Air accident involving a Sud Aviation Caravelle of the Líneas Aéreas Suramericanas

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Air accident involving a Sud Aviation Caravelle of the Líneas Aéreas Suramericanas
Líneas Aéreas Suramericanas Caravelle.jpg

The accident machine
Accident summary
Accident type Missing out, loss of control after an engine failure
place 7.8 kilometers from El Yopal Airport , ColombiaColombiaColombia 
date January 31, 2001
Fatalities 3
Survivors 3
Aircraft
Aircraft type FranceFrance Sud Aviation Caravelle 10R
operator ColombiaColombia Líneas Aéreas Suramericanas
Mark ColombiaColombia HK-3932X
Departure airport Bogotá airport , ColombiaColombiaColombia 
Stopover El Yopal Airport , ColombiaColombiaColombia 
Destination airport Mitú airport , ColombiaColombiaColombia 
Passengers 3
crew 3
Lists of aviation accidents

An aircraft accident involving a Sud Aviation Caravelle of the Líneas Aéreas Suramericanas occurred on January 31, 2001. A Sud Aviation Caravelle 10R of the Colombian cargo airline Líneas Aéreas Suramericanas crashed at El Yopal airport after an engine failure. Three of the six people on board were killed in the accident. It is the world's last aircraft accident involving a Sud Aviation Caravelle aircraft.

machine

The aircraft involved in the accident was a Sud Aviation Caravelle 10B with the serial number 201, which had made its first flight on January 21, 1966 with the aircraft registration F-BRNA , before being delivered to the Union de Transports Aériens on January 26, 1966 has been. From September 19, 1975 to April 1976, the aircraft was leased to Air Afrique and operated there as TU-TXQ . The machine was then phased out and stored at Le Bourget Airport . From October 7, 1976 to January 18, 1977 the machine was operated again by Air Afrique. It then stayed in Le Bourget for another 11 months until the French Air Force bought the aircraft and released it with the registration number F-RAFH . On July 9, 1994, the Caravelle was sold to Colombia and flew there for Lineas Aereas Suramericana as HK-3932X . The twin- engine, medium - range, narrow-body aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7A engines. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had been operating for 24,072 hours.

Inmates

There were three passengers and three crew members on board the Caravelle. The crew of three consisted of a flight captain, a first officer and a loadmaster.

The 34-year-old flight captain Alberto Martinez Cespedes had 3,445 hours of flight experience, 2,320 of which he had with aircraft of the Sud Aviation Caravelle type. Of this, he had flown 2,000 hours in the function of the first officer and 320 hours in the function of the flight captain.

The 24-year-old first officer Juan Manuel Rozo Carreño had 320 hours of flight experience, all of which he had completed in aircraft of the Sud Aviation Caravelle type.

the accident

The Caravelle flew on a cargo flight from Bogotá via El Yopal to Mitú. The cargo consisted of 14 barrels with a total of 3700 liters of gasoline. The plane left El Yopal at 1:45 p.m. When trying to land in Mitú, the landing gear touched down shortly before the threshold of runway 01. The crew flew a holding pattern and assessed the situation. The left main landing gear had broken away and a hydraulic leak caused control problems. By switching from the yellow to the blue hydraulic system, the crew was able to regain control.

After the pilots had flown over the control tower in Mitú, the air traffic controller confirmed that the left main landing gear had been torn off. The flight crew then declared an air emergency and informed the air traffic controller in Mitú that they would fly back to Bogotá. When the pilots found that they could not fully retract the buoyancy aids , they decided to turn back to El Yopal. The plane rose to 10,000 feet and flew to El Yopal at that altitude. The pilots then found that the left engine oil pressure dropped. They then switched off the engine. As a result, the machine began to lose altitude and speed. The pilots contacted the air traffic control in El Yopal and informed them of the emergency. They decided to make another flyby of the tower, whereupon the air traffic controller in El Yopal confirmed to them that the left main landing gear of the machine had sheared off. The crew then stated that they wanted to use fuel from the left wing tank in order to avoid a fire on that side during the emergency landing. The fuel gauges showed unreliable values ​​and it was difficult to exactly determine the amount of fuel present and to be drained, as the last part of the flight was carried out under extraordinary conditions. By flying past the towers and flying with the landing gear halfway down, the aircraft had consumed more kerosene than would have been normal on such a flight under normal conditions. It was decided to select the left fuel tank and continue to use fuel until the low fuel warning appears. The first officer recommended that the master restart the left engine before landing so that reverse thrust would be available on both sides during landing. The captain rejected this proposal. The captain flew the machine to the southwest of El Yopal Airport and instructed the first officer to fly further away from the runway while using his cell phone to communicate with the airline's operations manager. When the low fuel alarm activated, the pilots selected the right tank and the captain decided to turn back to land at El Yopal Airport. The right engine began to fail during the approach. The machine quickly lost altitude until it hit the ground 4.9 miles from the threshold of runway 05. The aircraft caught fire after impact and was completely destroyed.

root cause

The cause of the first impact in Mitú was found to be a low level of situational awareness on the part of the pilot flying on the final approach, and the failure of the on-board crew to adequately prepare for the foreseeable emergency was the cause of the aircraft's ultimate crash.

Contributing factors were found to be the passive attitude of the crew, especially the pilot in dealing with critical situations, inadequate crew resource management , poor or inadequate communication in the cockpit, the captain's limited experience in this function and the general low flying experience of the first officer .

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