Three non-nuclear principles
The three non-nuclear principles ( Japanese 非核 三 原則 , Hikaku San Gensoku ) are a resolution of the Japanese parliament . Japan's nuclear policy has been decisively influenced by this since its adoption in 1971. However, the resolution has not yet been incorporated into a law.
The principles were formulated in a speech given by Prime Minister Eisaku Satō to the House of Representatives in 1967 in the course of negotiations for the return of Okinawa to Japan .
The three principles
The three non-nuclear principles of Japan are as follows:
- Japan shouldn't manufacture nuclear weapons .
- Japan should not have nuclear weapons.
- Japan should not import nuclear weapons.
History of principles
During the negotiations for the return of Okinawa by the US to Japan in the late 1960s, there was growing opposition among the Japanese population to the US’s plans to continue to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa. This had its origins in the atomic bombs being dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II, which led to a strong aversion among the Japanese population to the storage and handling of atomic bombs in Japan and Japanese waters.
This growing opposition made negotiations between the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato difficult with American officials, as a growing proportion of the Japanese population feared that the government would support a nuclear weapons program. As a compromise between Japanese and US interests, Eisaku Satō presented the Three Non-Nuclear Principles to the National Assembly. In the course of this, Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in exchange for the return of a nuclear-free Okinawa.
Satō then added the four pillars of nuclear policy to the principles:
- Japan should work for a peaceful use of nuclear energy.
- Japan should work towards global nuclear disarmament.
- Japan should rely on the protection of America's nuclear strategy.
- Japan should support the three non-nuclear principles.
The third point in particular was of decisive importance for Satō. He feared that Japan's defense capabilities would be too severely weakened by renouncing nuclear weapons in the event of the loss of its American allies. The chosen formulation created a back door through which it was possible to react to future changes in world politics.
In 1971 the principles were adopted by the National Assembly, but were not given legal character. Eisaku Satō was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his work for a nuclear-free Japan .
Since Satō's tenure, every prime minister officially supported upholding the principles. Over the decades, political voices have repeatedly come up in favor of a nuclear armament in Japan, but the vast majority of the Japanese population continues to advocate strict adherence to the principles.
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- ↑ a b c d Eisaku Sato: "The Pursuit of Peace and Japan in the Nuclear Age" (English), on nobelprize.org, accessed on November 4, 2016
- ↑ "RESOLUTION ON THE REJECTION OF THE VISIT OF NUCLEAR-ARMED Warships INTO KOBE PORT" (English), on prop1.org, accessed on November 4, 2016
- ^ Yasuhiro Nakasone: "Japan - A State Strategy for the Twenty-First Century" (English), Routledge Shorton , 2002, ISBN 978-0700716333
- ^ "Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Hiroshima Memorial Service for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony" , at www.japan.kantei.go.jp, accessed on November 4, 2016
- ↑ "JAPAN - Dangerous Game" on www.spiegel.de from June 10, 2002, accessed on November 4, 2016