Philosophical zombie
A philosophical zombie or P-zombie in the philosophy of mind and epistemology is a hypothetical being who cannot be distinguished from a normal human from the outside, but does not experience any conscious experience or sensations ( qualia ). For example, a philosophical zombie who is hit with a sharp object does not feel pain, but acts exactly as if he were feeling pain.
Zombie arguments
The term philosophical zombie is primarily used in thought experiments that serve to support arguments (often referred to as "zombie arguments") against forms of physicalism (ontology) such as materialism, behaviorism, and functionalism. Physicalism is based on the assumption that all aspects of nature can be explained physically: all aspects of human nature and perception must be explainable from a neurobiological point of view. Some philosophers, such as David Chalmers , claim that a zombie, physiologically indistinguishable from humans, would, as a logical possibility, represent a valid refutation of physicalism. Physicalists like Daniel Dennett counter that Chalmers' physiological zombies are logically incoherent and therefore impossible.
The motif of the zombie has always occupied philosophers. It also serves as a metaphor for a hypothetical being that is physically, functionally and thus also biologically the same as a person from the outside, but has no phenomenal consciousness or "inner experience". Such a philosophical zombie behaves like a normal person, but does not have any qualitative states of consciousness such as pain. Its behavior is determined solely physically and functionally. In the conceptual framework of a philosophy of mind , the imaginability of such beings is understood and discussed as a problem for materialistic or physicalistic approaches. David Chalmers in particular argues that materialism is based on the assumption that the existence of consciousness already results from the physical-functional description. The imaginability of zombie scenarios, however, shows that even a complete physical-functional description does not imply the existence of consciousness.
Susan Blackmore describes the problem very clearly: “ For example, let's imagine the zombie Sue Blackmore. Zombie Sue looks just like me, acts just like me, talks like me about her private experiences and discusses consciousness like me . For an outsider, she is indistinguishable from the real Sue. The only difference is that it has no inner life and no conscious experience; it is a machine that produces words and behaviors while it is completely dark inside. Could this zombie sue really exist? "
Zombie arguments following David Chalmers can be broken down into an epistemological and a metaphysical sub-argument. The epistemological argument asserts that philosophical zombies can be imagined and thus illustrates an explanatory gap between the physical-functional and the phenomenal perspective. In the metaphysical argument, from the imaginability of philosophical zombies, the failure of materialism is concluded. Materialists can accordingly reject the epistemological or the metaphysical sub-argument. “Type A materialists” reject the imagination of philosophical zombies and claim that consciousness does not actually exist or can be explained as a physical-functional phenomenon. "Type B materialists" accept the epistemological argument, but claim the compatibility of materialism and the imaginability of philosophical zombies. Proponents of ontological dualism see in the thought experiment of the "philosophical zombie" a proof that spirit and matter are two separate entities .
Artificial intelligence
Artificial neural networks are capable of learning, similar to a brain (see machine learning ) and are used today in many areas (see applications of artificial intelligence ). The question arises whether such artificial systems develop a consciousness (or soul, spirit). If this is not the case, then there is an artificial brain in the sense of a neural network, which is indeed in a neural state, but does not have a correlating mental state. See also: Chinese room .
Individual evidence
- ↑ Robert Kirk: Zombies. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
- ↑ Chalmers, D. (1996): The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, New York.
- ^ Daniel C. Dennett: Consciousness Explained . Little, Brown and Co., Boston, Toronto, London 1991, ISBN 0-316-18065-3 .
- ^ Daniel C. Dennett: Darwin's Dangerous Idea . Simon & Schuster, New York 1995, ISBN 0-684-82471-X , p. 322.
- ↑ David Chalmers. The Conscious Mind , New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 94-99.
- ^ Susan Blackmore: Conversations about consciousness , Suhrkamp Verlag 2012, ISBN 978-3-518-29623-3 , p. 16
- ^ David Chalmers: Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In: Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind , S. Stich and F. Warfield (Eds.), Blackwell. And in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, D. Chalmers (Ed.), Oxford, 2002. The article is available online on David Chalmer's website .