Convict judgment
With the convict judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of March 14, 1972, the court decided, contrary to the prevailing opinion in doctrine and jurisprudence, that persons in a special legal relationship can also invoke basic rights.
facts
The complainant, a prisoner of the Celle prison , wrote a letter on Christmas Eve 1967 about the conditions in the prison to an association that represents the rights of prisoners. This letter was withheld by the prison management because it was offensive and the internal information of the prison should not be made public. The attorney general rejected the immediate complaint against this on January 16, 1968. By decision of March 8, 1968, the court rejected an application for legal aid at the Higher Regional Court of Celle because of an intended court decision according to § 23 EGGVG because it was of the opinion that the complainant, as a prisoner, could not invoke the constitutionally protected freedom of expression because the Fundamental rights are not applicable to him. In addition, the head of the institution acted in self-defense by withholding the letter.
The complainant raised his constitutional complaint against this.
Summary of the judgment
The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that even with persons in a special legal relationship , such as prisoners, a restriction of the basic rights is only possible on the basis of a legal basis, which, however, has so far been missing.
The court recognized that the prevailing opinion so far did not consider this to be necessary because this group of people was not entitled to basic rights from the outset. At the time, the only legal basis for the execution of sentences was Article 104 of the Basic Law, which, however, did not contain any regulations on the manner in which sentences were executed. This can only be explained in such a way that even the fathers of the Basic Law considered such a regulation to be dispensable in view of the prevailing opinion. However, the court decided that, in the light of the Basic Law, such a completely indefinite restriction of fundamental rights can no longer be accepted.
Nevertheless, restrictions on fundamental rights must be accepted for a transitional period until a corresponding legal basis exists. For this reason, opening the letter to check its contents was a permissible restriction of fundamental rights and not a violation of the confidentiality of the letter . The situation was different when it came to the reluctance of the letter. This is a violation of the complainant's freedom of expression because a corresponding law would not be permissible either. Only those measures are permitted that are essential for the security of the prison, which applies to the opening of the letter, but not to its reluctance. A general restraint of all letters that are offensive or contain internals of the prison is not essential, as there are other, less drastic ways to resolve the conflict between the prisoner's freedom of expression and the security of the prison. The prison management has criminal and civil law steps at its disposal against insults, further cuts in the freedom of expression are not covered by the Basic Law. The prison management could not appeal to self-defense either.
Consequences of the judgment
The immediate result of the ruling was the enactment of a legal basis for the penal system, the Penal Service Act , which came into force in 1977.
However, the ruling had far more far-reaching consequences outside of the direct sphere of influence, as it affected all constellations of a special legal relationship. Among other things, this affected children in care who no longer had to put up with arbitrary measures by their educators, or even pupils in a school.