Semantic externalism

The language-philosophical thesis of semantic externalism states that the meaning of an expression can depend on factors that are not intrinsic to the speaker.

Thus two speakers can be identical with regard to their intrinsic properties, but refer to different things with a given expression and in this respect mean different things by the expression.

In this formulation, of course, nothing is said about what the intrinsic (in contrast to the extrinsic) properties of a speaker should consist of. The assumption that the reference (denotation, extension) of an expression is part of its meaning (cf. extension and intension ) as well as the assumption that the identity of an expression is compatible with different references also remains worthy of discussion . In addition, the question arises how the meaning (and the reference to the speaker) are related to the meaning (and the reference) simpliciter . The latter question is particularly important because the semantic externalism thesis is often formulated as a thesis about the meaning (or the reference) simpliciter .

Philosophical historical origin

As a historical origin of the theory of semantic externalism is generally Hilary Putnam's famous Twin Earth - thought experiment considered. It is supposed to show that two “molecule-for-molecule” identical speakers can use the term “water” to refer to chemically completely different substances. The thought experiment is based on a planet that is almost completely identical to earth. The similarities between the earth and the "twin earth" go so far that every person on earth has a counterpart on the twin earth whose qualitative experiences coincide with his own. The only difference between the two planets is the chemical composition of the liquid that fills the seas and rivers, that is used for drinking and washing, etc. While these roles are played by on Earth , they are played by a different substance on Twin Earth , , played. Putnam's thought experiment is intended to support the semantic judgment that an earth dweller ("Oscar") refers to with the word "water" , while its twin earth counterpart ("Twin Oscar") refers to, with the word "water" regardless of the intrinsic identity (understood as “molecule-for-molecule” identity) between the two speakers. It is important to understand that this means that the meaning of “water” is not limited to a definition such as “the liquid that fills seas and rivers, suitable for drinking and washing, etc.”: both terrestrial and twin terrestrials. Residents accept the definition. Hilary Putnam emphasizes that the difference between the various meanings of the speakers can also be determined in relation to pairs of earth-twin earth speakers around the year 1750, before the development of the modern science of chemistry. Putnam summarizes the thesis of semantic externalism with the slogan "meanings just ain't in the head". ${\displaystyle H_{2}O}$ ${\displaystyle XYZ}$ ${\displaystyle H_{2}O}$ ${\displaystyle XYZ}$

It should be noted that Putnam, in his 1975 article, refers to the work Naming and Necessity by Saul A. Kripke , published a few years earlier , in which a causal theory of the relation of expressions was outlined, from which semantic externalism ( understood at least as a thesis about the relation of expressions) directly follows. In his book, Kripke opposes the theories of characterization of the relation of expressions , i.e. theories according to which the relation of "water" results from definitions such as "the liquid that fills the seas and rivers, which is good for drinking and washing, etc.". For his arguments, Kripke uses thought experiments that are very similar to Putnam's twin-earth thought experiment. For this reason, some philosophers also use the name "Kripke-Putnam semantics" or "KP semantics" for semantic externalism.

Types

Putnam's thought experiment supports an externalism according to which the microphysical structure of the speaker's environment (causally affecting the speaker) can influence the meaning of her expressions. This shows the close relationship between semantic externalism and the causal theory of reference: the former (at least understood as a thesis on the relation of expressions) is a consequence of the latter.

In addition to the microphysical differences that come into play in the “twin earth” thought experiment, social factors in determining the meaning of the speaker were also examined in the specialist debate. Tyler Burge, for example, tried to show with a thought experiment that the meaning of an expression is influenced by the language behavior of other members of the speaker's language community. Burge's thought experiment, for example, is supposed to suggest the semantic judgment that two intrinsically identical speakers can refer to different clinical pictures with their expression "arthritis". In Burge's case, the extrinsic difference to the speakers is that in one case the relevant experts in the language community only use the term for joint complaints, while in the other case they also apply it to other complaints.

Arguments for semantic externalism

The main argument for semantic externalism is based on Putnam's thought experiment (or related thought experiments, see e.g. Burge's thought experiment on social externalism).

Another argument (also by Putnam) points in its main premise to the intuitive equality of the meaning of "elm tree" (elm) in the mouth of a competent botanist and in the mouth of a person who (like Putnam himself) elm (elm) of beech trees (beech) cannot distinguish.

Arguments against semantic externalism

Not all philosophers were convinced by the thought experiments. Some outright deny the thesis of the difference in speaker meaning between Earthling and Gemini Earthling. According to them, Earthling and Gemini Earthling refer to the same thing as "water," for example . ${\displaystyle \{H_{2}O\vee XYZ\}}$

Another possibility to hold on to semantic internalism in the light of thought experiments is the answer that the relation of an expression in the mouth of a speaker is based on more complex speaker-intrinsic factors than initially assumed. This includes, for example, dispositions of self-correction in the light of (unexpected) empirical data or in the light of the (unexpected) linguistic dispositions of other speakers. (See two-dimensional semantics .)

According to some philosophers, what speaks against externalism as a whole is that it makes the successful communication of different speakers appear mysterious.

Related theses and debates

In addition to semantic externalism, many philosophers advocate an externalism of mental content, according to which the content of beliefs and other mental intentional states (such as hope, fear, worry) depends on factors that are extrinsic to the carrier of the state.

The externalism of the mental content plays an important role in the philosophy of mind , in the question of the possibility of knowledge of oneself, and in the discussion of skepticism.

A close relative - or a subspecies - of the externalism of mental content is called "active externalism" in the English-speaking debate. According to him, certain mental or cognitive states or processes are only realized in action, especially in action using external objects.

Web links

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the externalism of mental content
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the relevance of externalism in relation to the possibility of knowing oneself

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Hilary Putnam: 1975. The meaning of 'meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7: 131-193.
2. ^ Saul A. Kripke: 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. The book is based on lectures given as early as 1970 and widely known among language philosophers since that year.
3. ↑ See for example Nicos Stavropoulos: 1996. Objectivity in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Z. BS 133
4. ^ Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121.
5. ↑ Putnam 1975, ibid.
6. ↑ See e.g. B. Tim Crane: 1991. All the difference in the world. The Philosophical Quarterly 162: 1-25
7. ↑ See Joe Lau, Max Deutsch: 2013. "Externalism about Mental Content" . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
8. ↑ See T. Parent: 2013. "Externalism and Self-Knowledge" . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
9. ↑ See Joe Lau, Max Deutsch: 2013. "Externalism about Mental Content: Active Externalism" . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.