Two power standard

The two-power standard was the maxim of British naval armament in the period from 1889 to the First World War , according to which the British fleet should always be at least as strong as the two next smaller fleets combined.

The two-power standard principle is a lesson from the wars against France and Spain in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Together the fleets of France and Spain had outnumbered the British navy, at least in number. The British Admiralty therefore followed the view that Great Britain must be able to keep a third and, if necessary, a fourth great sea ​​power at bay even after a loss-making war against a federation of two great naval powers .

The two-power standard was introduced into the British House of Commons in the Naval Defense Act of 1889 and passed with the votes of the Conservatives . The author of the law was Lord George Hamilton , Secretary of the Sea of ​​the 2nd Salisbury Administration . The policy of the Two-Power-Standard was - despite verbal criticism from the so-called "radical liberals" within the Liberal Party and the left press - essentially continued by all British governments between 1889 and 1914. This also took place against the background of the rapidly accelerating German naval armament since 1899/1900 (see Naval Laws ) and the French-Russian alliance since 1892.

In fact, at no point has the Royal Navy reached the two-power standard. As a result of the financial burdens of the First World War and the extensive construction programs of the USA and Japan , the United Kingdom had to abandon the idea of ​​the two-power standard after 1918 and, in particular, grant the United States of America (USA) equal rights in maritime arms issues. The Washington Fleet Conference finally marked the pro forma end of the two-power standard concept.