Informal trialogue

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Informal trialogues (from Latin tri , German three , modification of dialogue , English informal trialogue, also triangle ) are inter-institutional negotiations between the three legislative bodies of the European Union . These are political negotiation meetings between the three institutions involved in the EU legislative process - the Commission , the Council and Parliament . This possibility of negotiating was introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty . Deviating from the ordinary legislative procedure, they allow the bodies to reach agreements in every phase of the legislative process and thus to issue legal acts. They may be preceded by preparatory technical meetings attended by experts from the three institutions. Planning and deadline issues as well as detailed content-related issues are discussed on the basis of compromise texts. The proportion of legal acts dealt with by means of informal trialogues was 93 percent in the seventh legislative period of Parliament (2009–2014).

actors

The European Parliament sends the respective chairman of the committee responsible, a rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs from the political groups represented. On behalf of the Council of the European Union , the representative of the member state holding the Council Presidency, the chairman of the responsible committee of permanent representatives and the chairman of the relevant working group take part in the negotiations. A mediating role of the Commission to, perceived by a Director or the responsible Head of Unit. A maximum of ten people take part in the meetings. Non-attached MPs are generally excluded from the negotiations.

Course of the procedure

Before the start of the negotiations, the negotiating mandates and the positions of the Council and Parliament are determined internally. For Parliament, the members of the committee responsible draw up a report with amendments to the legislative proposal submitted by the Commission . This will be discussed in plenary. If the requests are accepted, they form Parliament's mandate and the project is rejected to the committee responsible. The Council's negotiating mandate results from its position on Parliament's motions. The dates of the negotiations are announced publicly, the meetings themselves do not take place publicly and no minutes are made. The purpose of the negotiation is to reach a compromise on a package of amendments that is acceptable to the Council and Parliament. Negotiations can be brought in at any stage of the legislative process and result in a first reading agreement, an early second reading agreement, a second reading agreement or a joint text during the conciliation. The four-column working document is the elementary tool here. Three columns contain the respective positions of the institutions, while the fourth row is reserved for compromise proposals. The debate, led by the host of the meeting (Parliament or Council), develops as each point of view is discussed. The Commission is acting as the mediator here in order to facilitate the agreement between the co-legislators. All participants act on the basis of the negotiating mandate that their respective body has given them. Every final decision in the framework of the trialogues is informal and ad referendum and must therefore be approved again by each body in a formal procedure. Parliament in particular has to approve the decision by voting in committee. The number of trialogues depends on the topic and, above all, on the political circumstances; B. of upcoming elections. Usually the initiative comes from the Council, as there is a rotation of the Council Presidency and a certain number of files is desired during each presidency.

Criticism of the informal trialogue negotiations

Proponents of trialogue negotiations emphasize the increased efficiency and acceleration of the process in terms of both informal and formal negotiations. The familiarity of the actors as well as the absence of the public in the trialogue negotiations are also an advantage in finding compromises. According to observers, the Commission has a stronger position in the informal trialogue negotiations than the Parliament: in 70% of the cases of the formal trialogue negotiations, the result achieved is closer to the position of the Council than to that of Parliament.

The increased efficiency in passing laws comes at the expense of the fundamental democratic principles of the European Union : transparency and participation.

  • As a result of informal trialogue negotiations, the ordinary legislative procedure provided for in Art. 294 TFEU is not fully applied.
  • The non-public conduct of negotiations makes it more difficult for the EP MEPs and Council members who are not involved to participate in finding a compromise. This considerably weakens the role of the European Parliament, since its function as a representative democratic organ is no longer guaranteed.
  • In addition, the non-public debate prevents the contribution of expertise from civil society and business interest groups.
  • The participation procedure otherwise usual in the ordinary legislative procedure, which allows interest representatives to share their specialist and background knowledge with the legislative bodies by means of written statements, hearings or working groups, does not apply. Not including non-state expertise can be at the expense of the quality and meaningfulness of the law.
  • The Commission, which is formally only supposed to act as an intermediary between Parliament and the Council, has a significantly greater influence on the outcome of the informal trialogue process than it does with the formal trialogue. Differences of various kinds that exist between the Council and Parliament can be discussed in the readings preceding the formal trialogue. As the parties involved are interested in a quick solution in the shortened procedure, disputed points are often transferred to the Commission by means of delegated or implementing acts. The Commission is only allowed to regulate insignificant parts of the basic legal acts by means of delegated acts, but there is no definition of what is essential and what is not. The legislative process is therefore in a gray area and the boundaries between legislative and executive are in danger of becoming blurred.
  • The power of the Commission to withdraw its legislative proposals throughout the informal trialogues may increase the pressure on delegates to find a compromise that is as close as possible to the Commission's ideas. We can therefore observe a shift in the institutional balance in favor of the European Commission
  • The legal texts resulting from informal trialogue negotiations are impaired in terms of their democratic legitimation, since the negotiating guidelines for the European Parliament delegation in the committees and in the plenary were not approved.
  • For the Bundestag , too , the result of the trialogue negotiations can only be seen afterwards.
  • Since the position of the Council and EP in the first reading is not determined by the previously conducted trialogue negotiations, the public cannot understand how the representatives of the Council and EP position themselves in the trialogue negotiations.
  • The course of the negotiations is also opaque to the public: the meetings are not public, the results and minutes are only intended for internal use (and not for publication).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ European Parliament: Activity report on codecision procedures and conciliation procedures. July 14, 2009 - June 30, 2014 (7th electoral term), Brussels 2014, p. 10.
  2. ↑ Weidenfeld, Werner: Die Europäische Union, Paderborn 4th edition 2015, p. 166.
  3. ^ Fabio Franchino, Camilla Mariotto: Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee In: European Union Politics. September / vol. 14, No. 3, 2013, p. 346 ff., Available online as Fabio Franchino, Camilla Mariotto: Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee. Retrieved January 7, 2016 .
  4. ^ Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier: The Invisible Transformation of Codecision: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy , Swedish Institute Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 2003: 7, 2003, pp. 6, 23
  5. ^ Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag eV: Consultation of the European Ombudsman on the transparency of trialogues, Brussels 2016, p. 2f.