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transcription |
Latin |
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Explanation
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Basic concepts
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| λόγος
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logos
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(different translations)
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Speech, logos , phrase, language
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- Different meanings in Plato : statement, word, definition, argumentation, investigation, train of thought, judgment, reason, accountability, relationship
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| ὄν
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on
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ens , esse , res
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Being, being, thing
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| οὐσία
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ousia
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essentia , quidditas
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Essence , Ousia
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| λόγος τῆς οὐσίας
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logos tes ousias
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ratio substantiae
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Essential concept
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Aristotle : He calls such a being ( on ) the same name ( homonym ), which has the same name ( onoma has), but a different concept of essence ( logos teis ousias ). A painted person has the name "living being" ( zoon ), just as a real person has the name "living being". The concept of essence associated with the name “living being” is different, since the real human being, in contrast to the painted one, is a living being.
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| τὁ τί ἦν εἶναι
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to ti en einai
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quod quid erat esse
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that which it means (for a thing) to be, essence, essence
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Aristotle : a definition ( oros ) is a "speech [ logos ] that denotes the essence [ o to ti en einai ] [ semainon ]".
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| ὄνομα
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onoma
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noun
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Surname; Nominal word
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Plato : "But the sign that is added by the voice to what those actions do, we call the noun " ( to de g 'ep' autois tois ekeinas prattousi semeion tes phones epitethen onoma ).
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| λεγόμενον
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legomenon
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dictum , id quod dicitur
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what is said, what is said
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Aristotle : He divides the “linguistic expressions” ( legomena ) into those that are pronounced in a “connection” ( symploke ) (one could say: sentences) like “man walks”. And second, in those that are pronounced without a connection (one could say: words) such as “human”, “bull” or “runs”. A single phrase such as “human” or “runs” cannot be true or false. Only connected expressions (sentences) such as “man walks” can be true or false.
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Terms for the conceptual logic
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| ὅρος
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horos
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definitely
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definition
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Plato : Phaedrus 237c-d; Theaetetus 209a et seq .; Menon 86d-e.
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Pseudo-Plato : a "speech [ logos ] from the difference [ diaphora ] and the closest genus [ genos synkeimenon ]".
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Aristotle : a "speech [ logos ] which denotes the essence [ o to ti en einai ] [ semainon ]".
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| διαίρεσις
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dihairesis
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divisio
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Dihairesis
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| συναγωγή
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synagogue
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Merging
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- is the grouping of "different things" into one genre
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| διχοτομία
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dichotomia
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Dichotomy
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Multiple division
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| γένος
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genos
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genus
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genus
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- inconsistent use by Plato , consistent use in the sense of genus by Aristotle
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Aristotle : "Genus is that which is predicated on several things and according to their kind according to different things when specifying their what or essence [en to ti estin]".
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| μέγιστα γένη
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megista gene
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most important genera, highest genera
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Plato : At one point he speaks of five so-called “most important genres” ( megista gene ): being (or: being, on ), identity (or: equality, tauton ), difference ( heteron ), movement (or: change, kinesis ), Calm (or: persistence, stasis ).
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| εἶδος
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eidos
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species
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Art
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- inconsistent use by Plato , consistent use in the sense of kind by Aristotle
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| ἄτομον εἶδος
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atomon eidos
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species specialissima
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indivisible type
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| εἰδοποιὸς διαφορά
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eidopoios diaphora
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differentia specifica
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specific difference , species-
forming difference
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- is a property (or: characteristic) that belongs to one of the species of a genus and does not belong to the other species (or the other species) and is thus species-forming
- in Plato : “difference”, Aristotle added “specific” (or: “species-forming”)
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| ἴδιον
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idion
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proprium
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Proprium
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Aristotle : is a property of something with which it has exactly the same scope of terms (e.g. "Man is capable of grammar ").
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| συμβεβηκός
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symbebekos
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accidens
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Commercial
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Aristotle : is a property of something that is not species-forming.
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| ὁμώνυμος
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homonymos
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aequivocus
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same name
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Aristotle : Such "beings" ( on ) is the same name ( homonym ), which has the same name ( onoma has), but a different concept of essence ( logos teis ousias ). A painted person has the name "living being" ( zoon ), just as a real person has the name "living being". The concept of essence associated with the name “living being” is different, since the real human being, in contrast to the painted one, is a living being.
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| συνώνυμος
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synonymous
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univocus
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single name
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Aristotle : Synonymously he calls those "being" ( on ) that have the same name ( onoma ) and also the same concept of essence ( logos tes ousias ). For example, a person has the name "living being" and falls under the term "living being", just as the ox has the name "living being" and falls under exactly the same term "living being".
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| παρώνυμος
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paronymos
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denominativus
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almost
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Aristotle : Paronymously , Aristotle calls “being” ( on ), which is named after something else. This is how the "grammarian" is named after the "grammar".
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Predications |
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Inversion of subject and predicate is possible |
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Inversion of subject and predicate is not possible |
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Definition
indicates the essence of the subject |
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Proprium
does not indicate the essence of the subject |
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Part of the definition of the subject |
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Accidental
does not form part of the definition of the subject |
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genus |
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difference |
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genus |
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| Type (1) |
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specific
difference |
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Type (2) |
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An example: |
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Creature |
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| human |
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sensible |
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animal |
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The ten categories and the first and second substance
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| οὐσία |
ousia |
substantia |
substance |
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| πρώτη οὐσία |
prote ousia |
great substantia |
first substance |
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Aristotle : “A substance [ ousia ] is chief, and that which is also considered first [ protos ] and most [ malista ] as substance, that which is neither predicated of a subject [ hypokeimenon ] [ legetai ], nor in one Subject is; such as B. this person [ tis anthropos ], or this horse. "
- "In addition, the first substances are called substances in an excellent sense because they are the subject of everything else and everything else is predicated on them."
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| δευτέρα οὐσία |
deutera ousia |
secunda substantia |
second substance |
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Aristotle "Second substances [: deuterai de ousiai hot] those in whose species the so-called first substances are contained and that [hot as both these types eidon ] such as the genera [ gene ] these species. So is z. B. this man [ tis anthropos ] contained in man [ anthropo ] as his species and the species for this species is the living being [ zoon ]. These species and genera are called second substances, such as B. humans and living beings. "
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| πόσον |
poson |
quantitas |
quantity |
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| ποῖον |
poion |
qualitas |
Qualitative |
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| πρός τι |
pros ti |
relatio |
relation |
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| ποῦ |
pou |
ubi |
Where |
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| ποτέ |
pote |
quando |
when |
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| κεἶσθαι |
keisthai |
situs |
location |
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| ἔχειν |
echein |
habitus |
to have |
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| ποιεῖν |
poiein |
actio |
do, work |
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| πάσχειν |
paschein |
passio |
suffer |
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Living being
(as a genus is a
second substance ) |
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Human
(as a kind of
second substance ) |
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Animal
(as a kind a
second substance ) |
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Socrates
(as a certain person is a
First Substance ) |
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Aristotle
(as a certain person is a
First Substance ) |
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Terms for the logic of judgment
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| ἀπόφανσις
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apophansis
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Judgment , statement
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| κατάφασις
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kataphasis
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affirmatio
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affirmation
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Aristotle : “Each of the [categories] mentioned here does not in itself contain an affirmation [ kataphasis ]; but through the connection of these with one another an affirmation arises. Every affirmation is either true [ alethes ] or false [ pseudes ]; but linguistic expressions [ legomenon ] that are said without connection [ symploken ] are neither true nor false; z. B. Man, know, run, win. "
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| ἀπόφασις
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apophasis
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negatio
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negation
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| ἀληθῶς
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alethos
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verum
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true
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Aristotle : “Each of the [categories] mentioned here does not in itself contain an affirmation [ kataphasis ]; but through the connection of these with one another an affirmation arises. Every affirmation is either true [ alethes ] or false [ pseudes ]; but linguistic expressions [ legomenon ] that are said without connection [ symploken ] are neither true nor false; z. B. Man, know, run, win. "
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De interpretatione 1, 16a9 ff .; De anima III, 6, 430a26 ff .; 8, 432a10 ff.
- “To say of something that is that it is, or of something that is not, to say that it is not, is true.” ( To de to on einai kai to me on me einai aletes ).
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| ψεῦδος
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pseudos
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falsum
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not correct
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Plato : a speech ( logos ) is wrong "both when it says of what is that it is not and when it states that it is of what is not" ( ta te onta legon me einai kai ta me onta einai ).
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Aristotle : “Each of the [categories] mentioned here does not in itself contain an affirmation [ kataphasis ]; but through the connection of these with one another an affirmation arises. Every affirmation is either true [ alethes ] or false [ pseudes ]; but linguistic expressions [ legomenon ] that are said without connection [ symploken ] are neither true nor false; z. B. Man, know, run, win. "
- "To say of something that is that it is not, or to say of something that is not that it is, is wrong" ( legein to on me einai e to on me on einai pseudos ).
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| κατηγόρημα
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category
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praedicamentum
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the said
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| ὑποκείμενον
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hypokeimenon
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subiectum
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the subordinate , subject
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| συμπλοκή
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symploke
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complexio
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connection
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Aristotle : He divides the “linguistic expressions” ( legomena ) into those that are pronounced in a “connection” ( symploke ) (one could say: sentences) like “man walks”. And second, in those that are pronounced without a connection (one could say: words) such as “human”, “bull” or “runs”. A single phrase such as “human” or “runs” cannot be true or false. Only expressions (sentences) connected to an affirmation, such as “man walks”, can be true or false.
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| ῥῆμα
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rema
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verb
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Verb , verb
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Plato : "We call the proclamation that relates to actions a verb" ( to men epi tais praxesin on deloma rema pou legomen ).
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| πρῶτος λόγος
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protos logos
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Elementary proposition
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Plato : “not only names, but also determines something by linking the verbs with the nouns” ( ouk onomazei monon alla ti perainei, symplekon ta remata tois onomasi ). In this way he gives “customer information” ( deloi ), not only “about being” ( peri ton onton ), but also about “ things that are becoming or have become or future”.
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Terms for the final logic
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| συλλογισμός
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syllogismos
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syllogism
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syllogism
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