Intragroup conflict

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An intra-group conflict (from the Latin intra “within” and confligere “fighting”) describes a conflict that occurs within a social group . Thus, the intra-group conflict represents a specification of group conflicts.

More specifically, an intra-group conflict describes disagreements, disagreements, and tensions that arise when actions or opinions of one or more group members are unacceptable and lead to resistance from one or more other group members. Situations in which the interacting individuals perceive that the advantages of group members impair their own chances of profit also trigger an intra-group conflict.

Basics

Consequences of intra-group conflicts

Conflicts within groups are unavoidable side effects of group life. When negotiating procedures and the result to be achieved, different people and opinions collide. The conflict itself does not necessarily represent a problem. Short-term conflicts can even be beneficial if dealt with constructively, so that the group members can grow with given problems under favorable circumstances.

Possible positive / negative consequences:

  • Reduction of interactions within the group due to excessive competition
  • Maximizing the individual profits through manipulation or similar of the group members
  • Development, reinforcement and stereotyping of enemy images
  • Discussions can promote innovation, creativity and productivity and reveal alternative solutions to problems
  • Develop strong social identity
  • Increase in standards, motivation and goals
  • Improvement of problem solving strategies
  • Optimization of decision-making processes

Types of intra-group conflicts

Personal conflict: Roots in individual antipathy for a group member
Content conflict: disagreement on questions / topics relevant to the group goals and group results.
Procedural conflict: Disagreement about the methods the group should use to accomplish its basic task.

Causes of Intragroup Conflicts

  • Social Dilemmas
    • Terms dilemma : can in the use of public goods occur
    • Contribution dilemma: arise when an individual must contribute to a public good in order for it to persist
    • Prisoner's Dilemma: Matrix game in which the individual goals of one person conflict with the goals of another person or group
  • Asymmetrical information (see Trucking Game)
  • Group size: the larger the group, the more likely it is that conflicts can arise. The larger the group, the less identifiable the performance of the individual group members becomes, which can lead to the problem of " free riding ".
  • Expectations about the behavior of others: a conflict often arises from the fact that individuals assume that other group members are acting in a competitive manner and not in a cooperative manner. When they see the behavior of others, they may interpret it as competing, even if it is not.
  • Communication: Communication in a negative mood tends to trigger disagreements and disputes.
  • Type of task: certain types of tasks have payout structures that tend to encourage conflict behavior
  • Etc.

Conflict behavior within groups depends on the social values ​​of the group members. A distinction is made between three types:

  • Competitor: Motivated to maximize own results and minimize group members' profits; Differences of opinion are seen as "win-lose" situations
  • Cooperator: Motivated to maximize collective outcomes (tries to maximize both own outcomes and group outcomes); Differences of opinion are attempted to resolve in "win-win" situations.
  • Individualist: Motivated to only maximize one's own results; helps or affects group members when it increases their own results

Conflict resolution strategies

A number of conflict resolution options are conceivable for defusing intra-group conflicts. Typical conflict resolution strategies for defusing intra-group conflicts are described below.

Tit for Tat Strategy translates as “Like you to me, so I to you!”. With this strategy there are exactly two choices. These are cooperation and competition. The Tit for Tat Strategy always starts with a cooperative move, so that the playing partner reacts to it with the same move if possible. One advantage of the Tit for Tat Strategy is that the message is clear and understandable for everyone. The cooperative move shows that competition is not tolerated and that cooperation is rewarded. The disadvantage of the Tit for Tat Strategy is the spiral of conflict . This can only be interrupted again with great difficulty. In addition, the behavior of more competitive people can be encouraged.

Negotiation translates as negotiation, conducting a conversation. The individual members take turns presenting their own opinion or position. A middle is then agreed.

Mediation means mediation, dispute settlement. Here an outsider approaches the group. He holds talks with the individual parties. There is a separate consultation. This allows the mediator to instill / build trust and the parties can express themselves in peace. It is important here that the mediator does not accept any side, but only mediates. He can intervene if problems arise and eliminate the misunderstanding immediately. The better the mediator is trained, the better the method for resolving conflicts works. The execution of the mediation requires the consent of all parties, otherwise it can lead to rejection.

Arbitration translates as arbitration . There are no individual meetings here as in mediation. Both parties agree in advance that the arbitral tribunal will make the decision and that it will then be carried out / accepted. Both parties present their opinions at a meeting and then the arbitral tribunal decides. Arbitration is very suitable when a decision has to be made promptly. If there is more time, negotiation is usually better.

Game theory approaches

Prisoner's Dilemma

The Prisoner's Dilemma is the most popular matrix game. It represents a social dilemma where the goals of an individual conflict with the goals of a group. In the original version, it is a situation in which two suspects can independently either confess or deny a crime committed together, thereby influencing the length of their prison sentences. You have to decide whether to cooperate and not confess, or not to cooperate and confess to the act. The dilemma is that they each do not know what the other decision is.

Trucking game

The trucking game is a well-known game simulation. The scenario of the laboratory experiment envisages two imaginary freight forwarding companies, each led by a female person. The women each own a truck that is supposed to transport various goods from A to B.

The initial outfit for women is $ 4. The turnover per successful trip is 60 cents. For every second of travel time required, 1 cent is deducted from the start-up capital as operating costs. So if the players need longer than 60 seconds, 1 cent is paid from the starting capital for each additional second.

The trucks are controlled by means of a control panel. With the help of the control panel, the account balance, your own position and the position of the opponent can be queried. The aim is to maximize your own capital. The women cannot see each other and there are 3 game runs. The players can choose between the "alternative route" (longer journey time) and the "single-lane road". The single-lane main route is the most direct and shortest route and cannot be used by both players at the same time. If the women both drive on the road at the same time, either one has to drive back or both cannot continue on their way to their destination. Both variants cost valuable time and therefore capital. There is an alternative route for both players. This means that the players cannot meet here and lose valuable time. However, this route is longer and the players automatically lose at least 10 cents when using the route.

In the first round of the game, the players can use all routes without restriction.

  • First playthrough; identical requirements for both players

In the second playthrough, an unequal distribution of power (asymmetry) is developed through a goal. This is installed on the main course and can only be opened and closed by one of the two players (Acme) when she is on the course herself.

  • Second game run; Acme controls a gate

In the third round, both players are assigned control of a goal on the main route.

  • Third game play; both players control one goal each

The results of the simulation show that the two players are usually forced to negotiate with one another. Successful negotiation is tied to the sum of the common profit. In other words, the higher the amount, the faster the players managed to find a common solution for using the single-lane main road.

Overall, winnings (Ø 1 $) can only be achieved on the first play through. In the second playthrough, both made losses (Ø 2.03 $), whereby the losses of the player without a goal (bolt) are significantly higher. In the third playthrough the losses of both players are even higher (Ø 4.38 $).

  • Payout overview per game run

From this it can be concluded that the possibility of threatening always worsens the results, even for the person who has the possibility of threatening. It tends to be the case that if there is a threat, it is used. It is always safer to choose a cooperative strategy, as it is more promising than a competing one, because more capital is often to be preserved through cooperation in a threatening situation.

literature

  • L. Fischer, G. Wiswede: Foundations of social psychology. Oldenbourg, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-486-25790-0 .
  • DR Forsyth: Conflict: Conflict. In: DR Forsyth: Group Dynamics. Brooks, Belmont 1999, ISBN 0-534-26148-5 , pp. 235-266.
  • M. Hemesath: Survey Article. Cooperate or Defect? Russian and American Students in a Prisoner's Dilemma. In: Comparative Economic Studies. Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 83-93.
  • C. Stangor, C. (2004): Cooperation and conflict within groups. In: Social Groups in Action and Interaction. Psychology Press, New York 2004, ISBN 1-8416-9407-X , pp. 285-310.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ M. Deutsch, RM Krauss: The effect of threat upon interpersonal bargaining. In: Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 61, 1960, pp. 181-189.