Aachen hostage-taking

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The former regional central bank of Aachen near the main train station. Since 2012 branch of the Sparkasse Aachen. (2020)

The hostage-taking in Aachen was a crime committed from December 20-22, 1999 in the then Aachen state central bank branch (LZB) and a money transport company from the nearby town of Würselen . The criminal Adnan Hodciz, who was armed with firearms and hand grenades and had several criminal records, took two employees and the managing director of the money transport company hostage. On December 22, 1999, more than 50 hours after it began, the hostage-taking was ended when the hostage-taker was killed by a final rescue shot. All three hostages survived the crime, but two were injured. One suffered multiple gunshot wounds from the perpetrator, the other was hit by fragments from a hand grenade.

Sequence of events

Start of the hostage-taking in Würselen

On the morning of December 20, 1999, around 9:00 a.m., the perpetrator entered a branch of the Kötter Group in Würselen, eight kilometers from the state central bank in Aachen. First he politely asked the employees to open the company's vaults. At first, the employees were not aware of the seriousness of the situation. The event was viewed as a kind of stress test for the company. However, when the perpetrator began threatening the people with a firearm, his request was complied with. However, since there was only a relatively small amount in the safes, the perpetrator decided to go to the LZB with the company's managing director Rudolf Becker and two employees (a driver and a secretary) as hostages in an armored money transporter.

Highlight in the LZB

In the meantime the police had already been informed by an emergency call. In Cologne , 80 kilometers away , the operations management was taken over by the chief police director Winrich Granitzka. Once at the LZB, the vehicle was allowed to pass the vehicle lock unhindered, as the company was also commissioned by this. The perpetrator forced the surrender of the daily income of one million marks. Then he wanted to leave the building the same way. The operations management instructed the deputy director of the bank, however, to keep the access gate closed at all costs, as they feared and absolutely wanted to avoid another uncontrolled situation like the one in Gladbeck's hostage-taking eleven years earlier. As a result of this decision, the situation for the hostages worsened dramatically. The perpetrator fired several shots, but they did not injure anyone, and threatened to shoot hostages if the police did not let him go. The 30-year-old driver was tied to a pipe while standing and was connected to the safety pin of a hand grenade with a rope. Should the hostage z. B. collapse due to tiredness, that would have triggered the trigger and thus the death of the hostage. Despite the threats, the police kept the gate closed. So the negotiations that the perpetrator conducted over the phone about Geisel Becker remained without results.

The situation also seemed hopeless on the part of the police. Access was hardly possible without endangering the hostages' lives due to the secure construction of the underground car park. Later that day, the hostage-taker withdrew with the hostages into the armored transporter and blocked an entrance through which the police were considering access. Since the chance of a successful access practically disappeared, negotiations continued. The perpetrator requested a getaway car and the police made it possible to flee without resistance, including hostages, money and weapons. The police offered an escape without hostages or weapons, which the perpetrator did not respond to. Without an agreement, the hostage-taking went into the first night.

After the hostage-taker and the police did not come to an agreement on the second day, the perpetrator shot the driver a total of three times with an announcement: once each in the leg, one shoulder and one foot. Although the police did not know exactly how badly the hostage was injured at the time, their demands were still not addressed. On the second day there were no significant successes in the negotiation either. The police tried to wear down the perpetrator and get him to give up. However, it was clear to the operations management that the situation would have to be resolved on the third day at the latest, as the psychological and physical strain would otherwise be too high for all those involved and especially for the hostages.

On the second night, the hostages and hostage-takers had not slept for more than 40 hours, and then almost a catastrophe occurred when the hostage-taker, presumably falling asleep, dropped an unlocked hand grenade. He was able to kick her out of the vehicle in good time and into the hall, where she detonated. The 30-year-old secretary was hit by shrapnel in the head and back, but was not seriously injured.

The identity of the perpetrator was still not clear either.

liberation

View from behind of the gates of the vehicle lock, behind which the perpetrator holed up for days. Liberation took place on the square in front of it (2020)

On the morning of December 22nd, the operations management gave permission for the final rescue shot after no chance of getting the perpetrator to give up was seen. In addition, the police and hostage takers were able to come to an agreement for the first time. At around 9:45 a.m., the getaway car was driven into the underground car park by a SEK officer, as requested by the perpetrator. The engine of the prepared car could be switched off by radio. In return, the hostage taker had to leave the two wounded hostages behind and was only allowed to take one hand grenade with him. After he had left the building in the getaway car with the managing director as the remaining hostage, the engine was deactivated on the property of the building. The area was still cordoned off by police cars. Officials of the state police and the GSG 9 had taken position in the immediate vicinity. Snipers aimed at the hostage-taker from surrounding buildings, roofs and from a German railroad passenger train on the opposite railway line. He left the car shortly afterwards with the hostage. He held his remaining unsecured hand grenade to her chest and warned the emergency services that his death would also lead to the death of the hostage. As before, attempts were made to persuade the perpetrator to give up by phone, but a warning shot by a sniper was unsuccessful. The perpetrator tried to escape on foot with the hostage Becker and the money. It was feared that it could cause further damage to the city center, which is only a kilometer away, and to the Christmas market there, which is why they wanted to prevent the crime scene from being relocated at all costs. At 10:48 a.m., the hostage-taker was shot by a sniper from the SEK immediately behind the LZB property, despite the hand grenade being unlocked. At the same time the hostage was called by the officers on site to grab the hand grenade in order to continue to interrupt the time fuse. GSG 9 ordnance disposal personnel hurried to secure the hand grenade provisionally by fixing the rocker arm of the detonator with adhesive tape.

Thus the hostage-taking ended on the third day. A total of around 700 police officers were on duty. The perpetrator masked during the crime could only be identified after the crime.

Perpetrator

The hostage-taker was Adnan Hodciz, 46, from Bosnia. He was a felon known to the police and who was already in jail for further robberies and hostage-taking. Hodciz had been deported to Bosnia twice, whereupon he entered Germany illegally again.

At times the hostage Rudolf Becker was also suspected of being an accomplice, as he acted as spokesman for Adnan Hodciz with the police during the act and always seemed very calm and serene.

Awareness

Despite its dramatic course, the crime is largely unknown or has been forgotten today. One reason for this is that, in contrast to the hostage-taking of Gladbeck eleven years earlier, journalists were denied access to the crime scene and the perpetrator. After the catastrophic outcome of Gladbeck with two dead hostages, the press was massively criticized for making the work of the police more difficult. In Aachen, the perpetrator was not allowed to go, despite the extremely critical situation for the hostages, in order to avoid another uncontrollable odyssey. The image material initially kept under lock and key was only published later.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Achim Kaiser: Sparkasse grabs "the Bundesbank". In: Aachener Nachrichten. January 27, 2012, accessed March 22, 2020 .
  2. ↑ a b c Verena Müller: The martyrdom in the lock of the LZB. In: Aachener Zeitung. December 19, 2009, accessed March 22, 2020 .
  3. ↑ a b The hostage drama in Aachen 20 years ago. In: WDR. December 20, 2019, accessed March 22, 2020 .
  4. ↑ a b Sven Felix Kellerhoff: The final rescue shot was fired at 10:48 a.m. In: world. December 4, 2019, accessed March 22, 2020 .
  5. ^ Moritz Küpper: The lessons from Gladbeck. In: Deutschlandfunk. December 20, 2019, accessed March 22, 2020 .