Principle of simultaneity

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The simultaneity principle (also: coincidence principle ) is within the meaning of § 16 i. V. m. § 8 StGB the basic framework of German criminal liability , which applies in particular to deliberate crimes . It is normatively derived from the certainty requirement of Article 103, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law .

At the same time, the offense must be objectively realized, there must be intent , the illegality of the act and the guilt must be given.

Problems

Basically, an (intentional) crime follows a certain causal path . Initially formed when perpetrators of Tatentschluss , which is the intent to commit an act. The perpetrator then makes preparations for the offense and begins attempting the crime with the immediate start of the offense (offense) . With the realization of all objective elements of the fact, the deed is completed. Certain offenses (such as robbery , theft ) provide an additional point to end the offense by securing the gain of the crime.

Intent

In order to be punishable, the intent with regard to the realization of the facts must exist in any case if the offense - even if only on an experimental basis - has started, i.e. the perpetrator immediately started the offense. It must cover the success and the other elements of the offense, which can be argued in accordance with Section 16 (1) of the Criminal Code. The premeditation before the start of the act (preparatory stage or earlier) is called dolus antecedens , its counterpart after completion of the act dolus subsequens . However, both intentions do not extend into the period of the offense and are, in the opinion of the Federal Court of Justice, irrelevant. The act can therefore be carried out without intent, insofar as only a punishment, if provided for, for negligent behavior comes into consideration.

Deviations from the causal process are also problematic. Here it could be argued that in the imagination of the perpetrator (and thus exclusively covered by the intent) only a certain chain of causes is set in motion, the deviation of which from the imagination would lead to a cancellation of the intent. A distinction must be made here: If the deviations are insignificant, intent will continue to be irrefutably assumed. Otherwise there would be considerable need for evidence. Significant deviations from the causal process, however, rule out intent. This problem must be differentiated from the atypical causal processes for which the objective attribution is not already available.

illegality

The illegality must be chronologically linked to the offense, i.e. simultaneously, in order to justify the allegation that the offense is illegal. Therefore, justification reasons can only exist if a self-defense , justifying emergency or an emergency-like situation is present at the same time. Delayed self-defense also suffers from the unsuitability of the agent.

fault

The act must have been culpably brought about. Therefore, as with intent and illegality, it also applies to guilt that it must exist simultaneously with the act. Thus, at the time of the commission of the offense, there must be guilty responsibility according to § 20 StGB, which is excluded through intoxicating substances ( drugs , especially alcohol ) or through mental illness of a temporary nature or through lack of awareness (then usually no attributable act). From blood alcohol concentrations of 3.0 ‰, the state of complete incapacity begins, at concentrations of 2.0 ‰ and higher the criminal offense of intoxication can be fulfilled. Since the punitive threat of intoxication lags behind that of serious crimes , the Federal Court of Justice, based on the previous case law of the Reich Court, constructed a forward guilt about the institute of actio libera in causa . Use of this legal institution has been rejected more frequently in recent years because it cannot be reconciled with the principle of simultaneity (due to the requirement of certainty). A higher court decision on this legal institution has not been made in recent years.

literature

On the principle of simultaneity in intent:

Individual evidence

  1. cf. e.g. Johannes Kaspar, JURA 2007, 69, 71.