Social dilemma

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Social dilemmas exist when the best possible pursuit of the individual interests of the actors involved leads them to a state that puts them in a worse position than solutions in which the best action to maximize the individual interests is dispensed with. Mathematical game theory describes social dilemmas as situations in which at least one deficit equilibrium exists compared to the welfare optimum or Pareto efficiency . For example, a social dilemma can exist in a social conflict situation in which two different interest groups stand in each other's way and are together worse off than in a cooperative solution.

The economic description of social dilemmas consists in the fact that the interest-related actions of the groups lead to sub-optimal conditions. The description of the optimal (desirable) condition is of course subject to evaluation. A job seeker presumably assesses collectively agreed wages differently than an employee. In unequivocal cases, the Pareto optimization can be used. Based on this optimum one can define:

  1. Each participant receives a higher profit from a non-cooperative action than from a cooperative action, and
  2. all those involved are overall better off when they cooperate than when everyone makes the selfish choice.

In this context, one speaks of negative external effects or market failure in economics .

Use dilemma and contribution dilemma

Another important aspect that can be differentiated is whether the dilemma relates to the use of a common resource ( usage dilemma ) or to the contribution to the creation or maintenance of a good ( contribution dilemma / public goods dilemma ). These differ from a. in the opposing distribution of the positive and negative consequences of certain behaviors on the individual and society.

Usage dilemma

Dilemmas of use can occur with commons (see also tragedy of commons ). While the profit is individualized, any damage to the good is socialized. For example, the use of a public road benefits a driver individually. If, however, there are too many vehicles in relation to the capacity of the road, they will all be stuck in a traffic jam.

Use dilemmas can be exemplified using the example of overfishing in the oceans. The exploitation of a natural, self-regenerating resource (e.g. fish stock in the Atlantic) is limited by its regeneration speed and the resource can be seriously damaged by excessive use (overfishing). The more fish he catches, the greater the profit for the individual fisherman, while losses due to resource degradation affect all fishermen. This means that the profit is individualized and accrues immediately, while the damage is borne by everyone. Since - due to the social dilemma - fishermen who have handled the resource responsibly and have fished less are also harmed, there is no economic incentive for individual fishermen to behave responsibly. In addition to this dilemma, there is a time trap, because the gain in resource overuse occurs immediately, while the loss occurs later. This temporal problem affects many resources, even if they are used individually, i.e. there is no social dilemma in the true sense of the word. The time trap is often associated with a considerable delay in the negative consequences (often years or decades) compared to the short-term positive returns. The losses in the future are discounted so that intertemporal preference shifts take place.

Contribution dilemma

Contribution dilemmas can arise with public goods . In this situation one has to contribute to a good (e.g. accomplish something, give money) so that it can be created or maintained. In other words, in this case a small negative individual consequence (e.g. tax contribution, license fee) leads to a long-term positive consequence for the group (provision of the public good e.g. a street). This favors free riders who do not contribute but still enjoy the goods.

Historical examples

Prominent historical examples are e.g. B. the complete deforestation of almost all forests in Haiti, Greece or Ireland.

overcoming

Possibilities to overcome a social dilemma are offered by regulations and internalizations by the legislator, for example in emissions trading , or communication between the actors, in the case of overfishing e.g. B. International agreements that limit the number of fish caught. In the case of contribution dilemmas, the state can provide public goods and finance them from tax revenues.

Effect of communication

In the experiment by Orbell, van de Krag and Dawes (1988) they offered the following game: 7 participants receive $ 6 each, which they can either keep or donate to the other participants. In this case, your donation will be doubled so that every other participant will receive $ 2. The more you keep your money, the less is paid out. To get the most profit, one individual would have to keep their money while everyone else donates their share. Result: Without the possibility of consultation, there were only 38% who donated their money, with prior discussion 79%. As an explanation, the researchers cite, on the one hand, the obligation to donate through public pledges and, on the other hand, a sense of community promoted by the discussion.

Game theory examples

Game theory examples of social dilemmas are given below:

literature

  • G. Hardin: The tragedy of the commons. In: Science . 162, 1968, pp. 1243-1248.
  • J. Platt: Social traps. In: American Psychologist . 28, 1973, pp. 641-651.
  • RM Dawes: Social dilemmas. In: Annual Review of Psychology. 31, 1980, pp. 169-193.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ JM Orbell, AJC van de Kracht, RM Dawes: Explaining discussion-induced comparison. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 54, 1988, pp. 811-819.