Physiocentrism

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The physiocentrism (from the Greek physis = nature) is considered in the environmental ethics as an antonym for anthropocentrism . According to a strictly anthropocentric view, extra-human nature has no intrinsic value and is only there for humans. Physiocentric positions, on the other hand, assume that nature has its own moral value, which man must take into account.

Distinctions

Within physiocentrism, a distinction is often made between pathocentric , biocentric and radical physiocentric approaches. According to pathocentrism, all sentient beings have an intrinsic moral value. Biocentrism basically assigns an intrinsic value to all living beings. In the context of radical physiocentrism, a distinction is made between an individualistic variant and a holistic variant. The individualistic variant assigns moral values ​​to individual things in nature, such as stones. In the holistic approach, the entirety of nature is regarded as the bearer of moral values.

Pathocentrism

The ability to suffer is a criterion for differentiation. Morally “relevant” objects are therefore humans and more highly developed animals, in which the ability to suffer is obvious, such as B. in monkeys, horses and dogs.

Biocentrism

Every living being has a moral intrinsic value. Was u. a. Designed by vegan or vegetarian people, animal rights activists and environmental activists ; but is also propagated by theologians like Rupert Lay and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Albert Schweitzer , who advocates more biophilia against slipping into an inhuman world. See also the religion of Jainism , in which non-violence towards all living beings is a basic ethical principle.

holism

Morally relevant criterion is being in itself. Therefore, not only living beings, but also inanimate nature are relevant for ethical action.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. Angelika Krebs : An overview of natural ethics. In: Angelika Krebs (Ed.): Naturethik. Basic texts of the current animal and eco-ethical discussion. Frankfurt am Main 1997. Pages 337-379. P. 342.