David Papineau

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

David Papineau (born September 30, 1947 in Como , Italy ) is a philosopher and professor of philosophy of science at King's College in London . Besides the philosophy of science, Papineau's main area of ​​work is the philosophy of mind , in which he works on a naturalistic theory of consciousness .

After a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics from the University of Natal in South Africa , Papineau studied philosophy and received his Doctor of Philosophy in 1974 from Cambridge University . After teaching at Cambridge, Papineau is now a professor in London.

Philosophy of mind

Papineau sees himself as a naturalist. He therefore claims that consciousness is a natural phenomenon that can be explored and explained using natural science . Such a position, however, has to contend with some problems that Papineau has dealt with extensively.

  1. Intentionality : Many mental states relate to facts in the outside world, for example the thought that Angela Merkel is shorter than 1.80 m relates to the fact that Angela Merkel is shorter than 1.80 m. This phenomenon is known as "intentionality". If one wants to reduce mental states to biological states, for example, one has to explain how biological states can be intentional. Papineau responds to this with an evolutionary story: A biological state represents a state of affairs in the external world because it is its evolutionary function to represent this state of affairs. Papineau's position is similar to that of Ruth Millikan . (see teleosemantics )
  2. Qualia : Many mental states, however, also have the property of being experienced in a certain way. A mental state like a headache not only leads to a certain behavior , it feels a certain way. Now, it is argued that mental states not to biological states reduce leave because they could not explain why a certain biological condition leads to the experience of pain. Papineau objects to this argument that there is no need to answer the why question. Suffice it to say that the biological and the mental states always appear together to argue for an identity of the states.

literature

  • For Science in the Social Sciences (1978)
  • Theory and Meaning (1979)
  • Reality and Representation (1987)
  • Philosophical Naturalism (1993)
  • Introducing Consciousness (2000)
  • Thinking about Consciousness (2002)
  • The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution and Probability (2003)

Web links