Withdrawal from Karánsebes
The withdrawal from Karánsebes (Turkish: Şebeş Muharebesi , Romanian: Lupta de la Caransebeş ) took place in September 1788 as part of the Russo-Austrian Turkish War (1787 to 1792) . A battle of Karánsebes has not been sufficiently secured historically and at least in known form it may be a legend. Nevertheless, the event is considered a military disaster with allegedly up to 10,000 dead.
prehistory
After the Ottoman Empire because of the Russian occupation of the Crimea to the Russian Empire had declared war, came as a Russian ally and Austria to Russia's side in the conflict one. Emperor Joseph II initially led the Austrian army personally in the area of Transylvania and Serbia, but in the fight against the Ottomans led by Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pascha no significant successes were achieved. At the beginning of the campaign, the Austrians complained about the malaria causing tens of thousands of sick and dead people because their army camp near Belgrade was in a swampy area.
Joseph II himself was apparently in poor physical condition when he is said to have decided to fight with half of his armed forces - around 100,000 men - against a Turkish army under the leadership of the Grand Vizier. September collided at Slatina . In the vicinity of the town of Karánsebes , the alleged "battle" finally took place on September 17, 1788, which was to take an unexpected turn.
Battle of Karánsebes
During the advance of the Austrian troops, mounted hussars shielded the columns of the infantry; at nightfall some of these cavalrymen met peddlers from whom they bought liquor. When infantrymen, exhausted from the march, left the column for this purpose, they were shooed away by the cavalrymen of higher status. Annoyed by the arrogance of their mounted comrades, some soldiers fired shots in the air and shouted “Turci!” (“Turks!”). The consequences of this joke were fatal - in the dark the hussars and other units panicked, units marching backwards fired at the hussars fleeing from fright, which triggered a general shootout and escape from the supposed ambush of the Turks.
Sometimes the “Halt!” Shouts of our own officers, supposedly as “Allah!”, Were misunderstood; the diversity of languages in the Austrian army encouraged such misunderstandings. Since the army was just passing a bridge with parts, there were congestion there, while men and baggage units were pushed into the water. In this chaos, the gathering and rearrangement of the associations was unsuccessful, so that a general panic escape soon ensued.
At dawn the next morning the disaster became evident; Large numbers of baggage, equipment and cannons had been lost, and the Austrian army retreated. The Turkish armed forces, which arrived a few days later, are said to have found a good 10,000 dead and wounded, all of them killed by self- fire.
Authenticity and sources
Personal fire ("friendly fire") was a problem militarily at all times, but the numerical proportions (10% casualty rate, as well as the significant number of 10,000 men for the armies of that time) are unlikely. The muskets used at the time had longer loading times and poor precision, so the battle should have been much more intense than would have been realistic in the situation. The losses resulting from the resulting chaos, such as fatal falls in a crowd, etc., must be viewed critically for such figures.
A relatively reliable source is the " Story of Joseph the Second " by AJ Gross-Hoffinger, written 59 years after the alleged battle, but the enormous number of victims is not mentioned here. Another early mention dates from 1843, 55 years after the incident, although hardly any further details can be found here. There is no reliable confirmation of the incident from the Ottoman or Turkish side, and there are no indications in the corresponding chronicles of the city, although other incidents of the war are certainly listed. It is precisely the imprecise sources on an incident of this explosive nature and of this magnitude that give rise to doubts, which is why at least embellishment and exaggeration will be the case here as part of a modern legend , which is occasionally processed as an unbelievable military failure on the Internet and in secondary literature. A contemporary description of the events is less dramatic. In the court report from the camp of September 23, 1788 the incident is described in such a way that the entourage had been sent ahead to Karánsebes and Austrian cavalry was supposed to keep the advancing Ottomans at a distance. When a firefight broke out in the rear of the train, the wagoners of part of the train fled on the carriage horses and left the train wagons behind. Order could soon be restored, but part of the entourage was lost. The court report puts the losses on the Austrian side at 150.
Remarks
- ↑ Compare for example: Durschmied, Erik: The Hinge Factor: How Chance And Stupidity Have Changed History . London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, pp. 65f
- ^ Real newspaper for the year 1788 . Edited by Johann Heinrich Groß. No. 80/1788 of October 7, 1788. Erlangen 1788, p. 726f: “At midnight, many Wallachians came with great shouting: the Turks! the Turks! Startled by this false noise, everyone started thinking of rescue. A few houses that were set on fire by these Wallachians increased the horror. The confusion was beyond words. ... Our crew encountered another regiment in the darkness. The officers of the first called stop! stop! the second believed the Turkish call allah! heard, fired and killed many of their comrades. "
- ↑ Content reproduction of the court report in Real-Zeitung for the year 1788 . Edited by Johann Heinrich Groß. No. 80/1788 of October 7, 1788. Erlangen 1788, pp. 727f
Individual evidence
- ↑ Giorgio Bergamino, Gianni Palitta: Disasters Militares , S. 30f. Tikal, Madrid 2018
literature
- Regan, Geoffrey: Military duds and their greatest defeats , licensed edition of Weltbild Verlag, ISBN 978-3-8289-0840-6
- Durschmied, Erik: Hinge factor. How coincidence and stupidity write world history , Böhlau, ISBN 978-3-205-99159-5