SWIFT analysis

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The "structured what- if technique" (SWIFT) is one of the methods for analyzing potential hazards. In comparison to other methods of "prospective hazard analysis" (PHA), is the SWIFT analysis is rather unknown. It can be classified as a highly efficient risk identification analysis and is mainly used today in high-risk sectors such as the nuclear industry or healthcare.

background

Problems can arise in a variety of environments. The emphasis is on "can". In the past, errors were usually only corrected when they had already occurred. In addition to additional costs, this also causes disruptions in the process flow, reduced quality and thus dissatisfied customers. The aim is therefore that problems should not be combated retrospectively, but rather eliminated before they arise.

The first methods of hazard analysis were developed in the 1960s. These were initially used in industry. It was not until the 1990s that the techniques became popular in healthcare as well. Today, risk management is not only part of the quality management system, but is an integral part of the accreditation requirements. In the DIN standard 14971: 2013-04 paragraph 4.4 "Assessment of the risk or the risks for each hazardous situation" it is stipulated that "For each identified hazardous situation [...] the associated risk or [...] the associated risks using available Information or data are to be assessed. For hazardous situations in which the probability of damage occurring cannot be assessed, a list of the possible effects for use in risk assessment and risk control must be drawn up. The results […] must be recorded in the risk management file. "

construction

The structure and structure of the SWIFT analysis differ significantly from other methods. In contrast to the FMEA analysis (failure mode and effects analysis) or the PAAG procedure (prognosis, finding the cause, estimating the effects, countermeasures), the SWIFT analysis does not have any prescribed documentation or work processes. It is based on a brainstorming session that is to be developed by a team of specialists. It is important that these are not only people who have the theoretical background for a process (e.g. product manager), but above all those who can give a well-founded assessment of possible risks, effects and measures through practical reference and background knowledge . In order to be able to create a risk matrix at the end of the analysis, the most important facts must be divided into so-called categories before the brainstorming begins. Each category corresponds to a process-related keyword that describes a problem. During this process it is important not to lose touch with important questions such as "What if ... happened?" Or "How can / could ... happen?" These questions often encourage one not only to think about theoretical process errors, but also indirectly include the mindset of the customer or the patient. The "structured what-if technique" is not suitable for identifying multiple errors. The structure of such a risk matrix can be explained very well using the example of a compressed air supply system.

Columns of the matrix:

  1. Category z. B. Malfunction of plant components and instrumentation
  2. What if z. B. Failure of the compressor
  3. Impact z. B. No compressed air supply
  4. Measures z. B. Alerting by pressure measurement on the storage tank
  5. Recommendation z. B. Check the need for a back-up system

Of course there can also be several “What ifs” for one category.

Advantages and disadvantages

Due to the strong focus on the most important processes, the SWIFT analysis can usually be carried out faster than other, more detail-oriented methods. However, the time saved also has its disadvantages. Risks that could arise in smaller sub-processes would be overlooked. In summary, one can say that the SWIFT analysis is a very efficient risk identification technique, but should still not be used as individual evidence. The greatest success is achieved in interaction with other methods, such as the HAZOP analysis, which also includes less important sub-areas and can thus evaluate the entire process.

For the final creation of the risk matrix, it is also advisable to include diagrams in order to carry out a complete analysis.

See also

literature

  • Alan J. Card; James R. Ward; P. John Clarkson: Beyond FMEA: the structured what-if technique (SWIFT). In: Journal of healthcare risk management: the journal of the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management 31 (4) pp. 23–29, (2012) doi : 10.1002 / jhrm.20101 .
  • DIN e. V .: Quality and risk management systems in healthcare and conformity assessment of certification bodies. Standards and specifications . Ed. Beuth (DIN-Taschenbuch, v.469), 2nd ed. Berlin (2013), online . ISBN 978-3-410-23460-9
  • Gerd F. Kamiske (ed.): Manual of QM methods. Choosing the right method and implementing it successfully . unchangeable Reprint d. 1st edition of 2013, Ed. Hanser, Munich (2015), p.34, ISBN 978-3-446-43558-2
  • Henry W. Potts; Janet E. Anderson; Lacey Colligan; Paul Leach; Sheena Davis; Jon Berman: Assessing the validity of prospective hazard analysis methods: a comparison of two techniques . In: BMC health services research 14 pp. 1-10, (2014) doi : 10.1186 / 1472-6963-14-41 .
  • Reinhard Preiss: Methods of Risk Analysis in Technology. Systematic analysis of complex systems; ID; Rating; Presentation; Application , published by TÜV Austria (Edition TÜV Austria), Vienna (2009), ISBN 978-3-901942-09-9

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c Alan J. Card et al .: Beyond FMEA: the structured what-if technique (SWIFT). In: Journal of healthcare risk management: the journal of the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management. Edition: 31 No. 4, 2012, pp. 23–29
  2. ↑ Gerd F. Kamiske : Handbook of QM Methods. Choosing the right method and implementing it successfully . Hanser Verlag, Munich 2015, p. 3 4
  3. ↑ DIN e. V .: Quality and risk management systems in healthcare and conformity assessment of certification bodies. Standards and specifications , Beuth Verlag, Berlin 2013, p. 174
  4. ^ A b Henry W. Potts et al .: Assessing the validity of prospective hazard analysis methods: a comparison of two techniques . In: BMC health services Research. No. 14, 2014, pp. 1-10.
  5. ↑ a b Reinhard Preiss: Methods of risk analysis in technology. Systematic analysis of complex systems; ID; Rating; Presentation; Application , TÜV Austria, Vienna 2009, pp. 166–173