Property dualism

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The property dualism is a position of the philosophy of mind , whose central thesis is that a person is not of two substances composed (mind and body), but that there is only one object (the person), but physical and mental characteristics have ( i.e. material properties and non-material properties). Qualia , i.e. the subjective content of experience, are often viewed by property dualists as non-material properties, since the ability to reduce them to physical or physical states remains doubtful.

objection

Property dualism is an interactionist approach because it assumes that the physical affects the mental and that the mental can affect the physical; the latter assumption is the more problematic (keyword: mental causation ). Because this assumption speaks against the principle of the closedness of the physical world. It says that only physical things can influence other physical things. The mental, on the other hand, takes place by definition outside the physical world; it has no physical elements or properties. But if it has no physical components, it cannot influence the physical either.

Representative

See also

swell

  1. ^ Robinson, H. (2003) "Dualism", in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell, Oxford, 85-101.
  2. ↑ Ansgar Beckermann: Analytical introduction to the philosophy of mind. 2nd edition De Gruyter, Berlin et al. 2001, ISBN 3-11-017065-5 , p. 115.
  3. ↑ Helmut Schuster: Reductionism, interactionist property dualism and epiphenomenalism. In: Economics working papers 2005-07, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, Linz 2005.