Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower

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Second chance. Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower is a political science analysis by Zbigniew Brzeziński that was published on May 5, 2007.

In Second Chance , Brezinski deals with 15 years of US foreign policy after the break-up of the Soviet Union , when the US emerged as the “winner” of the Cold War. It describes the administration of three presidents, George HW Bush , Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and analyzes the causes and consequences of their policies regarding the leadership role of the USA.

Zbigniew Brzeziński (1977)

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Challenges for global leadership

As a world power, the USA has focused on its national security since 1990, but has three major missions for world politics:

  • Shaping political relations to produce a more cooperative system of world politics
  • Containing conflicts, preventing terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, collective peace efforts in regions of civil war to reduce violence in the world
  • to fight the increasing inequality of living conditions in accordance with the "world conscience" and to give an answer to the ecological challenges

According to Brzezinski, the ten most important turning points in history between 1990 and 2005 are:

  1. Withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, USA as the leading world power
  2. The victory in the first Gulf War was not used, peace in the Middle East is not sought, growing hostility of the Islamic world towards the USA
  3. NATO is expanding into Eastern Europe; The Atlantic community gained decisive influence on world politics.
  4. Globalization is institutionalized through the WTO, the IMF's Bailout Fund and the fight against corruption through the World Bank. Singapore issues will be the basis of the DOHA conference.
  5. The financial crisis in Asia establishes an Asian community that is either determined by the dominance of China or the competition between Japan and China. China's accession to the WTO.
  6. The Chechnya war, the Kosovo conflict and Putin's election as Russian president all contribute to the emergence of Russian nationalism and an autocratic system. Russia is using its natural resources to become a confident energy superpower.
  7. In view of the permissive stance of the USA, India and Pakistan are becoming nuclear powers despite the negative stance of the world public. In the face of inconsistent and inconsistent US self-restraint efforts, North Korea and Iran continue to covertly step up their efforts to become nuclear powers.
  8. The shock of September 11th drives the US into a state of fear and leads it to pursue unilateral political goals. The US declares a war on terror.
  9. The Atlantic community is divided over the US war in Iraq. The EU fails to develop its own political identity or clout.
  10. The global impression of the US military omnipresence and the US illusion of the extent of its power were shaken by the US failure in Iraq in the aftermath of the victory. The USA recognizes the need for cooperation with the EU, Japan, China and Russia on important issues of world security. The Middle East is becoming a critical test of US leadership.

The haze of victory (and the emergence of contradicting visions)

The defeat of the Soviet Union was not the work of Ronald Reagan alone but the result of forty years of effort. Almost every president had contributed. But Pope John Paul II , Lech Wałęsa and Mikhail Gorbachev were also decisive. Brzezinski mentions Eisenhower's strengthening of the NATO alliance, Kennedy's limitation of Soviet influence in the Berlin and Cuba crises, and the race to the moon that destroyed the Soviet illusion of superiority. The Vietnam War led to Nixon's detente , but Carter began his human rights campaign which merged with John Paul II's spiritual admonition and put the Soviet Union on the defensive ideologically. Carter first supported the resistance against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and laid the foundations for a military presence in the Persian Gulf. Reagan challenged the Soviet Union more strongly in all areas, which drove Gorbachev's perestroika into a general crisis in the Soviet Union. George H. W. Bush exploited the weakening of the Soviet Union with finesse and benefited from the prehistory. But despite its successes, barely 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the US was viewed with strong hostility.

In foreign policy there were two directions, the supporters of economic and political globalization and the neoconservatives . The advocates of globalization relied on interdependence and connectivity as a means of universal progress, with the USA as the spearhead of an optimistic development that would be of benefit to all. The neoconservative doctrine, on the other hand, whose heyday was the George W. Bush administration, turned back to Reagan’s policies, which found their harsh course against the Soviet Union justified by its collapse and absolutized it as the sole means of success. The neoconservatives represented a sympathetic, morally self-assured, Manichean , activist and militant position of strength and clarity, which reduced all political issues to the simple opposition of good and bad, which was sympathetic to Christian fundamentalist circles . The threat from the Soviet Union has been replaced by militant Islam and the Arab countries. This doctrine only became politically relevant on September 11th, when the fear of terrorism and the need for security even questioned the validity of basic rights. Francis Fukuyama's progress model served as a deterministically understood basis for the spread of democracy by all means in the Middle East. Samuel P. Huntington's cultural theory was interpreted as the reason for the conflict with the Islamic world from the different value orientation. At the same time, with the hedonistic relativism of its upper and middle classes , the USA lacked a deeper moral legitimation for its leadership role, which should have been defined by humanitarian goals, a policy based on consensus rather than division, and an answer to the needs of the masses.

Original Sin (and the Pitfalls of Tradition)

The "new world order" slogan became George H. W. Bush's trademark. He had taken over the term from Gorbachev without really seriously wanting to put it into practice. Bush I was a good crisis manager in Eurasia's many crises, but he had no strategic vision. He did not turn his victories into a lasting historical success. Russia was only dismantled, not remodeled, and the Middle East was not pacified after the success against Saddam Hussein.

In a chronological overview of the unusually numerous challenges during the Bush presidency, Brzezinski briefly explains the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the trade union movement in Poland, the effects of which also affected the surrounding countries, the protest on Tianmen Square, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Kuwait Crisis, changes in the Central American states that had a close connection with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavia conflict, the striving for independence of the Baltic states, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of Ukraine.

Victorious diplomacy

Bush's most urgent goal was to cope with the collapse of the Soviet Union without international upheaval and to avoid a split in the Atlantic alliance through Gorbachev's offers, which met with the sympathy of some partners. He reacted to the suppression of the student protest in China with mild public reprimand, but had Snowcroft announce in a secret mission that this was only being done for the sake of form. He did not want to jeopardize the strategic partnership with China. In December there was a public visit with a “goodwill toast”, which the public interpreted as servile. His greatest success was the reunification of Germany. Gorbachev's consent was answered with well-meaning proposals for cooperation with the aim of creating a system of worldwide cooperation. Financial help was also promised. “Bush's performance deserves the highest praise. He lured, soothed, flattered and subliminally threatened his Soviet counterpart. He had to seduce Gorbachev with the vision of a global partnership, while at the same time encouraging him to endure the collapse of the Soviet empire. "

The reunification of Germany was also possible because Germany had become an isolated outpost through the trade union movement in Poland, which Gorbachev was inclined to give up in favor of a “new world order”. The reunification meant an important shift in focus in the geostrategic balance, especially since Germany became a member of NATO and the EU. It was clear that Europe would now advance into what was formerly Eastern Europe. In doing so, internal tensions such as those that occurred in the crumbling Yugoslavia should be avoided. For Bush, the new world order became a sign of traditional stability; the dissolution of the state order was to be prevented, something Bush was reluctant to admit in public and later denied. The surprising outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia raised concerns for the Soviet Union. Nationalism was underestimated, especially since the Soviet Union was equated with Russia. The State Department assumed that the Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic entity similar to the USA. This misconception was reflected in Bush's “chicken Kiev” speech, in which he condemned “suicidal nationalism” and isolationism to the Ukrainian “Soviet citizens” and praised the reforms of the Soviet Union. James Baker called for the center of the Soviet Union to be strengthened.

However, this US stance was overtaken by the events that began with the independence of the Baltic countries. After the break up of the Soviet Union, the main concern was initially to secure the nuclear arsenal in the former Soviet republics. There was no strategy for Yelzin's Russia. "Not much thought was given to developing a comprehensive program of political and socio-economic change in order to bind Russia firmly to Europe." The not inconsiderable financial aid had no concept and "was largely simply stolen". What was even worse was that during the extreme economic crisis, American advisors swarmed into the corrupt and chaotic “new democracy” of Yeltsin in order to enrich themselves with Russian “reformers” through privatizations, especially in the field of energy sources.

When it comes to the Yugoslavia conflict and Afghanistan, the government was too passively wait and see. For Afghanistan, where the US-sponsored resistance, "too little effort was made to shake up the international community to help Afghanistan stabilize and recover economically."

Lost triumph

At the same time, Bush had to solve the Iraq problem. Saddam speculated on the support of the Soviet Union, on the distraction of the US by Eastern Europe and on its Vietnam debacle, but was wrong in his assessment of geopolitical reality, since the US had been the only world power since 1989 and Saddam's attack on Kuwait was seen as a challenge . The UN agreed to the military operation, and some countries, especially the Soviet Union, were more in favor of sanctions. Bush implemented sanctions, fended off attempts to allow Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait with honor, and had troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. Despite the Soviet attempts to mediate at the very last minute, the attack began. The result was a humiliation for Saddam, but not the end of his rule. Brzezinski believes that this would have been possible through a military ultimatum demanding his exile. The victory was not used strategically and in the Arab world the US was perceived as the heir to British imperialism, behind whose actions Downing Street was seen as the mastermind.

He did not tackle the Palestine conflict either, although his aim was to end the settlement building and to recognize the rights of the Palestinians. He thanked Israel with generous financial support for not taking retaliation for Iraqi missile attacks that would have disrupted the Arab alliance. However, despite the intensive work of the Jewish lobby in Israel, he disappointed expectations of a loan guarantee until Shamir was replaced by Rabin. The peace conference in Madrid, to which Gorbachev had invited together with Bush, went without a total solution of the conflict ("comprehensive peace"), which would have been possible with clear strategic goals (no right of return for Palestinians, no expansion of Israel beyond the borders of 1967, Territorial equalization, demilitarization of a Palestine state and a special status for Jerusalem), but only led to the recognition of Israel's right to exist by the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian self-government.

Furthermore, Bush did not succeed in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to India, Pakistan and North Korea, which was also a consequence of the Iraq war, because countries only saw security against the USA in the nuclear deterrent.

The unused victory became the original sin of Bush's legacy: the indecisive, soon resented and self-damaging Middle East policy, led in the following twelve years to the opinion in the region that the US was continuing the imperialist colonial policy of the British and hypocritically supporting Israel's settlement policy. The presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia prepared the ground for the hatred of extreme Sunnis for America.

Brzezinski sums up: "Bush's biggest mistake wasn't what he did, but what he didn't do." What was missing was the great vision for the future of the world, the Middle East and international cooperation with Russia, China and emerging powers. He "... had turned his promising call for the New World Order into affirmation of the more intimate old imperial order."

The impotence of good intentions (and the price of negligence)

Bill Clinton's idealistic vision of renewal, mainly domestically, less externally motivated, was that of inexorable and beneficial globalization. “He saw foreign policy as a continuation of domestic policy by other means.” Clinton did not organize decision-making from above, as was the case with Bush, and deliberations resembled a “coffee gossip”. Through the Congress, the Israeli and Cuban lobby in particular promoted legislation that interfered with the president's foreign policy. Foreign policy was further complicated by media propaganda campaigns that named Libya, Iraq, Iran and China enemies of the year. Compared to Bush, the challenges of international politics were more complex and the answers more constructive.

Brzezinski briefly explains the most important events from January 1993 to December 2000, with particular emphasis on NATO's eastward expansion, the NATO mission in Yugoslavia and the Chechen war.

Shaping the future

The end of the Soviet Union offered Clinton three options for the implementation of international security and cooperation: 1. The end of the costly arms race and joint disarmament, especially with regard to nuclear weapons, 2. The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons as a first step towards a new international system Security, 3. Cooperation with a strengthened Europe in the transatlantic alliance.

The first goal was achieved in full, while the USA was able to use its resources fully to secure a worldwide military area of ​​operation.

The second goal was not achieved in the cat-and-mouse policy with North Korea, although the USA would have had the opportunity to exert political pressure and stop uranium enrichment. Similarly, efforts with regard to India and Pakistan were useless, with the US being accused of wanting to monopolize nuclear weapons.

All of this could have been prevented through international cooperation and a resolute US presence. The third goal was achieved; it was the most constructive and lasting result of Clinton's foreign policy, especially because of the eastward expansion. Clinton's advisors advised caution and consideration for Russian sensitivities. “So American efforts focused on a process of extensive 'preparation' for enlargement, imaginatively labeled as Partnership for Peace, which had the advantage of making enlargement easier while postponing the real decision. In the meantime, the Russian attitude turned into a clear rejection and at the end of 1994 Clinton had to appease Yeltsin by publicly accepting three “no's”: no surprises, no rush and no exclusion of Russia. "

The further policy was two-pronged: on the one hand, the relationship with Russia was to be strengthened, but NATO was also to be expanded.

Bibliography

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski: Second Chance. Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower. Basic Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-465-00355-6 .