Information economics
The information economics is a branch of economics that analyzes how information and information systems affect the business and economic decisions. It relates to the costs associated with obtaining and providing information . It examines the exchange between the actors (e.g. customers) and the effects of different levels of information and conditions on the functioning of economic systems.
An asymmetrical distribution of information between the actors has an impact on the internal structure of an organization (efficient organization, vertical / horizontal integration ...) as well as effects on the behavior of an actor on the market (price setting, cartel formation ...).
In information economics, a distinction is made between the following types of uncertainty (due to asymmetrical information distribution):
- Event uncertainty (exogenous uncertainty)
- Market uncertainty (endogenous uncertainty)
The degree of uncertainty differs depending on which goods are involved:
- Search goods
- Experience goods
- Trustworthy goods
The quality of search goods can be determined before the purchase (when searching), that of empirical goods only after the purchase (through one's own experience) and the quality of trustworthy goods only with great difficulty or not at all. The best-known example of a trustworthy asset is a drug: you don't know whether it made you healthy or whether your recovery can be traced back to other factors; you have to trust the doctor in this regard.
The information economy comes from v. a. in principal-agent relationships (see principal-agent theory ) too. By setting incentives (monetary / non-monetary), the agent should be encouraged to behave in the interests of the principal. The principal has no or only incomplete information about the behavior of the agent.
The dilemma of incomplete information leads to the problems of " adverse selection " and " moral hazard ". Strategies for solving the problems are, firstly, signaling private information (signaling) and other monitoring ( monitoring ) of the agent behavior. Both cause costs. Another option is screening. The principal collects information about potential agents ex ante. The agents can then be assessed with the aid of the information. This results in costs for principal screening and possibly signaling costs for agents.
- Example:
- By complying with the QS 9000 standard , company A would like to signal that its operation is regularly monitored and logged. A has several direct competitors who manufacture comparable products. Company B wants to buy products that A and its competitors make. In order to get an overview of the quality of the providers on the market, he carries out a "screening". This means that it collects information that is accessible to him, which enables him to assess the providers and their products.
- A thus signals via the QS 9000 that its products are being monitored qualitatively and are therefore "better" than those of its competitors. B carries out a screening in which he collects information and compares companies. As shown above, this causes costs for both A and B.
In 2001 the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to the three economists George A. Akerlof , Michael Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz , who founded modern information economics .
Web links
- Information economics - definition from the Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon