phenomenology

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The phenomenology (from ancient Greek φαινόμενον phainomenon , German , visible, appearance ' and λόγος lógos , speech', 'teaching') is a philosophical movement whose representatives the origin of knowledge acquisition in immediately given phenomena, the phenomena seen.

The formal descriptions of the phenomena basically reflect the demands of all phenomenological approaches, be they philosophical or scientific , literary or psychological . They differ only in the way they deal with what is immediately given. Phenomenology was significantly influenced by Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century .

Concept history

The word "phenomenon" already describes an appearance in ancient Greek (see the etymology of phenomenon ), which means a single event that can be perceived by the senses. The significance of such phenomena has been prepared by the school of the skeptics , which sees itself as a setback to the metaphysical dogmatism of the previous philosophical schools such as that of Parmenides of Elea . The term “phenomenology” or “phenomenological” goes back to the 18th century and can be found in Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (Philosophy of the Ancients) and Johann Heinrich Lambert ( On the Method to Prove Metaphysics, Theology and Morality Correctly , 1762 ). This as a concept of a phenomenologia or optica transcendentalis. In Lambert's work New Organon or Thoughts on the Exploration and Designation of the True and its Differentiation from Error and Appearance , Part 4: Phenomenology or Doctrine of Appearance (1764), a doctrine of appearance is distinguished from a doctrine of truth .

Kant also uses the term to denote a doctrine of the limits of receptivity . Among other things, this resulted in his Critique of Pure Reason . Furthermore, in Hegel's work , especially in the phenomenology of the spirit , the term stands for the totality of the appearances of the spirit in consciousness, history and thought. The phenomenology of the mind understands itself as the science of the experience of consciousness, which is initially still absolute immediacy, later returns to absolute knowledge. Franz Brentano alternatively used the term phenomenological or descriptive psychology. Phenomenology only became an independent philosophical method through Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century.

Husserl's phenomenology

Husserl's aim is to rehabilitate philosophy as the “first science” ( prima philosophia ). According to Husserl, only a phenomenological philosophy can meet the prerequisites of a truly strict science, because a naturalistic or experimental philosophy is based on prejudices and assumptions about existence, that is, it is not oriented towards the "things themselves". This orientation characterizes the entire flow of phenomenology. Its purpose is to ensure that the sciences are only guided by evidence that comes from the immediate experience of consciousness.

Husserl describes this connection in an article in the Encyclopædia Britannica 1927 as follows:

“Phenomenology describes a new kind of descriptive method that made its breakthrough in philosophy at the turn of the century and an a priori science that has emerged from it , which is intended to provide the basic organon for a strictly scientific philosophy and to enable a methodical reform of all sciences as a result . "

- Husserliana IX, 277

In this article, three essential aspects of Husserl's phenomenology are mentioned:

  • Description as a method
  • Apriority of phenomenology (scientific claim)
  • Foundation for all other sciences

These three aspects are binding structural features of phenomenology for all subsequent phenomenologists - even if they have been subjected to clear criticism in the further development of phenomenology and the change in the phenomenological research community.

Root of phenomenology

Franz Brentano

Husserl's phenomenology is strongly influenced by Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology , which also describes psychological phenomena independently of the physical stimuli that generate them. In contrast to an empirical psychology, Brentano had formed the concept of intentional consciousness . This is an expression of the belief that consciousness is never unrelated to something: consciousness is always conscious of something .

"Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (also probably mental) non-existence of an object, and what we, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the relation to a content, the direction towards an object ( which / here is not to be understood as a reality), or what would be called immanent objectivity. Each contains something as an object in itself, although not each in the same way. Something is presented in the imagination, something is recognized or rejected in the judgment, loved in love, hated in hate, desired in desire, etc. This intentional non-existence is exclusively peculiar to psychic phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. "

- Franz Brentano : Psychology from the empirical standpoint, 1874, p. 124f.

This seemingly trivial discovery paves the way to one of the fundamental philosophical problems - the division of the world into subject and object . Based on the intentional nature of consciousness, this problem could be dealt with from a new perspective.

Brentano also assumed that the foundations of logic cannot be justified in a naturalistic psychology. Husserl takes up this aspect and expands this thought of Brentano's descriptive psychology into a transcendental phenomenology that aims to explain the possibilities of acts of consciousness in general.

The criticism of psychologism

Husserl's philosophical starting point was the assumption that prevailed at his time that truths must be viewed relatively and only show themselves in their respective historical form ( historicism ) or are the product of a naturalistically conceived psyche ( psychologism ). Philosophy would then no longer be a form of gaining knowledge and would have to hand over this task to psychology. Husserl countered this view with his critique of psychologism. According to Husserl, the thesis of psychologism, that logic is part of psychology, since this, as the science of the psyche, also deals with the laws of thought, is wrong. According to this, logic would be the teaching of thinking, reasoning and judging and a special case of psychic abilities. Husserl contradicts this view in two respects. First of all, he shows that the consequence of psychologism would result in a mere relativity of logical laws. So the principle of contradiction would become a mere probability, since empirical rules cannot claim general validity.

Another problem concerns the acts of thought and their correctness . If the laws of logic were of a purely empirical nature, derived from the laws of thought, this does not mean that they are also correct. So there are logically wrong judgments that also arise from thinking. Thus, the criterion of correctness cannot lie in the thinking itself, unless wrong judgments are subject to a different thought sequence, in which case the question remains, what the criterion for correct or incorrect thought sequences is. Husserl is convinced that psychologism is ultimately the content of thought, e.g. B. distinguishes the judgment, not the course of thought, the judgment itself. The judgment itself is thus real , while the content of the judgment is ideal . This distinction between content and act of thought, between “genesis” and “validity”, will remain constitutive in the sequel to phenomenology.

Free variation

Methodologically most widespread is the free variation, which is closest to the descriptive approach of phenomenology. Through free variation in the imagination , different but similar things can be presented. Each of these things is only limited by what is logically possible, not by its possibility of existence (example: Goethe's concept of the primordial plant ). In this free variation, constants can be discovered in which the different variants “coincide”, e.g. B. Scarlet and Bordeaux are different colors, but both are red. It is this coverage, this identity in the eidetic variation , which results in the generality that Husserl describes with the term “idea”. Without its metaphysics, Husserl's eidos is a Platonic idea. It is the essence, a universality, which is given in a clear, intuitive way. The important thing here is the difference between empirical generalization and this ideation : empirical perception is always limited, while pure eidetic variation is infinite, since it not only looks at what is currently existing, but also makes use of all logical possibilities. If, according to Husserl, philosophy is to be a strict science, it needs this universality and the possibility of a final justification which it gives, which is phenomenology.

Intentionality of consciousness

Intentionality is the central concept of Husserl's phenomenology in general. He takes up the problem of subject and object that was already hinted at in the criticism of psychology. Intentionality means the fact that our consciousness is always directed towards something, that is, an awareness of "something". This term can be made clear by looking at a phenomenon : Everyday perceptions, such as B. the perception of people or objects, take place in a non-reflected attitude that does not question the meaningfulness of the person or thing. Husserl now assumes that this meaningfulness is something that we attach to things. One example of this is what is known as deception . If we look at a mannequin in a shop window in front of which we are standing, it can happen that we are surprised to see that it was not a mannequin but a person. At that moment - and this is the point in time when the illusion turns - the meaning of this figure changes. This is how I behave B. no longer as if I were unobserved.

Picture puzzle of a skull, 19th century

Edmund Husserl speaks in his ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy ( also Ideas I) of noesis and noema as basic moments of the constitution of the object and thus as the limit of what can be said. “Noesis” means how the act of consciousness relates to its object (believe, want, hate, love) and “noema” means how the object appears through these noetic acts (what is believed, wanted, hated, loved).

So is z. B. the noema of the perception of a tree the “tree perceived”. This differs fundamentally from the tree that z. B. can burn, while tree perception cannot because it has no real properties. However, the perception of trees has its own objective meaning: for example, trees can grow and must be touched. So the tree is seen as something that is structured like this. We something as something vermeinen , is the central idea of Husserl called intentionality. (The topic can be analogous perhaps the example of picture puzzles clarify: I See Fold the right picture puzzle as an example of how the intentional imagined between two meanings.)

Similar to the picture puzzle, the substance (Greek: hýlê ) of our perception is only available through the intentional act as e.g. B. real, fantasized, dreamed, etc. meant. That means we give meaning to the hyle. Now after Husserl z. B. the subjects of biology also attached a sense, z. B. "moves by itself and reproduces". The meaningfulness behind it is the so-called material ontology , which Husserl also calls regional ontology . According to Husserl, these regional ontologies are the basis for the sciences , since they first constitute the objective meaning of the subjects of the individual sciences.

But how can it be that we saw a doll in the shop window (see above), another time a person? Husserl would say that we both had a perception . Even the deception is initially a perception that later turns out to be a deception. What has changed is only the sense of meaning with which we have occupied the aspects of our perception: inanimate thing - person. So that there can be deceptions, we obviously have to be able to attach a meaning to the objects, which, however, can also change again. A central term in Husserl's terminology is shadowing . Objects are never presented to us as a whole, but only appear to us from the side. We never have the complete perspective of it, which would ultimately correspond to the complete imperceptibility of the object. The prerequisite for perception is therefore the perspective, which at the same time also makes up the concealment of the thing, thus making the phenomenon of deception possible.

The epistemological punch line of this approach consists in the dissolution of the aporia which, according to Husserl, empiricism and rationalism have left behind. Since their followers approach the phenomenon of the world at a distance , some by accepting an external world, others by conceiving it as a product of reason, they do not proceed strictly according to the phenomenon. If they did this, according to Husserl, they would find that we neither perceive ourselves first and then the world, nor the world first and then ourselves, but always experience ourselves in the world in the same original way. This complementarity of world and consciousness describes the structure of intentionality. By intending (assuming) the world and things as objective, they maintain their independence from our consciousness. By tracing this structure of consciousness, Husserl succeeds in going beyond the classic problems of epistemology . Methodically, Husserl proceeds in a strict, phenomenon-oriented description . Important aspects are the epoché and the eidetic reduction :

Epoché and eidetic reduction

Eidetic reduction : Husserl's vehemently demanded path “to things” leads via a reflexive view of their being (εἶδος = the view / the being). The consideration of an object has to be limited to the pure act of consciousness, in that it consistently renounces all prejudices and thus includes “the being of the world in brackets”. The method of the epoché (abstaining, pausing) characterizes Husserl as "abstaining from files in relation to the idea of ​​neutrality". This requires a threefold abstinence from subjective attitudes (emotional preconceptions, vocabulary, so-called self-evident), theoretical assumptions (formal logics, hypotheses) and finally traditional knowledge (intersubjectivity, convention, dogmas). In a second step (the transcendental eidetic reduction ) the existence of the object is disregarded insofar as only the "whatness" is shown, that is, what the object is, its essence .

From the perspective of transcendental consciousness, being is only viewed as a correlate of conscious-being, i.e. without assumptions or judgments about the actual being or non-being of the contents of consciousness. This method approaches the thought experiments of Descartes and Hobbes on the so-called "world annihilation" (the question: What will be preserved if the physical world no longer existed?). But this immediately gives rise to one of the greatest problems in phenomenology. Husserl had made the above-mentioned difference between the act of consciousness (noesis) and the content of consciousness (noema). This corresponds to a division that distinguishes what consciousness is and what it means (because according to Brentano, consciousness is always intentional). But how can one say that the contents of consciousness still have meaning when all existence has been excluded? Husserl wanted to exclude existence because, according to him, objects transcend consciousness: if they exist, they exist outside consciousness itself. In order to gain access to pure ideas, their existence must therefore be excluded. Phenomenology must be able to answer when and how it is possible that consciousness relates to something “consciousness-transcendent”. Husserl's explanation will be that the content is very well consciousness-transcendent, but that the intention itself must be consciousness-immanent. So something is always intended immanently, while it is intended as consciousness-transcendent because if it existed it would be outside of consciousness.

History of Husserl's impact

At the beginning of the history of the impact of phenomenology is the “Philosophical Society Göttingen”, a discussion forum in which from 1910 to 1920 a. a. Alexandre Koyré , Dietrich von Hildebrand , Theodor Conrad , Hedwig Martius (after their marriage in 1912 she was called Hedwig Conrad-Martius ), Hans Lipps , Edith Stein , Roman Ingarden and Adolf Grimme gathered around Husserl and Adolf Reinach . Phenomenology became one of the most important currents in contemporary continental philosophy . The sociology benefited from it mainly by the work of Alfred Schutz and later in ethnomethodological research approaches. Phenomenology influenced ethics of values as an analysis of the essence of the ethical ( Moritz Geiger , Hans Reiner , Max Scheler , Dietrich von Hildebrand), found its way into psychology ( Alexander Pfänder ) and law (Adolf Reinach). Phenomenological thinking has decisively shaped and promoted the development of existentialism in Germany and France. Accordingly, it runs through the most important works of Jean-Paul Sartre . For Maurice Merleau-Ponty , perception and body are the focus of phenomenological work, for Paul Ricœur language and memory. Eugen Fink , a former assistant to Husserl, was particularly loyal to his line. Martin Heidegger, on the other hand, also Husserl's assistant and one of the most prominent representatives of phenomenological philosophy, developed his own phenomenological approach in which the concept of being plays the central role. The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka should also be mentioned. Husserl's thoughts also had a strong influence on Laura Perls , one of the co-founders of Gestalt therapy .

The way from Husserl to Heidegger

The path from Husserl to Heidegger can be viewed from various angles. The central aspect, however, is certainly Heidegger's thought and reproach to Husserl that humans themselves cannot be described in the phenomenological epoch, because, according to Heidegger, what makes them what they are: their existence is disregarded. On the basis of being and time , which is dedicated to Husserl, one can see how essential the method of phenomenology is for Heidegger's question about being. Heidegger describes the phenomenon as “that which shows itself in itself”, as that which shows itself in beings as what it is: the being of beings. From this he concludes: “Ontology is only possible as phenomenology”. Ernst Tugendhat sees the decisive step in the development of Heidegger's phenomenology in the fact that, in contrast to Husserl, who only focused on the "givens of objects", it broadened the view and "under the heading of exploration and clearing for the possibility of the dimension of givenness and truth as such “question.

Hans Lipps' Hermeneutics of Reality

While Husserl called for a decline to a “transcendental ego”, which should first and foremost constitute the concrete human being, and Heidegger worked out his existential analysis of Dasein as a fundamental ontology in Being and Time , Hans Lipps asks : “To what extent is the constitution in the various meanings of beings experience of my existence? ”For him, human existence is based on the interpretation of reality, philosophy is“ responsible acceptance of myself ”.

Max Scheler's ethics of values

Max Scheler had a methodical approach to phenomenology. At the center of his thinking is the material ethics of values, which he describes as a special area of ​​phenomena in the sense of the phenomenological method.

Eugen Fink's late convictions

Eugen Fink was Edmund Husserl's assistant and student for many years and ultimately an interpreter of phenomenology authorized by Husserl himself. All the more important was his speech at the phenomenological colloquium in Brussels in 1951. Here Fink announced that Husserl's approach was not as unconditional as Husserl, and subsequently he himself, had always emphasized. The considerations about appearance , being , objects , objects and beings are prior to the phenomenological method and not its result.

The phenomenology in Michel Foucault's thinking

Michel Foucault was heavily influenced by phenomenology, especially Heidegger, in his early writings. Only in his genealogical writings does he subject phenomenology to intense criticism.

Phenomenology of perception in Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) developed phenomenology further, showing connections and demarcations to Husserl and Heidegger. With him, the corporeality in particular comes into focus. The classic dichotomies (e.g. subject and object or body and soul) should be productively overcome.

Emmanuel Levinas and phenomenology

Levinas, influenced by both his Jewish tradition and Martin Heidegger, developed an ethic that is guided by the face of the other. Since the other never catches up for Levinas, i. H. is to be understood in its totality, it makes a claim that ultimately exceeds everything. In this context, the frequently made comparison between Martin Buber and Levinas is interesting . Although both have part of their roots in the Jewish tradition, Buber sees the opposite in principle as the same, whereas for Levinas this would mean the end of all ethics.

Phenomenology and ideological criticism with Jürgen Habermas

In sharing Husserl's criticism of the objectivist self-understanding of the sciences, Jürgen Habermas would like to warn against falling into a different objectivism that distracts from the legitimate, knowledge-guiding subjective interests.

Further positions

The crucial point of phenomenology is the "impossibility of the subject to make definitive cognitive statements about an object", so Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in his contribution "The task of the humanities today" from 2004.

Contemporary phenomenological theories

Phenomenology has influenced many of the current philosophical currents. It should be noted that it is precisely philosophers who take a critical view of phenomenology, e. B. Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida were greatly influenced by them.

Phenomenology of the foreign

With his responsive phenomenology , which is strongly based on Merleau-Ponty , Bernhard Waldenfels has developed a phenomenology of the foreign in which the foreign is described as a border region that cannot be crossed. His phenomenology shows the limits of access, especially in socially important problem areas such as violence, strangers, illness and death.

Life Phenomenology

The radical phenomenology of life founded by Michel Henry (1922–2002) differs from classical phenomenology and also from the early Merleau-Ponty insofar as it does not seek to fathom what appears in the world itself, but rather to an original (self -) the appearance of transcendental subjectivity in life. Henry v. a. inspired by the teaching of an inner bodily apperception in Maine de Biran .

Structural phenomenology

Following a critical connection to Husserl and Heidegger, as well as going beyond the basic phenomenological approaches of 'transcendental or horizon phenomenology' in Husserl and 'ontological or phenomenology of existence' in Heidegger, Heinrich Rombach develops a 'phenomenology of the ever-worlds' with genetic or structural phenomenology.

Depth phenomenology

Both José Sánchez de Murillo and Heinrich Rombach use the term depth phenomenology as a description of another original variant of phenomenology . In addition to numerous intense and sustained impulses that Sánchez received from the philosopher Heinrich Rombach in Würzburg from 1971 to 1981, it goes back to research in the field of German Romanticism - in particular Jakob Böhmes , Franz von Baaders and Schellings - which began in 1977 . The study of the theology of Karl Rahner and the phenomenological research paths opened up by Edmund Husserl , Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre were also important for depth phenomenology. Therefore, depth phenomenology tries to uncover hidden basic conditions of natural and anthropological phenomena, to illuminate their meaning for life and to convey them to people.

New phenomenology

The New Phenomenology is a variant of the phenomenology introduced and significantly developed by the philosophy professor Hermann Schmitz , who retired in 1993 from Kiel . In particular, the collaboration with the scientific fields of medicine and psychology is important for the new phenomenology. The basis of the New Phenomenology is a rediscovery of involuntary life experience based on what every person perceives pre-theoretically and empirically with his own body .

The philosopher and student of Schmitz Guido Rappe took up some of the approaches of the New Phenomenology and developed them further. The systematic treatment of the biographical dimension of the body , which Schmitz can only find rudiments, is to be seen as an essential extension .

Image phenomenology

Edmund Husserl already found in Paragraph 111 of Ideas I (1913) as well as much more detailed in the lectures on image consciousness, fantasy and memory (1980), which were published from the estate, the distinction between image carriers , e.g. B. the real colors on the canvas, the picture object , i.e. the object shown, and finally the picture subject , which means a real model outside the picture. An important step in the further development of image phenomenology is Jean-Paul Sartre's extensive study Das Imaginäre (1940), which - unlike Husserl - understands the experience of images as a special case of the imagination and not of perception. More recently, Lambert Wiesing's conception of the image object as an artificial presence just as sharply as Sartre delimits the visual representation from physics. The image phenomenology of the present has received further impulses from Dieter Mersch's Aesthetics of the Performative or from Emmanuel Alloa's description of the diaphanous image.

Perceptual phenomenology

The phenomenology of perception is in part identical with the phenomenology itself, because for Edmund Husserl , perception is the fundamental givens. Maurice Merleau-Ponty , who in his main philosophical work The Phenomenology of Perception (1945) wants to get to the bottom of the physicality of the perceptual subject in its essential facets is probably considered a classic of perceptual phenomenology . More recently, following Hermann Schmitz, Gernot Böhme has come to understand that the perceiver is affected by perception and that the atmosphere is the primary object of perception. Lambert Wiesing , on the other hand, speaks of a me of perception because he does not focus on the conditions of possibility, but on the consequences of the reality of perception for the perceiver himself. Jens Bonnemann examines in The corporeal experience of perception: A phenomenology of the body-soul relationship, in turn, the character of the physical experience by distinguishing this pathic dimension of perception from its epistemic and practical dimension.

Phenomenology and analytical philosophy

In the first generation of representatives of phenomenology and so-called analytical philosophy, there were sometimes mutual relationships, for example between Husserl and Gottlob Frege . It is different with representatives of analytical philosophy, who focus on language analytical methods for the reconstruction of statements, be it the orientation towards formal languages or the orientation towards colloquial language . Phenomenology and analytical philosophy have a common origin in terms of both time and content, if one follows Michael Dummett's account , Frege, Brentano and Husserl's criticism of psychologism . According to Frege, thoughts cannot be analyzed using the mechanics of individual mental operations, but are time-independent objects that do not enter into causal relationships. Even Bernard Bolzano , the u. a. was received by Husserl and Alexius Meinong on this point , made a sharp distinction between ideas or thoughts about oneself (objective) and the subjective consciousness of them. Logic has to do with the former, while psychologism demands adherence to the latter. As a result, however, both approaches diverge in such a way that most representatives of phenomenology did not share the language-analytical orientation carried out by some important representatives of analytical philosophy. Husserl's descriptive essential science then claims a systematic “analysis” and “description” of the givens presented in the “directions of seeing”. In contrast, proponents of normal language philosophy, such as the late Wittgenstein, oriented themselves towards the program of determining the essence of objects by analyzing the use of related linguistic expressions (“grammar”). Since Husserl expressly opposed allowing the “grammatical analysis” to lead the rigorous science towards the “things themselves”, these research directions were considered incompatible for a long time. But other authors also emphasize sewing in both directions. For example, Husserl and Heidegger also turn to language and its use. JL Austin speaks of "linguistic phenomenology" in 1956/57. What is meant by this is, as with the late Wittgenstein, an "orientation towards the use of language, but with a greater claim to reality for cases in which everyday language finds no words and then develops new words". The spoke analytical orientation but have shared no phase all analytic philosophers. In particular, central themes, terms and approaches of classical phenomenology since the 1970s have also been taken up in parts of the analytical philosophy of mind , including the approach to the first-person perspective for the investigation of the intentionality and phenomenal quality of states of consciousness and the structures of consciousness at all. Research programs of this kind have been called "analytic phenomenology" since the turn of the century. The most important representatives include Roderick Chisholm , Dagfinn Føllesdal , Jitendra Nath Mohanty , Hubert Dreyfus , Uriah Kriegel , David Woodruff Smith , Barry Smith .

Phenomenology of Self-Awareness

Unlike in the Logical Investigations , Edmund Husserl represents an egological conception of consciousness in Ideas I. The intentionality of consciousness is therefore based on an I, which represents the unity of all acts of consciousness. In so far as this I is pure and transcendental, it is not subject to phenomenological reduction. With the phenomenon of self-confidence, Husserl differentiates on the one hand between the “stream of experience” and the “pure I of experience”, which is necessarily associated with the stream of experience, as a “necessary here”.

This egological view is criticized by Jean-Paul Sartre in The Transcendence of the Ego . Since for Sartre the ego is not transcendental and therefore not an inhabitant of consciousness, it is rather an intentional and transcendent object that, like every other, falls under the phenomenological epoch . Logically, Sartre defends a non-egological conception, the basis of which is a phenomenological description of self-confidence:

“[...] while I was reading there was awareness of the book, of the characters in the novel; but the ego did not inhabit this consciousness, which was only consciousness of the object and non-positional consciousness of itself [...] there was no ego in unreflected consciousness. "

In the introduction to Being and Nothingness from 1943, Sartre introduced the term “pre-reflective cogito”. In order to avoid the well-known problem of an infinite regress, the pre-reflective cogito, that is, the non-reflected self-consciousness that is implicitly present before any positing objectification, is distinguished from the reflexive self-knowledge, in which the reflected consciousness becomes the recognized object of the reflective consciousness becomes. Sartre understands pre-reflective self-consciousness in the following way: every positing consciousness of an object is at the same time non-positing consciousness of itself, that is, of being positing consciousness of an object. This thesis of a pre-reflexivity of self-consciousness, as found above all in Sartre, contradicts a current mainstream of Philosophy of Mind, namely the so-called higher-order theorists, for whom self-consciousness is based on reflection or self-knowledge coincides. In the phenomenology of self-consciousness by Lambert Wiesing, the assumption of an ego as a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness is rejected and instead argued for a me as a consequence of the reality of self-consciousness. In order to avoid the problem of infinite self-reflection, in which the knowing must always be a recognized consciousness, etc., Wiesing understands self-consciousness as a part-whole relation: the self-consciousness me is part of a whole, and this whole is awareness. In order to do justice to the phenomenological fact that one cannot escape the consciousness of oneself, an ambiguous term is introduced, which defines the self-consciousness as "imposition": On the one hand, self-awareness is an imposition because it is imposed on the subject without being asked, and on the other hand, the term unreasonable refers to the fact that a person has to somehow “feel like” if they are self-confident. Thus, according to Lambert Wiesing, imposition is the forced mood.

Phenomenology in Other Sciences

In many sciences one speaks of a phenomenological attitude . However, this sometimes differs from the phenomenology of Husserl and the use of the term by the following philosophers, since phenomenology in the above sense does not stop at the description of the mere facts. Most of the scientific approaches that use the term phenomenological fall back on a more original meaning of the term phenomenology; for example, they do not perform eidetic reduction . However, this should not hide the fact that in some branches of phenomenology, such as classical legal phenomenology, the original phenomenological method is also retained.

The word creation phenomenological is often used in popular science, whereby the purely phenomenal is usually meant as an object . The phenomenal, however, is at first mere appearance , not the underlying reality , or else a mere appearance that refers to a physical or psychological being that cannot be known . Phenomenology is confused here with phenomenalism , a position of early positivism , a variety of subjective idealism , whose antagonist is realism . A closer look at the intentionality and the epoché and its results make the difference between the two positions clear. (see above)

Legal phenomenology

The legal phenomenology goes back to Edmund Husserl and was differentiated above all by the legal philosopher Adolf Reinach. Wilhelm Schapp , also a student of Husserl, initially continued Reinach's work critically, but later developed his own story phenomenology, which turned away from Reinach. You, like other legal phenomenologists, tried to find an answer to what is law on the basis of phenomenology. Or in the words of phenomenology: what the essence of law is. Legal phenomenology has a few supporters in Germany and the Netherlands, but it is most strongly represented in Italy and Spain.

Phenomenological approach in the natural sciences

The "first look" at the empirical data material from a research plan, the first phase of a systematic scientific work, sifting through the collection of material is often called phenomenology. Phenomenological here usually means describing the situation on the basis of its apparent properties. A test procedure is described, if possible, without the aid of theories (which is of course only possible to a limited extent, since the theory itself determines the test setup and procedure), animal behavior is only described (against the background of a theory of biology), but if possible not in the sense of human understanding interpreted, just seen what happened. The concept of phenomena on which this is based is that of naturalistic appearance, although this may be based on a deeper, but not necessarily a logically-rationally comprehensible truth.

Phenomenological attitude in therapeutic theories

In theories of humanistic-psychotherapeutic directions such as gestalt therapy , talk therapy or logotherapy and existential analysis , phenomenology is often in the foreground as an epistemological tool. In addition to Husserl, philosophers such as Martin Buber and phenomenologists such as Emmanuel Levinas are also mentioned. Karl Jaspers founded a psychopathological phenomenology . Common to all theories is the caution with regard to quick interpretation, not wanting to absolutize theories, but always to remain connected to the concrete area of ​​experience of everyday life, and to respect the autonomy of the experience of the other. In doing so, however, they regard phenomenology only as a methodological approach. The fact that Husserl did theory and carried out reflective descriptions is not in the foreground in these therapeutic procedures. The reflexive sharpness and transcendental problems are not discussed in these procedures. Thus, the phenomenological use of language is only partially phenomenological in the sense of Husserl, the theoretical basic relations to phenomenology are only associative .

Phenomenological Education

Phenomenological educational science deals theoretically and empirically with educational, learning and upbringing experiences. Education is defined as a secular, factual concept, upbringing as a socio-theoretical concept and made systematically fruitful for educational science. The traditional theories of education and upbringing ( educational theory ), as developed in Germany by Wilhelm von Humboldt , Friedrich Schleiermacher , Johann Friedrich Herbart , Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche , are systematically and empirically redimensioned from a phenomenological perspective. For over 100 years it has been an established sub-discipline and an independent way of thinking and researching in education. In addition to Husserl and Heidegger, contemporary theories mainly refer to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Bernhard Waldenfels . Common to all approaches is the descriptive access to pedagogical experience, which is supplemented with hermeneutic and social science methods. Right from the start, the core themes of Husserl's phenomenology - time, body, world of others - are systematically related to the practice and theory of education and training, and the phenomenological method of description and reduction is critically taken up and productively developed. Methodological problems that arise in a qualitatively meaningful description of educational experiences and situations are also reflected on anew. While theoretical and empirical questions were in the foreground in the beginning ( Aloys Fischer , Rudolf Lochner ), in the period after the Second World War there were mainly anthropological ( OF Bollnow ), anthropological and curricular ( Werner Loch ), structural phenomenological ( Heinrich Rombach ), coexistence ( Eugen Fink ), existential-critical ( Egon Schütz ) and learning-theoretical ( Günther Buck ) approaches further dissemination. Current phenomenological approaches work more theoretically and empirically and deal with areas of the lifeworld and foreignness ( Wilfried Lippitz ), relearning and physicality ( Käte Meyer-Drawe ), exercise and attention ( Malte Brinkmann ), early childhood learning ( Ursula Stenger ) and aesthetic education ( Kristin Westphal ). Representatives of phenomenological educational science can be found in many sub-disciplines: general pedagogy , social pedagogy , school pedagogy and specialist didactics , early childhood education , media pedagogy .

literature

Husserl's works

  • 1887: About the concept of number. Psychological analysis .
  • 1891: Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and logical investigations .
  • 1900: Logical Investigations. First part: Prolegomena to pure logic .
  • 1901: Logical Investigations. Second part: investigations into the phenomenology and theory of knowledge .
  • 1911: Philosophy as a strict science .
  • 1913: Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology .
  • 1923–24: First philosophy. Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction .
  • 1925: First philosophy. First part: critical history of ideas .
  • 1928: Lectures on the phenomenology of inner time consciousness .
  • 1929: Formal and transcendental logic. Attempt a critique of logical reason .
  • 1931: Méditations cartésiennes .
  • 1936: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy .
  • 1939: experience and judgment. Investigations into the genealogy of logic.
  • 1952: Ideas II: Phenomenological investigations into the constitution.
  • 1952: Ideas III: The phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences.

Introductions and overviews

  • Andreas Becke: The way of phenomenology: Husserl, Heidegger, Rombach (= Boethiana . Volume 36). Kovač, Hamburg 1999, ISBN 3-86064-900-0 (dissertation University of Hanover 1998, 241 pages).
  • Sophie Loidolt: Introduction to Legal Phenomenology Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2011, ISBN 978-3-16-150706-9 .
  • Ferdinand Fellmann : Phenomenology for the introduction (= for the introduction . Volume 316). Junius, Hamburg 2006. (2nd, unchanged edition 2009, ISBN 978-3-88506-616-3 )
  • Matthias Flatscher, Iris Laner and others: New Voices of Phenomenology. Volume 1: The tradition / the self (= libri virides 1.1), Verlag Traugott Bautz, Nordhausen 2011, ISBN 978-3-88309-638-4 .
  • Matthias Flatscher, Iris Laner and others: New Voices of Phenomenology. Volume 2: The Other / Aisthesis (= libri virides 1.2), Verlag Traugott Bautz, Nordhausen 2011, ISBN 978-3-88309-636-0 .
  • Karl-Heinz Lembeck : Introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1994. (2nd, unchanged edition. 2005, ISBN 3-534-18954-X )
  • Christian Möckel: Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology (= UTB for Sciences. Volume 2007). Fink, Munich 1998, ISBN 3-8252-2007-9 .
  • Dermot Moran: Introduction to Phenomenology. Routledge, London 2000. (2003, ISBN 0-415-18372-3 )
  • Guido Rappe : Introduction to Modern Phenomenology. Phenomenon / body / subjectivity. Projektverlag, Bochum 2018, ISBN 978-3-89733-443-4 .
  • Hans Rainer Sepp (ed.): Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological movement. Certificates in text and images. Alber, Freiburg im Breisgau / Munich 1988, ISBN 3-495-47636-9 .
  • Elisabeth Ströker , Paul Janssen: Phenomenological Philosophy. (= Philosophy manual ). Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1989, ISBN 3-495-47499-4 .
  • Helmuth Vetter (ed.): Dictionary of phenomenological terms. Meiner, Hamburg 2005, ISBN 3-7873-1689-2 .
  • Herbert Spiegelberg , The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. 2 volumes. Nijhoff, The Hague 1960. (3rd edition. 1982, ISBN 90-247-2535-6 )
  • Dan Zahavi : Phenomenology for Beginners. (= UTB. 2395). Fink, Paderborn 2007, ISBN 978-3-8252-2935-1 .
  • Hans Rainer Sepp, Lester Embree (Ed.): Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics. (= Contributions To Phenomenology. Vol. 59). Springer, Dordrecht / Heidelberg / London / New York 2010, ISBN 978-90-481-2470-1 .
  • Bernhard Waldenfels : Introduction to Phenomenology (= UTB . Volume 1688). Fink, Munich 1992, ISBN 3-8252-1688-8 .

Book series

  • Orbis phenomenologicus , ed. by Kah Kyung Cho (Buffalo), Yoshihiro Nitta (Tokyo) and Hans Rainer Sepp (Prague). 1993 to 2001 with Verlag Karl Alber , Freiburg / Munich (8 volumes), since 2002 with Königshausen & Neumann , Würzburg. The volumes are individually in the catalog of the German National Library . The series, of which more than 50 volumes were published by 2010, presents approaches and results of phenomenology in three sections, determines its positions in the context of other philosophical currents, discusses aporias in phenomenological thinking and continues phenomenological research. The "Perspectives" are dedicated to factual topics and deal with important authors and research centers in phenomenology. The “sources” bring together primary texts and develop documentary material on the international phenomenological movement. The “studies” present current research results.
  • Studies in phenomenology and practical philosophy. edited by Christian Bermes , Hans-Helmuth Gander, Lore Hühn and Günter Zöller. Ergon Verlag , Würzburg / Baden-Baden 2006 ff.
  • Phenomenology. Texts and contexts. 1997 to 2001 edited by Karl-Heinz Lembeck , Ernst Wolfgang Orth and Hans Rainer Sepp. Edited since 2006 by Jean-Luc Marion , Marco M. Olivetti and Walter Schweidler. Alber, Freiburg / Munich
  • Phenomenological Education. With Springer VS since 2015, edited by Malte Brinkmann, Wilfried Lippitz and Ursula Stenger.

History of Husserl's impact

  • Andreas Becke: The path of phenomenology - Husserl, Heidegger, Rombach. Hamburg 1999, ISBN 3-86064-900-0 .
  • Hans Rainer Sepp (ed.): Metamorphosis of phenomenology. Thirteen stages from Husserl. Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg i. Br./ München 1999, ISBN 3-495-47855-8 Liber amicorum for Meinolf Wewel .

International distribution

  • Yoshihiro Nitta (Ed.): Japanese Contributions to Phenomenology. Karl Alber, Freiburg i. Br / Munich 1984, ISBN 3-495-47556-7 .
  • Kah Kyung Cho, Seon Sook Hahn (Ed.): Phenomenology in Korea. (= Orbis phenomenologicus, Perspektiven. Volume 1). Karl Alber, Freiburg i. Br / Munich 2001, ISBN 3-495-47899-X .
  • Javier San Martin (Ed.): Phenomenology in Spain. (= Orbis phenomenologicus, Perspektiven. Volume 10). Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2005, ISBN 3-8260-3132-6 .
  • Bernhard Waldenfels : Phenomenology in France. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1987.
  • Rolf Elberfeld : Phenomenology of Time in Buddhism. Methods of intercultural philosophizing. 2nd Edition. Verlag Frommann Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2010, ISBN 978-3-7728-2227-8 Elberfeld discusses texts on the time phenomenon by four thinkers from India, China and Japan
  • Hans-Dieter Gondek, László Tengelyi : New Phenomenology in France. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2011, ISBN 978-3-518-29574-8 .

Phenomenology and analytical philosophy

  • Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi: The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge, New York 2008, ISBN 978-0-415-39122-1 . A. Beavers: Review. ( faculty.evansville.edu ( Memento from May 17, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) PDF; 103 kB)
  • Terence Horgan , J. Tienson, M. Potrč (Eds.): Origins: The Common Sources of the Analytic and Phenomenological Traditions. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy. Memphis Tenn 40.2003. ISSN  0038-4283
  • Wolfgang Huemer: The Constitution of Consciousness : A Study in Analytic Phenomenology, New York: Routledge 2005, ISBN 0-415-97129-2 . Revision of Diss. Toronto 2000 .
  • Geert Keil and Udo Tietz (eds.): Phenomenology and language analysis. Mentis, Paderborn 2006, ISBN 3-89785-244-6 .
  • Sean D. Kelly: The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind. Garland Publishing, New York 2001.
  • Gregory McCulloch: The Life of the Mind : An Essay on Phenomenological Externalism, Routledge 2003.
  • Jitendra N. Mohanty: Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account. Basil Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts 1989, ISBN 0-631-16741-2 .
  • Daniel Schmicking, Shaun Gallagher (Eds.): Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer 2009, ISBN 978-90-481-2645-3 .
  • David Woodruff Smith: Mind world : essays in phenomenology and ontology, Cambridge University Press 2004, ISBN 0-521-53973-0 .
  • David Woodruff Smith, Amie L. Thomasson (Eds.): Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2005, ISBN 0-415-39122-9 . S. Gallagher: Review .
  • Amie L. Thomasson: Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy. [Memphis Tenn.] 40 (2003), pp. 115-142. ISSN  0038-4283

Legal phenomenology

  • Sophie Loidolt: Introduction to Legal Phenomenology Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2011, ISBN 978-3-16-150706-9 .
  • Kai Purnhagen: Foundations of Legal Phenomenology - A critical presentation of the legal phenomenology by Adolf Reinach and Wilhelm Schapp on the a priori foundations of private law. Jura 2009, p. 661.
  • Kai Purnhagen: The Architecture of Post-National European Contract Law from a Phenomenological Perspective - A Question of Institutions. Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2011-25; Center for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2011-11; Post-National Rulemaking Working Paper Series No. 2011-01 2009, available at ssrn.com

Phenomenological Education

  • Wilfried Lippitz: Phenomenological research in German educational science. In: W. Lippitz (Ed.): Difference and Strangeness. Phenomenological Studies in Education. Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2003, ISBN 3-631-50629-5 , pp. 15-42.
  • Malte Brinkmann (Ed.): Education. Phenomenological Perspectives. Königshausen & Neumann. Würzburg 2010, ISBN 978-3-8260-4257-7 .
  • Egon Schütz, Malte Brinkmann (ed.): Existential-critical pedagogy. Phenomenological writings on the anthropological practice of education, art, language and humanism. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2017, ISBN 978-3-658-14509-5 .
  • Malte Brinkmann, Sales Severin Rödel, Marc Fabian Buck (eds.): Pedagogy - Phenomenology; Relationship determinations and challenges. Wiesbaden 2017, ISBN 978-3-658-15742-5 .
  • Malte Brinkmann (ed.): Phenomenological educational science from its beginnings to today. An anthology. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2018, ISBN 978-3-658-17082-0 .
  • Malte Brinkmann, Johannes Türstig, Martin Weber-Spanknebel (eds.): Body - Leiblichkeit - Embodiment. Pedagogical Perspectives on a Phenomenology of the Body. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2019, ISBN 978-3-658-25517-6 .
  • Günther Buck, Malte Brinkmann (ed.): Learning and experience. Epagogue, example and analogy in educational experience. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2019. ISBN 978-3-658-17098-1 .
  • Wilfried Lippitz: Phenomena of upbringing and education. Phenomenological-pedagogical studies. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2019, ISBN 978-3-658-24187-2 .
  • Malte Brinkmann (Ed.): Embodiments. (Post-) phenomenological investigations between educational theory and physical practices in educational fields. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2019, ISBN 978-3-658-27491-7 .

Magazines

  • Phenomenological research. Phenomenological Studies / Recherches phénoménologiques. Volume 1 (1975. Phenomenology today ) to Volume 30 (1996. The Freiburg Phenomenology ) ed. by Ernst Wolfgang Orth on behalf of the German Society for Phenomenological Research (DGPF). 1996 to 2000: New series 1 to 5 ed. by Ernst Wolfgang Orth and Karl-Heinz Lembeck i. A. the DGPF. Alber, Freiburg / Munich, ISSN  0342-8117 - From 2001 ed. by Karl-Heinz Lembeck, Karl Mertens and Ernst-Wolfgang Orth with the participation of Julia Jonas i. A. the DGPF. Meiner, Hamburg, ISSN  0342-8117
  • Bulletin d'analysis phenomenologique. Liège 1.2005ff. ISSN  1782-2041
  • Studia Phaenomenologica. Humanitas, Bucharest 1.2001ff. ISSN  1582-5647
  • Journal phenomenology

Further information

Philosophy Bibliography : Phenomenology - Additional references on the topic

Web links

Overview representations
Bibliographies
  • Publications on continental and analytical phenomenology at philpapers
  • J. Zalabardo: Phenomenology. In: The London Philosophy Study Guide. University of London 2005.
Institutions and resources
More specific information

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Georgi Schischkoff (Ed.): Philosophical dictionary. 14th edition. Alfred-Kröner, Stuttgart 1982, ISBN 3-520-01321-5 , Lexikon-Stw. Skepticism. P. 641 f.
  2. ↑ See the history of the term “phenomenology”: Niels W. Bokhove : Phenomenology. Origin and development of the term in the 18th century (Quaestiones infinitae, 1; Diss. Utrecht, 1991) (Aalen: Scientia [now: Amsterdam: Kloof], 1991). Contains the prehistory of the Terminus, Oetinger (as early as 1736!), Lambert, Kant, John Robison and a look ahead to the 19th century. Summary in: Hans Burkhardt, Barry Smith (Eds.): Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Vol. 2: L-Z. (Munich etc .: Philosophia Verlag, 1991), pp. 698-700.
  3. ↑ Karl Jaspers : General Psychopathology. 9th edition. Springer, Berlin 1973 (unaltered reprint of the 4th edition from 1946, as of 1942) ISBN 3-540-03340-8 , p. 47, footnote 1. This is how Jaspers characterizes the use of the term phenomenology in the sense of Hegel before his own Phenomenology lectures.
  4. ^ Franz Brentano : Psychology from the empirical standpoint , Volume 2, O. Kraus (Ed.), Meiner, Hamburg 1955, 27 and 124.
  5. ^ Arnold, Thomas .: Phenomenology as Platonism. On the Platonic essential moments of Edmund Husserl's philosophy. De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2017, ISBN 978-3-11-052805-3 .
  6. ↑ Edmund Husserl : On phenomenological reduction: texts from the estate (1926-1935), ed. by Sebastian Luft. Springer, Dordrecht 2013, ISBN 978-1-4020-0744-6 , p. 281.
  7. ↑ Edmund Husserl : Fantasy and Image Consciousness , ed. by Eduard Marbach (Husserliana XXIII). Meiner, Hamburg 2006, ISBN 3-7873-2691-X , p. 222.
  8. ↑ Joseph M. Bochenski: The contemporary methods of thinking. UTB, Stuttgart 10th edition 1993, ISBN 3-8252-0006-X , p. 23.
  9. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Being and time. Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006, §7, p. 28 and p. 35.
  10. ↑ The concept of truth in Husserl and Heidegger. de Gruyter, Berlin 1970, p. 184.
  11. ↑ Jürgen Habermas : Knowledge and Interest. Frankfurt inaugural lecture on June 28, 1965. In: Merkur. Issue 213, December 1965, pp. 1139-1965. (Ren. in: ders .: Technology and Science as “Ideology”. (= edition suhrkamp. Volume 287). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1968, pp. 146–168; 4th edition. 1970, 5th edition. 1971) .
  12. ↑ Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht: The task of the humanities today. (2004). In: Presence. Suhrkamp, ​​Berlin 2012, ISBN 978-3-518-29542-7 , pp. 145–168, therein p. 159.
  13. ↑ Heinrich Rombach: The presence of philosophy. Freiburg / Munich 1987, p. 9, foreword to the third edition.
  14. ↑ José Sánchez de Murillo: The existentialist conception of freedom and the Christian experience of God. A critical examination of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre in terms of religious phenomenology. Inaugural dissertation. Würzburg 1975 p. VI note 3 and The Spirit of German Romanticism. Franz von Baader's attempt to renew science. From Kant to Jakob Böhme. Würzburg 1981 Foreword pp. I and IV.
  15. ↑ Benedikt Maria Trappen: Your word is only song. The dimension of depth phenomenology. In: Farewell to the familiar. Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-00-038861-3 , p. 221 ff.
  16. ↑ Be humble . Nothing new from José Sánchez de Murillo. Review by Benedikt Maria Trappen on José Sánchez de Murillo: About longing. Urgrund and Abysses. In: Der Kreis (magazine) . No. 275/276, Munich 2016, pp. 59-61, ISSN  2197-6007 .
  17. ↑ Guido Rappe : Body and Subject. Phenomenological contributions to an expanded view of man . Projektverlag, Bochum 2012, ISBN 978-3-89733-255-3 .
  18. ↑ Michael Dummett : Origins of Analytical Philosophy. London 1993, esp. 23ff et passim , German: Origins of analytic philosophy. ad Engl. J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main 1997, p. 32.
  19. ^ Philosophy of strict science. 1911.
  20. ↑ Philosophical Investigations. 1953, § 373 u. a.
  21. ↑ Edmund Husserl : Logical investigations. Tübingen 1968, introduction and II 12-14.
  22. ^ So Herbert Schnädelbach : Reflection and Discourse. Frankfurt am Main 1977, and phenomenology and language analysis. third volume of articles, Frankfurt am Main 2000. For a phenomenological criticism of analytical philosophy, he refers to Cornelis A. van Preusen: Phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Stuttgart 1969, and vice versa for a "fundamental criticism of phenomenology" on the then Husserl and Heidegger expert Ernst Tugendhat : Lectures to introduce language-analytical philosophy. Frankfurt am Main 1976, pp. 86 ff and 143 ff. In addition to Heidegger's Being and Time , Kant's interpretation of analytical judgments as explanatory judgments ( KdrV B 11) is cited.
  23. ↑ Werner Strube: Phenomenology, linguistic. In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy. HWPh Volume 7, pp. 507-510 with reference in particular to JL Austin : A plea for excuses. In: Philosophical Papers. Oxford 1961, p. 130; German in: G. Grewendorf, G. Meggle: Linguistics and Philosophy. Frankfurt am Main 1974.
  24. ^ David Woodruff Smith:  Phenomenology. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . and the selection bibliography below .
  25. ↑ Edmund Husserl: Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology . Ed. V. Karl Schuhmann, The Hague 1976. Hamburg 2009. p. 19.
  26. ^ Jean-Paul Sartre: The transcendence of the ego , p. 50. In: Jean-Paul Sartre: The transcendence of the ego. Philosophical essays 1931-1939 . From the French v. Uli Aumüller, Traugott König and Bernd Schuppener. Ed. V. Bernd Schuppener. Reinbek near Hamburg 2010.
  27. ↑ Jean-Paul Sartre: Being and Nothing. Attempt a phenomenological ontology . From the French v. Hans Schönberg and Traugott König. Ed. V. Trust the King. Reinbeck near Hamburg 2017. p. 17.
  28. ↑ Malte Brinkmann: Phenomenological theory of Bildung and education. In: Michael A. Peters (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 1–7 ( link.springer.com )
  29. ↑ Malte Brinkmann: Phenomenological Educational Science. A systematic overview from its beginnings until today. In: Malte Brinkmann, Sales Severin Rödel, Marc Fabian Buck (eds.): Pedagogy - Phenomenology; Phenomenology - Pedagogy. Relationship determinations and challenges. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2017, pp. 17–46.
  30. ↑ acsu.buffalo.edu
  31. ↑ springer.com .