Tom Regan

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Tom Regan

Tom Regan (born November 28, 1938 in Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania , United States , † February 17, 2017 ) was an American philosopher . His Case for Animal Rights is considered a classic in animal ethics and represents the first elaboration of an abolitionist animal rights position . In the context of Regan's subsequent professional defense of his approach, about three strands of debate can be identified:

  1. On the one hand, he responded to opponents of the animal rights position, such as B. Jan Narveson , Peter Carruthers or RG Frey .
  2. On the other hand, he insisted against other arguments for ethical consideration of animals on a deontological justification for this position. Regan particularly criticized Peter Singer for his utilitarian argument.
  3. Finally, he responded to the feminist criticism of his argument, which included that, on the one hand, a fundamental rights discourse was not helpful in effectively protecting the interests of other animals, and, on the other, that Regan considered the role of feelings and moral impulses in ethics versus logic and reason disdain. Cora Diamond , Brian Luke and Josephine Donovan have brought criticism of this kind to him.

Further contributions by Regan to ethics concern a comparatively sharp criticism of environmental ethics or the environmental movement and an elaboration of the borderline argument . Less well known, but valued by experts, are Regan's works on the philosophy of George Edward Moore .

Biographical

Tom Regan was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in November 1938 to Marie and Thomas Regan. He grew up in the city and describes his environment at the time in autobiographical texts as simple and appropriate to the social conditions of the working class to which his family belonged. The quarter was shaped by mining and the steel industry. Remarkably, Regan also worked in a butcher shop as a student. As an early turning point in his life, Regan describes the change of this environment to one of the suburbs in 1953. It was initially only this environment that motivated Regan to attend college. Regan was at best a slightly above average and certainly not an outstanding student. He also started his studies primarily because of the lack of desire to pursue a job. He chose philosophy for the pragmatic reason that he did not have to take a course in American and Pennsylvania history that he did not like. Regan describes his passion for writing as the only common thread in this development, which was fueled by some of his early teachers and pastors. Regan hardly thought seriously about animals or moral issues relating to them during this period.

Regan graduated from Thiel College in Philosophy in 1960 and then studied at the University of Virginia . He wrote his master's thesis on the concept of beauty and finally received his doctorate under the direction of Peter L. Heath in 1966 on the concept of good . He received his first teaching assignment at Sweet Briar College from 1965 to 1967. From 1967 he taught until his retirement in 2001 at North Carolina State University , where he held a full professorship from 1972. During his career he held various teaching positions at other institutions, for example at Oxford University in 1973, at the University of Calgary in 1977, at Brooklyn College in 1982, at the University of Essex in 1988, at Eastern Michigan University in 1996 and at Massey University in 1997. In addition to the international recognition that Regan has received for his pioneering research on the animal rights position, he has also received multiple awards for excellent teaching.

Regan has been married to Nancy Jane Regan, nee Tirk, since June 17, 1962. During this time, the young couple bought the dog Gleco, whose accidental death - and the Regan family's concern for it - played a key role in Regan's thinking about animal ethics. Together, the Regan couple gave birth to the children Bryan Regan (born October 8, 1966) and Karen Regan (born November 24, 1970). Nancy and Tom Regan jointly run the Culture and Animals Foundation . The foundation has set itself the task of promoting animal rights policy through intellectual and artistic expression.

Animal rights argument

Origin context

As a young university professor, Regan's participation in the peace protests in the context of the Vietnam War prompted him to think and write philosophically about the pacifist position. The questions raised by this topic led him to read Gandhi's writings intensively in 1972. For Gandhi, the idea of ahimsa , which is often translated as nonviolence , plays a key role in his pacifist theory of political change. It was a matter of course for Gandhi to apply the idea of ​​nonviolence to animals as well. Since people could live without violence against animals - especially without the violence of animal husbandry - and since violence should always be avoided whenever possible, Gandhi saw it as an ethical duty to live a vegetarian life. After his essay on the pacifist position (which Regan, incidentally, rejected - at least in its radicalism that violence can never be justified -) he devoted himself more intensively to the question of animal ethics raised by Gandhi and initially published a widely reprinted one in October 1975 Essay on the Moral Basis of Vegetarianism in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy . This was followed by various other essays on the topic, which were later collected in the anthology All That Dwell Therein (University of California Press 1982) and which Regan in retrospect considers all interesting but technically half-baked. During this period, Regan also served as the co-editor of various textbooks on applied ethics, and he and Peter Singer co- authored such an introductory book in 1976, entitled Animal Rights and Human Obligations .

Regan's case begins with a commentary on this painting by Stefan Lochner (* around 1400), who here painted St. Jerome with a tamed lion . Lochner had never met a lion during his lifetime, which makes his portrayal look silly from today's perspective. Lochner's image of lions is paradigmatic for the unenlightened, premodern understanding of animals in general.

Animal awareness and wellbeing

The first part of Regan's Case is an extensive analysis of the philosophy of the mind of animals. Starting with Descartes ' concept of the bête machine , which assumed that, unlike humans, animals do not have any participation in mental phenomena or that mental properties in animals are always reducible to their physical and physiological condition, Regan argues for animal participation in principle on the phenomenon of consciousness. On the one hand, Descartes' argument that human language skills are a necessary condition for consciousness is problematic: According to Regan, it is unclear how human children develop language skills if they cannot conceptually perceive the world beforehand. Descartes is also subject to an objection from La Mettrie , which radicalized Descartes insofar as this rejected Descartes' argument for the existence of an immortal soul in humans and also took the view for humans that these essentially function as "thoughtless automatons". Without answering La Mettrie here, Regan admits that assuming that non-human behavior is purely mechanical, the same is true of human behavior. Regan concludes this paper for the time being with a summarizing reply to modern variants that deny animals participation in the phenomenon of consciousness:

  1. The attribution of awareness to certain animals is consistent with our everyday experience. Projects to explain animal behavior without assuming mental phenomena were unsuccessful.
  2. The attribution of awareness of certain animals corresponds to everyday language.
  3. The attribution of consciousness for certain animals does not have to presuppose or imply that animals have an immortal (immaterial) soul and can therefore be represented independently of religious beliefs about afterlife.
  4. Animal behavior is consistent with understanding them as conscious.
  5. An evolutionary understanding of consciousness provides a theoretical basis for understanding certain animals as conscious beings.

As a result, Regan expands the argument in order to arrive at the position that some animals can also have their own wishes, interests and beliefs. These desires and beliefs then constitute a concept of the well-being of animals, so it makes sense to say that animals are those beings who can fare better or worse in their subjective well-being, depending on human actions.

Moral-philosophical embedding

In addition to the theses just discussed on the intellectual constitution of animals, Regan's group of meta-ethical theses is one of the central requirements of the animal rights argument. Regan, for example, suggests that ideal moral judgments should at least meet the following criteria: They must (1) have a clear conceptual structure, (2) be well informed about the objects to be judged, (3) sufficiently rational, (4) impartial, (5 ) be formed out of a sober state of mind and (6) be based on valid moral principles. He specifies the last point by stating that valid moral principles should always be (6a) consistent with one another, (6b) of reasonable scope, (6c) formulated with sufficient precision, and (6d) compatible with our moral intuitions. Regan further differentiates the concept of moral intuition into pre-reflective intuitions (“gut feelings”) and reflected moral intuitions as moral feelings that we also have after “we have made an honest effort against the criteria [meaning 1-5 ] to weigh up ... [Any] ethical theory that cannot explain these intuitions in a large number of cases cannot usefully be taken as the best theory. "

Finally, Regan discusses something more specifically against the view that all duties that humans have towards animals only concern animals, but are ultimately not due to them, but instead apply to other people, morality, God or the like. Specifically, Regan argues against Jan Narvesson's ethical egoism , who regards all duties as indirect duties in this sense, which everyone ultimately owes to himself, that this view can justify radically unequal institutional arrangements. Against John Rawls ' theory of indirect duties towards animals applies Regan, make sure it is ultimately arbitrary, in the original position behind the veil of ignorance does not presuppose a lack of knowledge about one's own species belonging. Against Immanuel Kant, he shows that the “exaggeration” of humanity is ultimately based on a lower understanding of animal abilities.

Criticism of utilitarianism

After Regan has rejected the possibility of building animal ethics on a theory of indirect duties, he considers some action- utilitarian proposals as examples of theories of direct duties towards animals, or towards animal experiences or preferences. His core objection here is the accusation that the different versions of utilitarianism make it too easy for us to justify killings: If a hedonistic or preference- based utilitarianism professes to optimize the relationship between happiness and happiness as the only moral principle. Suffering or of satisfaction vs. Setting the frustration of preferences forces this theoretical position to conceptualize the individual individuals themselves as mere “containers” for preferences or experiences. Their integrity as subjects can then only be of ethical interest indirectly for the purpose of feelings of happiness or preferential satisfaction. A second objection concerns the role of the principle of equality within utilitarian theories. It is unclear how it can be asserted that all interests are normatively considered equally when it is asserted at the same time that maximizing utility is the only moral principle. Either you admit an inconsistency here and recognize the principle of equality as an additional moral principle, or you explain how the principle of equality can be logically derived from the principle of utility, which, according to Regan, must have the consequence of diluting the moral content of the principle of equality. Finally, Regan discusses the extent to which Peter Singer's vegetarian argument fails because of these deficits in utilitarianism .

Legal argument

Since, according to Regan, attempts by other theories to justify fundamental, reflective moral intuitions, such as the fundamental prohibition against killing innocent moral agents without necessity, ultimately fail, he suggests the concept of the same inherent value. The logical structure of the inherent value is here on the one hand a value that “cannot be reduced to or commensurate with the values ​​of one's own or other people's experiences”. On the other hand, a value that applies equally to all entities with inherent value and does not allow any gradation. Regan suggests, regarding the scope of the same inherent value, as a sufficient but not necessary criterion the possession of a subjective well-being. Inherently valuable are at least all “subjects with a life that can be for their better or worse as subjects; and logically independent of their possible usefulness for others. "

On the basis that all subjects have an inherent value, Regan finally argues for the “principle of respect” as a fundamental principle of his legal theory. In terms of content, this principle requires “that we only treat individuals with inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value.” The “injury principle” is somewhat less formal and it is derived directly from the respect principle. Because we owe subjects of a life respect, and those subjects have welfare of their own, we disregard the inherent value that arises from welfare if we violate them.

The concept of animal rights is eventually told by Regan as a correspondence from legitimate claims and obligations: P has exactly then a right to X , if the claim of P on X is a valid claim, or if others play a duty entitlement from P to X to protect. With this sparing legal term, the principle of respect translates directly into a right to respectful treatment. Alan Soble recognizes Ronald Dworkin's proposal from Taking Rights Seriously in the form of this legal term , which Regan does not explicitly refer to in the case .

In the remainder of the text, Regan develops a few secondary principles in order to deal with certain moral configurations. In order to resolve conflicts between equivalent legal interests, for example , Regan proposes the principle of minimal overriding of rights claims , or the miniride principle for short , which stipulates that only a minimal number of legal claims should be overridden in such situations. Another such principle concerns the worse off principle , which prescribes, in the case of conflicting legal interests that cannot be compared with one another, avoiding harm to those who are generally worst off . This principle could be used to justify, for example, the avoidance of major harm to only a few innocent people rather than minor harm to no matter how many innocent people.

Some Implications of Regan's Animal Rights Position

With regard to the implications of his animal rights argument, Regan clearly advocates an abolitionist position against all forms of institutionalized animal use, including hunting and animal experimentation.

From this Regan also derives a moral duty to be a vegetarian . In the case , Regan extensively addresses a number of objections in this regard, which is why vegetarianism, for example, does not pose a risk to one's own health and also represents a real economic option that might seem somewhat trivial from today's perspective. At this point, Barry Kew criticizes the fact that the criticism of Regan's milk and egg production is only implicit and that the vegan position is thus based on the logic of his argument, but for the apparent stabilization of the position by weakening the consequences below its actual value on sale is. Gary Francione notes that Regan's policy of alliance with institutionalized animal welfare partially undermines his abolitionist position. He particularly criticizes Regan's role in a demonstration in Washington in the late 1990s that was ultimately taken over by the institutional animal welfare organization and flopped because of a boycott of many abolitionists.

Some discussions about the animal rights argument

Wildlife

A standard objection to the animal rights position is the reference to the violence that animals do to one another: If animals had rights, people would have to systematically intervene against this violence, which some consider to be an absurd consequence and on this basis reject the animal rights position. Regan's response to this reductio ad absurdum was essentially not to see the violence that animals do to one another as a violation of rights. In order to be able to violate (moral) rights, one has to be a moral agent - have a concept of morality and be able to respond to moral appeals, which does not apply to animals. In this way, an obligation to intervene in the face of legal violations, as accepted by Regan, does not necessarily result in an obligation to intervene in, for example, predator-prey relationships. Many animal rights activists have also criticized this reply. In particular, it was noted that Regan, in an analogous thought experiment with a toddler who has got hold of a revolver and is shooting around, does indeed allow violent interventions against the toddler if necessary, although in this example too there can be no legal violation. More recent animal rights activists tend to no longer negate interventions in principle, whereby the debates about the necessary extent and the priority of the "wildlife question" over institutionalized animal exploitation are lively continued.

Role of emotions

Regan was accused (often in the same breath with Singer) of devaluing the role of affects and emotions in an emancipatory practice for animals, especially by parts of the ecofeminist thought traditions.

Brian Luke and Cathryn Bailey, for example, criticize Regan's strategy of starting with readers who are initially indifferent to animal suffering, in order to ultimately argue primarily against any logical inconsistencies in their position. Regan is also always trying to present its animal rights position in a soberly argued framework and to differentiate animal rights activists from "crazy, emotional and uneducated" people who have fallen victim to "Bambi complexes". Luke argues that the presumed general apathy towards animal suffering does not exist in general and therefore emotionalizations and experiences can play an at least equal role in animal rights discourses. Elsewhere, Regan also seems to recognize a priority of ethical affects and even expresses this poetically: "Philosophy can lead the horse to the water, but the feeling is necessary for it to drink." Could stir up such moral affects but philosophy hardly contribute anything, which is why he does not locate his own role in it. In addition to discussing the strategic role of emotions, Deborah Slicer has exacerbated this criticism and argued that “legal tradition ... reproduces a culture of questionable dualistic hierarchies”. It presupposes a concept of male subjectivity and urges us to value “abstract principles instead of virtues and affects”.

Josephine Donovan argues similarly and opts for a critical reading of "the rationalist atomism of the liberal tradition" in favor of "visions that emphasize collectivity, emotional ties, and an organic (holistic) concept of nature."

Resolution of fundamental rights conflicts

Some have objected to Regan that his proposals for resolving conflict situations - i.e. the case of conflicting and fundamental interests of humans and animals - are problematic. Regan has carried out his theses on the hypothetical example of a lifeboat with four people and a dog, whereby the crew is forced to throw a creature overboard for reasons of space. Here Regan argues that - although death is also a substantial evil for the dog - the death of normal adult humans should be categorically differentiated from it on the grounds that ... Therefore, in this situation, the dog should be thrown overboard.

This resolution has raised a number of problems. Some subsequently tried to use this admission to argue by analogy that the use of animals is compatible with Regan's animal rights position. Francione has argued that this analogy does not work because the lifeboat examples are only about exceptional situations. The focus in Regan's theory is explicitly on everyday situations and human exploitative relationships with animals. In these everyday situations there are generally no existential conflicts, as is assumed in the lifeboat example, so that Regan's dissolution is a coherent possibility that does not necessarily discredit his central conclusion of the abolition of institutionalized animal use. Nonetheless, he (and others) consider the premise that death is a lesser evil for animals to be empirically questionable. Sapontzis points out, for example, that although humans obviously have opportunities for satisfaction, animals are fundamentally absent. However, the reverse is also true, so that this observation cannot justify the hierarchy made. Beyond the empirical questions, Evelyn Pluhar criticizes that Regan's statement "the severity of injury from death depends on the possibilities for satisfaction that death excludes" with Regan's views about the same inherent value that belongs to all subjects of a life, is incompatible. Singer also noted that "a theory that tries to teach us that all subjects in life (including dogs) have the same inherent value cannot be reconciled with the fact that in such lifeboat examples, the dog must always be sacrificed."

Tom Regan at a lecture in Heidelberg (May 2006)

Awards

Publications

Books
  • Tom Regan: The Commendation Thesis - An Analysis of the Concept of Goodness . University of Virginia, 1966. (Dissertation)
  • Tom Regan: Understanding Philosophy . Dickenson, 1974, ISBN 082210122X .
  • Tom Regan, Peter Singer [1976]: Animal Rights and Human Obligations , 2nd ed. Edition, Pearson, 1989, ISBN 0130368644 .
  • Tom Regan, Beauchamp , Callicott , Rachels , Bedau, Levenbook [1980]: Matters of Life and Death , 3rd ed. Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1992, ISBN 0070513309 .
  • Tom Regan, Donald Vandeveer (eds.): And Justice for All… New Introductory Essays in Ethics and Public Policy . Rowman & Littlefield, 1982, ISBN 0847670600 .
  • Tom Regan: All that dwell therein: Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics . University of California Press, 1982, ISBN 0520045718 .
  • Tom Regan [1983]: The Case for Animal Rights , 3rd ed. Edition, University of California Press, 2004, ISBN 0520243862 .
  • Tom Regan: GE Moore: The Early Essays . Temple University Press, 1986, ISBN 0877224420 .
  • Tom Regan: Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Uses of Animals in Science . Temple University Press, 1987, ISBN 0877225117 .
  • Tom Regan: The Struggle for Animal Rights . Intl Soc for Animal Rights, 1987, ISBN 0960263217 .
  • Tom Regan: Bloomsbury's Prophet: GE Moore and the Development of his Moral Philosophy . Temple University Press, 1986, ISBN 0877224463 .
  • Tom Regan (ed.) [1991]: GE Moore: The Elements of Ethics . Temple University Press, 2003, ISBN 1592131948 .
  • Tom Regan: The Thee Generation: Reflections on the Coming Revolution . Temple University Press, 1991, ISBN 0877227586 .
  • Tom Regan: Defending Animal Rights . University of Illinois Press, 2001, ISBN 0252074165 .
  • Tom Regan, Carl Cohen : The Animal Rights Debate . Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, ISBN 0847696634 .
  • Tom Regan: Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy . Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, ISBN 0742533549 .
  • Tom Regan, JM Masson: Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights . Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, ISBN 0742549933 .
  • Tom Regan, Andrew Linzey (eds.): Animals and Christianity: A Book of Readings . Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007, ISBN 1556356889 .
Movies
German-language texts & editions
  • From human rights to animal rights . In: Friederike Schmitz (Ed.): Animal ethics . Suhrkamp, ​​2014. ISBN 9783518296820
  • Ursula Wolf (ed.) : How to establish rights for animals . In: Texts on animal ethics . Reclam, 2008, ISBN 3150185351 . Also in Angelika Krebs (ed.) : Natural ethics: Basic texts of the current animal and eco-ethical discussion , 6th edition, Suhrkamp, ​​1997, ISBN 3518288628 .
  • IAT (Ed.): The Animal Rights Debate . In: animal rights . Harald Fischer Verlag, 2007, ISBN 3891314175 .
  • Klaus Petrus : Animal rights and the question of violence , 2013 at tier-im-fokus.ch as a translation from Tom Regan: How to Justify Violence . In: Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth , Steven Best , Anthony J. Nocella II (eds.), AK Press, 2006, ISBN 1904859569 .
  • The basic idea of ​​animal rights (part 1 & 2 ) in animal liberation (42) & (43)
  • Tom Regan in an interview with Melanie Bujok in Animal Liberation (43)
  • An excerpt from: Tom Regan: The case for animal rights , in Peter Singer (ed.): In Defense of Animals , Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985 and an interview that the Advocates for Animals (GB) did in 2002 with Tom Regan have led.

literature

  • Daniel A. Dombrowski : The Singer-Regan Debate . In: Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases . University of Illinois Press, 1997, ISBN 9780252066382 , pp. 9-45.
  • Gary L. Francione : Regan's Rights Theory . In: Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement . Temple University Press, 1996, ISBN 1-56639-461-9 , pp. 14-20.
  • Evelyn B. Pluhar : Regan, Tom . In: Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy , 1st ed. Edition, Macmillan Reference USA, 2008, ISBN 0028661370 , pp. 195-197.
  • Mark Rowlands : Tom Regan: Animal Rights as Natural Rights . In: Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice , 2nd ed. Edition, Palgrave, 2009, ISBN 0230219446 , pp. 58-98.
  • Gary Steiner : Contemporary Liberal Approaches to the Moral Status of Animals . In: Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship . Columbia University Press, 2008, ISBN 023114234X , pp. 99-115.
  • Ursula Wolf : Regan's conception of animal rights . In: Das Tier in der Moral , 2nd edition. Edition, Klostermann, 2004, ISBN 3465033140 , pp. 38–43.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights: A Decade's Passing . In: Richard T. Hull (Ed.): A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry - Presidential Addresses of the American Society for Value Inquiry. Radopi, Atlanta, 1994, pp. 439-459 (pdf; 1.7 MB).
  2. Tom Regan: An Examination and Defense of One Argument concerning Animal Rights . In: Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy . 22, No. 1, 1979, ISSN  0020-174X , p. 189. doi : 10.1080 / 00201747908601872 .
  3. See, for example, the reviews of ( Regan 1986 ).
  4. ^ Giovanni Aloi: Animal Rights, Human Wrongs . In: Antennae , 2011, pp. 21-27. Archived from the original on October 4th, 2012 Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.antennae.org.uk 
  5. Tom Regan: The Bird in the Cage: A Glimpse of my Life Archived from the original on March 7, 2013. Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Between the Species . 2, No. 2, 1986, pp. 90-99. Retrieved June 26, 2013. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / digitalcommons.calpoly.edu With some additions too.
  6. ^ Mohandas K. Gandhi and Tom Regan: Advocates for Animal Rights
  7. Tom Regan: A Defense of Pacifism . In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy . 2, No. 1, 1972, pp. 73-86.
    • Regan's terms of legitimacy for violence, see ( Petrus 2013 ).
  8. Tom Regan: The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism . In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy . 1975, pp. 181-214.
  9. ( Regan 1986 p. 95).
  10. ^ Regan 2004 pp. 4–25.
  11. Regan 2004 p. 28.
  12. Regan 2004 pp. 78-81.
  13. Regan 2004 pp. 126-140.
  14. Regan 2004 p. 148.
  15. Regan 2004 p. 193.
  16. Regan 2004 pp. 204-211.
  17. Regan 2004 S. 212-218.
  18. Regan 2004 S. 218-230.
  19. Regan 2004 p. 239.
  20. Regan 2004 p. 247.
  21. Regan 2004 p. 248.
  22. ^ Alan Soble: Rights, Killing, and Suffering by RG Frey; Animals and Why They Matter by Mary Midgley; The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan . In: Ethics . 96, No. 1, 1985, pp. 192-195.
  23. ( Regan 2003 p. 1)
  24. Barry Kew: It's a (Two-) Culture Thing: And how veganism has been sold short . In: Critical Society . 1, No. 7, 2011, pp. 20-35.
  25. ^ Claudette Vaughan: The Gary Francione Interview. Part 1 ( Memento of March 18, 2010 in the Internet Archive ), 2 ( Memento of February 10, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) in Abolitionist Online (2005).
  26. ( Francione 1996 pp. 226-230).
  27. For example Dale Jamieson : Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance: A Critique of Regan's Theory of Rights . In: Ethics . 100, No. 2, 1990, pp. 349-362.
    • James B. Callicott: Review of Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights . In: Environmental Ethics . 7, 1985, pp. 365-372.
  28. Regan 2004 p. 285.
  29. Steve Sapontzis : Predation . In: Ethics and Animals . 5, No. 2, 1984, pp. 27-38.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Dead Link / digitalcommons.calpoly.edu  
    • Elisa Aaltola : Personhood and Animals . In: Environmental Ethics . 30, No. 2, 2008, pp. 175-193.
    • Beril İdemen Sözmen: Harm in the Wild: Facing Non-Human Suffering in Nature . In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice . 2013, ISSN  1386-2820 , pp. 1-14. doi : 10.1007 / s10677-013-9416-5 .
  30. ^ Rainer Ebert, Tibor R. Machan : Innocent Threats and the Moral Problem of Carnivorous Animals . In: Journal of Applied Philosophy . 29, No. 2, April 27, 2012, ISSN  1468-5930 , pp. 146-159. doi : 10.1111 / j.1468-5930.2012.00561.x .
  31. A current bibliography can be found here (as of June 2013).
  32. Brian Luke : Brutal: Manhood and the Exploitation of Animals . University of Illinois Press, 2007, ISBN 0252074246 , pp. 208-209.
    • Cathryn Bailey: On the Backs of Animals - The Valorization of Reason in Contemporary Animal Ethics . In: Josephine Donovan, Carol Adams (Eds.): The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics . Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 0231140398 , pp. 344-359.
  33. ( Regan 1986 p. 95).
  34. ( Luke 2007 p. 212).
  35. ^ Tom Regan: The Search for a New Global Ethic . In: Animal's Agenda . No. 6, 1986, pp. 4-6, 40-41.
  36. Deborah Slicer: Your Daughter or your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue . In: Hypatia . 6, No. 1, 1991, pp. 108-124. Here p. 112.
  37. ( Slicer 1991 p. 113).
  38. Josephine Donovan : Animal rights and feminist theory . In: Signs . 15, No. 2, 1990, pp. 350-375.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Here p. 358. @1@ 2Template: Toter Link / ethik.univie.ac.at  
  39. Regan 2004 p. 324.
  40. ^ Hugh Lehman: On the moral acceptability of killing animals . In: Journal of Agricultural Ethics . 1, No. 2, 1988, pp. 155-162.
  41. Gary Francione : Comparable Harm and Equal Inherent Value: The Problem of Dog in the Lifeboat . In: Between the Species . 11, No. 1, 1995, pp. 81-89.
  42. Steve Sapontzis : Morals, Reason, and Animals . Temple University Press, 1992, ISBN 0877229619 , p. 219.
  43. Regan 2004 p. 324.
  44. Evelyn B. Pluhar : When is it morally acceptable to kill animals? . In: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics . 1, No. 3, 1988, pp. 211-224.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Toter Link / ethik.univie.ac.at  
  45. ^ Peter Singer : Ten Years of Animal Liberation . In: The New York Review of Books . 17, 1985.
  46. ^ Neil Koomen: He's waging Fight for Animal Rights . In: The Times-News , December 19, 1988, pp. 1 & 13. 
  47. Humane Society, April 9, 2012: The Joseph Wood Krutch Medal: The HSUS's highest honor has been bestowed on exceptional advocates since 1970 ( Memento of the original from October 28, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.humanesociety.org
  48. NCSU: 2007 Honors Baccalaureate and Celebration of Academic Excellence (PDF; 701 kB)