Practical ethics

This article is about Peter Singer's book. For the area of ​​ethics, see applied ethics .

Praktische Ethik (Original: Practical Ethics ) is the title of a book by Peter Singer , first published in 1979 , in which he outlines his preferential utilitarian ethical approach and establishes conclusions for problem areas of applied ethics , including animal ethics , the vitality of embryos and other bioethical topics. It has been translated into many languages ​​and caused heated discussions about the value of human life (and its assessability) , especially in Germany , Austria and Switzerland .

The book was revised in 1993 and two new chapters were added in a second edition, one on ecological issues and one on refugees . In 2011 a third edition was published, in which the chapter on the topic of displacement was removed and a new one on ethical issues of climate change was included.

content

Equality and interests

In the chapter on equality and its implications, Singer explains the principle of balancing interests. Accordingly, equality does not mean treating everyone equally, but considering all interests equally. It is not justified to take the species into account when weighing interests. What matters is not whether a being belongs to the human species , but what interests it has. For example, the ability to feel pain is coupled with an interest in not being in pain. All individuals who can feel pain must therefore be considered in a trade-off.

According to Singer, there is no ethical reason not to treat the interests of living things equally. In order to be able to speak meaningfully of interests, he sets the ability to feel pain as a prerequisite for interests. Living beings that cannot feel pain have no interests and therefore no interests that need to be taken into account.

Singer's ethics are based on a utilitarian approach, so he considers “rights” to be of little use unless they serve as an abbreviation to refer to “more fundamental moral principles”.

The concept of person

Based on John Locke , Singer develops his concept of person. This is constitutive of his ethical approach. A person is therefore a living being who is self-aware, sensitive and autonomous and has an interest in something. It must also be able to have wishes for the future and be aware of the past and present. It is about a continuous awareness of identity over time, i.e. a “distinct entity in time”.

Singer distinguishes three categories of beings:

• unconscious beings, for example plants . These beings cannot feel pain and do not need to be considered when weighing interests.
• conscious beings, such as fish , who are sentient. Your interests must be taken into account.
• self-conscious beings (people) , for example, adult humans and apes (assuming no mental impairment is present). Killing them outweighs killing only conscious (but not self-conscious) beings, as they usually have a desire to go on living in the future.

Animals

One consequence of this approach is that the interests of all animals capable of suffering must be taken into account as well as the interests of humans. This has a particular impact on modern factory farming and animal experiments , in which the animals often suffer and their interest in not feeling pain is disregarded.

The different consideration of interests based on belonging to a species (for example, people who classify their interests as being more important than animals) is what Singer describes as speciesism, based on terms such as racism or sexism .

Why is killing wrong?

Why killing a living being is wrong, according to Singer, does not depend on the species (e.g. whether the living being is a person or not), but on the state of consciousness. While the killing of a conscious, not self-conscious being merely deprives the being of the possibility of further experiencing pleasure, the killing of a person is more serious according to Singer's definition. Since people are aware of their future and have wishes for it, the killing of a person represents the thwarting of the fulfillment of the wishes. In addition, the killing of a living being is seldom painless; this pain must also be taken into account.

The killing of embryos, fetuses and newborns

When a fertilized egg grows through the fetus into an infant, there is no clear point at which killing is unethical. Singer notes that the common dividing line at the point of birth , the presence of a consciousness or the independent viability in relation to the prohibition of killing has no ethical significance, since it represents a fuzzy and often unfounded demarcation.

Because with every fair comparison of morally relevant properties such as rationality, self-confidence, consciousness, autonomy, sensation of pleasure and pain, and so on, the calf, the pig and the much mocked chicken have a good lead over the fetus at every stage of pregnancy [...] .

For Singer, the most important criterion is the fetus' ability to suffer, which begins at a certain point in time. A woman's serious interests would, therefore, normally at all times take precedence over the rudimentary interests of even a conscious fetus.

Rich and poor

According to Singer, there is no moral justification for a few people living in abundance while many other people are in poverty and starving. He advocates that people who can afford it should donate 10% of their income to counteract this inequality. He comes to this demand after a discourse on the question: What is morally worse? Kill or let die? from the point of view that in the case of economic abundance, not donating is tantamount to letting die . In the case of donations, the resulting benefit outweighs the comparatively small loss suffered by the donor.

He pays 20 to 30 percent of his income to Oxfam and UNICEF .

Refugee problem

In the chapter The Inside and Outside, which is only contained in the second edition, Singer cites arguments for the admission of more refugees to the rich industrialized countries. According to the principle of equal consideration of the interests of all those concerned, he first names the interests of refugees - their most urgent and fundamental interests are obviously at stake - and secondly those of the residents of the host country. He is also considering indirect consequences, for example the chance of an upswing or the risk of destabilization in the host country or a stabilization of the world order, in that rich countries do not leave the poor alone with the issue. As a result, like in the chapter rich and poor , he takes the opinion that drastically more refugees need to be helped, even if this means a reduction in the luxury common in industrialized nations. According to Singer, doubling the quotas could even be of benefit to the population.

In the third edition, Singer took the chapter out of his work. To deal with the subject in a single chapter of a volume aimed at an international readership must inevitably remain superficial. Singer did not think that an appropriate and sufficiently differentiated discussion was possible in this context.

Climate change

In the third edition, Singer included a chapter on climate change , "the essential moral challenge of our time". Greenhouse gas emissions cause damage far away, imperceptibly to the polluter . Singer refers, among other things, to estimates by the World Health Organization , according to which an additional 140,000 people died as a result of climate change in 2004 alone. People lack instinctive inhibitions and emotional responses to this form of harm. According to Singer, the mere view that one should not harm strangers means an obligation to stop the previous approach and to pay for any damage that has already occurred.

Singer discusses three approaches to determining who should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to what extent: The principle of taking historical emissions into account, the principle of an equal per capita share in the absorption capacity of the atmosphere, and the principle of limiting luxury emissions while maintaining a livelihood. Emissions remained allowed. But, according to Singer, there is no plausible ethical principle imaginable that the rich countries could use to justify their high greenhouse gas emissions. He compares the action of the rich countries in their massive effect with a war of aggression against the threatened people.

With regard to individual obligations , Singer states: The effect of individual emission reductions is apparently small and not noticeable by anyone. However, a very large number of people - millions, maybe billions - (in total) very great damage is caused by the emissions of an individual. According to Singer, it is absurd to ignore minor damage in this case. In addition, there is the exemplary character and the political impact of climate-friendly behavior. In addition to responsibility for individual or collective injustice caused by greenhouse gas emissions, there is an obligation to work towards a change in politics in one's own country.

environment

Singer sees different moral values emerge particularly clearly when asked about the right way to deal with nature . In an anthropocentric view, as it is widespread in the occidental tradition, people are of central or even sole importance. The value of something natural then lies solely in the fact that it can be a means to human ends, be it for livelihood or for e.g. B. aesthetic experiences. If the interests of all future generations and those of all sentient beings ( pathocentrism ) are appropriately taken into account when consuming exhaustible natural resources , then such an ethics would provide effective arguments for “environmental values”. When considering future generations, the usual practice of attaching less weight to the interests of future people ( social discounting ) could be unjustified if this would irretrievably lose things that could be significant for the future.

Arguments that other than sentient beings, such as plants, species, ecosystems or the entire biosphere , could have a value in their own right ( biocentrism ) are not able to convince Singer. Albert Schweitzer's arguments in favor of an ethics associated with “reverence for life” are incomprehensible to Singer; the same point of view could be taken with regard to artificial things. Singer also rejects deep ecological convictions that also attribute value to the lifeless. Because here, too, Singer does not see a meaningful orientation, as it is given by interests in sentient beings, as possible.

Ends and means

Using four cases, the ends and means chapter, and the third edition, Civil Disobedience, Violence and Terrorism , discusses different types of civil disobedience and violence . In all cases it is a violation of the law that is committed in order to change a recognized but - from the point of view of the perpetrator - immoral practice. The question examined by Singer is when can the use of such illicit means for laudable purposes be justified.

Singer differentiates between civil disobedience, violence against property and violence against living beings. It also plays a role for him whether disobedience or violence is exercised in a democracy or another system, for example a dictatorship. He very often regards civil disobedience as justified. Various possible consequences have to be weighed up: the extent of the injustice, the consequences of the prohibited act, the risk that respect for the law and democracy will fall drastically, or the risks of counterproductive consequences for the intended purpose. Normally, judgments that have come about in established, peaceful processes are to be accepted; this applies in particular to democratic decisions that actually represent the majority. However, if the decision does not represent the majority or to draw the majority's attention to an injustice or - however much more difficult to justify - in the case of particularly great injustices such as genocide, even against the apparent will of the majority, disobedience can be right.

Violence, on the other hand, is difficult to justify. The reasons given for violence against sentient beings must generally be more weighty than those for property damage. Violence against people is only in extreme cases, such as resistance in the era of National Socialism justifiable.

Why Act Morally?

The last chapter of the book is a contribution to the philosophical debate on the justification of morality . The title question is a variation on the key question of this debate first raised by Bradley . As a metaethical question, it does not belong in the same category of questions such as “Can an abortion be justified?” Or “Do animals have rights?”, Which ethics tries to answer, but is a question about ethics itself . Singer specifies it as a search for reasons for making judgments and decisions in general on the basis of their universalizability - from the standpoint of the impartial observer - and not solely on the basis of self-interest, aesthetics or etiquette.

Arguments that reason alone demands moral action from us because immoral, i. H. non-universalisable action that would contradict an objective, universal reason are not conclusive for him. An amoral , selfish view that takes one's interests first can be as coherent as one that does the same for the interests of all. Acting out of a sense of duty, for the sake of morality itself, is socially useful and commendable, but ultimately remains unfounded. According to Singer, the decisive factor in ascribing morality to an action is not that it is morally motivated; what is more important are the consequences of the action . Therefore, it is possible for Singer to look for reasons for moral action even in the motive of self-interest.

Singer outlines two amoral character types: the impulsive, asocial "psychopath", who only focuses on his own, short-term pleasures, and the "clever egoist" who pursues long-term, but also only immediate, personal interests. For them it cannot be ruled out that they can lead a happy or fulfilled life. However, according to Singer, the first one lacks a meaningful goal, the second one will often fail because of insatiability. An obvious solution is the ethical view, which helps us to overcome our inward-looking interests. Reason, in a broad sense, which includes self-awareness and reflection on the nature and purpose of our own existence, urges us to have broader interests than the quality of our existence, and consequently to act ethically.

reception

Practical Ethics is Singer's main work and is in line with his book Animal Liberation , which was published four years earlier . Animal liberation , more aimed at an academic audience. British philosophers Roger Crisp and Tim Chappell included it in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy bibliography on utilitarianism as an "influential collection of utilitarian discussions of various practical issues" . The Australian philosopher Stephen Buckle credits Practical Ethics for arguing clearly and taking a remarkable standpoint of its own on a number of issues.

Buckle sees Singer following in the footsteps of non-cognitivist predecessors in metaethics , especially those of Richard M. Hare . Ultimately, however, Singer's moral justification is not conclusive for him. At the beginning of his work, Singer explains why the utilitarian point of view forms an initial minimal ethical basis: if one takes the moral point of view, then one cannot refuse to take the step of universalizing one's self-interest-oriented decision-making and arrives at this utilitarian point of view, which at least the interests of all Those affected. As a reason why one should even take the step of universalization, Singer finally gives an enlightened self-interest that indirectly leads to one's own happiness via the ethical point of view. But why, asks Buckland, will someone who is only interested in himself necessarily take the step of universalization if this is not in his interest? To do this, one has to assume that in addition to self-interest, people also have an inherent urge to universalize. But then, instead of self-interest, one could just as easily put a universalism at the beginning of the considerations. By placing self-interest at the beginning and subordinating reason to it, Singer followed Hume . But instead of, like Hume, accepting compassionate feelings as a moral justification, he replaces it, according to Buckle, inadmissibly with an inconsistent attempt at a rational justification based on self-interest.

In Germany, Austria and Switzerland in particular, Singer was heavily criticized for the book. His lectures at universities were deliberately disrupted and protests forced the organizers to cancel. Disability organizations and other groups accuse Singer of “contempt for human beings”. Singer's opponents justify their rejection of a discussion with the "inviolability of human life" and refer to the T4 campaign during the Nazi era, in which life was also "assessed" and 100,000 disabled people were killed.

A compilation of the reactions to Singer's ethics and a chronology of the public discussion is under the title Peter Singer in Germany. To endanger the freedom of discussion in science. been published.

Work history

Second edition

Singer goes into more detail on some of the criticisms of the first edition. Attached is a reprint of Singer's essay " On Being Silenced in Germany ", in which he describes the debate in Germany from his point of view. There he criticizes, for example, the lack of willingness to discuss what “absolute human dignity” and “value of life” actually mean, what these ethical concepts are based on and what their implications are. In addition, he defends himself against comparisons of his position with the acts during the National Socialist era.

Singer encounters HLA Hart's criticism that a utilitarian should also be replaceable as follows: The creation of new preferences , even if these are met, is generally neither good nor bad. For example, creating the “hunger” preference may appear acceptable if it is rewarded and satisfied with a tasty meal. On the other hand, it is not desirable to get a headache, even if a remedy is available and thus the desire to end the pain can be fulfilled. Preferences of persons cannot be replaced, because the fulfillment of a replacement preference goes hand in hand with the creation of the same and this is ethically neutral, i.e. cannot justify the destruction of the original preference.

third edition

In the third edition, the chapter on the refugee problem that was added in the second edition was removed. A chapter on climate change and the associated challenges has been added to this end.

In his foreword to the third edition, he describes the most significant change as a rethinking of his earlier position on the question of whether the emergence of a new living being - be it human or non-human - can in any sense compensate for the end of the same living being that has been killed . After the revision of the third edition, he no longer sees a position based exclusively on preferential utilitarianism as a satisfactory solution to this dilemma. These parts of the book would still leave him with a great deal of philosophical uncertainty.

After Singer had presented the third edition of the volume Practical Philosophy , he finally largely abandoned the preferential utilitarian view in his work on The Point of View of the Universe (2014), in which he examined the positions of Henry Sidgwick , which were oriented towards classical hedonistic utilitarianism joined the hedonistic view of classical utilitarianism.

literature

• Peter Singer: Practical Ethics . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979; 2nd edition, 1993; 3rd edition, 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-70768-8 (German practical ethics. 3rd edition. Reclam, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-15-018919-1 )
• Kurt Wuchterl: Discussions and controversies in the philosophy of the 20th century. Haupt, Bern 1997, ISBN 3-8252-1982-8 .
• Dale Jamieson (Ed.): Singer and His Critics. Blackwell, Oxford 1999, ISBN 1-55786-909-X .
• Till Bastian (Ed.): Think, write, kill. On the new "euthanasia" discussion and on Peter Singer's philosophy. Hirzel, Stuttgart 1990, ISBN 3-8047-1112-X .

References and comments

1. ^ Page at Cambridge University Press. Retrieved March 17, 2011.
2. ^ Roger Crisp and Tim Chappell: Utilitarianism . In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 2011, doi : 10.4324 / 9780415249126-L109-2 .
3. ↑ ^{a b} Stephen Buckle: Peter Singer's Argument for Utilitarianism . In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics . tape 26 , no. 3 , 2015, doi : 10.1007 / s11017-005-3974-z .
4. ↑ Christoph Anstötz (Ed.): Peter Singer in Germany. To endanger the freedom of discussion in science. Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1995, ISBN 3-631-48014-8 .
5. ^ Peter Singer: On Being Silenced in Germany . In: The New York Review of Books . 38, No. 14, August 15, 1991, ISSN  0028-7504 , pp. 36-42.
6. ^ Adam Ford: The Point of View of the Universe - Peter Singer. July 4, 2017, accessed on September 13, 2018 (see also the integrated interview with Peter Singer, from min. 2:30). 

From practical ethics, 2nd edition. Reclam :

1. ↑ p. 130
2. ↑ p. 120
3. ↑ p. 196f
4. ↑ p. 197
5. ↑ p. 435f

From practical ethics, 3rd edition. Reclam :

1. ↑ ^{a b c} pp. 14-15
2. ↑ pp. 383-386
3. ↑ pp. 386-406
4. ↑ pp. 407-418
5. ↑ ^{a b} pp. 419-448
6. ↑ pp. 483-488
7. ↑ pp. 488-492
8. ↑ pp. 489-514
9. ↑ pp. 513-516
10. ↑ pp. 37-44

Notes :

1. ↑ However, it is entirely possible that interests do not affect conscious beings. For example, a person can view the natural flora as something beautiful and have an interest in its preservation. Unconscious beings do not have (and cannot have) an interest in maintaining them, but since conscious beings can have such an interest, this interest must be taken into account. Jean-Claude Wolf speaks about the distinction between an instrumental (as opposed to an intrinsic ) value. (Jean-Claude Wolf: Animal ethics. Freiburg (Switzerland) 1992, 60 f.)
2. ↑ The figures relate to changes compared to the years 1961–1990 as the base period, see World Health Organization (ed.): Global health risks: mortality and burden of disease attributable to selected major risks . 2009, ISBN 978-92-4156387-1 , pp. 24, 39, 50 ( who.int [PDF; 3.8 MB ]).
3. ↑ In the third edition, there is a fifth case on the subject of climate change, namely an unauthorized occupation of a coal-fired power station by Bill McKibben and Wendell Berry .