Explanation gap
Explanation gap (eng. Explanatory gap ) is in the philosophy of mind used term, with the problems of a reductive of explanation of consciousness is referred. The term was introduced into the consciousness debate in 1983 by the American philosopher Joseph Levine in the essay Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap .
Levine assumes that physicalism is true, which implies that mental states are physical states. According to Levine, this means that the existence of mental states should be made understandable through a physical - or a neuroscientific or cognitive science - theory. However, some mental states have the property of being experienced in a certain way. These subjective experiences ( qualia ) would also have to be explained by a complete scientific theory. However, according to Levine, this is precisely not the case. No physical - or neural - event can explain why something is being experienced. Precisely for this reason, every attempt to identify physical and mental events leaves a gap in the explanation.
The concept of the explanatory gap describes the problem of consciousness in an epistemological and not an ontological framework: Levine does not want to show that mental states are nonphysical entities . Rather, it is already contained in the term of the explanation gap that it is a non-ontological problem of the explanatory services. It is precisely this that distinguishes Levine's analysis from property-dualistic theories such as that of David Chalmers , who sees the failure of materialism in the explanatory gap.
Levine's reasoning has had a strong influence on the philosophy of mind and his essay is considered a modern classic in the field. Many physicalistic philosophers also accept the problem of the explanatory gap. However, Levine's reasoning has also been criticized. David Papineau , for example, rejected the thesis of the explanatory gap in the widely acclaimed article Mind the gap .
Web links
- David J. Chalmers: The Explanatory Gap - Introduction . In: Toward a Science of Consciousness III (PDF; 3.7 MB): The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, edited by Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kasniak, and David J. Chalmers, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass./ London 1999, p. 3 ff.
Individual evidence
- ^ Joseph Levine: Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap . Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 4, October, 1983, pp. 354-361
- ↑ David Chalmers: The conscious Mind . Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, ISBN 0195117891
- ^ David Papineau: Mind the Gap . In: Philosophical Perspectives , 1998