Integrative business ethics

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The Integrative Business Ethics is a theory of how economic activity can be integrated into a general ethical conception of human action.

Integrative business ethics was developed by Peter Ulrich , who was director at the Institute for Business Ethics at the University of St. Gallen from 1989 to 2009 . Instead of an economic logic that is increasingly dominant in modern times, he calls for a justification for an economic activity that is primarily oriented towards being useful to life to be emphasized.

Ulrich sees neither a natural law nor a religious-metaphysical approach as a justification for such a position, but only a rational ethic based on republican liberalism and humanism . With reason Ethics Ulrich says "the rational generalizable intersubjective reciprocity of the right to respect for and recognition of all subjects than in their dignity and subject quality" untouchable "people." Based on the practice of human life world sees Ulrich a rise of the Golden Rule over the casual observer in Adam Smith and the categorical imperative in Immanuel Kant to the discourse ethics of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas as the best elaborated (elaborated) form of such a rational ethic .

Tasks of business ethics

Ulrich mentions the tasks of integrative business ethics

  1. Critique of “pure” economic reason
  2. Determination of socio-economic rationality
  3. Description of the public discourse as the principal “place” of morality.

The critical approach is intended to show that normativity is "not the" other side "of economic rationality, but its foundation". (IWE 128) It is important to “turn against economistic shortenings and circular conclusions”, which arise from the fact that pure economic rationality concepts represent a break in the reflection on their inner rationality. A well-understood economic reason thus becomes a "declared farewell to economism within economic theory on philosophical paths."

When dealing with the scarcity of resources and goods, not only is economic rationality a benchmark, but the social conflicts that are always associated with it require an integrated normative solution. "The unconditional moral requirement that claims validity as a normative condition for all reasonable action is that of legitimacy, [...]" (IWE 130) According to Ulrich, legitimacy can only be fulfilled if not only those directly but also indirectly affected and theirs Taking interests into account. The practical question in life is therefore not whether an action is efficient, but to whom the efficiency applies.

"Any action or institution can be considered socio-economically rational that free and responsible citizens (can) have determined as a legitimate form of value creation in the rational understanding among all those concerned." (IWE 132)

According to Ulrich, only a business ethic that follows this socio-economic rationality can claim to adequately emphasize the moral point of view. Integrative business ethics counteracts an economic calculation that has become independent in the neoclassical era with the question of the purpose and the claim that economic activity is useful to life. Ulrich distinguishes three basic types of business ethics theories (IWE 135):

  1. Corrective business ethics is a form of applied ethics that is based on given application conditions and is limited to the delimitation of economic factual logic through ethics.
  2. Functionalist business ethics takes its starting point in economic rationality and asks about the usefulness of morality for economic interests, so that the place of morality lies outside of economic activity.
  3. Integrative business ethics wants to determine the legitimate foundations of economic activity in normative discourse and thus assigns ethics the task of providing a foundation for economic activity.

Ulrich vehemently opposes the submission of business ethics to an externally prescribed logic of things which - from his point of view supposedly - leads to irreversible practical constraints.

“In the name of“ pure ”economic logic, it is not ethically neutral or“ value-free ”, but rather normative positions that are represented: the normative is always part of the economic ratio - it cannot be added as something external or foreign to it become. It would therefore be a fundamental error to think that business ethics are simply “applied” ethics for the domain of business that was previously untouched by normativity. Rather, it is understood as the rational ethics of economics, in its approach and core a philosophical-ethical criticism of "pure" economic reason, or what is taken for it. "

For Ulrich, practical constraints only arise when you have decided to follow a certain logic. The pursuit of profit is not based on natural laws, but is subject to human decisions, so that moral self-limitation is also possible.

"If we come to the conclusion in the practiced or presented discourse with those directly affected that our choice of purpose would" force "us to do things that we could not approve of other people from a moral point of view, we should recognize our moral duty in to refrain from the economic activity in question and to strive for our economic self-assertion in another way. "(IWE 171)

The concept of a life-serving economy

Ulrich points out that from Aristotle to Adam Smith the inclusion of economic activity in a natural order was taken for granted. (IWE chap. 5.1, here 179) It was only the independence of the economy in the neoclassical period, supported by the political liberalism of the 19th century, which Ulrich equates with a market-radical neoliberalism, that led to a reduction to a purely economic rationality. This has resulted in a normative exaggeration of the doctrine of the “free market”, which is primarily in the interests of the wealthy citizens. In ethics, this is reflected in utilitarianism as the “ideology of capitalism”. (IWE chap. 5.2, here 191ff), according to Ulrich, business ethics should not be understood as a pure corrective for market failure, which always comes into play when market failure leads to sensation and scandals. It is even less an instrument of economic activity that functionally serves to improve economic efficiency. According to Ulrich, economic action must withstand an ethical assessment. The moral actor must be able to account for his actions towards those affected and the environment. Conversely, the moral demands on the actor must be reasonable.

Ethics, which take precedence over economic activity, first require clarification of the question of meaning (IWE Chapter 6) and the question of legitimation (IWE Chapter 7). The question of meaning is used to examine which form of economic activity is beneficial for people, how the individual quality of life can be increased in order to be able to lead a good life. This includes the question of the values ​​to be striven for and taken into account, as well as the question of shaping the future for a life worth striving for. The question of legitimation is directed towards the form of coexistence, which is reflected in the social rules of a well-ordered society. Legitimate economic activity means clarifying for whom values ​​are created. (IWE overview scheme 219)

Ulrich discusses the desired order of a life-serving economy based on various concepts of justice, ranging from radical liberalism (Buchanan) to political liberalism (Rawls) to communitarianism (Sandell). For him, pure liberalism is based on a Hobbesian egoism that ignores the perspective of the social. This form of liberalism is primarily based on negative freedoms. Due to the veil of ignorance and the fading out of individual interests in Rawls' thought model, Ulrich sees the primacy of the economic principle here too, even if individualistic egoism is limited by the principles of equal opportunities and constant consideration of the worst off. In communitarianism, on the other hand, Ulrich sees an overemphasis on the community of values, which includes the tendency towards conformism.

Ulrich opposes these theories with his ideal of "republican liberalism". To characterize his conception, he draws on the distinction between citizen and bourgeois , following Kant . The bourgeois orientates themselves primarily on their property (“I have private property, therefore I am”), while the citizen draws his identity from active participation in a civil society (“I participate in the res publica, therefore I am”) (IWE Table 321). Freedom in a participatory and deliberative civil society is above all positive freedom (freedom to do something). According to Ulrich (IWE 280-281) this includes:

  1. Equal participation and participation in terms of civil rights and obligations (comprehensive citizenship status)
  2. Possibility of grassroots self-organization (society as a network of egalitarian civic associations)
  3. Comprehensive equal opportunities and real autonomy (civilization of the market as well as that of the state)

Ulrich briefly reviewed whether this claim by the concept of satisfaction of basic needs is met (basic needs) and concludes that this is not compatible is bound with a provision of fundamental rights and, in addition to the individual, so that the problem of social Participation is not covered. (IWE 286) Ulrich, on the other hand, sees positive impulses in the development policy discussion, especially in the dependence theory and in the liberation pedagogy of Paulo Freire .

Ultimately, Ulrich sees a comprehensive concept for shaping a life-serving economy in Amartya Sen's chances of realization , which is aimed at determining the substantial freedoms that make it possible to lead a life striven for with reasons.

"In its socio-economic closeness to life and humane essentiality, the authorization and skills approach points back to the considerations of an" economy of abundance of life "in the context of the question of the meaning of economic activity (Chapter 6) and thus also makes clear the necessary dual direction of basic social and economic rights: on the one hand, it works about the authorization and ability of all people to integrate with equal opportunities in the market-based production and consumption process, but at the same time about their authorization and ability to (partial) emancipation from the functional constraints of the economic system. "(IWE 289)

Similar to Martha Nussbaum , Ulrich draws up a (heuristic) catalog of basic skills, which, from his point of view, represents skills that are worthy of fundamental rights, limited to the field of business (IWE 291-292):

  • “The ability to understand one's own context in life and to orientate oneself in life (right to upbringing and education);
  • the ability to develop one's own personality, self-confidence and self-esteem and to be able to bring them to bear in the world of work (right to inviolable identity and appropriate participation in decision-making processes also in business life);
  • the ability to develop social belonging and to be able to maintain relationships with other people as a respected person (right to social integration):
  • the ability to exercise one's rights, especially in the event of unreasonable interference or abuse by others (right to legal protection and a fair trial);
  • the ability to raise and maintain a family (right to partnership, marriage, children and adequate social support for families):
  • the ability to participate as a responsible citizen in social communication and in democratic politics (right to participate in public communication);
  • the ability to secure one's economic existence whenever possible on one's own (right to vocational training, the right to work, fair working conditions and fair wages, but also the right to self-employed entrepreneurship and private property, including the right to adequate investment credit, in particular microloans ');
  • the ability to lead a decent life in self-respect even in economic emergencies (right to a livelihood and social support). "

The levels of business ethics

According to Ulrich, the implementation of integrative business ethics must take place at all levels of action. “Places” of morality are individual ethics (micro level) as well as the design of the framework (macro level) and ethical action by and in companies (meso level).

Individual ethics

For the individual Ulrich rejects a Hobbesian rationality because this amounts to an egoistic economic liberalism. Rather, he calls for a republican civic virtue with a civic spirit (Dahrendorf) and a civilized public spirit (Offe) which, in return, is opposed to the civil rights of the free-democratic order. (IWE 317) An essential place of morality is the critical public, in which a responsible economic citizen participates. "Only the public use of reason by free and responsible citizens can generate the critical pressure of legitimation in the republic, which urges the political authorities to perceive the public interest instead of just their own special interests." (IWE 333)

Ulrich demands (IWE 342) as formal "minimum demands on the republican civic virtue":

  • “First of all, a general willingness of citizens to reflect on their own preferences and attitudes, which includes a certain self-critical openness to change them out of insight;
  • secondly, the fundamental willingness to reach an understanding with regard to impartial, fair principles and procedural rules for deliberative processes, whereby in order to clarify this necessary basic consensus, it is particularly important to refrain from exploiting available power potentials to advance interests;
  • Thirdly, the willingness to compromise in areas of dissent, which, in addition to the good will to a basic consensus on fair rules of the game for finding compromises, requires permanent mutual respect for limited disagreements;
  • fourthly, the willingness to legitimize, ie the willingness to subject one's own 'private' actions without reservation to the condition of a public legitimacy test, which includes the renunciation of a priori privatism, appropriate forms of 'publicity' and accountability for publicly relevant activities. "

For Ulrich, the republican economic citizen has to subordinate himself to the common good: “The core of the legitimacy thesis is the unconditional readiness of republican-minded economic citizens to give priority to the principles and rules of just coexistence in the community determined within the framework of the public use of reason (ie deliberative democracy) to grant their (special) interests which are not justifiable to everyone. The immediate consequence of this is the moral obligation in personal action to renounce strict private maximization of self-interest. "(IWE 347)

Ulrich demands of a critical consumer “to resist the seduction of the equally ubiquitous goods offerings and to make a reflected, autonomously limited use of them.” (IWE 356) Similarly, the critical investor should also be “willing to self-limit the private pursuit of returns in favor of priority consideration or at least additional consideration of ethical-practical aspects of capital allocation ”. (IWE 358)

To summarize and mitigate, Ulrich points out that there is no binding force for idealistic demands on the individual: “The extent to which economic civic engagement should go in the outlined dimensions of professional and private life is, in a free society, in principle the responsible decision of the responsible person Left to citizens. "(IWE 359)

Order ethics

Ulrich describes the ethical assessment and design of the social framework for economic activity as an ethics of order, for which he calls for primacy over the “logic of the market”. A “vital”, life-serving market economy is to be striven for, which Ulrich understands instrumentally: “It is about market control according to ethical-practical aspects of human, social and environmental compatibility. Where market solutions as such do not “promote a decent life” but stand in the way, political market limitation is indicated, even if this is from a “purely” economic point of view and the like. U. is associated with a loss of efficiency and prosperity (for whom?). ”(IWE 366) A regulatory policy that is limited to a competition policy, as Ulrich calls for neoliberalism, is not enough. Ulrich describes the idea that the common good and prosperity are best promoted by a market economy as a "metaphysical promise of salvation". (IWE 378) He even evaluates the concept of the social market economy of ordoliberalism as "systematically inadequate and outdated political-philosophical foundation of their regulatory conception." (IWE 389)

Ulrich criticizes

  • the rejection of democratic elements such as co-determination by the ordoliberals and describes this as a “democratic deficit”;
  • the demand for competition-neutral regulatory measures, because from his point of view no regulatory intervention can be neutral in relation to those affected, so that regulatory policy must always be guided by morality.

Regulatory decision-making processes must be mentally opened to the critical public debate. (IWE 400) This is about

(a) the subjective rights of all economic citizens in the market process
In addition to property, business, employee, consumer and tenant rights, Ulrich also sees the rights of citizens affected by external effects in terms of information, protection and legal action. "Based on the realpolitical status quo, the main aim will be to neutralize the influence of property relations on political-economic communication relations, which is hardly disputable in political science, i.e. to eliminate communication-distorting or closing power resulting from rights of disposal in the regulatory process." (IWE 404 )
(b) the accounting standards that go into the microeconomic calculations
By this, Ulrich understands state-prescribed pricing and price monitoring against monopoly structures as well as control measures such as subsidies or tax structuring. This is intended to influence distribution issues and structural allocations.
(c) the marginal standards that limit the market
Ulrich describes limit values ​​for emissions or immissions, pollution of food and also minimum wages and maximum working hours as boundary standards. This also includes customs duties, limited shop opening hours or Sunday work, approvals that depend on quality standards or safety regulations. Finally, this area includes the definition of public goods, especially in the areas of health, education and culture. "In fair competition, no compulsion other than that of better offers should count - but there does not have to be competition everywhere in life." (IWE 409)

With regard to globalization too, Ulrich criticizes unbound and uncontrolled markets and competition between economies. From the point of view of integrative business ethics, comparable marginal norms, rights and accounting norms must be created at least within the large regional areas such as the EU, Asean, NAFTA or Mercusur.

Business ethics

In business ethics, Ulrich first takes a critical look at the profit principle and comes to the conclusion: “In principle, strict profit maximization cannot be a legitimate entrepreneurial action orientation, because it means that all value aspects or claims that conflict with profitability are subordinated to it. Any approach to business ethics that does not categorically make the entrepreneurial success or profit orientation dependent on a reservation of legitimation is to be understood as economically abbreviated: Legitimate profit pursuit is always morally limited profit pursuit. "(IWE 450)

For Ulrich, business ethics cannot be limited in terms of instruments. As long as ethical principles are applied in such a way that they improve the company's position in the market, there is no ethical action, but the application of corporate management methods. The charitable use of profits does not meet the requirements of business ethics either, because it does not ask how these profits were achieved. It is also not enough to see business ethics as a corrective to the profit principle, because one then withdraws general entrepreneurial activity from ethical evaluation. In the first step of integrative business ethics, the company is required to "secure its livelihood and its economic success exclusively with socially legitimate and sensible strategies of entrepreneurial value creation." (IWE 463) In the explanation, Ulrich speaks of the "social function optimization of Entrepreneurship ”and names Migros , The Body Shop or Tom's of Maine as outstanding examples . "From the perspective of integrative business ethics, the systematic idea is essential here that the usefulness of the entrepreneurial value creation idea is understood as the constitutive ethical and functional basis of the business model, whereby the categorical priority of the substantive usefulness over the economic potential for success must be maintained." (IWE 467)

In addition to the general orientation of the company, Ulrich believes it is imperative that companies actively work to improve the framework conditions through association work. This is primarily a question of attitude: “Without republican-minded economic citizens in the management levels of companies, who are generally prepared to give the ethical principles of the Res publica systematic priority over their own economic interests, there will be neither regulatory nor corporate ethics come to practice. "(IWE 472)

Ulrich regards “the private autonomy of private companies under company law as a legal fiction; In fact, larger companies in particular have long since become quasi-public institutions: Their ownership base is private, but their interdependencies are largely publicly relevant. "(IWE 474) Therefore, in the event of a conflict, companies have to face a public discussion with their stakeholders :" Yes It is and remains to propose the task of the company as stated; but to ensure a legitimate distribution of added value and consumption, and thus business integrity, this must be unreservedly made available to all “stakeholders” in a corporate policy deliberation process and justified to all those affected. ”(IWE 475) As a limit to the duty of justification to a critical public and Ulrich calls the “influence exerted by the stakeholders” the criterion of reasonableness. As a consequence, there is a claim that goes well beyond the existing legal system and also contradicts it in its basic view: “The predominant concentration on the principal-agent problem, i.e. the strict focus of management (agent) on owner interests (Principal), from a broad perspective, is more of a part of the problem than the solution. At this point, the business-ethical perspective of good corporate management, which wants to do justice to all legitimate stakeholder interests, separates from that of commercial law, which is limited to the given norms of company law and, in particular, stock corporation law. "(IWE 490-491)

Criticism of integrative business ethics

One of Ulrich's first critics is Birger Priddat with the view that integrative business ethics is less oriented towards Kant, but rather a virtue ethics in the sense of Aristotle, which is linked to discourse ethics. Therefore, one is dealing with “a political theory of needs democracy leaving out the economic problem.” For Werner Lachmann , one of the main problems lies in the implementation of integrative business ethics, for which he misses appropriate proposals: “It is noticeable that Ulrich alle shies away from practical applications. ”Steinmann / Löhr see the reason for this in the fact that Ulrich's concept lacks an economic benchmark for assessing actions. "Since Ulrich does not specify with which or whose claim the dialogue should begin, one must assume a series of spontaneous suggestions without presumption of correctness to the address of the companies. Such efforts remain 'aimless' in the truest sense of the word. ”The economist Joachim Weimann gives Ulrich a reflection without sufficient understanding of the“ normative foundations of economic research ”. In particular, he reproaches Ulrich for not clearly separating the question of allocation and distribution when he demands that people be allowed to assert claims to alternative life plans. Because these too compete for scarce goods. Efficiency does not mean, as Ulrich asserts, "the relative maximization of the private advantage", but simply the absence of waste. The Pareto criterion does not imply any practical constraint, but rather the ethical requirement to avoid waste. Economic theory does not decide on questions of distribution, but provides information about which distribution works how efficiently. Rationality does not mean selfishness, but can just as well be used for altruistic goals. “The realization that competitive markets lead to an efficient allocation of resources under the condition of strictly selfish behavior is an extremely important insight. But that does not mean that self-interest is justified as the only legitimate purpose in life. "(Ibid.) Weimann reproaches Ulrich for building his argument on problems that are not represented in this way by anyone:" He creates an ideological construct on which can be taken splendidly, which unfortunately has nothing to do with what is happening within the economic discipline. "(ibid.)

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Peter Ulrich: Lebensdienliche Marktwirtschaft, in: Thomas Bausch, Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke, Thomas Rusche, Michael Stitzel, Micha H. Werner (eds.): Responsibility for the future in the market economy. Festschrift for Hans Jonas, Lit, Münster 2000, 70-84, here 73
  2. ↑ Jürgen Mittelstrass: Business Ethics as a Scientific Discipline ?, in: Georges Enderle (Ed.): Ethik und Wirtschaftswwissenschaft, Berlin 1985, 17-32, here 24, quoted from IWE 129
  3. ↑ Peter Ulrich: Orient oneself in ethical-political thinking, in: Information Philosophie, 4/2002, 22-32, here 23
  4. ↑ Ulrich takes this designation from Ernst Tugendhat: Vorlesungen über Ethik, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1993, 327
  5. ↑ Immanuel Kant: About the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but is not suitable for practice , in: Gesammelte Werke, ed. By Wilhelm Weischedel, Suhrkamp, ​​Volume 11, 125-172, here 151
  6. ↑ Ulrich refers (285) to Johan Galtung : Human rights - seen differently, Frankfurt 1995
  7. ↑ Ulrich refers (287) to the anthology by Dieter Senghaas (ed.): Peripherer Kapitalismus. Analysis of addiction and underdevelopment, Frankfurt 1974
  8. ^ Paulo Freire: Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Education as the Practice of Freedom, Reinbek 1973
  9. ^ Ralf Dahrendorf : the modern social conflict, Munich 1994, 70
  10. ↑ Claus Offe : Fessel und Bremse: Moral and institutional aspects of "intelligent self-limitation", in: Axel Honneth u. a. (Ed.): Interim considerations. In the process of enlightenment, Frankfurt 1988, 739-774, here 759
  11. ↑ Birger P. Priddat: Transformation of Economic Reason? About P. Ulrich's suggestion to “moralize the economy”, in: EK Seifert and R. Pfriem (eds.): Wirtschaftsethik und Ökologische Wirtschaftsordnung, Bern 1989, 151-164, here 152, quotation 153
  12. ↑ Werner Lachmann: Old Wine in New Hoses ?, in: Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften (EuS) 4, 11/2000, 591-593, 592
  13. ↑ Horst Steinmann / Albert Löhr: Basics of business ethics, Stuttgart, 2nd edition 1994, 129
  14. ↑ Joachim Weimann: Reflection without Understanding? , in: Ethics and Social Sciences Eighth Discussion Unit , Issue 4 (2000) , 11/2000, pp. 625–627.