Transcendental object

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The transcendental object is a conception of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Kantian theory of knowledge and is used as one of the sub-concepts of the thing-in-itself . As with this one, the meaning of the “transcendental object” in Kant is not entirely uniform, but always means a concept of the intelligible. It preferably designates the "factuality" a priori, that is, the objectivity generated by the understanding, to which the appearances are related in perception and which as such is constant. It is the pure “something” of all things, which by definition cannot be assigned a predicate.

definition

The term "transcendental" in Kant means that knowledge that does not concern objects, but rather the conditions of their possibility that lie in the understanding and reason, i.e. the conditions of the human type of knowledge itself. (In contrast, "transcendent" describes the "flying over a limit") . The transcendental object can therefore only be one of these a priori conditions of knowledge. Because already “the concept of appearance demands that one thinks of 'something' that appears” and “this something must be an object independent of sensuality, an 'object in general' or a 'transcendental' object.” Sensuality alone would deliver only “rhapsodic” sensations, and therefore, according to Kant, there must be a relation to an imaginary objectivity: “Since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding relates them to something as the object of sensual perception: but this something is in so far only the transcendental object. ”As the“ something ”of objectivity in general, the transcendental object is always indeterminate, so that no predicate can be assigned to it.

The interpretation in positivistic reception

In the increasingly empirical and idealistic-positivistic reception of Kant's work and in the course of the scientifically oriented schools of Neo-Kantianism, a physical interpretation of the transcendental object prevailed, which opposes the Kantian conception. In this sense, P. Unruh states that Kant is not concerned with “an intrinsically existing thing affecting subjects in an ominous (perhaps even 'transcendental' way) and states that this has been in literature since H. Vaihinger but to be found: “What is meant is that the transcendental object affected us; as a result of this causation we received an idea in which the object would be given as an empirical object. ”N. Knoepffler also remarks:“ The transcendental object is misunderstood as a transcendent one. ”

This misunderstanding, which is also widespread in the US-American reception of Kant, is usually connected with the reference in which Kant uses the term “transcendental object” to denote the “cause of appearance”, but it again means that the mind itself “Thinks an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object”, that is, as one that the mind itself generates. In this context, Kant declares it permissible to call the transcendental object a noumenon in order to underline that it is a pure thought thing. Elsewhere, however, he specifies that it cannot be called “the noumenon” because no other property (i.e. no predicate) can be assigned to it as a mere “something”. As a result, the transcendental object is also not conceivable in the plural (on the other hand, for example, “the immortal soul” or “the infinite being” are thought things with predicates, i.e. noumena ).

literature

  • Nikolaus Knoepffler, The term “transcendental” in Immanuel Kant. An investigation into the “Critique of Pure Reason” . Munich 2001

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Cf. Nikolaus Knoepffler, The term “transcendental” in Immanuel Kant , p. 57 f. Immanuel Kant: Kant. Edition of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin 1900 ff., AA III, p. 43
  2. ↑ Nikolaus Knoepffler: The term "transcendental" in Immanuel Kant , p. 58
  3. ^ Friedrich Kaulbach: Immanuel Kant , Berlin, New York, 1982, p. 162
  4. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Kant. Edition of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin 1900 ff., AA IV, p. 163
  5. ↑ Nikolaus Knoepffler: The term "transcendental" in Immanuel Kant , p. 58
  6. ↑ Patrick Unruh: Transcendental aesthetics of space: on Immanuel Kant's spatial conception , p. 108 ff., M. Applied to Hans Vaihinger: Kant Studies , Volume II, S 6 f .; 56
  7. ↑ Nikolaus Knoepffler: The term "transcendental" in Immanuel Kant , p. 58
  8. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Kant. Edition of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin 1900 ff., AA III, p. 231
  9. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Kant. Edition of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin 1900 ff., AA IV, p. 165