Dense term

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A dense term or thick concept (German also: thick (ethical) term or valuable fact ) denotes terms in which description and evaluation are closely linked and therefore contain descriptive and normative aspects in equal measure . The reflection on dense concepts was introduced into the philosophical and epistemological discussion by Bernard Williams . Typical examples of dense terms are 'cruel', 'coward', ' lie ', ' brutality ' or 'gratitude'. Dense terms are distinguished from thin terms such as 'good' or 'bad', which contain a rating but no descriptive component. Although dense terms are mostly discussed with reference to ethics, they can be found equally with aesthetic and epistemic values.

Williams developed his idea of ​​dense ethical terms in the light of the universal prescriptivism of his academic teacher Richard Hare and inspired by the social anthropological method of dense description . Since then, the analysis of dense concepts has been in the context of a metaethical discussion about the strict separability of facts and values, as claimed by logical empiricism or other positivist positions. Were involved in the discussion alongside Williams as Philippa Foot , Iris Murdoch , John McDowell , John Mackie and Hilary Putnam .

Fact and value judgments

Dense terms are discussed as a challenge for philosophical positions that give fact and value judgments a fundamentally different status. For example, anyone who considers factual judgments to be objectively true or false and does not assign value judgments to be truthful must be able to clearly distinguish between factual and value judgments. Dense terms, on the other hand, seem to be the interlacing of factual and value judgments in statements such as 'Nero was a cruel ruler.' to imply.

Prescriptivists like Hare suggest addressing this problem by differentiating between descriptive and evaluative aspects of dense terms. Dense concepts are composed of a descriptive and a normative component, which are to be separated in the philosophical analysis. For example, the statement 'Nero was a cruel ruler.' A distinction can be made between a value-neutral description ( e.g. , 'Nero caused deep suffering in his subjects.') and an evaluation (e.g., 'It was bad that Nero caused deep suffering in his subjects.').

Against such a two-component theory, McDowell and Putnam, among others, object that they do not take the entanglement of descriptive and evaluative aspects seriously enough. Thus the descriptive aspect of 'cruel' cannot be identified as 'causing deep suffering', since not all causing deep suffering is cruel. For example, an operation can cause deep suffering without being cruel, and behavior can be cruel without causing deep suffering. The separation of a descriptive and evaluative component therefore fails because of the fact that behavior can only be identified as cruel with reference to value judgments.

Hilary Putnam draws extensive metaphysical consequences from the entanglement of facts and values ​​in dense terms . According to Putnam, the fundamental entanglement of facts and values ​​shows that convincing philosophical positions cannot be limited to pure factual ontologies. This applies in particular to physicalistic positions in contemporary philosophy , according to which the descriptive vocabulary of physics is sufficient for a complete and fundamental description of reality .

literature

  • Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana 1985; dt. ethics and the limits of philosophy. Hamburg, 1999.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Hilary Putnam: The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 34.
  2. ↑ Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Hamburg, 1999, p. 197f.
  3. ↑ Timothy Chappell: "Bernard Williams", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), URL = < http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/williams-bernard / >
  4. ↑ See Hilary Putnam: The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy and Other Essays . Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 34 f.
  5. ^ Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 141
  6. ^ John McDowell: Non-cognitivism and rule following, in: Mind, Value, and Reality Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 201
  7. ↑ See Hilary Putnam: The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy and Other Essays . Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 38 f.