Barzani revolts

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The Barzani revolts are a series of military conflicts between Kurdish nationalists and the Iraqi army. They took place between 1961 and 1970 and ended with a short-lived autonomy of the Iraqi part of Kurdistan .

They are named after the Kurdish tribal leader and politician Mustafa Barzani . However, the naming of the events is inconsistent. There is also talk of the First Kurdish War . According to this nomenclature, the conflicts of 1975 are referred to as the Second Kurdish War. The uprising has entered the Kurdish view of history as the “September Revolution”; the Kurdish word şoreş used for this can be translated as uprising, upheaval or revolution.

Political history

When the monarchy in Iraq was overthrown in a military coup in 1958 by officers under Abd al-Karim Qasim , the Kurdish minority saw the new regime as a beacon of hope. The new government initiated negotiations with Kurdish leaders and promised concessions. However, the Kurdish leadership did not consider the conditions to go far enough and the talks ended without results.

To buy internal security, the Qasim government purged potential political rivals. However, the repression against monarchists, Nasserists and communists created resistance on the basis of ethnic and tribal loyalties. Sometimes there were even skirmishes between entire military units of the Iraqi army.

In this political climate, the Kurdish leader Barzani decided to revolt against the central government.

course

Outbreak of the revolt

In September 1961 Barzani began the revolt with 600 armed men. However, he was able to pull large parts of the Kurdish tribes to his side. One of the five Iraqi infantry divisions was stationed in Kurdistan with the 2nd Infantry Division. This was largely formed by local Kurds from the region. After initial successes, Barzani withdrew to the mountains and waged a guerrilla war against the Iraqi army. Barzani's armed forces had grown to around 5,000 full-time soldiers and 5,000-15,000 local militiamen by spring . These new Peshmerga came mainly from deserters from the Iraqi 2nd Infantry Division.

In March 1962, Barzani felt strong enough to launch an offensive. The goal was to conquer the northern Iraqi cities of Zaxo and Dahuk . The goal was not achieved, but the guerrillas inflicted heavy losses on the remaining soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Division. This particularly weakened the power of the Kurdish tribes, which were loyal to the central government.

Qasim's reaction

The Iraqi head of state decided to nip the uprising in the bud with a massive troop contingent. The insurgents should also be deprived of supplies and food by controlling rural areas, cities and roads. However, the Kurdish resistance movement continued to gain popularity and by early 1963 already made up 15,000 full-time soldiers. The number of militiamen remained at 10,000. Although the Peshmerga had no heavy weapons, they received covert supplies from Kurds in Turkey and the government of the Shah of Persia .

The Iraqi army units failed to bring the uprising under control, although they were reinforced by a mostly Arab infantry division. The air force carried out attacks on civilians. There was looting by army personnel. The guerrillas isolated the army bases from each other and ensured that the troops had to be withdrawn in places for logistical reasons.

Course under the President Arif

In February 1963 Qasim was overthrown by General Abd al-Salam Arif and the Ba'ath Party . To show strength, Arif launched a three-division offensive in September 1963. However, the troops operating throughout Iraqi Kurdistan were unable to force a decision. A brigade-strength Iraqi unit was isolated and encircled. This could only be freed after two months with great effort. Then there was a military stalemate. For the next three years, Barzani and the Iraqi government held fruitless peace talks.

By 1968 the central government fielded up to 40,000 soldiers in several offensives. The strategic goal of interrupting the guerrilla supplies by concentrating in the border area with Iran failed. Also attempts to split Kurdistan into two parts. Even diplomatic initiatives that motivated the neighboring countries to cooperate did not result in a decision. In May 1966, Kurdish Peshmerga killed more than 2,000 Iraqi soldiers when they overran a poorly laid out camp. This led to an extensive demoralization of the Iraqi army.

Agreement under Al-Bakr

When Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr took power in Iraq in 1968, he too was considering a military solution. Despite the fact that 60,000 soldiers were deployed, the attempt failed in 1969. Bakr and the ruling Ba'ath Party were increasingly exposed to pressure from their neighbors because of their foreign policy. As a result, the government decided on a temporary, diplomatic compromise in order to be able to withdraw troops from northern Iraq and use them to secure the border. In March 1970, the Iraqi Kurds were guaranteed autonomy. As Vice President, Saddam Hussein personally signed a pledge agreement.

Individual evidence

  1. Aram Rafaat: Kurdistan in Iraq: The Evolution of a quasi-state . Routledge, 2018, ISBN 978-1-351-18881-4 , The September revolution and the establishment of Free Kurdistan ( google.de [accessed January 10, 2019]).
  2. Andrea Fischer-Tahir: "We gave many martyrs". Resistance and collective identity formation in Iraqi Kurdistan, ISBN 978-3-89771-015-3 , Münster 2003, p. 68
  3. a b c d e f g h i Kenneth Pollack: Arabs at War, Lincoln, 2004; Pp. 156-167