Borda election
In a Borda election , the voter's preferences are determined using a ranking list. The first place gets the most points, the second place one point less than the first, the third place one point less than the second, the fourth place one point less than the third, etc.
There are two different methods of determining the number of points for first place: The simpler method gives the first place one point less than there are total of candidates, so that a completely filled out ranking list gives the last one 0 points. The voter has the opportunity here to give his favorite better chances by foregoing further information after the first placement. The modified version, however, gives the first place as many points as the voter ordered candidates. If only two are marked, there are only two points for the first and one point for the second. If 8 are marked, the first receives 8 points and the second 7.
Borda is used in a slightly modified form in the Eurovision Song Contest : Regardless of the number of participating countries, points can only be awarded to 10 countries; the first ranked country receives 12 and the second ranked 10 points instead of 10 or 9.
Borda has a weak point: the method is not immune to clone attacks. This means that an ideology can significantly increase its chances of success by increasing the number of its candidates.
The Borda election also violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives . This paradox of ranking evaluation according to Borda, for example, leads to the fact that the exclusion of a candidate after the election changes the original ranking of the remaining candidates. A constructed example with four candidates and seven jurors:
| Voters | A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F. | G | total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| candidate | ||||||||
| a | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 |
| b | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| c | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 13 |
| d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6th |
Here candidate c is the winner. If candidate d, who has the lowest number of points, is excluded, a victory results.
| Voters | A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F. | G | total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| candidate | ||||||||
| a | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 15th |
| b | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 14th |
| c | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 13 |
| d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
This electoral method was proposed by Nicolaus Cusanus in De concordantia catholica in 1433 , but was ignored and is now assigned to the French Jean Charles Borda . This was in conflict u. a. to the Marquis de Condorcet , whose Condorcet method is now used by some organizations for elections.
There are numerous other methods of aggregating preferences:
- Rating choice
- Choice by consent
- Majority vote (with and without runoff)
- Rank elections
The social choice theory (Engl. Social Choice Theory) deals with these procedures and rules.
See also
Individual evidence
- ^ De concordantia catholica , Volume 3, Section 536