Tyler Burge

Charles Tyler Burge (* 1946 ) is an American philosopher and professor at the University of California, Los Angeles . In 1971 Burge received his Doctor of Philosophy from Princeton University .

Burge has made contributions to various philosophical topics, in particular to epistemology and philosophy of mind . He became known for his arguments for externalism (also called "anti-individualism"), whose thesis is that the content of a mental state is not determined solely by the brain . Today Burge is considered to be one of the most exposed critics of the reductionist and physicalist currents in the philosophy of mind. He also made important contributions to Gottlob Frege research. Burge is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 1993), theBritish Academy (since 1999) and the American Philosophical Society (2007).

Externalism

Externalism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the mind is not determined by the brain alone. So it is conceivable that two people are in the same biological state but have two different thoughts . Externalists explain that the concrete content of a thought also depends on the natural and social environment.

The classic formulation of this position can be found in Burge's 1979 essay Individualism and the Mental . Burge's train of thought is based on an argument by Hilary Putnam who tried to show with a thought experiment in The Meaning of Meaning in 1975 that meanings are dependent on the environment.

Burge offers the following thought experiment: A patient A feels pain in his thigh and goes to the doctor with the conviction that he has arthritis . This opinion is wrong, however, since arthritis is only spoken of in connection with joint diseases. Now Burge asks to imagine a twin earth in the thought experiment , in which everything with the exception of one corresponds to the current world. The exception is that on Gemini Earth, inflammation of the thigh is also called "arthritis". A patient B in the twin world, unlike A, would have a true opinion if he thought he had arthritis. This also applies if it is completely identical to A in its physical-biological structure.

Now Burge argues as follows: A and B must have different opinions, since A's opinion is false and B's opinion is true. However, A and B are completely identical in their physical-biological structure. So two people can be alike in their biological-physical structure without having the same opinions. Opinions are part of the mind / consciousness. So people can differ in their states of mind or consciousness without differing in their biological-physical structure. So the mind is not determined by biology (or even the brain). Philosophers also speak of the mind not supervising over the brain .

Doubts about physicalism

Burge is also considered a skeptic with regard to physicalistic theories of mind. He not only thinks that physicalism has hitherto unsolved problems, but also explains in the article Mind Body Causation and Explanation , published in 1993 , that the common objection to non-physicalist positions is implausible. Most physicalists argue with the phenomenon of mental causation : Mental states can have physical effects, for example fear can cause an escape. Now there seems to be a purely biological cause for the escape . Physicalists now argue that the biological cause would make any mental cause superfluous. As a solution to this problem, they offer to trace the mental cause back to the biological cause. Burge, on the other hand, explains that it is not a problem to assume a plurality of causes. This brings him to the following position:

At any rate, mentalistic explanation and mental causation do not need validation from materialistic metaphysics. It seems to me, that we should be more relaxed about whether or not some form of materialism is true. I think it a thoroughly open - and not very momentous - question whether there is any point in insisting that mental events are, in any clear sense, physical. (Burge, 1993, p. 117)		In any case, mentalistic explanations and mental causations do not need to be confirmed by a materialistic metaphysics. It seems to me that we should be more relaxed about whether any form of materialism is true. Whether it makes sense at all to insist that mental events are physical in the true sense of the word is, in my opinion, a completely open, but also not particularly decisive question.

literature

Primary

• Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121.
• Tyler Burge: 1982. Other Bodies. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.): Thought and Object . New York: Oxford.
• Tyler Burge: 1986. Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 45: 3-45.
• Tyler Burge: 1988. Individualism and Self-Knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 85: 64-663.
• Tyler Burge: 1989. Individuation and Causation in Psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70: 303-322.
• Tyler Burge: 1993. Mind Body Causation and Explanation, in: Heil / Mele (ed.): Mental Causation . Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN 019823564X
• Tyler Burge: 2003. Replies. In Hahn and Ramberg.
• Tyler Burge: 2005. Truth, Thought and Reason: Essays on Frege . Oxford: Clarendon.
• Tyler Burge: 2007. Foundations of Mind . Oxford: Clarendon.
• Tyler Burge: 2010. Origins of Objectivity . Oxford: Clarendon.

Secondary

• Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg (eds.): 2003. Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge . Cambridge: MIT Press, ISBN 0262582228 .
• Maria J. Frapolli and Esther Romero (eds.): 2003. Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge . Palo Alto: CSLI Publications, ISBN 1575863464 .

Web links

• Literature by and about Tyler Burge in the catalog of the German National Library
• Burge's site at UCLA