Biocentrism

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The Biocentrism is an ethical model that all "living" assigns an ethical intrinsic value. If this eigenvalue is the same for all entities , i.e. without gradation, one speaks of radical biocentrism or egalitarian biocentrism , otherwise it is hierarchical or weak biocentrism . In the sense of general ethical theories, especially animal ethical theories, it is often discussed comparatively in connection with approaches of pathocentrism and anthropocentrism on the one hand and holism on the other.

If the question of who will benefit from moral legal agreements is reversed and asked about possible exclusion or discrimination , questions of contractual theories are touched upon . Martha Nussbaum tries to compare such paradigms from this perspective in Frontiers of Justice (2006). Based on such an alleged discrimination, Mark Rowlands suggests in Animals like us (2002) a possible opening of John Rawlsscher's theories of contract and justice to animals. The extent to which his proposal still corresponds to Rawls' model is discussed.

A criticism of biocentrism can be conducted from a utilitarian point of view in such a way that ethical criteria must have an influence on the concrete well-being of individuals. If one follows Peter Singer's arguments, one arrives at a normatively less inclusive pathocentrism. However, there are also utilitarian representatives of biocentrism, such as Jean-Claude Wolf .

From deontological positions, modern Kantians , that is, anthropocentrics, argue against biocentrism , referring to the formulations of the categorical imperative , which would correspond to the realm of ends or autonomy formula. Julian Franklin (not a biocentric himself) criticizes this approach by noting that these formulations refer to the source of morality . A distinction must be made between those individuals who are affected by moral judgments and those who make them. Tom Regan makes an analogous distinction by differentiating between the sets of moral agents and moral patients (such as those who act morally and those who are treated morally). Bernd Ladwig takes up this approach, but in contrast to Regan comes normatively, mainly for pragmatic reasons, to a hierarchical legal theory.

See also

literature

advocate
  • Albert Schweitzer : Reverence for Life
  • Paul W. Taylor: Respect for Nature Princeton 1986
critic
  • Jutta Ditfurth : Relaxed into barbarism. Esotericism, (eco) fascism and biocentrism. Hamburg: 1996. ISBN 3-89458-148-4
  • Oliver Geden: Right Ecology. Environmental protection between emancipation and fascism . 2., updated and exp. Edition. Berlin: 1999. ISBN 3-88520-759-1

Individual evidence

  1. See Peter Singer, for example, Animal Revolution
  2. Cf. Arne Naess for example Gandhi, Natur och Kultur (2000)
  3. Documentation at the University of Hanover
    → Cf. also Kirsten Schmidt in Blinde Hühner as a test case of animal ethics theories in Journal for Philosophical Research Vol. 62 Issue 4, October / December 2008
  4. Daniel Loewe: Inclusión de animales no-humanos en un marco de argumentación teórico contractual in VERITAS, Vol 53, No 1 (2008).
  5. Cf. Jean-Claude Wolf: Argument for and contra animal rights in Information Philosophy August 3/2008
    Refers to Julian H. Franklin: Animal Rights in Moral Philosophy p. 176 Columbia University Press (2005)
  6. ^ See: Tom Regan: The Case for Animal Rights