Harmel report
The Harmel report refers to a 1967 report on the situation of NATO in view of the existing NATO strategy of “ massive retaliation ” (MC 14/2), suggested by the then Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel . Building on this, NATO decided on the Harmel Doctrine , a dual strategy.
NATO should be strengthened as a factor in lasting peace. She should:
- On the one hand, act as a deterrent through sufficient military strength to guarantee the military security of their member states clearly and unequivocally
- On the other hand, under the sign of a secured military equilibrium, lasting relations should be established with the Warsaw Pact states in order to be able to resolve fundamental political questions.
Military security and a policy of détente should not be a contradiction in terms, but complement one another. Security was understood as the sum of defense and relaxation. All NATO member states were called upon to improve their national network of relations with the USSR . However, within the framework of this policy of détente, the relationship with the Alliance must not be endangered (ideally through a policy of the NATO member states in the same direction). It was assumed that the Eastern European countries would also be positive about this policy. The outcome of this new type of policy should also be the clarification of the German question , which was the main source of tension in Europe. The Harmel report was finally reflected in the new NATO security strategy Flexible Response in 1967 (MC 14/3) .
Individual evidence
- ↑ Lars Colschen: German Foreign Policy , Munich 2010, p. 152.
literature
Helga Haftendorn: Origin and Significance of the Harmel Report of NATO from 1967 , Quarterly Issues for Contemporary History, Jhrg. 40, 1992, Issue 2, p. 169ff