Free rider problem

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The free-rider problem (Engl. Freerider trouble ) denotes a problem of collective action , which in the use of the commons can occur if economic agents the benefits of a good gain without consideration. It occurs both in the case of purely public goods and in the case of common goods , since there an exclusion from the use of such goods is not possible or only possible with disproportionate effort. The name is derived from dodging on the running boards of trams.

Free rider problem with public goods

For purely public goods such as For example, in the case of street lights or dykes, free rider behavior means that not all users of these goods are willing to pay for their creation and maintenance costs. As a result, such goods are not or not sufficiently offered by private providers. This is also referred to as a provision problem . That is why public goods are mostly provided by the state as so-called basic supplies and financed through taxes .

Free rider problem with common goods

In the case of common goods (unclean public goods) there is a risk of overuse as a result of free rider behavior . One speaks here of an appropriation problem . Due to the free access, free riders can benefit from self-restraint by other individual users by intensifying their use accordingly. This problem of collective action is described using the social science model tragic commons . Examples of this are overcrowded roads, overfishing of the seas, but also overloaded peer-to-peer networks. Government restrictions on use or the establishment of private property rights are recommended as solutions to the commons problem. At least in small communities, the enforcement of self-restraints in the use of collective goods can, under certain circumstances, also be supported by social sanctions .

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Individual evidence

  1. a b c Elinor Ostrom : The constitution of the commons. Beyond the state and the market. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1999 (The Unit of Social Sciences, 104) (German translation by Ostrom: Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York / Victoria 1990).
  2. Keyword: public goods in the Duden economy from A to Z. Basic knowledge for school and study, work and everyday life. 2nd edition Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut & FA Brockhaus 2004. Licensed edition Bonn: Federal Agency for Civic Education 2004.
  3. Kamvar, Sepandar D .; Schlosser, Mario T .; Garcia-Molina, Hector (2003): The Eigenentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks . In: Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web. Pp. 640-651.
  4. Garret Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science, 162 (1968) pp. 1243-1248.