Topic (Aristotle)
The Topik ( ancient Greek Τόποι Tópoi , Latin Topica ) is the fifth and penultimate book of Organon , a compilation of writings by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle . In the writings of Organon, Aristotle clarifies basic philosophical , logical and grammatical concepts. While the first four books of the Organon illuminate their subject primarily theoretically, the last two deal with the practice of reasoning. The topic deals with the dispute , i.e. the argumentative dispute between two opponents on a specific topic, whereby the topic must be seen in connection with rhetoric and dialectic (according to ancient understanding). In antiquity and also in the Middle Ages , the dispute was an important part of the formation of scientific terms, as science was seen in connection with the perception and opinion of the scientist. Plato's dialogues give an impression of the philosophical dispute .
The core of the topic is formed by several hundred "topoi", in English "places". These are rules that a disputant should observe in order to conduct a good dispute. In part, these are practical tips, in part, logical principles are formulated to protect the disputant from getting entangled in contradictions . A whole chapter is devoted to the rules of correct definition .
Book 1: The subject of the topic
Aristotle defines the concept of the “probable” sentence here: Probable sentences are “those which seem true to all or most or to the wise and also from the wise again either to all or most or to the best known and most respected” (Topic I 1, 100b18 ). Probable sentences are therefore plausible because they are held to be true either by the general public or by certain authorities. Authorities can, however, contradict the broad masses or contradict each other, then a “dialectical problem” arises, ie a “theorem (subject of research) ... about which the multitudes and the wise either have no particular opinion or they think oppositely like this or this like those or both among themselves. ”(Topic I 11, 104b). However, the problem must have a theoretical or practical relevance, in Aristotle's words, it must aim “either at choice and flight or at truth and knowledge” (ibid.) (“Choice or flight” means that one is for or decides against a certain action). As an example of a dialectical problem with a practical meaning, Aristotle mentions “whether pleasure is desirable or not” and as a problem with a theoretical meaning “whether the world is eternal or not” (ibid.). Dialectical problems can be resolved in disputes. To do this, it is especially important to assess the consequences of both sides of the problem. This is the subject of the Topik, the treatise deals with “finding a method by which we can form conclusions about every problem posed from probable sentences and, if we are to speak up ourselves”, that is, “do not get into contradictions” in a dispute ".
Aristotle defines the definition (horos) itself as “speech [logos] , which denotes the essence [o to ti en einai] [semainon]. "
Book 2: Topoi on Accident
The second chapter deals with topoi that have to do with accidents , that is, pointers to be observed when the problem is that a certain thing is ascribed an accident. Aristotle previously defined an accident as something “which can and cannot happen to one and the same person” (Topic I, 5 102b). So it can be B. Socrates may or may not have a beard, so the beard is an accident of Socrates. On the other hand, it must always be up to Socrates to be human, so being human would not be an accident.
Aristotle explains a whole series of topoi in connection with the accident, including the following: "Another place is to set up terms for what follows and what it follows ..." (Topic II 2, 109b). The “follow-up” is another word for “Akzidens”. As an example, Aristotle looks at the problem of whether one can wrong God. That God is wronged is not something that always belongs to him, therefore it is an accident. Aristotle now gives the hint for the accident "to set up a concept", i. H. “To ask what it means to do wrong. If it is said to do harm voluntarily, then obviously no wrong can be done to God ”. So, according to Aristotle, it is often helpful in a discussion to find a more detailed formulation for the accident, "because what you are looking for is often not yet clear if you only give the whole term ..." (ibid.).
Book 3: Topoi for the good
The third book deals with topoi about the desirable (good). Such is “what is desirable because of itself is more desirable than that because of someone else's desirable” (Topic III 1, 110a). If gymnastics is a means to health, then health is more desirable than gymnastics.
Book 4: Topoi on the genus
Topoi are formulated to be observed if the problem contains a generic name . “Genus is what is predicted by several of the kind according to different things when specifying their what or essence” (Topic I 5, 102a). Socrates and a horse, for example, are different in nature, but the question “What is it?” Can be answered with “a living being”, so that “living being” is a genus of Socrates.
Aristotle treats as a topos in connection with the genus that one should pay attention to “whether the specified species belongs to another genus that neither includes the specified genus nor is under it, as if z. B. someone put science as a species of justice ”(Topic VI 2, 121b). The problem here is that justice is on the one hand under the genus of virtue and that on the other hand the genus "science" is not above or below the genus "virtue" (such as the genus "living beings" above the genus "plant") stands). An object can only come under two genres if they are above or below each other in the genre hierarchy. Hence, “science” cannot be a class of “justice”.
Book 5: Topoi on Proprium
Here Aristotle deals with topoi that become relevant when the problem involves something called proprium. Aristotle explained the term “proprium” as follows: “Peculiar, proprium, is that which does not denote the essence of a thing, but only belongs to it and is exchanged with it in the statement” (Topic I 5, 102a). The proprium of a species is what belongs to all and only to the individuals of the species. Thus, according to Aristotle, the proprium of humans is that they are capable of grammar, since everyone and only humans are capable of grammar (i.e. use a language with a grammatical structure). On the other hand, sleep is not proprium, since other living beings also sleep.
If the discussion now revolves around a proprium, then, according to Aristotle, one of the things to check is “whether the proprium is not determined by something known or at least…” (Topic V 2, 129b). Aristotle's example is that someone states as the proprium of fire that it is most like the soul. But we know less about the soul than about fire, it is less known to us. Therefore the Proprium has been chosen incorrectly: “In this case the Proprium is not given correctly. We set it up because of the knowledge ”(ibid).
Book 6: Definition Theory
Aristotle deals here with topoi that play a role in connection with definitions . According to Aristotle, a definition is "a speech that indicates the essence" (Topic I 5, 102a). For example, the definition of the human being is “sensible beings endowed with reason”. According to Aristotle: “For every thing its essential being is one” (Topic VI 4, 141b). There can therefore only ever be one definition (ibid.). This is an essential difference to the modern definition concept (for example in mathematics ), according to which there can be many equally good (“equivalent”) definitions. In general, according to Aristotle, the “next genus” and the “species-forming difference” are defined. The next genus for humans is e.g. B. "Sense beings" (another genus would be "living beings", but this would not be the next, since all sensory beings are living beings; see also Topic VI 5). The species-forming difference indicates what distinguishes humans from the other sensory beings (such as cow, horse, etc.) and this is precisely “gifted with reason” (cf. Topic VI 6).
Aristotle formulates a. a. the following definition rules:
- The definition should not be unclear (Topic VI 2). This would be the case, for example, if the earth was metaphorically defined as a wet nurse (139b).
- The definition should not contain anything superfluous. The following applies: “Anything that can be left out is superfluous, but the rest explains what is defined” (Topic VI 3, 140b). If, for example, “the desire is described as a desire for something sweet or something that brings pleasure” (ibid.), Then “sweet” can also be left out, because sweet is already contained in lust-bringing.
- The definition should be “obtained using earlier and more well-known terms” (Topic VI 4, 141a). By “earlier” it is meant that the existence of the thing to be defined (the “definiendum”) already presupposes the existence of the defining things (the “defining”). This is e.g. This is the case, for example, with the definition of “man” as “sensible beings endowed with reason”, because without the sensory beings there could be no human beings; It is different if the line is defined as the boundary of the surface (141b). The surface already consists of lines, so it is not “earlier” than this, the definition would be incorrect. A special case of a violation of this commandment is circularity, when what is defined is explained by itself. Aristotle gives the example here that the sun is defined as the “celestial body shining during the day” (Topic 142b). The problem is that "day" in turn contains a reference to the sun, namely the day is defined as "the movement of the sun over the earth". Therefore the definition of the sun is circular and therefore incorrect.
Book 7: Topoi on Synonymy
The seventh book deals with topoi that are used to judge whether two terms denote “identical numbers”. According to a previously given explanation (Topic 1 7, 103a), these are synonymous terms such as B. "Robe" and "Dress". The connection to the previous chapter results from the fact that in a definition what is defined and what defines must always be synonymous. According to Aristotle an assertion of synonymy must u. a. thereupon it is checked “whether an impossibility by virtue of a hypothesis can exist” (Topic VII 1, 152b). The terms “the emptiness” and “that filled with air” serve as an example. These terms cannot be synonymous because if one assumes that a room is leaking air, there is no more air in the room, but there is still emptiness. "So with a certain condition, be it wrong or right, ..., one of the two things is canceled, the other is not, and therefore they are not identical." (Ibid.) This test is reminiscent of the much later, in the 20th Analysis of synonymy given by Rudolf Carnap in the 16th century , according to which synonymous terms must apply to the same things not only in the current but also in every counterfactual situation (“ possible world ”).
Book 8: The Rules of Disputes
After the previous books dealt with how to react in certain dispute situations, the last book deals with the disputation as a whole. In general, there are two participants in the disputes described by Aristotle, who are called "questioner" and "answerer" (cf. Topic VIII 4). The respondent defends a certain statement, called a "thesis", while the questioner wants to prove the negation of the thesis, the "final sentence". The questioner presents statements to the respondent that he or she can admit or deny. If the questioner can prove that the final sentence follows from what the respondent has admitted, then he has achieved his goal. Obviously, this is based on the dialogues of Plato's godfather, in which Socrates, in the role of the questioner, uses clever questions to get a sophist to admit an assertion that he had originally denied.
According to Aristotle, the respondent does not have to admit everything in the dispute, but only that which is “more probable”, i.e. H. is more plausible and credible than the final sentence, since “the less known is to be inferred from the better known” (ibid.). The questioner may only use premises that are more plausible than what he wants to prove, namely the final sentence. Then, in a successfully conducted dispute, a real gain in knowledge has taken place: The final sentence now appears more plausible than it was before, as it could be inferred from more plausible assumptions. If, on the other hand, he were inferred from premises that are even more implausible than himself, nothing would have contributed to greater credibility. "If something of the question does not have this quality (namely to be more believable than the final sentence), the respondent must not admit it."
Apart from the logical conclusion, the questioner can also establish a statement through “induction”: “Induction, however, is the ascent from the particular to the general, e.g. B .: if the best helmsman is whoever understands his cause and the same applies to the charioteer, then the best person is whoever understands his or her cause ”(Topic I 12, 105a). With induction, a general statement (“ Everyone is the best if he understands his cause ”) by showing special cases of the statement (“ The helmsman, charioteer ... is the best who understands his cause ”). This procedure is also well known from the dialogues of Plato. The respondent can only dispute a general statement obtained by induction if he is able to cite at least one counterexample: “If the opponent, although induction is carried out on many details, does not admit the general validity, then it is fair to say of him to demand that he cites an opposing instance ”(Topic VIII 2, 157a).
According to Aristotle, a dispute can be carried out for three purposes: the "competition", the "trial" and the "investigation" (Topic VIII 5, 159a). When it comes to competition, it's all about being the one who can argue best at the end of the dispute. In the investigation, however, the focus is on the final sentence itself and the question of whether it is possible to derive it from premises that are more plausible than himself. In addition, one can also conduct disputes in order to practice disputing, which is then the trial disputes.
Although the main focus of Aristotle is not the main focus of Aristotle because of the disputes of the contest, he gives some practical advice for these too, e.g. a. one reads: “Furthermore, it is advantageous not to stand up for something with great zeal, even if it is absolutely important. An opponent who betrays zeal is opposed to greater resistance ”(Topic VIII 1, 156b).
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Footnotes
- ↑ Aristotle: Topik 101b38.