Cost-reward model

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In the cost-reward model ( English cost-reward model ), founded by psychologist couple Jane and Irving Piliavin that is helping behavior ( assistance or Not Help) observers of an emergency using the assumption of factual and cognitive costs and benefits of the act says.

Help behavior model according to Piliavin et al.

Impulsive helping

The Piliavinian model relates to behavior in emergency situations, i.e. those situations in which decisions are made quickly and people's health is at risk. This impulsive help , in contrast to the deliberate help , is characterized by situational conditions and time pressure. If there is an immediate need for action, cognitive processing processes are not possible because there is not enough time. After Piliavin & Piliavin, impulsive help occurs when

  • an emergency situation is urgent and the consequences are predictable,
  • a resemblance to the victim is perceived,
  • the victim is assumed to have a special need for help,
  • there is an acquaintance or previous interaction with the victim,
  • attention is directed outwards and not on oneself,
  • the helper can act effectively according to his assessment.

Cost approaches

In the model of Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner and Clark the analysis of the costs of helping and of not helping is in the foreground. This includes material and immaterial costs as well as all anticipated consequences of non-aid such as B. Penalties for failure to provide assistance or psychological costs such as feelings of guilt or threats to self-image . Prosocial behavior becomes likely in a situation when the costs associated with that behavior are low.

Empathic arousal as a cost factor

Piliavin et al. assumed that observers of an emergency situation develop empathic arousal (over-activation) and assigned them to the cost factors in helping behavior. Since this physiological and emotional excitation is perceived as unpleasant, the observers are motivated to reduce it as quickly as possible and react accordingly. The greater the excitement generated by the plight of others, the more unpleasant it is experienced by the observer, which in turn motivates him to act. By acting one reduces one's own state of arousal. Since the observer primarily wants to maintain his own homeostasis , he helps the other either to indirectly change his own unpleasant physical state ( egoistic motivation), or because he empathically puts himself in the position of the other ( altruistic motivation). In the second case, empathy and the primary desire to help the other would be responsible for helping. In both cases, however, the uncomfortable physical condition is a cost factor that needs to be minimized.

In Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis , motivation based on compassion is considered separately. If self-assessment (as opposed to external assessment) and empathy are seen as the factors that favor altruistically motivated help, one feels more free in one's decision and can more easily evade the demand for help. If you still help in such situations, it is probably because of empathy with others, because of personal norms that are experienced as obligatory, and because of the responsibility that is attributed to oneself .

Prediction of help behavior

Piliavin postulated the respective help behavior that results from high or low costs of help and non-help:

  • high cost of help / low cost of non-help: leaving the situation, ignoring, denying
  • high costs of help / high costs of non-help: redefinition of the situation, defense mechanisms , degradation of the victim, diffusion of responsibility
  • low cost of help / high cost of non-help: direct intervention and assistance
  • low costs of help / low costs of non-help: no direct prediction possible, depending on the situation

Human-in-need experiments

Piliavin et al. conducted a series of experiments examining how observers react to a person in need and the conditions under which they are willing to provide assistance. In the investigation, the psychologists arranged fictitious emergency situations to find out whether passengers on the New York subway would come to the aid of a fellow traveler who suddenly collapses.

Victim with crutch vs. drunk victim (1969)

In their 1969 experiments, experimenters Irving Piliavin, Judith Rodin and Jane Piliavin chose the New York Eighth Avenue rapid transit system between 59th and 125th Streets; the journey between the two stations takes about eight minutes. While one of the assistants in the back of one of the cars inconspicuously logged what was going on, another - a male student - stood in the front. About a minute after leaving the station, he began to stumble and collapsed. He was told to lie on his back until someone came to his aid. If the train arrives at the stop without anyone helping it, someone else should do it. In any case, the team should get off at the stop and repeat the procedure on the next oncoming train.

The experiment was carried out in two versions. In the first version, the student carried a crutch (low cost of aid), in the second version the victim was supposed to appear drunk (high cost of aid). During these experiments, he doused himself with strong-smelling schnapps and carried a brown paper bag that clearly contained a bottle. The victim with the crutch was helped by at least one fellow traveler in 62 out of 65 cases. As expected, the drunk victim received much less help, but even he was helped in 19 out of 38 cases.

Blood vs. no blood (1972)

In the 1972 Piliavin & Piliavin experiment, four members of the research team climbed into a subway car at the same time: two observers, a “programmed” eyewitness and a victim. The travel time between two stations was about three minutes. The two observers and the eyewitness took a seat in the middle of the compartment. After the train started, the victim, a male student, walked towards the end of the compartment on a stick and fell to the ground directly in front of the programmed eyewitness. The type of emergency was varied: in one test condition the victim fell to the ground (low cost of aid), in the second blood came out of his mouth (high cost of aid). The type of programmed witness was also chosen differently: He wore either the clothing of a pastor (role of generalized helper), a doctor (role of specialized helper) or a normal suit. If no one came to the victim's help, the programmed eyewitness tried to get him. All four research members got off at the next station.

Of a total of 40 attempts, half each were due to the conditions “blood” and “no blood” of the victim. The programmed eyewitness wore the clothes of a doctor in 13 cases, in 12 those of a pastor and in 15 those of a normal passerby. Help was given less often under the “blood” condition (no help in four cases, indirect help three times, direct thirteen times) and the number of helpers was lower than in the other condition. In the situation without blood, direct help was given in 19 cases and once no one helped.

The type of programmed eyewitness had an impact on the reaction time of the observers, but there was no significant difference between the individual “programmed eyewitness” conditions. Only in the test condition “blood” + “doctor” did the reaction time increase many times over, i. H. the audience shed their responsibilities because a person was present who could be expected to do their duty to help.

Stigma vs. no stigma (1975)

Similar results were obtained in the condition where the victim had a noticeable fire mark on the face. The victim either had a heavily made-up half of his face (stigma that was clearly visible in the experiment) or a normal appearance. Furthermore, a doctor (recognizable by his external appearance) was present or not. The rate of help for the disfigured victim was reduced by the presence of the doctor. If, on the other hand, the victim was not drawn further, the presence of the doctor played no role in the assistance rate. This difference can be attributed to the fact that the fire mark on the face of the "victim" increased the perceived cost of helping the witnesses, as they presumably saw a connection between the negatively assessed trait (stigma) and the collapse. As a result, they shifted responsibility in the emergency onto the doctor and helped less. Otherwise, a collapse is an emergency that can be managed so that help is provided.

The results of the experiments confirmed the assumption that the higher the cost of aid, the less willing there is to provide aid. The scar on the face or the blood had a repulsive effect on the test subjects, and although they were aware of the seriousness of the situation, they tried either to delay or to avoid direct physical contact with the victim. The costs of the direct contact and thus the help had obviously been estimated very high.

Bystander effect

The bystander effect (also known as Genovese syndrome ) describes the phenomenon that witnesses to an emergency situation simply watch without intervening or providing help. The name Genovese syndrome is derived from the murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964, which led to a number of social-psychological studies on prosocial behavior. Thirty-eight neighbors ignored Kitty Genovese's screams for over half an hour while she was stabbed and raped without anyone coming to her aid.

The more bystanders (bystander) there are in an emergency, the more improbable or slower it will be for individuals to intervene.

The willingness to help can be inhibited by:

  • pluralistic ignorance ( pluralistic ignorance ) Other Around Standing not respond, is so close that there was still no real emergency.
  • Diffusion of responsibility ( diffusion of responsibility ): The responsibility to help distributed equally to many other users, so no one feels personally called but places the responsibility other witnesses.
  • Rating anxiety ( social apprehension ): Avoid people assistance, because they are afraid to embarrass themselves if they intervene in a situation that is not threatening to the person concerned.

The less people are present, the greater the likelihood of assistance. Help is greatest when only one person is present and the victim is able to personalize the request for help.

Investigations by Latané and Darley

Latané and Darley carried out experiments in 1968 to show that the willingness to help strangers in an emergency depends heavily on the characteristics of the situation. The participants, male students, sat in individual cubicles and communicated with one or more students via an intercom, supposedly each in their own cubicle. In fact, there was only one “real” participant, the others were taped initiates. During the discussion, the participant overheard someone having an epileptic fit, called for help, gasped for breath, and then fell silent. It turned out that the likelihood of intervention depended on the number of people involved. If several people were supposed to be present, fewer test subjects reported the emergency. If the test subjects believed they were the only helpers, they called for help without exception, but 40% of those who believed they were part of a group of five did not notify the experimenter at all (see spectator effect ).

In an experiment in 1970, students were asked to fill out forms in a room. Meanwhile, a person in a curtained off room was screaming about an allegedly injured foot. If the test person was alone in the room, 70% of the test persons tried to help the victim immediately. If an unmoved third party was in the room with the test person, the willingness to help decreased considerably, then only 7% helped (see pluralistic ignorance ).

Underground experiments and Genovese syndrome

Latané and Darley note that while Ms. Genovese's neighbors were alone in their apartments, they must all be aware of the fact that many other people could hear the screams as well. Since they could feel part of a larger group (comparable to the experiment by Latané and Darley in 1968), none of the neighbors felt the full burden of responsibility. The explanation initially seems incompatible with the results of the underground experiments by Piliavin et al. In these experiments, an average of more than eight other passengers sat in the part of the car in which the victim collapsed. And yet, in almost all cases where the victim wore the crutch, there was at least one person who would provide immediate help. Piliavin et al. also found that helpfulness did not decrease as the number of attendees increased. The explanation with the help of the sinking sense of responsibility does not seem to be correct here.

But how can the findings of Piliavin et al. with the behavior of Kitty Genovese's neighbors? Most of them must have known that many others could hear their screams too. What sets them apart from the subway travelers is that none of the neighbors could have known that no one else was helping. If none of those present had intervened in the subway, everyone would have known immediately that the victim was still in need. Little did Kitty Genovese's neighbors know that none of the others had taken the easy, obvious step of calling the police.

There are between the situations that the test subjects at Piliavin et.al. and Latané and Darley (1970) faced another difference. In the case of the former, every subject had good reason to assume that the other people in the subway car were as alien to the victim as they were to themselves. who knew the victim. You may therefore have assumed that the person had a reason not to intervene.

literature

  • Batson, CD (1998): Altruism and prosocial behavior. In: Gilbert, DT / Fiske, ST / Lindzey, G. (Eds.): The Handbook of Social Psychology. (Vol. 2) Boston: McGraw-Hill. 1998. pp. 282-316.
  • Darley, John M./Latané, Bibb (1968): Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8. pp. 377-383.
  • Latané, Bibb / Darley, John M. (1970): The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn't he help? New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
  • Piliavin, Irving / Rodin, Judith / Piliavin, Jane (1969): Good Samaritans. An underground phenomenon? In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 13, pp. 289-299.
  • Piliavin, Jane A./Piliavin, Irving M. (1972): Effect of Blood on Reactions to a Victim. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 23, pp. 353-361.
  • Piliavin, Irving M./Piliavin, Jane A./ Rodin, Judith (1975): Costs, Diffusion, and the Stigmatized Victim. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32. pp. 429-438.
  • Piliavin, Jane A./Dovidio, John F./Gaertner, Samuel L./Clark, Russell D .: Emergency Intervention. New York: Academic Press. 1981.
  • Piliavin, Jane A./Dovidio, John F./Gaertner, Samuel L./Clark, Russell D. (1982): Responsive Bystanders: The Process of Intervention. In: Derlega, Valerian J./Grzelak, Janusz (eds.): Cooperation and Helping Behavior: Theories and Research. New York: Academic Press. Pp. 278-325.
  • Wiswede, Günter: Social Psychology Lexicon. Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. 2003.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c Piliavin, Jane A./Dovidio, John F./Gaertner, Samuel L./Clark, Russell D .: Emergency Intervention. New York: Academic Press. 1981.
  2. ^ A b c Wiswede, Günter: Sozialpsychologie Lexikon. Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. 2003. p. 233ff.
  3. ↑ Piliavin, Jane A./Dovidio, John F./Gaertner, Samuel L./Clark, Russell D. (1982): Responsive Bystanders: The Process of Intervention. In: Derlega, Valerian J./Grzelak Janusz (eds.): Cooperation and Helping Behavior: Theories and Research. New York: Academic Press, 1982. pp. 280 ff.
  4. ↑ a b Manhart, Klaus: Anomalies of the rational decision theory. P. 205f. Full text online (PDF; 143 kB)
  5. ^ A b Piliavin, Irving / Rodin, Judith / Piliavin, Jane (1969): Good Samaritans. An underground phenomenon? In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 13, pp. 289-299.
  6. ↑ Piliavin et al. 1982: p. 296 ff.
  7. ↑ a b Batson, CD (1998): Altruism and prosocial behavior. In: Gilbert, DT / Fiske, ST / Lindzey, G. (Eds.): The Handbook of Social Psychology. (Vol. 2) Boston: McGraw-Hill. Pp. 282-316.
  8. ^ Huth, Radoslaw: Rational Choice and Altruism. Dissertation. P. 220f. Full text online (PDF; 2.1 MB)
  9. ↑ Piliavin et al. 1982: p. 288.
  10. ↑ a b c d e f Frank, Robert: The strategy of emotions. Oldenbourg: Scientia Nova. 1998. pp. 181-184.
  11. ↑ Article in "Time": The Subway Samaritan.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (from January 19, 1970)@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / aolsvc.timeforkids.kol.aol.com  
  12. ↑ Piliavin, Jane A./Piliavin, Irving M. (1972): Effect of Blood on Reactions to a Victim. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 23, pp. 353-361.
  13. ^ A b c Friedrichs, Jürgen: Methods of empirical social research. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag (14th edition), 1990. P. 347ff.
  14. ↑ Piliavin / Piliavin 1972: pp. 358f.
  15. ↑ Piliavin, Irving M./Piliavin, Jane A./ Rodin, Judith (1975): Costs, Diffusion, and the Stigmatized Victim. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32. pp. 429-438.
  16. ↑ Piliavin et al. 1975: p. 432f.
  17. ^ Lecture: Social Psychology at the University of Hamburg. S. 208. Full text online ( Memento of the original from June 10, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.uni-hamburg.de
  18. ↑ a b Latané, B./Darley, JM (1970): The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn't he help? New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
  19. ↑ Darley, JM / Latané, B. (1968): Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8. pp. 377-383.
  20. ↑ Zimbardo, Philip G./Gerrig, Richard J .: Psychology. Munich: Pearson Education Germany (16th edition), 2004. S. 802.