Philosophy of normal language

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Philosophy of ordinary language (English. "Ordinary language philosophy") or linguistic philosophy (English. Linguistic philosophy ) is a philosophical approach to language within analytical philosophy , which, in contrast to the philosophy of ideal language , assumes that normal language, ie the language used in everyday life is not deficient. A detailed analysis of the everyday use of the language can therefore provide knowledge.

history

In the early days of analytical philosophy , the philosophy of ideal language was predominant. This approach to language assumes that everyday language is deficient in many respects and needs to be improved or even replaced by a formal language. Accordingly, philosophical knowledge cannot be obtained by analyzing normal language, but only by developing clear language. Examples of this approach are the following works: The conceptual script , one of the arithmetic simulated formulas of pure thinking (1879) by Gottlob Frege , the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) by Ludwig Wittgenstein and The logical structure of the world (1928) by Rudolf Carnap .

In the 1930s, Wittgenstein changed his mind. He concluded that, firstly, normal language as we commonly use it was not wrong (unsuitable) and, secondly, that many traditional philosophical problems were just illusions created by misunderstandings about how language works. The first view led to the rejection of previous approaches to analytic philosophy - possibly all previous philosophy as well - and the second led to the replacement of those earlier approaches with reflection on language in its normal use, so that philosophical questions are clarified, i.e. That is, they are recognized as misunderstandings and thus resolved instead of trying to answer them in the ambiguous context. Philosophy of normal language is therefore sometimes understood as an extension, sometimes also as an alternative to analytical philosophy.

Although heavily influenced by Wittgenstein and his students at Cambridge , the philosophy of normal language flourished and developed mainly in Oxford in the 1940s and 1950s under JL Austin , Gilbert Ryle and Peter Strawson and was quite widespread for some time before theirs Popularity rapidly waned in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Central ideas

The normal language as we commonly use it is, firstly, not wrong (unsuitable), and secondly, many traditional philosophical problems are just illusions caused by misunderstandings about how language works.

An example: what is reality ? Philosophers have treated the word as a noun, which denotes something with certain properties. Over the millennia, they have discussed these properties. Instead, normal language philosophy examines how people use the word reality . In some cases people say, “It seems to me that this-and-that is true; but in reality that-and-which is the case ”. This expression does not mean, however, that there is a certain dimension of being (a property, namely being real), which that-and-which has, but this-and-that does not. We actually mean: “ This-and-that sounded right, but it was somehow misleading. Now I'll tell you the truth: that-and-which ”. In this usage, “in reality” means something like “instead”. And the phrase “In reality it is ...” fulfills a similar function - to steer the listener's expectations in the right direction.

This approach is also applied to other traditional philosophical questions: What is truth? What is awareness What is freedom If we want to answer questions of this kind, we need to examine the use of the words "truth", "consciousness", "freedom" in everyday language.

Austin , for example, points out that statements that postulate the truth are tied to pragmatic, performative, contextual conditions. For example, a statement that London is 80 km away from point X is sufficiently true in many conceivable situations, although - taking this example - to be precise, it could be 78.5 km.

The philosophy of everyday language necessarily goes hand in hand with a theoretical turn to actual speech activity in the sense that one deals with language and only creates intentional dispositions (such as making a promise). In Austin's terminology, these are performative speech acts. However, the accentuation of this fact also differs within the theoretical direction. For example, with John R. Searle , who is generally considered to be Austin's successor, a much stronger turn to a competence theory can be seen, although speech acts are still dealt with.

literature

Central plants

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Blue Book and the Brown Book.
  • Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations
  • Gilbert Ryle: The concept of spirit (The Concept of Mind)
  • John L. Austin: On the theory of speech acts. (How To Do Things With Words?)
  • John L. Austin: Sense and Sensibilia.
  • Peter F. Strawson: Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Methuen, London 1959

About the philosophy of normal language

  • C. Caton (Ed.): Philosophy and Ordinary Language , University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Il. 1963.
  • Oswald Hanfling : Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. Routledge, 2003, ISBN 0-415-32277-4
  • Eike von Savigny : On the philosophy of normal language. Suhrkamp, ​​1973.

Web links