Combined Action Program
The Combined Action Program was a tactical concept of the US Marine Corps during the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1971. As part of an asymmetric warfare , it had the goal of sub-units ("platoons") of the Marine Corps together with units of Vietnamese militias, permanently and deployed in the area, to be stationed and, almost self-sufficient by regular troops, to be deployed against units of the North Vietnamese Vietcong or the Vietnamese People's Army . The idea here was to unite platoons or groups of the US Marine Corps with local Vietnamese militias or paramilitaries (local / popular forces) and to assign these, Vietnamese villages and communities as local, combined action / defense platoons , to shield the assigned area and the civilian population living there from the influence of the North Vietnamese Viet Cong . These combined units lived among the civilian population, had their bases in the immediate vicinity of the assigned villages and relied logistically in part on the local infrastructure. The "Combined Action Platoons" (CAP) operated as exclusively in these designated locations as possible.
Historical context within the USMC's history of operations
Anglo-American military history research assumes that tactical and operational experiences of the US Marine Corps from conflicts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and a. in Haiti , Nicaragua , the Dominican Republic and during the “ Banana Wars ”, during which US Marines were able to “pacify” geographical terrain through targeted training of local militias and villagers combined with subsequent joint operations, as a prerequisite for the use of the Combined Action Program in Vietnam served. In contrast to the regular US Army , the USMC had many years of experience with the combination of regular troops and local residents to protect the defined territory, so that the introduction of the CAP in Vietnam primarily remained a concept of the Marines. For the purpose of training local paramilitaries abroad and their joint deployment with American soldiers, the US Army founded its own branch of service, the " US Army Special Forces " (Green Berets) , in the early 1960s . During the Vietnam War, these special forces operated covertly and independently of the regular armed forces, so that the approach of using asymmetrical units together with the Vietnamese civilian population within the regular force did not prevail.
First introductory steps
The first Combined Action Platoon was probably introduced in August 1965 in the Phu Bai area , after the commander of the 3rd Battalion / 4. U.S. Marine Regiment, LtCol William Taylor, had determined that the ten square kilometer area with six villages and a field airfield was too large to be used for sustained military operations. After approval by the commanders of the III. Marine Amphibious Force and Fleet Marine Forces Pacific , LtCol Taylor integrated four platoons of Marines with local paramilitaries, led by a Marines officer. This new concept had the advantage that the poorly trained, equipped and organized paramilitaries and militias were trained and led by marines and at the same time had an in-depth knowledge of the terrain, the structure of the population and social networks. They also spoke the local dialects and, due to their origin, belonged to the respective localities and communities. In the spring of 1967, the Combined Action Program was adapted after it became apparent that the commanders of regular troops did not know how to integrate the combined, self-sufficient American-Vietnamese units into their tactical combat structure. In 1969 there were already 102 CAPs in the area of responsibility of the US Marine Corps in Vietnam.
Development of a combined action platoon
The CAPs consisted of an average of fifteen volunteer marines assigned to a fifteen to thirty-man militia unit to defend a specific locality. The Marines supported the Vietnamese paramilitaries with close air support , artillery , firepower, rescue of the wounded with helicopters and training. A CAP was usually carried out by a USMC sergeant. The task of a CAP consisted in self-sufficient and often independent of regular troops to secure areas of terrain through patrols and reconnaissance operations and to defend them against attacks by the Viet Cong. The CAPs operated from temporarily fortified bases in the immediate vicinity of localities and tried to create and expand a safety zone around the populated areas. During the day, the members of the CAP participated in the life of the civilian population, whereas at night they carried out armed patrols to fight the enemy through ambushes and face-to-face battles.
Further development
1968 saw the introduction of rotating Combined Action Platoons ("Roving CAPs"), which operated daily between different towns and villages without concentrating on fixed bases, as the number of attacks on the only lightly protected, fixed outposts of conventional CAPs increased dramatically would have. In early 1970, more than two thousand marines were deployed as part of the Combined Action Program, supporting around 3,000 Vietnamese paramilitaries. In September 1970, the Combined Action Program was discontinued after a total of five years with the general troop reduction of the American armed forces in Vietnam. During this period, CAPs were responsible for the safety of more than 800 homesteads in over 200 localities and of over 500,000 civilians.
Program efficiency
The use of the Combined Action Platoons is rated militarily as largely successful. In many localities, CAPs generated the necessary security that the US armed forces needed to be able to implement economic development and official administration together with the Vietnamese civil authorities. Due to the consistently infantry approach using asymmetrical methods of small warfare, CAPs were considered an "inexpensive" alternative to regular troops, which were based on the use of air force, artillery and cost-intensive reconnaissance. In addition, many CAPs were considered popular with the civilian population because the marines were largely integrated into the structures of the communities, learned the Vietnamese language and contributed to the development of local structures with their financial strength.
A study by the US Army Command and General Staff College from 1991 came to the conclusion that no place that was secured in this way had converted to the side of the Viet Cong or the NVA after the CAPs were dissolved. Major Edward Palm, an officer in the Marine Corps and a former member of the CAP, assessed the use of the combined units more critically. In his opinion, CAPs were only successful where they weren't really needed. However, where the use of CAPs was necessary, it did not work successfully.
See also
Individual evidence
- Tom Flynn: CAC Papa3 Marine. A Voice of Hope. American Literary Press, 1994.
- Fraser Fowler: The USMC's Combined Action Platoons. A Counterinsurgency Success in Vietnam and Why it Failed to Derail US Military Strategy. In: Canadian Army Journal. Vol. 12.1 (Spring 2009), pp. 89-102.
- Robert A. Klyman: The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken. Honors thesis, University of Michigan, 1986.
- Michael E. Peterson: The Combined Action Platoons: The US Marines' Other War in Vietnam. MA thesis. University of Oregon, 1988.
- Russel H. Stolfi: US Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965 - March 1966. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington 1968.
- Ray Stubbe, John Prados: Valley of Decision. Dell, NY 1993.
- Michael D. Weltsch: The Future Role of the Combined Action Program. (PDF). US Army Command and General Staff College. USACGSC-Weltsch-1991. Retrieved January 23, 2012.
- Bing West: The Village. 1972.