The colonial origins of comparative development

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The colonial origins of comparative development is the title of an article published in 2001 by Daron Acemoğlu , Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson in the Journal American Economic Review (AER). The article deals with development economics and tries to answer the question of what the causes of the current per capita income of different countries are.

The quality of institutions is cited as the main cause of income differences and a country's economic performance ; but not given an exact definition. A state with better institutions in the sense of this work ensures, in particular, secure property rights .

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The authors assume that the European colonial powers preferred to settle in regions and countries that had favorable living conditions, especially an environment with few diseases. There they created sustainable, growth-promoting institutions. In contrast, areas that were unsuitable for Europeans due to the disease environment (e.g. Central Africa ) were more likely to be exploited. This classification is said to exist to this day and explains a large part of the income variation between countries.

The argumentation of the article describes the following causal chain:

  • (Potential) settler mortality affects the form of settlement, which in turn
  • shaped the early institutions of that time, which are the basis to this day
  • for the current institutions, which eventually
  • determine the current economic performance.

The mortality of the settlers is used as an instrument variable for the institutional development of former colonial states.

Reception and criticism

The article was received in many ways and taken up in the professional world. In the Research Papers in Economics database, the paper The colonial origins of comparative development (2001) ranks 42nd.

Criticism of the work is directed, for example, to that of Acemoglu et al. selected variable Risk of expropriation (risk of expropriation or exploitation), an index taken from the International Country Risk Guide and used as a proxy variable for institutions. This variable depicts current events in a country rather than the underlying institutional framework.

It is argued that in this sense, states that are led by dictators can achieve very high values, provided that they opt for appropriate policies, e.g. B. To promote property rights without these actually being institutionally protected. For example, the Soviet Union and Singapore had the lowest scores on the expropriation risk index in 1984 .

In 2012, the American Economic Review published David Albouy's work The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation: comment. which after a long time from many comments and replies (in the form of discussion papers) between Albouy and Acemoglu et al. took place.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91 (5), pages 1369-1401, December. P. 1370.
  2. ↑ Top 1 ‰ Research Items by Number of Citations - Citation Ranking List of Research Papers in Economics (accessed February 4, 2015).
  3. ↑ Glaeser, Edward L., et al. "Do institutions cause growth ?." Journal of economic Growth 9.3 (2004): 271-303.
  4. ↑ Albouy, David Y. "The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation: comment." The American Economic Review 102.6 (2012): 3059-3076.

literature

  • Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review , American Economic Association, Volume 91 (5), pages 1369-1401, December.

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