Shigaraki railway accident
The Shigaraki railway accident ( Japanese 信 楽 高原 鐵道 列車 衝突 事故 , Shigaraki kōgentetsudō ressha jōtotsu jiko ) was a serious railway accident that occurred on May 14, 1991 in the Japanese community of Shigaraki (today: Kōka ) in Shiga prefecture near Kyoto .
Summary
In the Greater Kyoto area, on May 14, 1991, a local train from Shigaraki and a to Kibukaki met the Shigaraki Kōgen Tetsudō ( 信 楽 高原 鐵道 ) single-track Shigaraki line between the Shigaraki-gūshi station and the temporary Onotani passing point ( 小野 谷 信号 場Onotani shingōjō ) Amplifier express train from Kyoto to Shigaraki frontally together. 42 travelers are killed and 614 injured. Ultimately, the accident was triggered by the crossing of a supposedly disturbed stop signal , but the causal factors for this were a lack of communication between the railway companies JR West and Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, unsettled manipulation of the signal system and insufficient signaling qualification of the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway staff.
The Shigaraki Kōgen Railway
In 1987 the so-called privatization of the up to then fully state-owned Japanese state railway JNR followed . Here, the JNR was divided into several regional railways - including the JR West - and a rail freight company. In addition, heavily deficit routes were either shut down or transferred to a so-called third-sector railway (the 1st sector being the JR, the 2nd sector being the private railways) with mostly municipal carriers.
One such railway is the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, which is mainly owned by Shiga Prefecture and Shigaraki Township. It is not surprising that the railway continues to incur more and more losses even under the new sponsorship.
The line consists solely of the 14.7 km long, single-track, non-electrified Shigaraki line, on which only one train runs at a time, so that no signaling technology is required. The route runs roughly in an east-west direction between Kibukawa ( 貴 生 川 ) and Shigaraki, the journey time is approx. 23 minutes. The Kibukawa station provides the connection to the network of the JR West Kusatsu Line and the Ōmi Tetsudō ( 近 江 鉄 道 ) main line . At the time of the accident, the railway had 20 employees, three of them in the travel center and only four drivers.
The world pottery festival
On the otherwise less frequented route, the World Pottery Festival ( 世界 陶 芸 祭 sekai tōgei matsuri ) from April 20, 1991, expected an increased rush. Therefore, the provisional passing point Onotani including the necessary signaling technology was built in order to be able to introduce additional direct trains of the JR West from Kyoto to Shigaraki. This enabled the number of trains to be increased from 15 or 16 to 26 journeys in each direction per day. An additional exit has also been set up at Shigaraki Station.
The necessary construction work at Shigaraki station and the Onotani passing point was carried out by the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, those at Kibukawa station and the connection to the JR Kamegawa control center ( 亀 山 ) by JR West.
The near-accident
On May 3, 1991, the dispatcher at the Shigaraki terminus tried in vain to set the exit signal for a train returning to Kibukawa at 10:14 a.m. The representative of the signal construction company, Mr. Y., cannot be reached.
In the event of a signal failure, it is planned that the otherwise unoccupied Onotani passing point will be manned by railway personnel. A journey may only be made after the route has been determined to be free and the journey has been negotiated by telephone.
The dispatcher asks the head of department N. for help, but he informs him that no one is available - it is renkyū (a series of consecutive holidays) when the rush to the pottery festival is so great that even he The director of the small railway company has to help out with ticket control.
Finally the head of department gets on to operate the turnouts at the passing point, and the train departs - contrary to the regulations - with a delay of approx. 10 minutes via the stop signal. The safety technology detects erroneous exit from Shigaraki and provides the exit signal direction Shigaraki of the alternate location Onotani to "Stop!", Whereby the oncoming amplifiers Express Train "world-pottery hard Shigaraki" ( 世界陶芸祭しがらき号 sekai tōgei matsuri Shigaraki- gō ) is stopped there and there is no accident.
The day of the accident
On May 14, 1991, at 10:10 a.m., the three-car train from Kibukawa, almost fully occupied with 250 passengers, arrives three minutes late at platform 1 in Shigaraki station and is supposed to be reinforced by one car from the depot at 10:14 Clock back to Kibukawa. Although this is a Tuesday, the train station is teeming with people who want to go to the pottery festival.
The dispatcher tries two or three times unsuccessfully to bring the exit signal for the return journey into the driving position. He is surprised that the control console shows that a train is on its way to Shigaraki, even though the train has already arrived and the next train - the amplifier express train "World Pottery Festival Shigaraki" - is just from Kibukawa should be gone.
He informs his supervisor, the department head N., who is currently on the platform, who in turn has the department head Y., who is assigned by the signaling company, called, who is currently collecting the tickets at the exit. The head of unit hurries into the relay room to check the signaling system.
The departure time passes without the signal being set to drive. The head of department instructs the dispatcher to take out the armband. If the signaling system is defective, it is provided that a person with a special armband drives along as a token for the respective single-track section .
The department head puts on the armband and climbs into the driver's cab together with the director, who wants to receive those responsible from the prefecture's Ministry of Transport for a security investigation. At 10:25 the train leaves on the signal that continues to show "Stop" without an employee being sent to the Onotani passing point to determine the freedom of the route and safety.
Meanwhile, the oncoming express train of the JR West, which is very crowded with 716 passengers on only three cars, leaves Kibukawa station two minutes late at 10:18. Due to the high volume of travelers, he left Kyoto station five minutes late at 9:30 a.m. According to plan, he is supposed to meet the return train at the Onotani passport. The delay of the express train had been noticed in the JR control center in Kamegawa and at 9:44 a.m. the priority direction lever was set in the direction of Shigaraki in order to be able to stop the oncoming train at the Onotani passing point.
After the train has left for Kibukawa, the Shigaraki dispatcher is convinced that the control lamp on the control panel is on for an erroneous exit. In the event of an accidental entry into the single-track section, the exit signal in the direction of Shigaraki at the Onotani passing point should automatically go to the stop position, but the status of this signal cannot be recognized on the control panel. A short time later, the head of department wearing the armband calls Head of Section Y. from the signaling company by radio.
At around 10:30 a.m., the express train passes the Onotani passing point. The driver is amazed that he is in motion even though there is no return train waiting on the siding. But he assumes that the return move is still in Shigaraki for some reason. Suddenly he sees a train coming towards him. Despite an emergency stop at a relatively low speed of 54 km / h, there was a collision at 10:35 a.m. and the first cars of the two trains reared up against each other.
Shortly after the collision, the accident is seen by drivers on the parallel country road and the police are alerted at 10:37 a.m. The salvage work lasts until the next day. 42 travelers are killed, 12 of them on the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, 30 on the JR West train. 614 are injured. Among the dead are five employees of the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, including the director and department head N. The driver from JR West survived the accident.
causes
Even if the exact reason why the exit signal from the Onotani slip road in the direction of Shigaraki did not stop on May 14 after the mistaken entry could not be determined precisely, the investigations after the accident showed that the cable between Shigaraki station was most likely and the Onotani escape point, which transmits information about an erroneous entry, was interrupted or incorrectly connected due to work on the signaling system. It should be noted, however, that the exit from Shigaraki against a stop signal was carried out both on May 3rd and on May 14th without the necessary safety measures and was therefore inadmissible (and highly dangerous!) - on May 14th there was only additional protection against wrongdoing fails.
Another shortcoming was that there was not a single employee within the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway who had a sufficient understanding of signaling technology. The signaling technology made necessary by the Onotani switchboard was explained in two meetings in March 1991, but it was not really understood by anyone. After all, Mr. Y., who was the project manager for the construction of the signal systems, was made available by the signal construction company during the time of the pottery festival. However, he was only responsible for the construction of signal systems and not a proven specialist in signal systems, which was also known to the railway company.
In the end, however, the accident also took its course because the exit signal at Shigaraki station could not be set to drive. JR West, which was responsible for the work at Kibukawa station and the connection to the JR Kamegawa control center, had set up a priority direction lever in the control center, which was intended to enable the return train at the siding in the event of a delay on the JR West train To be able to stop Onotani. The reason was that the JR line was also single-track and a train stopped in Kibukawa would have caused significant disruptions in the JR network. The first provided by the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway hold button on the control panel in Shigaraki station for the exit signal towards Kibukawa in the passing point Onotani, which would have achieved the same effect, was discarded. In retrospect, opinions differ between the JR West and the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway as to whether the latter was informed about it - regardless of the question of fault, there was a lack of communication here. In the meantime, the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, which in turn was responsible for work on the Onotani passing point and Shigaraki station, made changes to the signal system, which had the side effect that when the priority direction lever in Kamegawa was operated, the exit signal at Shigaraki station was also activated fell on red.
These changes, which were based on suggestions from the driving staff, were proposed by department manager N. on March 5, 1991 - about one month before the pottery festival started - as a change "to the safe side", but were made by the responsible construction department manager Rejected on the grounds that there was insufficient time to obtain approval from the Ministry of Transport. In the meantime, the head of the signal construction company, who had heard of the wishes of the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, passed them on to the signal system manufacturer, who two days later sent a draft sketch to the railway company. However, without sufficient communication between those involved in the construction work, this passed through the various subcontractors, and the work was carried out the following day. Although the head of the department reacted horrified that the sketch, which was only intended as a draft and had not received any approval from the responsible transport ministry, had been carried out, but ultimately the changes were not reversed, which would have taken two hours.
It becomes clear that the deficit Shigaraki Kōgen Railway with a thin staffing level, which was mostly recruited from former state or private railway employees, with the introduction of signaling technology and the simultaneous enormous rush at the pottery festival, which clearly exceeded expectations and well was also seen as an economic straw, was simply overwhelmed. The communication between the JR West and the Shigaraki Kōgen Railway, but also the distribution of responsibilities for the construction of the signal systems, was anything but optimal.
After the accident, operations were resumed on December 8, 1991. As before the construction of the passing point, only one defined train now runs on the entire route, which is separated from the networks of other railway companies, so that (again) no further signaling technology is necessary.
Web links
- The Kyoto Shimbun News Paper: 信 楽 鉄 道 (Japanese)
Coordinates: 34 ° 55 ′ 14.4 " N , 136 ° 5 ′ 16.2" E