Animal rights

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Animal rights are the subjective rights of animals . The animal ethics examines how animals, possibly including humans , have morally such rights. In addition, animal rights are discussed as part of a state legal system . The nature of the proposed rights and the animals affected by them vary between different positions.

Representatives of inalienable and comparatively extensive rights of animals are referred to as animal rights activists . These derive from animal rights far-reaching demands on a society regarding the handling of animals. The animal rights movement is a social movement that demands animal rights and is significantly influenced by the philosophical discourse.

history

Until relatively recently, human history had no formal rights for animals. It was not until 1822 that the first animal welfare law was passed in England, primarily to protect horses . In Germany, the Imperial Criminal Code only decreed around 50 years later, from 1871, that someone could be punished who "viciously tortures or mistreated animals in public or in an annoying manner". The Stuttgart pastor Albert Knapp founded the first German animal welfare association in 1837 . In 1881 the German Animal Welfare Association was created , although the latter have no formal rights, but have been campaigning for animal rights since it was founded. According to the German Animal Welfare Association, many animal rights are still only rudimentarily, if at all, formalized. In 2013, it was decided that farmers would only be allowed to castrate their piglets without anesthesia until 2019, a date that has now been postponed for another two years.

Philosophical viewpoints

Animal rights are proposed for those animals that animal rights advocates believe are conscious . The basis for this are often ethical concepts of philosophy , which assume that animals are capable of suffering and pain .

On this basis, a pathocentric ethics (root of the word παθ- path- , German 'sorrow-' in ancient Greek ) demands that all sentient beings be morally taken into account. Related to this, but going even further, is the position of granting animals their own dignity , hence a right to self-determination ( autonomy ). In cases of doubt, freedom or self-determination is sometimes higher than avoiding suffering or promoting happiness. Such animals, mostly all vertebrates , should therefore be given the right to dispose of their own bodies and the possibility of limited self-determination . The common practice of treating animals as property or commercial goods is rejected.

The granting of rights to certain animals does not mean the legal equality of humans and animals. According to their advocates, animal rights should be assigned to an animal species according to the complexity of the brain and the corresponding assumed differences in the ability to be conscious. Regardless of the benefit that an animal offers humans, animal rights activists argue, the animal should be given control over its own fate as much as possible; the ownership of animals and their use should therefore take a back seat to the animal's right to self-determination . Animal rights advocates consider the use of animals for food or clothing, entertainment or research purposes to be incompatible with the proposed animal rights.

Part of modern animal rights theory goes back to a group of Oxford University professors who began to question whether the moral status of animals should necessarily be inferior to that of humans in the 1970s. Among them was the psychologist Richard Ryder , who coined the term speciesism in 1970 - analogous to racism . Ryder was a co-author of Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans , edited by Roslind and Stanley Godlovitch and John Harris and published in 1972. A review by Peter Singer for The New York Review of Books laid the foundation for his 1975 book Animal Liberation , which is considered a classic of the animal rights movement.

Important works on the topic include The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan (published 1983), Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism by James Rachels (1990), Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals by Steven M. Wise (2000) and Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy by Julian H. Franklin (2005). In addition to these books, a large number of scientific articles appeared, for example by Donald VanDeVeer and Brent A. Singer et al. a. (see also below in the paragraph on philosophy). In Germany, a number of associations have been campaigning for the social and legal recognition of elementary animal rights and their implementation for several years.

What most arguments have in common is a naturalistic element, which is based on certain homologues that are named relevant to a legal concept , i.e. H. evolutionarily continuous, properties require a reflection in the moral or legal understanding. Animal rights arguments often constitute a moral-philosophical derivation for human rights . Due to the allegedly scientific fuzziness of the concept of species on the subject level, a subjective right cannot be ascribed or denied to anyone solely on the basis of belonging to a species . This alleged fallacy is called speciesist .

Sometimes animal rights are justified on the basis of critical theory or post-structuralist arguments.

Utilitarian theories

Peter Singer

Peter Singer; his book Animal Liberation is seen by many as the nucleus for the emergence of the animal rights movement

Peter Singer's book Animal Liberation. The Animal Liberation of 1975 is seen as an influential work in animal rights history that contributed significantly to the establishment of an animal rights movement. In it, Singer argues that there is no moral justification for ignoring the suffering of a being, regardless of its nature. The refusal to take into account the interests of other species is what he calls “speciesism” based on the terms “ sexism ” and “racism”. The principle of equality thus leads to the inclusion of the preferences of animals sensitive to pain, especially mammals, birds and fish, in the utilitarian weighing up.

In his work, Practical Ethics , published in 1979, Singer argues for a differentiation between beings who are merely sensitive to pain and those who are self-confident and have a sense of the future ( people ). Although their pain is to be weighted equally, the killing of a "person" outweighs that of a "merely" conscious living being. Because it is only when a “person” is killed that preferences regarding the future are thwarted and the being's autonomy is violated. The life of "persons" therefore has a special value. Singer emphasizes that there are non-human beings with person characteristics as well as human beings who can be classified as merely conscious.

As a consequence of his preferential utilitarian ethics , Singer calls for the abolition of industrial animal husbandry or a vegetarian or vegan way of life. He largely, if not categorically, rejects animal experiments . As part of the Great Ape Project , Singer calls for great apes to be granted fundamental rights.

Although Singer is considered an animal rights activist and an important representative of the animal rights movement, he does not attach great importance to the philosophical concept of law in his moral philosophy. Rather, his demands for animal rights should serve as an abbreviation to refer to "more fundamental moral principles".

Deontological theories

Individual rights

Tom Regan

Another qualitative innovation in the field is the approach of Tom Regan (The Case for Animal Rights) . In its center there are beings who are so-called “subjects of a life” . Such are characterized by properties and skills such as perceptions, desires, memory, assumptions, self-confidence, visions of the future and interests. Subjects of a life are normal adult humans, normal mammals one year old or older, and those humans whose mental faculties correspond to these animals.

Subjects of a life have an individual well-being that does not differ in principle from the well-being of humans: They have biological, psychological and social interests that can be more or less realized or fulfilled in the course of their lives. They may fare better or worse in life.

Autonomy is central to the understanding of well-being: subjects in a life have preferences which they can and want to pursue themselves. In addition, subjects of a life have an inherent value. Beings of inherent worth should never be treated as if their worth depends on their usefulness to others. Based on Immanuel Kant , one could say: beings with inherent value must never be viewed as a mere means of maximizing the interests of all.

Another term that is attributed to Regan, is approximately in a speziesismuskritischen argument, or as a response to a contract theoretical criticism, the distinction between so-called "morality Agents" (morally actors) and "morality Patients" (morally patients) . It is a matter of course within a human morality that individuals who neither understand nor shape morality nor take it into account when dealing with others still experience at least elementary protection through their rules. To deny animal rights, it is not sufficient to state that animals are unable to participate in ethical dialogue. Instead, morally relevant differences would have to be produced.

Kantian approach

Christine Korsgaard has made influential contributions to the reinterpretation of Immanuel Kant's philosophy. In her essay "Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account", she explains why a newly interpreted Kantian approach also makes animals assignable to the realm of ends and thus they should never be seen as an end in themselves and just like humans as mere means.

The main difference in their reinterpretation is, on the one hand, the introduction of the term “naturally good” and “naturally bad”. She assumes that we are beings from whose perspective things can naturally be good or bad - she presupposes this as a “natural fact”. Under this condition, the autonomous, rational self would no longer be the addressee of formulated moral laws. Instead our “animal self” (sic!), Which is given value, takes its place.

The second difference consists in the separation between the person who gives values ​​and moral laws by power of his reason and the person for whom the values ​​and moral rights are bestowed: the usual Kantian moral philosophy assumes reason as the basis for free will, which then qualifies the rational being for an end in itself through its conscious action and willing. Korsgaard, on the other hand, sees reason and free will only as a necessary condition for recognizing values ​​and for formulating moral laws to protect these values. However, it sees the object of the attribution of values ​​as our “animal self”, from the perception of which we share something morally significant with the animals and consequently these animals also qualify for the realm of purposes.

Finally, Korsgaard advocates an adapted categorical imperative for animals: we are allowed to interact with them as long as we do so in a way that we think it is plausible to think they would agree to if they could. In their opinion, implementation of this principle would result in the abolition of almost all current forms of animal use.

Practical autonomy

Steven Wise ( Rattling the Cage , Drawing the Line ) advocates the granting of animal rights based on what he called the criterion practical autonomy . He sees animals that have a sense of “I”, that act intentionally and have desires, as candidates for certain basic rights: They should not be allowed to serve as food or medical research. With a view to political enforceability, he suggests that the granting of rights to a few animal species ( primates , dolphins , elephants , gray parrots ) is limited for the time being . A practical implementation can be found in the Seattle-based Great Ape Project , which advocates a declaration for great apes at the United Nations , which should grant gorillas , orangutans , chimpanzees and bonobos some basic rights . In addition to the right to life, this means protection of individual freedom and the prohibition of torture.

Existing unequal treatment

Francione at a conference at the Universidad de la Rioja , Spain 2010

Gary Francione 's Introduction to Animal Rights is based on the following premise: If animals are considered property, all rights that could be taken for granted are directly nullified by this status. He points out that a call to regard property interests as equal to one's own is absurd. Without the elementary right not to be treated as human property, animals would have no rights at all, said Francione. He postulates that sensitivity is the only legitimate basis for moral status. This is in contrast to Regan, who sees qualitative measures in the subjective experiences of his “subject-of-life” based on a loose determination of who falls into that category. Francione claims that there actually is no animal rights movement in the US, only an animal rights movement.

In keeping with his philosophical position and his work on animal rights for the Animal Rights Law Project at Rutgers University , he points out that any effort that does not focus on the abolition of the property status of animals will be misled and ultimately the inevitable exploitation of animals results. He argues that it would logically be contradictory and immoral if the set goals of improving the conditions of animals were never achieved.

In his book Animals, Property, and the Law , he claims that the main barrier to bestowing animal rights is the status of animals as "things". Animal welfare tries to change the conditions for animals, but not their status. He considers it inconsistent to treat pets like dogs and cats like family members while slaughtering cattle, pigs and chickens for food.

criticism

Lack of legal capacity

Critics of animal rights point out that animals cannot be included in contract theory because they do not understand legal concepts. This is countered by the fact that an understanding of legal concepts is not a prerequisite for being considered a legal person. (There are people who have no understanding of legal concepts, but are still considered legal entities.)

Without recognizing an animal as a legal person, it is possible - and already legal practice - to grant animals the ability to suffer, feel pain and other basic skills and corresponding needs and demand that people also respect them.

Review by Norbert Brieskorn

The legal philosopher and Jesuit Norbert Brieskorn has stated that anyone who wants to grant more highly developed animals subjective rights must answer,

  1. whether rights should be granted to beings who, unlike humans, could never make use of them themselves;
  2. What would be the plus of the granting of rights to animals compared to those ethical obligations which humans are already imposed on animals through ethical reflection;
  3. whether it should be about extending human rights to animals or about specific animal rights;
  4. how to determine the respective priority between human and animal rights;
  5. on which the legitimacy of those who assert animal rights on behalf of animals is based.

Review by John Touhey and Terence P. Ma

John Touhey and Terence P. Ma criticize mainly on the basis of Peter Singer's position that it is a mistake in animal rights philosophy to propose it on the basis of supposedly morally relevant characteristics. Neither Singer's “criterion of suffering” nor Regan's “criterion of consciousness” could be sufficient for a moral concept. These terms are insufficient to “ grasp the nature of a being”. Even if the concept of suffering in humans and animals is about the same characteristic, there are phenomenological differences that result from the different nature of beings.

They attack the empirical basis of Singer's theses by noting that it has not been proven to what extent a concept of suffering, in contrast to the concept of pain, could be used in animals. On the one hand pain is required for the concept of suffering, but on the other hand it is also necessary to understand a contextual connection, i.e. to attribute meaning or expediency to it .

To Singer's argument that certain practices on animals are prohibited for ethical reasons because they would also be wrong, according to the authors, with people or children who are “fundamentally retarded”, they respond with the distinction between privation and deprivation , an argument of the patristic writer and Church Father Basil of Caesarea follows: Even if some people do not have the ability to act intelligently, all people are nevertheless predisposed to it, whether by nature. On the one hand, this nature would also be shared by people who did not have these abilities, and on the other hand, animals could not have such abilities either.

Critique by Helmut F. Kaplan

The animal rights philosopher Helmut F. Kaplan formulates the following "desirable structural features of animal rights concepts", on the basis of which he criticizes previous animal rights concepts: 

  1. Philosophical concepts of animal rights should consistently be formulated on a philosophical level so that they can be compared with other philosophical concepts of animal rights. This requirement is only insufficiently taken into account when central concepts of a theory are of a non-philosophical nature. That tends to be the case with Gary L. Francione's approach, whose concept of property is more based on the political level.
  2. Philosophical concepts of animal rights should have a certain potential for conflict resolution. This is hardly the case with theories that have only one morally relevant characteristic or criterion, because then no rules of precedence or approaches to conflict resolution are available. Kaplan mentions Albert Schweitzer's demand for awe of life as a negative example. Francione's approach also shows this deficit: He operates with only one morally relevant characteristic or criterion: property or sentience. A clear, more stringent rendering of Francione's approach fails, according to Kaplan, because of the vagueness and contradiction of his statements.
  3. If possible, philosophical concepts of animal rights should not contain utilitarian elements. Utilitarian considerations easily led to speciesist consequences. For example, it is entirely possible that the sum of the pleasure enjoyed by thousands of spectators in a bullfight is greater than the suffering of a single bull. In Peter Singer's philosophy, the difficulties that his utilitarianism brings with it jump right into the eye, according to Kaplan: Utilitarianism obscures the central and fruitful principle of equality and leads to problematic and controversial results on the subjects of animal experiments and euthanasia. 
  4. Philosophical animal rights concepts should have a certain potential to convince people of the importance and necessity of animal rights. Among other things, this is not the case if they are too complicated. Despite all of the utilitarian confusions and problems in Singer's theory, Tom Regan's approach is much more complicated. 
  5. If possible, philosophical concepts of animal rights should not contain any metaphysical elements. That is because this reduces their potential for acceptance or persuasion. Regan's central concept of inherent value tends to be metaphysical in nature. 

Finally, Kaplan warns against concepts of animal rights based on Kantian principles, since these are a priori and in principle problematic: First, Kant's theory is a prime example of a complicated philosophy and, second, Kant expressly argues against animal rights: we only have indirect obligations towards animals . According to Kaplan, Christine Korsgaard's approach confirms this fundamental mortgage: incomprehensible to philosophical laypeople and therefore unsuitable for sensitizing “normal” people to the meaningfulness of animal rights. According to Kaplan, to justify animal rights in this way is generally perceived as proving that animal rights cannot be justified.

practice

Animal rights and welfare

Germany

In the real sense, the term “animal rights” can initially refer to any set of rights for animals. As a term of ethics, however, at least the demand for the abolition of all use of animals for human purposes is understood.

"Animal protection" then means in this sense the demand for "humane treatment" with animals or "avoidance of unnecessary and considerable suffering" (as a term technicus of many animal protection rights). According to David Sztybel, a broad spectrum of more specific positions can be taken:

  1. The assurances of animal users that they “treat animals well” on their farms.
  2. A vague, general obligation on individuals to avoid "significant suffering" or possibly "treat animals well".
  3. The humanitarian welfare (so named after the various Humane Societies ) which refers to specific ethical values and from a broader responsibility for animals derived as, but not attack concrete, most uses of animals in (2). Hunting and extreme forms of intensive animal husbandry or vivisection are partially excluded from this .
  4. The animal liberation animal welfare or emancipatory animal welfare , such as by Peter Singer extending from an obligation to minimize suffering and further-reaching consequences, primarily vegetarianism derives, however, does not require absolute rights for animals and specifically, for example, some animal testing would not condemn. Some, including Singer himself, already equate this position (and those that follow) with animal rights, which others would reject.
  5. New Welfarism (about "New Animal Protection") according to Gary L. Francione .
  6. An animal rights position that does not distinguish between animal rights and animal welfare or rejects such a distinction. Richard Ryder’s position is among them .

Switzerland

The lawyer Antoine F. Goetschel held the office of lawyer for animal welfare in criminal matters in the Swiss canton of Zurich for three years ; He was also involved in anchoring animal rights in the Swiss federal constitution . Since April 2003 it has been in the Swiss Civil Code : Animals are not things .

Argentina

The Argentine judge Elena Liberatori ruled on October 21, 2015 in a procedure for the release of the female orangutan Sandra (orangutan) that the animal was "a non-human person" and ordered her release. Since the human ape is unable to adapt to life in the wild due to her genetic disposition, the judge chose a supervised outdoor enclosure in Florida as her place of residence after her release. The judgment represented the first court decision in the world in which a zoo animal was partially equated with humans.

Animal Rights and Church

On Maundy Thursday in 2014, the TierrechteAktiv e. V. Regensburg drew attention to the topic through a so-called animal crucifixion campaign . Activists of the group had shown a crucifixion scene wearing animal masks. The Sigmaringen administrative court had not objected to an animal crucifixion planned in Ulm .

Animal Liberation Movement

When it comes to political decision-making, some vegan supporters appear with confrontational campaigns. The aim should be to abolish cultures that contain carelessness towards animals through successive shifts in legislation or economic and social practice. The central organizations are PETA (international), Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC; England and Ireland) and the Austrian association against animal factories . The Animal Liberation Front (international) is partly included, but controversial.

Theoretically, all authors exclude actions that directly endanger humans and animals. Nevertheless, there have been attacks on people in the past and one murder, from which the associations distanced themselves.

Within this area of ​​tension there are many approaches that assume that veganism is militant and radical . The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security see the animal rights movement as a threat to internal security in the United States due to eco-terrorism . Some authors assume that internal security legislation in many Western countries was motivated to limit the options for veganism.

The discussion about the extent to which pragmatic concessions should be made to society is summarized under the term of the abolitionism debate.

Some argue that improvements in animal welfare and vegetarianism are not only much easier to achieve than an understanding of the arguments of animal rights activists, but that public awareness of the problem grows along with animal welfare regulations. Others, on the other hand, criticize the fact that this marginalizes the possibility of conveying what is perceived as fair treatment of animals. Suffering is more likely to be shifted from one form to another than abolished. The paradigm of the external determination of animal life through human interests would remain unaffected or would even be strengthened.

The position of part of the animal rights movement to generally reject any kind of animal use is also controversial within the animal rights movement. While there is agreement to abolish animal experiments and cruelty to animals as well as hunting for pleasure (as opposed to obtaining food), the display of (wild) animals ( zoo , circus ) is rated differently. The position is also not uniform when it comes to keeping pets: While the keeping of cognitive and suffering animals is rejected as food, some animal rights activists see no problems in using animals as guide dogs, pulling and riding animals or for therapeutic purposes.

See also

literature

Web links

Footnotes

Remarks

  1. ↑ There was practically no animal liberation movement at the time the book was published. According to Singer, the demand for the liberation of animals is to be understood as a metaphor. He calls for strict freedom from violence (cf. foreword to the 1990 edition and P. Singer: Democracy and Disobiedence , 1974, Oxford University Press)
  2. ↑ Singer avoids the term right (for example: right to life ) or uses it merely as an “abbreviation to refer to fundamental moral considerations.” ( Practical Ethics . 2nd edition. Reclam, p. 130)

Individual evidence

  1. ^ DM Broom, KG Johnson: Stress and Animal Welfare . Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, ISBN 0-412-39580-0 , pp. 178 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  2. ↑ James Rachel: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Ed .: Edward Craig. London / New York 1998, ISBN 0-415-07310-3 , Animals and Ethics.
  3. ↑ Burkhard Straßmann: Berlin animal shelter: What does the animal want? In: The time . December 27, 2012, ISSN  0044-2070 ( zeit.de [accessed on July 13, 2019]).
  4. ↑ Piglet castration. Retrieved July 13, 2019 .
  5. ↑ Martin Balluch : “The” continuity of consciousness . The scientific argument for animal rights. Guthmann-Peterson, 2005, ISBN 978-3-900782-48-1 .
  6. ↑ Norbert Hoerster : Do animals have a dignity? Basic questions of animal ethics. CH Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-51088-4 .
  7. ↑ Jörg John: Animal Law . Saxonia Verlag, 2007, ISBN 978-3-937951-81-2 , p. 145 .
  8. ↑ Edith Riether, Michael Noah Weiss: Animal - Human - Ethics . Lit Verlag, 2012, ISBN 978-3-643-50301-5 , pp. 74 .
  9. ↑ Norbert Walz: Critical Ethics of Nature . A pathocentric, existential-philosophical contribution to the normative foundations of critical theory. Königshausen & Neumann, 2007, ISBN 978-3-8260-3447-3 , p. 238 .
  10. ^ Markus Zimmermann-Acklin: Bioethics in theological perspective . Basics, methods, areas. 2nd Edition. Academic Press Friborg, 2009, ISBN 978-3-7278-1656-7 , pp. 20 .
  11. ^ Richard D. Ryder : Speciesism Again: The original leaflet . In: Critical Society . tape 1 , no. 2 , 2010, p. 1-2 ( PDF ). PDF ( Memento of the original from November 14, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.criticalsocietyjournal.org.uk
  12. ^ A b Tom Regan: The Case for Animal Rights . Reprint edition. University of California Press, 1985, ISBN 0-520-05460-1 .
  13. ↑ For example in the book "Soften the stone heart of infinity" published by Tierrechts-Aktion-Nord
  14. ↑ Practical Ethics . 2nd Edition. Reclam, p. 96f.
  15. ↑ Practical Ethics . 2nd Edition. Reclam, p. 130.
  16. ^ A b Tom Regan: Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy . Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, ISBN 0-7425-3354-9 , pp. 1 .
  17. ↑ people.fas.harvard.edu
  18. ↑ philpapers.org
  19. ↑ Friederike Schmitz (ed.): Animal ethics . Basic texts. Suhrkamp pocket book science, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-518-29682-0 , p. 243-286 .
  20. ↑ Friederike Schmitz (ed.): Animal ethics . Basic texts. Suhrkamp pocket book science, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-518-29682-0 , p. 60 .
  21. ↑ Because the categories of Roman law were also adopted in the genesis of the legal systems of the European states , animals generally fall under property law. Only in modern times has animal protection legislation changed this animal.
  22. ↑ Ulrike Pollack: The urban human-animal relationship . Ambivalences, opportunities and risks. 2007, ISBN 978-3-7983-2112-0 , pp. 179 .
  23. ↑ German Animal Welfare Act: TierSchG § 1
  24. ^ Terence P. Ma, John Tuohey: Fifteen years after “Animal Liberation”: Has the animal rights movement achieved philosophical legitimacy? In: Journal of Medical Humanities . tape 13 , no. 2 , June 1, 1992, p. 79-89 , doi : 10.1007 / BF01149650 .
  25. ↑ Kaplan, Helmut F .: What are animal rights? In: TIERethik. Issue 15, No. 2, 2017, pp. 41–55.
  26. ^ Lisa Kemmerer: In Search of Consistency: Ethics And Animals . Brill Academic Pub, 2006, ISBN 90-04-14725-X , pp. 59-101 .
  27. ↑ David Sztybel : Distinguishing Animal Rights from Animal Welfare published in Marc Bekoff: Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare . 1st edition. Greenwood Press, 1998, ISBN 0-313-29977-3 .
  28. ↑ Michael Langer in conversation , deutschlandfunk.de: The lawyer Antoine F. Goetschel . Deutschlandfunk , nuances. January 25, 2015.
  29. ↑ The Intimate Ape: Read the judge's decision that the orangutan Sandra is a "non-human person" , October 25, 2015, here the verdict in full length in Spanish
  30. ↑ Deutsche Welle : Orangutan leaves Argentina zoo for new life as 'nonhuman person' , September 27, 2019 (Engl.)
  31. ^ ORF (Vienna): Freedom after 25 years of imprisonment , September 27, 2019
  32. ↑ ORF: Female orangutan Sandra is a "non-human person" , September 27, 2019
  33. ↑ tierrechteaktiv-regensburg.blogspot.de
  34. ↑ openjur.de
  35. ↑ Justin Rood: FBI Report 2002
    Animal Rights Groups and Ecology Militants Make DHS Terrorist List, Right-Wing Vigilantes Omitted. March 25, 2005.
  36. ↑ Steven Best: Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Lantern Books, 2004, ISBN 1-59056-054-X .