himself in a hopeless position in the enclosed city. So he decided to break out when the opportunity arose. When the Carthaginians were distracted by the arrival of supply ships, he left the port on August 14, 310 with sixty ships and the best part of his troops, about 14,000 men, and narrowly escaped the pursuing Carthaginians by nightfall. In addition to citizens of Syracuse and Greek mercenaries, Samnites , Etruscans and Celts were also involved in the outbreak . The company's goal of invading Africa to relieve the home front was kept top secret from its own soldiers. To deceive the Carthaginians, the Greeks did not sail south, but chose a detour along the Sicilian north coast. After a six-day voyage, the fleet landed in Africa, on the west coast of the Tunisian Cap Bon peninsula , near Carthage. Agathocles had the fleet burned as he had no way of guarding it. So he began the advance with no possibility of retreat.

The Carthaginians were completely surprised. They had never been attacked in their heartland in their entire history, so they had few fortresses and little troop presence there. The land was extraordinarily rich and fertile, so the attackers took great prey. They took two cities. In a hurry, the Carthaginians raised an army from the citizenry consisting of 40,000 men on foot, 1,000 horsemen and 2,000 chariots. This force outnumbered the 14,000 men on the other side, but inferior in training and experience. In addition, the Carthaginian commanders rivaled one another. The Greeks won and the Carthaginians withdrew behind the walls of Carthage, although they had not suffered heavy losses. So the strange situation arose that each of the two sides threatened the capital of the other.

The Carthaginians ordered Hamilcar, who was still besieging Syracuse, to send them part of his forces. He sent 5,000 men to Africa. In the meantime Agathocles had taken a number of coastal towns and fortified towns near Carthage, including Tynes, now Tunis . He also won Ailymas, a king of the Libyans living there , as an ally. After conquering the coastal area, he turned inland, first to subdue the hinterland and then to lead the decisive blow against Carthage. He repulsed a counterattack.

The year 309 saw a turning point in Sicily as well. The Syracusans, under the command of Agathocles' brother Antandros, achieved great success. They were able to forestall an attack by the Carthaginian besiegers and their allies, the oligarchs under Deinocrates, and surprisingly attack and beat the enemy army as it approached during the night. Hamilkar was captured and then killed, and his severed head was sent to Agathocles in Africa. After this severe defeat of the Carthaginians, they were expelled from numerous Greek cities and towns.

Third phase of the war (309 to 307)

The African theater of war

In Africa, Agathocles suddenly got into an extremely dangerous crisis, which shows that he was not an absolute ruling tyrant, but had to take into account the democratic spirit in the army. After a feast, his son Archagathos had emotionally killed a high-ranking officer with whom he had got into an argument. The friends of the victim wanted revenge and the army demanded the death of Archagathos. The soldiers said that Agathocles would have to hand over his son or, if he refused, die himself. They deposed Agathocles, placed him under guard and elected new generals. When the Carthaginians found out, they invited the rebellious officers to defeat and promised high payments in return. Many commanders were ready. Finally, however, Agathocles managed to change the mind of the army with a speech and to achieve its reinstatement. Immediately afterwards he launched an attack on the surprised Carthaginians, who had expected his army to be disbanded, and inflicted heavy losses on them. After that there was further fighting, but this did not lead to any significant changes in the balance of power.

A constant problem was the lack of money, which led to arrears in pay payments and thus caused discontent in the army. The obvious way out of allowing the soldiers to plunder and to extort compulsory taxes from the population of the conquered areas was hardly considered, since the Greeks were dependent on the goodwill of their African allies and had to make sure that the Africans did not change front.

Agathocles needed additional troops to gain a decisive advantage in the war. Therefore he allied himself with the Macedonian Ophellas , a former companion of Alexander the great , who was now governor of the reigning diadoch Ptolemy I in Egypt in Cyrenaica ( eastern Libya ). Ophellas had the ambition to establish an independent rule. As a reward for military help, Agathocles offered him, in the future, after the destruction of the Carthaginian Empire, to give him its territory and to retreat to Sicily. Ophellas accepted this suggestion. He recruited numerous mercenaries, especially in Athens, and moved west with around 11,000 fighters to Agathocles. For the adventurous and arduous march through the desert he needed over two months. Soon after his arrival, Agathocles accused him of treason, had him killed and incorporated the new troops into his army. It is unclear whether this procedure was planned from the beginning or whether there was a conflict between the two commanders over the supreme command; the tradition hostile to Agathocles portrays it as perfidious betrayal.

In the period that followed, Agathocles succeeded in rounding off his African dominion and increasingly isolating the city of Carthage. Through these successes he reached the height of his power development in Africa, and an enclosure of Carthage became a possibility. However, he was only able to cut off supplies from the city on the land side, as he still lacked the necessary fleet for a sea blockade. A storm attack from the land side seemed hopeless because of the strong, easy-to-defend fortifications. Measures to create the necessary naval force through shipbuilding were already in progress when unfavorable news arrived from Sicily that induced Agathocles to return there with only 2,000 soldiers. He left the supreme command in Africa to his son Archagathos.

In Sicily, the Carthaginians were able to maintain the pressure on Syracuse despite the defeat of their army, and their fleet continued to block the city. The Agrigenes and the oligarchs under Deinocrates were still powerful, their slogan of autonomy for the Greek cities was popular. Shortly before the arrival of Agathocles, however, his generals defeated the Agrigenes despite being numerically inferior. He himself was able to take control of several cities, but Deinocrates managed to bring together an army of almost 20,000 infantrymen and 1,500 cavalrymen. Since Agathocles had no armed force of comparable strength, he avoided the fight.

Meanwhile, the situation of Archagathos in Africa deteriorated dramatically. The population had become increasingly tired of the Greek presence, in many places local resistance had to be broken in battles with many losses, and the Carthaginians went over to the offensive with 30,000 men. It turned out that Archagathos did not have the strategic talent of his father. Two separately operating armies of the Greeks suffered heavy defeats, with a total of around 13,000 men, including around 1,000 mounted men. The Greeks then lost many of their native allies and were in great danger.

Fourth phase of the war (307 to 306)

Agathocles managed to forge an alliance with Etruscan cities. With the support of an Etruscan fleet of 18 ships, he won a naval victory over the Carthaginians, whose commander fell. Then the Carthaginians had to give up the blockade of Syracuse. A Syracusian army was also successful on land against the Agrigento. However, because of the catastrophic development in Africa, Agathocles had to return there in the fall of 307.

In Africa Agathocles only had 12,000 Greek and Italian foot soldiers and 1,500 mounted men; the loyalty of his Libyan allies, some 10,000 men, was in doubt. After a failed attack on the Carthaginian camp, which cost him about 3,000 men, he lost his last Libyan allies and so found himself in a hopeless position. He could not return to Sicily with the army because he did not have the necessary ship capacity and the enemy fleet was in command of the sea. Therefore, in October or November 307, he went to Sicily with only a few confidants to get ships there.

The soldiers left behind regarded the Commander-in-Chief's departure as treason. They mutinied, killed the two sons of Agathocles, elected generals and negotiated with the Carthaginians about surrender. The terms of surrender they received were favorable; they were allowed to join the Carthaginian army either as mercenaries or to settle in Sicily in the Carthaginian sphere of influence there. Only a few city commanders remained loyal to Agathocles. The Carthaginians took these cities and crucified the captive commanders.

End of war

Despite the devastating defeat of his forces in Africa, Agathocles did not want to give up the fight against Carthage. He planned new armor and collected money for it. In the allied city of Segesta there was resistance to his fiscal coercive measures, which he severely punished. Allegedly, he had all adult Segestans - the city is said to have had 10,000 inhabitants - killed in a single day and sold the children into slavery. However, the traditional account of this process goes back to a very anti-tyrant source; therefore, distortions and exaggerations are to be expected.

Agathocles suffered a severe setback in Sicily when his general Pasiphilos defected with some of the troops to the oligarchs and several cities fell away from him. Now the tyrant saw that the war on the two fronts against the Carthaginians and his Sicilian opponents could not be won. Negotiations with Deinocrates, to whom he offered far-reaching concessions, failed. However, the negotiations with the Carthaginians, which led to the conclusion of peace in 306, were successful. The border between the Greek and Carthaginian areas in Sicily remained the same as it was before the war. Thus, the war did not bring any territorial gain to either side. At least Agathocles managed to get the Carthaginians to pay for the cessation of hostilities with gold worth 300 (according to a different report, 150) talents of silver and 200,000 bushels of grain.

Victory over the oligarchs

After the peace agreement, Agathocles was able to use all available forces to fight the supporters of the oligarchy. The decisive battle took place at Torgion, an unidentified location in central Sicily. Agathocles is said to have had just under 5,000 foot soldiers and around 800 horsemen, while his oligarchical opponent Deinocrates raised 25,000 infantrymen and 3,000 cavalry men. Agathocles was victorious because part of the enemy forces defected to him during the battle. Allegedly, after his victory, he ordered the murder of thousands of prisoners. Deinocrates, on the other hand, was not only spared, but Agathocles even reconciled with him and made him one of his commanders. With that the final decision in the fight against the oligarchic forces had been made. Deinocrates now turned against his previous comrades-in-arms. He handed over the bases of the oligarchs to the tyrant and had the defector Pasiphilos killed. Thanks to this success, Agathocles was able to subjugate the Greek part of Sicily completely or almost completely. It is unclear and controversial in research whether Agrigento was able to maintain its independence. From then on, the tyrant's rule remained unchallenged until his death.

Royalty

In 305 or 304, Agathocles assumed the title of king, following the example of the diadochi in the former empire of Alexander the great. Like the Hellenistic monarchs, he called himself only king ( basileus ) without adding a country or folk name. His kingship was therefore purely personal and not formally tied to a people or country. It referred to all areas that he could bring under his rule.

According to a hypothesis by Helmut Berve , the Polis of Syracuse, where Agathocles officially continued to be the general authorized by the people (strategós autokrátor) and exercised “care”, had a special legal position. According to this opinion, Agathocles did not officially include the city in his royal rule, as he formally took the old constitution into account. In recent research, however, the presumed special position is rejected.

Although the ruler asserted his claim to royal dignity in the capital too, he attached great importance to being close to the people. He refrained from building a palace or a castle like a tyrant, did not set up a royal court with court offices, and did not wear a diadem as a sign of royal dignity, but only a wreath. Thus he renounced essential elements of the monarchical self-representation. According to a mocking anecdotal tradition, he wanted to use the wreath to hide his hair loss.

Coin minting and pictorial representation

Coin (gold stater) of Agathocles. Obverse : head of Alexander the great with elephant scalp hood; Reverse : winged Athena Promachos with the legend "[Coin of] Agathocles"

The sovereignty of coins gradually passed from the city of Syracuse to Agathocles. In the initial phase, which lasted until 310, only the Syracusans were named as minters on all coins. In the following phase, from 310 to 306, the name of the tyrant appeared on the reverse of silver coins to glorify his military successes next to the image of the half-clothed goddess of victory Nike with a victory mark . Initially the Syracusans, who continued to be the minters, were named on the obverse; later Agathocles acted as mint for silver coins, while bronze was left to the Syracusans. After gaining royal rule, Agathocles also used the title of king on the coins. For a gold stater served him tetradrachms Ptolemy I, showing the head of Alexander the Great with an elephant scalp instead of a helmet, as a model. In contrast to other Hellenistic kings, Agathocles never went so far as to have himself depicted on the coins. With a few exceptions, coins were only minted in Syracuse.

Cicero mentioned in the year 70 BC In his second speech against Verre's valuable paintings, which Gaius Verres , the corrupt former governor of the province of Sicily , had stolen from the temple of Athena on Ortygia , an island in Syracuse. According to the accusation, Verres stole portraits of the Sicilian kings and tyrants, as well as a picture showing a cavalry battle of King Agathocles. According to Cicero, the depiction of the cavalry battle was the most important sight in their city for the Syracusans. Agathocles presumably had these pictures, including his own portrait, made as consecration gifts to the goddess and hung in the temple.

A bust probably depicting Agathocles is in the Vatican Museums . It shows him with a myrtle wreath .

Expansion outside of Sicily

In 304 Agathocles attacked the island of Lipara (now Lipari ) and forced the inhabitants to pay tribute; he probably annexed the Aeolian Islands . He also intervened on the southern Italian mainland, where he successfully took part in battles against the Italians there on the side of the Greek city of Taranto . His intention was to establish Syracuse supremacy in the south of the mainland. Through an attack he succeeded in taking the city of Croton , which had an important trading port. The military clashes with the stubborn brutes in Calabria were changeable and costly. Another aim of the tyrant was to control the sea route between Greece and southern Italy. In order to secure this sea connection, Agathocles occupied the western Greek island of Korkyra ( Corfu ) around 299 , after his fleet had won a major naval victory over the forces of the Macedonian king Kassander , who also wanted to incorporate the island into his sphere of influence. With this intervention, Agathocles interfered in the diadoch battles and also asserted a claim to power in Greece.

In the last years of his life, Agathocles planned a new major attack on the Carthaginian Empire, for the preparation of which he made enormous efforts. He had a fleet of 200 ships equipped. The goal was the complete expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily. Due to the death of the tyrant, this undertaking did not materialize.

Family policy

At the time of his kingship, Agathocles was one of the most powerful rulers in the Greek-speaking world and pursued a far-reaching marriage policy. Two sons of his first wife, Archagathus and Herakleides, had perished in Africa; a third son from this marriage, who appeared in command in southern Italy after the end of the Carthaginian War, apparently did not survive his father either. From his second marriage to a woman named Alkia, he had a son who was also named Agathocles. His daughter Lanassa probably came from this marriage as well. In his third marriage he married around 295 BC. Theoxene, a princess from the Egyptian royal house of the Ptolemies . She was probably not a daughter, but a stepdaughter of King Ptolemy I. The background to this step was probably primarily the mutual opposition of the two kings to Carthage. With Theoxene, Agathocles had two sons. Shortly before his death he sent his wife with her dowry and the two children back to Egypt as a precaution, because he wanted to keep Theoxene and the still young sons out of the expected bloody power struggles.

His daughter Lanassa married Agathocles to Pyrrhos I , king of the Molossians in Epirus , and gave her Korkyra as a dowry; so he regarded the island as personal property. Lanassa later separated from Pyrrhus; she dissolved the marriage and took up residence at Korkyra. The island had not been occupied by the troops of Pyrrhus, but remained militarily under the control of Agathocles. Lanassa then married the Macedonian king Demetrios I Poliorketes and brought Korkyra as a dowry into the new marriage. This marriage marked a change of alliance of Agathocles in the conflict between Pyrrhus and Demetrios.

death

The end of Agathocles' reign was overshadowed by a power struggle between his son Agathocles from his second marriage and his grandson Archagathos. Archagathos was a son of Archagathos, who came from the first marriage of Agathocles and who had perished on the African campaign. Agathocles decided on his son of the same name as his successor and sent him as the new commander to the armed forces near Mount Etna , which at that time were still subordinate to Archagathos. The tyrant's grandson, however, could not be eliminated, but killed the rival.

The credibility of the reports on further events is very doubtful. It is only certain that the king did not accept the murder of his son and excluded Archagathos from the succession. Before he died, he gave power back to the people of Syracuse at a popular assembly, so he preferred the restoration of democracy after his death to the appointment of the stubborn grandson as his successor. However, this did not mean that he abdicated as king. Soon after his death, Archagathos was killed.

The Syracusans confiscated the late ruler's property and removed his statues. The cities he subjugated made themselves independent.

reception

Antiquity

Even among contemporary historians, whose works are now lost, opinions about Agathocles diverged widely, and the judgments of ancient posterity were ambivalent. Four contemporaries - Antandros of Syracuse, Callias of Syracuse , Duris of Samos and Timaeus of Tauromenion - wrote detailed accounts, assessing the role of the ruler very differently. Antandros, an older brother of Agathocles, had been entrusted with important tasks by the ruler; his description must have been positive. The story of Agathocles in 22 books written by the historian Callias was certainly tyrannical. Callias was paid for by the tyrant for his work, but that does not necessarily mean that his report was untrustworthy. Courtly historiography was common among monarchs and was denounced by opposing authors as a falsification of history . Duris of Samos wrote a story of Agathocles in four books. Since he himself was the tyrant of his home island Samos , it is reasonable to assume that he described the events from a somewhat autocratic perspective. However, surviving fragments of his lost work indicate that his image of Agathocles was not decidedly positive, but relatively neutral and differentiated. However, he seems to have embellished his description literarily.

The best-known of the four contemporary reporters, Timaeus, who had a very negative assessment of the Agathocles reception of posterity, judged quite differently. The view of this historian was determined by his living conditions: on the one hand, his father Andromachos had assumed a tyrant-like position of power as lord of the city in his hometown of Tauromenion , but on the other hand he had cooperated with the anti-tyrant Timoleon. Timaeus himself had been banished by Agathocles and had to go into exile in Athens. As a result, he was cut off from the opportunity to take on a leadership role in his homeland that was commensurate with his family's reputation. Timaeus was aristocratic and painted a highly negative image of most tyrants. He harbored a personal hatred of Agathocles in particular. He accused him of cruelty, greed and cowardice.

The history of Timaeus met with severe criticism in the 2nd century BC. In the case of the historian Polybius , who accused his predecessor of incompetence and prejudice. Polybius came to an overall positive assessment of the achievements of Agathocles. Although this was the most nefarious of all people, one can even see from the representation of Timaeus that Agathocles was gifted and admirable. The tyrant must have had tremendous abilities, since as the son of a craftsman he rose to rule over Sicily and royal dignity on his own and put the Carthaginian empire in grave danger. Polybius also pointed out that the elder Scipio († 183 BC), the Roman victor over Carthage, Agathocles and Dionysius I of Syracuse, had praised as the two greatest statesmen and generals in history; they would have combined boldness with insight. Apparently the extraordinary boldness of the tyrant and his cold-bloodedness in the most difficult situations impressed at least a part of the ancient world. In a Comedy by Plautus , a character places the deeds of Agathocles next to those of Alexander the Great.

In the 1st century BC The Sicilian Diodorus wrote a universal story in which he described the epoch of Agathocles in books 19, 20 and 21. A considerable part of this work has been preserved and is today the main source for the tyrant's deeds. However, Book 21 is not available in its original wording, but only in a shortened Byzantine version. Diodorus was very well informed because he probably had direct access to the four great representations of the contemporaries of Agathocles. Although he criticized Timaeus, he largely took over - although somewhat mitigating - his negative view, although he was not a fundamental opponent of autocratic or monarchical rule. The reason for this could be that Diodorus was of Sicilian descent and resented the Syracusian autocrat for his raids and raids into the Sicelian country and the disregard for Sicilian autonomy.

Another source is the Epitome of Junianus Justinus , an excerpt from the lost Historiae Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus , a historian of the beginning Principate period . Trogus relied on the work of Timaeus, but the epitome also shows traces of at least one other now lost script that he used, the author of which apparently admired the deeds of Agathocles.

Further material is provided by the military writer of the imperial era , Polyainos , who gives eight short stories in his Strategiká (war lists) , some of which he owes in part to Duris of Samos.

Since the Agathocles image of ancient posterity was heavily influenced by the representation of Timaeus, reports of tyrannical cruelty were in the foreground. However, the positive aspects of domestic politics were not completely concealed. Polybius and Diodorus stated that after the consolidation of his power, Agathocles had switched to a mild form of government, and Polybius remarked that this is communicated by all historians. According to Diodor's account, the tyrant “stopped with murders and further punishments”, “showed himself to be friendly to the common people” and “did favors to many”.

Early modern age

Niccolò Machiavelli praised Agathocles as an example of a ruler who had come to power through overthrow, who wisely used cruelty by limiting it to the time of the seizure of power and later not only renouncing it, but even making himself popular through deeds. For this reason he was able to rule unchallenged for a long time.

Voltaire wrote a tragedy Agathocle in 1777, shortly before the end of his life . It was his final tragedy, more of a sketch than a finished work. The premiere took place in 1779, one year after the author's death. The piece was not well received and was only performed four times.

Modern

Classical Studies

In modern research, the judgments of Agathocles have turned out differently, depending on the assessment of the credibility of the anti-tyrant sources. It is emphasized that his political and military actions were aimed entirely at the goal of increasing and securing his personal power and that despite enormous efforts and spectacular successes he did not create anything lasting; the arrangement of his successor failed completely. His personality is similar to that of the Diadochi, who were his contemporaries.

Johann Gustav Droysen (1878) described Agathocles as probably the most important of his contemporaries in character, "in his spirit capable of everything bold and amazing, of brilliant military talent, of that strength of will, that harshness and consistency in action Achieving the goal is certain ”. He tirelessly and with excellent insight took care of the advancement of his subjects.

Helmut Berve (1967) found that although Agathocles' unusual military and political achievements and "the extraordinary features of his powerful personality" were undeniable, he could hardly be counted among "the really greats of history" because he had no permanently better and more secure one State created as that which he found. After all, the last fifteen years of his rule should be considered an epoch of relative stability.

Hermann Bengtson (1977) believed that one should not allow the Timaeus to influence one's judgment of the achievements of the Sicilian ruler. Agathocles is "undisputedly the last truly great figure of Western Greece". He "kept moderation in the possession of the rule and showed himself to be forgiving of his opponents".

Klaus Meister (1984) advocated a balanced assessment. The important leadership qualities of the ruler should be appreciated, but it should also be noted that his reign was characterized by an endless series of political murder. The atrocities were by no means directed only against an oligarchical upper class, rather the poorer population also suffered severely from the repression. The ruler's actions show many characteristics of a typical tyranny.

Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher published her extensive Agathocles biography in 2000. She emphasized as a special achievement that the ruler had recognized the requirements of his time and had taken them into account by creating a monarchy of Hellenistic type and merging the city-states of the Sicilian Greeks into a Hellenistic land state. He had succeeded in putting an end to the long, costly battles between oligarchs and democrats. With his alliance policy, he had prevented the threat of being encircled by hostile powers.

Michael Rathmann (2016) suspects that the economic upswing in Sicily, which Diodorus traces back to Timoleon's beneficial work, and the associated construction of important buildings, actually took place in the time of Agathocles. This would give a picture of prosperity in the tyrant's sphere of influence. Rathmann asserts that the archaeological findings also indicate that the upswing only took place under Agathocles and Hieron II and led to prosperity.

Fiction

The historian Günter Pollach describes the life of Agathocles in a novel published in 2008.

literature

  • Helmut Berve : The rule of Agathocles. Publishing house of the Bavarian Academy, Munich 1953
  • Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks. Beck, Munich 1967, Volume 1, pp. 441-457 and Volume 2, pp. 728-731
  • Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle. Since capoparte a monarca fondatore di un regno tra Cartagine ei Diadochi. Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Antichità dell'Università degli Studi di Messina, Messina 2000, ISBN 88-8268-004-5
  • Werner Huss : History of the Carthaginians. Beck, Munich 1985, ISBN 3-406-30654-3 , pp. 176-203
  • Caroline Lehmler: Syracuse under Agathocles and Hieron II. The connection of culture and power in a Hellenistic metropolis. Verlag Antike, Frankfurt am Main 2005, ISBN 3-938032-07-3
  • Klaus Meister : Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank , Alan E. Astin (Eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History . Volume 7/1: The Hellenistic World. 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, ISBN 0-521-23445-X , pp. 384-411

Web links

Commons : Agathokles  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Remarks

  1. Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 385; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 22; Caroline Lehmler: Syracuse under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 37.
  2. Anna Simonetti Agostinetti: Agatocle di Siracusa: un tiranno-operaio. In: Aristonothos 2, 2008, pp. 153-160.
  3. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 22 f.
  4. Diodor, Libraries 19: 3, 3–4. See Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 23 f.
  5. See on this Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 24–31.
  6. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 29-34; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 25.
  7. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 33 f., 38-44; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 27.
  8. Justinus, Epitome 22,2,5-7. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 52-55.
  9. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 41-46.
  10. Diodor, Libraries 19.5.5. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 41 f., 45 f.
  11. ^ Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 30 f. See, however, the different interpretation by Efrem Zambon: From Agathocles to Hieron II: the birth and development of basileia in Hellenistic Sicily. In: Sian Lewis (ed.): Ancient Tyranny , Edinburgh 2006, pp. 77–92, here: 78.
  12. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 45-47.
  13. Diodor, Libraries 19.6.4-19.8.2. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 47-49. Cf. Klaus Meister: Agatocle in Diodoro: interpretazione e valutazione nella storiografia moderna. In: Emilio Galvagno, Concetta Molè Ventura (ed.): Mito, storia, tradizione , Catania 1991, pp. 187–199, here: 193. Meister considers the numbers to be exaggerated.
  14. Diodor, Libraries 19: 9, 1-5. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 49-52.
  15. For the office of general with unlimited authority see Martin Dreher : The Syracusan Constitution in the 4th Century BC. Between theory and practice . In: Wolfgang Schuller (ed.): Political theory and practice in antiquity , Darmstadt 1998, pp. 50–58, here: 54–56. See also Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Volume 1, Munich 1967, p. 446.
  16. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 36–41.
  17. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 36.
  18. Caroline Lehmler: Syrakus under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 39; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 36 f.
  19. Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Volume 1, Munich 1967, pp. 447-449.
  20. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 41–45, 72 f.
  21. Diodor, Libraries 19.70.1–2. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 65-79.
  22. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 80-83.
  23. Diodor, Libraries 19.71.7 and 19.72.2; Justinus, Epitome 22: 3, 1-6. See Werner Huss: Geschichte der Karthager , Munich 1985, p. 181.
  24. Diodor, Libraries 19, 72, 1-2. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 85 f.
  25. Diodor, Libraries 19, 102, 6-8; 19,103.4; 19,107,4-5. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 88-92.
  26. See on this Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 92–95.
  27. Werner Huss: History of the Carthaginians , Munich 1985, p. 184.
  28. Werner Huss: History of the Carthaginians , Munich 1985, p. 184 f.
  29. Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 394 f .; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 117-121, 133-135.
  30. The figures for the Carthaginian army come from Diodor, Bibliotheke 20,10,5. See on these processes Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 395; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 135-142.
  31. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 142 f., 145–158.
  32. Diodor, Libraries 20,29,2-20,30,3. See Werner Huss: Geschichte der Karthager , Munich 1985, p. 191.
  33. On these processes see Werner Huss: Geschichte der Karthager , Munich 1985, p. 192 f.
  34. Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 396; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 153.
  35. Werner Huss: Geschichte der Karthager , Munich 1985, p. 194. Helmut Berve: Ophellas expresses doubts about the credibility of the representation in anti-tyrant sources . In: Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswwissenschaft (RE), Volume 18.1, Stuttgart 1939, Sp. 632-635, here: 634. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 189 excludes a plan of murder that was drawn up from the start , also Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 397. Cf. Brian Herbert Warmington: Karthago , Wiesbaden 1964, p. 132; Caroline Lehmler: Syracuse under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 40 f.
  36. Diodor, Libraries 20,54,2-20,55,5. See Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 204-208; Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 398.
  37. See also Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 401 f .; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 209-216, 252 f.
  38. Werner Huss: History of the Carthaginians , Munich 1985, p. 197 f .; Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 398 f.
  39. Werner Huss: Geschichte der Karthager , Munich 1985, p. 199; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 227-231.
  40. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 241.
  41. Werner Huss: History of the Carthaginians , Munich 1985, p. 199 f.
  42. Werner Huss: History of the Carthaginians , Munich 1985, p. 200 f.
  43. The source on Segesta's punishment is Diodorus, Libraries 20.71. See also Klaus Meister: The Sicilian History in Diodorus from the Beginnings to the Death of Agathocles , Munich 1967, p. 160; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 242 f.
  44. Werner Huss: History of the Carthaginians , Munich 1985, p. 201 f .; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 245 and note 14.
  45. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 60 f .; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 255-257, on Agrigento, pp. 256 f. Note 14. Cf. but Klaus Meister: Agatocle in Diodoro: interpretazione e valutazione nella storiografia moderna. In: Emilio Galvagno, Concetta Molè Ventura (ed.): Mito, storia, tradizione , Catania 1991, pp. 187–199, here: 196 f. Meister criticizes the portrayal of Consolo Langher.
  46. Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 63 f .; Efrem Zambon: From Agathocles to Hieron II: the birth and development of basileia in Hellenistic Sicily. In: Sian Lewis (ed.): Ancient Tyranny , Edinburgh 2006, pp. 77–92, here: 82–84.
  47. Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Volume 1, Munich 1967, pp. 454 f .; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 68–73.
  48. Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 411; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 259, note 19.
  49. Diodor, Libraries 20,54,1; Aelian, Varia historia 11.4. See Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 70–72; Anna Simonetti Agostinetti: Agatocle di Siracusa: un tiranno-operaio. In: Aristonothos 2, 2008, pp. 153–160, here: 159.
  50. On the coinage of Agathocles see Maria Caccamo Caltabiano: La Nike / Nymphe di Agatocle e l'ideologia della Vittoria. In: Maria Caccamo Caltabiano (ed.): Tyrannis, Basileia, Imperium , Messina 2010, pp. 277–302, here: 277–282; Walther Giesecke: Sicilia numismatica , Leipzig 1923, pp. 89–95 and illustrations, plate 21; Andrew Stewart: Faces of Power. Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics , Berkeley et al. 1993, pp. 266–269, 432–433 and Figure 87.
  51. Caroline Lehmler: Syrakus under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 47 (see also pp. 62–83); Efrem Zambon: From Agathocles to Hieron II: the birth and development of basileia in Hellenistic Sicily. In: Sian Lewis (ed.): Ancient Tyranny , Edinburgh 2006, pp. 77–92, here: 80–84.
  52. Cicero, Against Verres 2,4,122 f. See Caroline Lehmler: Syrakus under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 111–115.
  53. ^ Illustrations by Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 372 f.
  54. For these undertakings see Maria Intrieri: Politica e propaganda: Corcira nelle lotte fra basileis. In: Luisa Breglia et al. (Ed.): Ethne, identità e tradizioni: la “terza” Grecia e l'Occidente , Pisa 2011, pp. 431–455, here: 438–442, 446–448; Gabriele Marasco: Agatocle e la politica siracusana agli inizi del III secolo aC In: Prometheus. Rivista quadrimestrale di studi classici 10, 1984, pp. 97-113. Marasco doubts the alliance with Taranto (p. 101 f.). Cf. Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 406 f.
  55. Werner Huss: History of the Carthaginians , Munich 1985, p. 202 f .; Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 408.
  56. Matthias Haake: Agathokles and Hieron II. Two basileis in Hellenistic times and the question of their succession . In: Víctor Alonso Troncoso (ed.): Diadochos tes basileias. La figura del sucesor en la realeza helenística , Madrid 2005, pp. 153–175, here: 155.
  57. ^ Fritz Geyer : Theoxene . In: Paulys Realencyclopadie der classischen Altertumswwissenschaft (RE), Volume 5 A / 2, Stuttgart 1934, Col. 2255 f .; Werner Huss: Egypt in Hellenistic Time , Munich 2001, p. 203 (and note 103 on the dating).
  58. See Gabriele Marasco: Agatocle e la politica siracusana agli inizi del III secolo aC In: Prometheus. Rivista quadrimestrale di studi classici 10, 1984, pp. 97-113, here: 97 f., 112 f.
  59. ^ Fritz Geyer: Theoxene . In: Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswwissenschaft (RE), Volume 5 A / 2, Stuttgart 1934, Col. 2255 f., Here: 2256.
  60. Gabriele Marasco: Agatocle e la politica siracusana agli inizi del III secolo aC In: Prometheus. Rivista quadrimestrale di studi classici 10, 1984, pp. 97-113, here: 106; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 192, 194 f., 302-305 f., 319 f., 327; Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 406-408.
  61. Matthias Haake: Agathokles and Hieron II. Two basileis in Hellenistic times and the question of their succession . In: Víctor Alonso Troncoso (ed.): Diadochos tes basileias. La figura del sucesor en la realeza helenística , Madrid 2005, pp. 153–175, here: 159–162; Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, p. 320 f .; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 73 f.
  62. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 74 f.
  63. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 76 f.
  64. Klaus Meister: Agatocle in Diodoro: interpretazione e valutazione nella storiografia moderna. In: Emilio Galvagno, Concetta Molè Ventura (ed.): Mito, storia, tradizione , Catania 1991, pp. 187–199, here: 197; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 43; Helmut Berve: The tyranny among the Greeks , Volume 1, Munich 1967, p. 456.
  65. Klaus Meister: The Sicilian story with Diodor from the beginnings to the death of Agathocles , Munich 1967, p. 131; Michael Rathmann: Diodor and his library , Berlin 2016, p. 179 f.
  66. Klaus Meister: The Sicilian story with Diodor from the beginnings to the death of Agathocles , Munich 1967, p. 131; Michael Rathmann: Diodor and his library , Berlin 2016, p. 179 f. and note 89.
  67. Michael Rathmann: Diodor und seine Bibliotheke , Berlin 2016, p. 180 f .; Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 18, 21. Cf. Pascale Giovannelli-Jouanna: Douris et l'historiographie d'Agathocle. In: Valérie Naas, Mathilde Simon (eds.): De Samos à Rome: personnalité et influence de Douris , Paris 2015, pp. 123–155, here: 124 f., 133–135; Klaus Meister: The Sicilian story with Diodor from the beginnings to the death of Agathocles , Munich 1967, p. 133. Frances Pownall suspects a critical account: Alexander's Political Legacy in the West: Duris on Agathocles. In: Cinzia Bearzot, Franca Landucci: Alexander's Legacy , Rome 2016, pp. 181–201, here: 195–197.
  68. Michael Rathmann: Diodor und seine Bibliotheke , Berlin 2016, p. 180 and note 91.
  69. Klaus Meister: The Sicilian story with Diodor from the beginnings to the death of Agathocles , Munich 1967, pp. 132, 136; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, pp. 8–11, 21.
  70. Polybios, Historiai 12.15 and 15.35. See Michael Rathmann: Diodor und seine Bibliotheke , Berlin 2016, p. 181 f.
  71. Plautus, Mostellaria 775-776.
  72. Michael Rathmann: Diodor und seine Bibliotheke , Berlin 2016, p. 178 f., P. 180, notes 89 and 92, p. 181–187; Helmut Berve: The rule of Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 12 f. Cf. Klaus Meister: Agatocle in Diodoro: interpretazione e valutazione nella storiografia moderna. In: Emilio Galvagno, Concetta Molè Ventura (ed.): Mito, storia, tradizione , Catania 1991, pp. 187–199, here: 187–192; Pascale Giovannelli-Jouanna: Douris et l'historiographie d'Agathocle. In: Valérie Naas, Mathilde Simon (eds.): De Samos à Rome: personnalité et influence de Douris , Paris 2015, pp. 123–155, here: 143–147.
  73. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 19 f.
  74. Helmut Berve: Die Herrschaft des Agathokles , Munich 1953, p. 20.
  75. Polybios, Historiai 9.23.2 and 12.15; Diodor, Libraries 19,9,6. Cf. Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 390.
  76. Niccolò Machiavelli, Il principe 8. Cf. Caroline Lehmler: Syrakus under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 48, note 98.
  77. Voltaire: Agathocle .
  78. Caroline Lehmler: Syrakus under Agathokles and Hieron II. , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 48; Klaus Meister: Agathocles . In: Der Neue Pauly , Volume 1, Stuttgart 1996, Sp. 237-239, here: 239; Matthias Haake: Agathokles and Hieron II. Two basileis in Hellenistic times and the question of their succession . In: Víctor Alonso Troncoso (ed.): Diadochos tes basileias. La figura del sucesor en la realeza helenística , Madrid 2005, pp. 153–175, here: 161 f.
  79. ^ Johann Gustav Droysen: History of the Diadochi , Basel 1952 (new edition of the 2nd edition from 1878), p. 267 f.
  80. Helmut Berve: Die Tyrannis bei den Greeks , Volume 1, Munich 1967, p. 457.
  81. ^ Hermann Bengtson: Greek History from the Beginnings to the Roman Empire , 5th, reviewed and supplemented edition, Munich 1977, p. 394.
  82. Klaus Meister: Agathocles. In: Frank W. Walbank, Alan E. Astin (eds.): The Cambridge Ancient History , Volume 7/1, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1984, pp. 384-411, here: 410 f.
  83. Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher: Agatocle , Messina 2000, pp. 324-326, 328, 339 f.
  84. Michael Rathmann: Diodor und seine Bibliotheke , Berlin 2016, p. 178, note 81 and p. 184 f.
  85. Günter Pollach: Agathocles - The tyrant of Syracuse. Historical novel , Frankfurt / Main 2008.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on October 26, 2010 in this version .