David Chalmers
David Chalmers (born April 20, 1966 in Sydney , Australia) is an Australian philosopher . His main areas of work are the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind . There he is considered one of the most important representatives of (property) dualism .
biography
Chalmers studied mathematics at the University of Adelaide , where he began studying in 1983 and graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1986, and at the University of Oxford (1987-88). In 1989 he went to Indiana University . Here he worked at Douglas Hofstadter's Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition and received his Ph.D. in Philosophy and Cognitive Science in 1993 . His doctoral thesis eventually led to his widely acclaimed and much-cited book The Conscious Mind (1996). From 1993 to 1995 he was a McDonnell Fellow in Philosophy, Neuroscience and Psychology at Washington University in St. Louis .
Chalmers taught philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz (1995–98) and at the University of Arizona , Tucson (1999–2004). He has been Professor and Director of the Center for Consciousness at the Australian National University in Canberra since 2004 . Since September 2009 he has also been spending part of the year at New York University . In 2013 he was elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences . In 2015 he received the Jean Nicod Prize .
The difficult problem of consciousness
In 1995 David Chalmers coined the expression “the hard problem of consciousness”. By this he understands the question of why there are experiences - or qualia - at all . Why does it hurt when I prick my finger with a needle? We understand some of the internal processes that take place in such a situation: Signals are sent from our fingers to the brain, where complex processing processes take place. With the help of imaging techniques, we can even find out what processes are going on in the brain when we experience pain in the finger. But, according to Chalmers, we still haven't the slightest idea why it hurts! Why don't all these processes happen without even a spark of consciousness arising? This is the hard problem of consciousness and also the classic quality problem as formulated by Thomas Nagel , Frank Cameron Jackson and Joseph Levine .
Chalmers contrasts the difficult problem with a “easy problem of consciousness”. This simple problem comprises all the psychological phenomena that do not depend directly on the question of the content of the experience or the qualia. For example, learning , memory , thinking or problem solving . These are topics in which neuroscientific and cognitive science research is making great strides. Now, with his somewhat provocative speech of the “simple problem”, Chalmers does not want to say that the results of these sciences are trivial. Only in comparison with the question of the experience content are these simple problems, since they can be solved using functionalist methods. The natural sciences (and with them the neurosciences) make use of explanatory models that work with structures, functions and comparisons. These methods fail (so far) when it comes to an “objective” or generally valid scientific explanation of the qualia. So we know very roughly how B. could look like an explanation of learning, but we have no idea what an explanation of our experiences might look like.
The assumption of the "hard problem" is rejected by some materialists. One of Chalmers' most vehement opponents is Daniel Dennett , according to which Qualia can be explained objectively by means of a "heterophenomenology", whereas Dennett, according to Chalmers, would only "define away" the problem but not solve it in reality.
Classification of positions in the philosophy of mind
In his article Consciousness and its Place in Nature , published in 2002, Chalmers constructed a classification of various positions in the philosophy of mind that he considered possible. As a distinguishing feature, especially of the materialistic positions, he chooses the type of answer to the “difficult problem of consciousness”, the arguments and positions of which he rejects in order to finally deal with alternatives. Chalmers discusses at least seven key positions:
Type-A materialism
The Type-A materialist claims that there is no gap between phenomenal and physical facts. In its radical form, it completely denies the existence of consciousness and leans towards a completely functionalist or behaviorist interpretation of the concept of consciousness. In less radical forms, he admits a small epistemic (knowledge-related) gap, but claims that this is easy to close. Chalmers argues against Type-A materialism that it denies the obvious. He analyzes the arguments advanced by the Type-A materialist in order to be justified. He comes to the conclusion that none of these arguments justifies one completely denying the existence of phenomenal facts: "This claim is not supported by arguments, but by observations of a certain kind together with the refutation of counter-arguments." Chalmers therefore rejects the type- A materialism.
Type-B materialism
Type B materialism admits that there is an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, but denies that it suggests a metaphysical gap. With this position, the epistemological difficulties are taken into account without having to leave a materialistic position. Chalmers first shows that the analogies put forward by Type B materialists to other scientific advances, such as the identity of water and H 2 O or of genes and DNA, are not valid . Their identity was ultimately concluded empirically, which, according to Chalmers, is not possible for the difficult problem of consciousness. It shows that all of the analogies cited show a purely empirical gap, but not an epistemic gap. So there is no reason to believe that our knowledge advancement will one day close this gap. The Type-B materialist can respond to this argument by making the epistemic divide a fundamental principle of nature. Chalmers does not accept this, however, and argues as follows: Fundamental principles such as those postulated in physics (e.g. gravity) consistently relate to the relationship between different entities or properties. Instead, the Type-B materialist tries to elevate the identity of the physical and the phenomenal to the rank of a fundamental principle, an approach for which, according to Chalmers, there is no other independent example. The further analysis of Type B materialism presented by Chalmers is complex and ultimately leads to the rejection of this position.
Type-C materialism
The Type-C materialist also admits an epistemic gap, but claims that this gap cannot be closed for us either today or for all of the future because of our cognitive limitations. Phenomenal truths could in principle be derived from physical truths, but we are currently unable to do so or because of fundamental restrictions. Chalmers first shows that Type-C materialism often appears as a variant of Type-A materialism, in that it ultimately only denies the existence of phenomenal consciousness without providing any good arguments. Chalmers counters the position that one day consciousness can be traced back to physical principles as follows: Physical descriptions are always descriptions of structure and dynamics. From such descriptions only other descriptions of structure and dynamics can be derived. However, phenomenal consciousness has nothing to do with properties such as size, shape, position and movement, and thus nothing to do with structure and dynamics. Whatever advances we have made in our knowledge of the physical, therefore, cannot explain consciousness unless they include consciousness in their explanations. This happens e.g. In part already by some authors of the quantum theory. With this, however, these authors leave the ground of materialism and ultimately represent a type-D dualism or a type-F monism. Type-C materialism is thus also rejected by Chalmers.
Type-Q materialism
Chalmers describes another form of materialism, which is represented in particular by supporters of the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine (hence "Type-Q"). This position would reject the distinction between the materialistic positions made above, since it also rejects the distinction between conceptual and empirical truth. Chalmers explains that this position too must ultimately provide an answer to the difficult problem of consciousness, which turns out to be a materialism of types A to C. Concerning the treatment of the materialist positions, Chalmers concludes that he sees no other alternative to defend materialism. Since all of the positions described are untenable for him, according to Chalmers, materialism must be wrong. Chalmers then deals with possible alternatives to materialism.
Type-D dualism
Type-D dualism assumes that the (micro) physical area is not causally closed. Conversely, the phenomenal is causally effective in relation to the physical world. The best-known variant of Type-D dualism is a substance dualism , as represented by Descartes (hence also "Type-D"). Forms of property dualism can also fall under type D insofar as the phenomenal properties are viewed as causally effective. Chalmers then goes into the standard objections to dualism. One of these arguments criticizes the fact that an interaction between the two postulated substances cannot be proven. Chalmers objects, however, that physics does not provide such a proof for other fundamental interactions either. For example, Newtonian physics asserts that there is a causal interaction in the form of gravity, but does not explain further how gravity works - the effect is simply assumed. Another standard argument against dualism is the causal closeness of the physical. The dualism is in contradiction to this and thus also in contradiction to science. Chalmers addresses this argument in a number of ways. First of all, he states that physics leaves room for the assumption of further basic fundamental forces , four of which are currently assumed. He then argues that the non- deterministic aspects of quantum physics in particular leave room for an interactionist interpretation. He closes the discussion by stating: "In summary, one can say that the standard objection to interactionism has little impact, interactionism is at least one possibility that is worth exploring further."
Type-E dualism
The type-E dualism regards the physical and the phenomenal as metaphysically different, but in contrast to the type-D dualism regards the phenomenal as causally ineffective. This position is thus the so-called epiphenomenalism (hence also "Type E"). Type E dualism escapes the standard counter-argument to dualism by recognizing the causal closeness of the physical. This is done by giving up the mental causation and thus at the price of intuition that our phenomenal perceptions (e.g. the perception of a red traffic light) are the cause of our actions (braking the vehicle). Chalmers argues against this intuition, among others, by David Hume , who has shown that the appearance of causality arises from the mere succession of events and that the intuition may therefore be wrong. A more complex argument against epiphenomenalism looks at the relationship between consciousness and its representations, as expressed in the statement "I have consciousness". According to epiphenomenalism, this statement can indeed be made by a conscious being, but it would be caused purely physically. Chalmers argues that the belief that one is conscious, and accordingly the statement "I have consciousness", does not necessarily have to be caused by consciousness. Consciousness merely constitutes this belief. Chalmers finally assesses the Type E dualism as a "coherent theory without fatal difficulties", which, however, is at the same time not very elegant and counterintuitive.
Type-F monism
Under the type F monism, Chalmers summarizes a number of positions which have in common that phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are viewed as the "intrinsic nature" of physical reality ( neutral monism , panpsychism ). He attributes this position to a discussion of physics by Bertrand Russell . In The Analysis of Matter , Russell explains that while physics makes statements about the relationships between different entities, it says nothing about the internal properties of these entities. Type F monism simply adds a theory of intrinsic nature to physical theory without, for example, questioning the causal closeness of the physical or the structure of the physical theory. In this way, according to Chalmers, "(proto) phenomenal properties [...] form the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation." He notes that Type-F monism has similarities with both materialism and dualism: "Type-F monism is materialistic in letter while it is spiritually a dualistic theory." One of the most important objections to type F monism is the combination problem first formulated by William James : It is currently completely unclear how a superordinate consciousness such as that of a human is to arise from countless proto-phenomenal units of consciousness. Chalmers notes, "I think this is by far the biggest problem with Type F monism. Whether or not it can be solved is currently an open question."
Property dualism
Diagnosing the difficult problem of consciousness has led Chalmers to a position called property dualism. Such a position rejects materialism , but it is also very different from classical dualism. The classical dualism was based on two substances - matter and spirit - while the property dualist only recognizes one substance, namely matter. However, the property dualist is determined that not all properties are physical properties. Specifically, this means for Chalmers: In addition to physical properties (such as mass or shape), humans also have some kind of non-physical properties (namely experience or qualia).
The path from the difficult problem of consciousness to the thesis of property dualism is quite rocky and on a high theoretical level. The basic idea can still be made understandable: Chalmers assumes that materialism is fixed on reductive explanations. This means that the content of the experience must in principle be reducible to the basic physical properties - if materialism is true. According to Chalmers, however, such a reduction presupposes a moment of necessity that combines the basic physical properties and the higher-level properties. This necessity is not given in the case of the content of experience. As a result, it is - in the philosophical thought experiment - possible a priori that there are zombies . Zombies represent an exact (!) Material copy of an ordinary person, only with the significant difference that they have no (!) Consciousness . Since the existence of a zombie is possible a priori, the mentioned necessity, which materialism presupposes, is not mandatory. So materialism is wrong. One can only really understand this argument if it is clear what is meant by “necessity”. This is exactly what Chalmers tries to explain and - following on from Saul Aaron Kripke - to put it on a sound basis using so-called two-dimensional semantics .
Necessity, supervision and reduction
The terms necessity , supervenience and reduction are closely related. Let us start with supervenience: A property A supervises over the properties B if and only if there can be no change in A without B changing. An example: There can be no change in biological properties without changes in chemical properties.
Most of the time, such supervenience relationships are no coincidence ; rather, the relations necessarily result. A can supervene over B with necessity, because B causes A through laws of nature . Chalmers speaks of natural supervenience here. A can also supervise over B if necessary, because BA logically or conceptually implies. Chalmers then speaks of logical supervenience.
Chalmer's thesis is that only logical supervenience is sufficient for reductions. A can only be reduced to B if A follows from B logically or conceptually. More concretely: A higher-level property can only be reduced to physical properties (and thus integrated into a materialistic worldview) if the higher-level property follows logically or conceptually from the existence of the physical properties.
We can now better understand Chalmer's argument against materialism. Chalmers thinks that almost all properties logically supervise over the physical properties and can thus be explained reductively. A classic example of reduction is water. Water can be reduced to H 2 O because the properties of water can be logically and conceptually derived from the properties of the H 2 O molecules with the help of the fundamental laws of nature. However, such a deduction fails for one property of the human being: the content of experiences cannot be logically and conceptually derived from the biological characteristics of the human being. So the logical supervenience fails, so the reduction fails, so the content of experiences cannot be integrated into a materialistic worldview. But there are experiences. So materialism is wrong.
literature
- David J. Chalmers: The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996.
- Jonathan Shear (Ed.): Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1997. (anthology on Chalmer's work)
- David J. Chalmers (Ed.): Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002.
- David J. Chalmers: The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010.
- David J. Chalmers: Constructing the World. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012.
Web links
- Chalmers homepage
- Chalmers Weblog Fragments of Consciousness
- Center for Consciousness at the Australian National University
- David Chalmers in conversation with Barbara Bleisch on SRF, July 2019
Individual evidence
- ↑ For the biography cf. http://consc.net/chalmers/
- ↑ Consciousness and its Place in Nature (PDF; 192 kB)
| personal data | |
|---|---|
| SURNAME | Chalmers, David |
| BRIEF DESCRIPTION | Australian philosopher |
| DATE OF BIRTH | April 20, 1966 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH | Sydney |