The transcendence of the ego
The transcendence of the ego (French: La Transcendance de l'Ego ) is the first original philosophical work of Jean-Paul Sartre . A part was written in 1934 during his stay in Berlin, where Sartre wanted to study Husserl's phenomenology . In 1936 the font was published in the journal Les Recherches philosophiques (Philosophical Research). With his monograph, Sartre deals with an internal problem of the phenomenological school, which is why the reference to Husserl is not surprising. What is more noticeable is that Kant occupies a special place in Sartre's thought process. The terminology is therefore simultaneously shaped by Husserl and Kant. In the following works by Sartre, however, terms such as “transcendental consciousness” no longer play a role.
The thesis of Sartre's writing is that the ego is not an "inhabitant" of consciousness. This means that it is not the basis of consciousness, but an object of consciousness. With this first thesis at the beginning of the train of thought, a second finally connects at the end of the work: Consciousness is transcendental, it is an impersonal form of spontaneity. Sartre's philosophical position is unusual because he does not arrive at a theory of the subject from consciousness.
The method that the subtitle names, “sketching a phenomenological description”, is descriptive. It is a matter of reproducing an experience of thinking whose outcome is marked by intentionality.
In the first part, Sartre shows that the ego-ego consists of two different components, the spontaneous je-ego and the objective moi-ego.
In the second part, Sartre examines how the ego is constituted. After making the problem clear, he explains how it came about.
construction
I. The Je and the Moi
- A) Theory of the formal presence of Je
- B) the cogito as a reflective consciousness
- C) Theory of the material presence of Moi
II. The constitution of the ego-ego
- A) The states of consciousness as transcendental units of consciousness
- B) Constitution of actions
- C) The qualities as possible units of the states
- D) Constitution of the ego-ego as the pole of actions, states and qualities
- E) The Je-I and the consciousness in the Cogito
conclusion
Starting point in Kant's philosophy
Sartre's starting point is Kant's famous sentence: “The 'I think' must be able to accompany all of our ideas” Sartre wonders whether the per-ego accompanies all of our ideas. The answer is negative and Kant anticipated this because he chose the phrase “must ... be able to”, which Sartre particularly emphasizes. So there are ideas without the ever-ego.
Sartre chooses reading as an example. If the book is good, it catches the reader's attention and he forgets himself, there is no more I-I, he turns the pages over without saying "I turn the pages". So you have to distinguish between two states: “I know that I will do this now and then do that” and “There is awareness of doing this and then doing that”. So you have to realize that there are cases of consciousness without the ego. This fact indicates, for Sartre, that there is an area of impersonal consciousness.
For Kant, the ego is a condition of the possibility of experience. For Kant it is transcendent, superior to things, and transcendental, independent of and transcending experience. One has to distinguish this from the empirical ego, that is, from the ego that I find in experience.
On this basis one must distinguish the transcendental from the empirical consciousness. Relationship is only a condition of possibility, not necessity. "The transcendental consciousness is only the totality of the necessary conditions of an empirical consciousness".
Proceeding from this it is pointless to ask what a transcendental consciousness can be, since it does not form on the level of experience, but rather precedes all experience as a condition of possibility. Sartre does not want to avoid the problem that an ego sometimes exists in consciousness, but he would like to remain grounded in the facts, and therefore he includes Husserl in his further considerations.
A phenomenology of the ego
With Husserl and phenomenology, the transcendental consciousness is “bracketed”; it is not a set of conditions, but an “absolute fact”, it is “an absolute”. The transcendental consciousness can also be called absolute consciousness. Its absoluteness is explained by the fact that it is pure consciousness of oneself. In this sense it must also be understood that it is intentionality. This law of consciousness means nothing else than that consciousness is determined by the fact that it is always consciousness of something, as Husserl had learned from Brentano. Sartre understands intentionality from the fact that:
“[...] the way of existence of consciousness is to be conscious of itself. It becomes awareness of itself to the extent that it is awareness of a transcendent object . Everything is clear within the consciousness and transparent within the consciousness: the object faces it with its characteristic darkness and impenetrability. However, it is itself pure and simple awareness of the awareness of the object. That is the law of his existence. "
This minimal definition of consciousness in its radicalism, simplicity and severity can also be found in Sartre's work “Das Sein und das Nothing”.
In many passages, Sartre speaks of consciousness without making it clear what it is. He is mostly concerned with transcendental or absolute consciousness, but there are six forms and therefore six different definitions of consciousness; transcendental, empirical, reflexive, unreflected and reflected and ultimately reflective consciousness.
With regard to Kant, the perspective is changed. Through the intentionality, which consists in referring to something different, the consciousness with the object reference becomes a unified consciousness. By stepping out of itself, it unites towards an object and in time. This phenomenological understanding of consciousness is no longer about Kant's transcendental I, but about Husserl's, which unites and at the same time individualizes. The je-ego becomes completely useless and superfluous. It only heralds the "death" of consciousness.
A difference between Sartre and Husserl here is that Husserl's position is not uniform and consistent.
First of all, in the Logical Investigations , he regarded the ego as a synthetic and transcendental product of consciousness, and therefore as an object of consciousness. As a result, however, Husserl took a step back and made the transcendental ever-ego the basis of the consciousness again, which produces and possesses it, instead of just being an inhabitant of consciousness, as Sartre says.
The following passages prove this:
"Also, to tell the truth, I have to acknowledge that I cannot expose this original self at all as the center of necessary reference."
For comparison:
“The objective world that exists for me, that existed and will exist for me, this objective world with all its objects, as I said above, sets in me all the meaning and all the existential value that it has for me Has. She places them in my transcendental self, which alone reveals the phenomenological epoch. "
Sartre's problem is the union of the idea of the ego as an inhabitant with the first definition of consciousness. He rejects this because it would threaten consciousness as such. Intentionality makes consciousness a nonsubstantial absolute, pure spontaneity. The Moi-I, on the other hand, is opaque, it destroys the clarity of consciousness. The transcendental I is the death of consciousness. Introducing it makes consciousness a solipsistic monad.
Critique of the concept of the unconscious
Sartre does not refer directly to Freud, but rather to the French moralists, especially La Rochefoucauld and his theory of self-love, the longing for oneself as the secret driving force behind all of our actions. “In the opinion of the moralists, self-love and thus also the self is hidden under a thousand forms in all feelings. In general, in the function of this self-love which it carries, this I wants all things for itself. The structure of all my actions is this self-reference. Returning to myself would be the constituent act of consciousness ”.
- Sartre ascribes the invention of the unconscious to La Rochefoucauld without the latter having invented the term.
- Sartre sees the mistake in psychologists of confusing reflexive acts with irreflexive ones.
- Sartre uses an example to make the difference clear: someone comes to the aid of a friend. At this moment there is only one thing for his consciousness: bring friend-help-.
- The theorists of self-love do not see this first moment of desire as complete and autonomous, but rather imagine an unhappy state that I would like to end by the act of helping. However, this connection requires reflection. (P. 40)
- The theorists of selfishness assume that reflection is the primary element hidden in the unconscious, but this is precisely contrary to the idea of the unconscious.
- Sartre concludes from this that the non-reflective consciousness must be viewed as autonomous. The reflection "poisons" the desire. Before they are poisoned, they are pure.
The analysis of the psychological theory of an inner-worldly consciousness leads to the same result as the phenomenological analysis: the ego is not in the irreflexive states of consciousness, nor behind them. The ego arises only with the reflexive act as the noematic correlate of a reflexive intention.
literature
- Jean-Paul Sartre : La Transcendance de l'ego. Vrin, Paris 1992 [1936].
- Jean-Paul Sartre: Les Carnets de la drôle de guerre. Gallimard, Paris 1983.
- Philippe Cabestan: Dictionnaire Sartre. Ellipses, Paris 2009.
- Philippe Cabestan, Arnaud Tomes: Le Vocabulaire de Sartre. Ellipses, Paris 2001.
- Vincent de Coorebyter: Sartre face à la phenomenology. Ousia, Brussels 2000.
- Jean-Marc Mouillie: Sartre, conscience, ego et psyché. PUF, Paris 2000.
Individual evidence
- ↑ La Transcendance de l'Ego (TE), Vrin, Paris, 1992, p. 13.
- ^ Immanuel Kant : Critique de la raison pure . Analytique transcendantale, GF, Paris 1987, L. 1, Chapter 2, Section 2, § 16 “De l'unité originairement synthétique de l'aperception”, p. 154.
- ↑ TE, p. 15, selon l'interprétation d ' Émile Boutroux .
- ↑ TE, p. 18.
- ↑ TE, p. 21.
- ↑ TE, pp. 23-24.
- ↑ Edmund Husserl : Recherches logiques. Volume II, Part 2, V, § 8 "le moi pur et l'avoir conscience".
- ^ Edmund Husserl: Méditation cartésienne. Vrin, Paris, 1953.
- ↑ TE, p. 25.