Riding in the forest
Riding in the forest refers to a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of June 6, 1989. In this, the court specified the scope of the right to general freedom of action as well as its own examination competence in constitutional complaints .
facts
The plaintiff, chairman of a riding club, initially sued the Aachen Administrative Court against the blocking of numerous field and forest paths for riders. The administrative court dismissed the action as inadmissible due to lack of legal standing because the plaintiff had no subjective right to use the field and forest paths as a rider.
After the plaintiff appealed, the legal situation changed through an amendment to the landscape law of North Rhine-Westphalia . Riding was now basically only permitted on field and bridle paths , but not on other forest paths. In addition, riders had to attach an official license plate to their horse and pay a fee for this, similar to the vehicle tax . For this reason, the plaintiff now applied for a declaratory action to determine that he was allowed to use the paths in question as a rider, and as an alternative to oblige the city of Aachen to signpost a network of bridle paths.
The Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia rejected the main application as unfounded , the court already declared the auxiliary application as an inadmissible amendment to the complaint . The appeal before the Federal Administrative Court , with which the plaintiff complained of a violation of the Federal Forest Act, was also unsuccessful. Although the Federal Forest Act basically allows riding in the forest, this only binds the state legislature to the extent that it cannot completely prohibit riding in the forest. The state law does not violate this, since it expressly allows riding in the forest on bridle paths.
With his constitutional complaint, the plaintiff challenged restrictions on various fundamental rights . In particular, he complained that the obligation to use a license plate and the obligation to pay a fee for his horses represent a violation of the free development of personality . The state law is also unconstitutional because it violates higher-ranking federal law. On the one hand, state law violates the Federal Forest Act by expressly prohibiting riding in the forest, which is fundamentally permitted by federal law, on the other hand, the law also violates the road traffic licensing regulations by stipulating official license plates for horses, although the StVZO only does this for Provides motor vehicles. The prohibition of riding in the forest also restricts his constitutionally protected freedom of movement in the federal territory; this also represents a de facto professional ban because he is in fact not allowed to work as a rider. This also violates the right to property.
Summary of the decision
The First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court declared most of the constitutional complaint to be inadmissible , but at least the rest to be unfounded.
The court initially stated that the freedom of action under Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law places every human action under the comprehensive protection of fundamental rights, including riding in the forest. However, the freedom of action is restricted to the extent that this is required by the constitutional order, apart from the core area of private life , which is completely beyond the influence of public authority. A constitutional complaint based on Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law can therefore be used to examine whether a law that restricts freedom of action belongs to the constitutional order, i.e. is formally and materially in accordance with the norms of the constitution.
Accordingly, it is not only necessary to check whether the law is in material terms constitutional, in particular whether the law complies with the principle of proportionality and, if the freedom of action is subsequently restricted, the protection of legitimate expectations is maintained, but also whether it was formally and legally enacted. In the case of state law, this also includes the examination in accordance with Article 31 of the Basic Law to determine whether state law is compatible with federal law or with federal framework law. Here, however, the Federal Constitutional Court is not bound by the interpretation of federal law by the specialized courts, because this would lead to unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights if a court interprets federal law differently in two cases. Rather, the Federal Constitutional Court can independently assess the compatibility of state law with federal law.
Measured against this standard, the only regulation admitted for constitutional complaints, namely the fundamental ban on riding in the forest outside of bridle paths, is compatible with the constitution. Riding is not the core area of private life, so that a restriction of this right is generally permissible. The state law also does not violate federal law, because the aforementioned norm of the Federal Forest Act, which declares riding in the forest to be permissible, does not have any external effect , rather it is a framework norm that exclusively obliges the state legislature to create independent regulations on riding in the forest to enact. The regulation is also materially permissible, since the legislature's intended separation of pedestrians and riders in the forest, which is clearly aimed at avoiding dangers from riders, represents a permissible restriction of freedom of action. The regulation is also sufficiently determined, since the approved bridle paths are issued by the competent authority. It is also not a retrospective restriction of the basic rights, since riding in the forest was only allowed for a total of five years and was clearly issued as a transitional regulation, so that riders cannot rely on the protection of legitimate expectations . One of the judges of the First Senate, Dieter Grimm , gave a special vote . He saw riding in the forest not protected by general freedom of action.
Consequences of the judgment
With the ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court significantly expanded the scope of general freedom of action and thus made the right to general freedom of action a basic right to catch . it can be used if no other fundamental right is relevant in a particular case.
See also
Footnotes
- ↑ BVerfG, decision of June 6, 1989, Az. 1 BvR 921/85, BVerfGE 80, 137
- ↑ the Landscape Act of May 2, 1995 (GV. NRW. P. 382) came into force; see also right.nrw.de
