Slovak national uprising
Monument of the National Uprising in Banska Bystrica
| date | August 29 to October 28, 1944 |
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| place | Central Slovakia |
| output | Suppression of the uprising, transition of the insurgents to partisan warfare |
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| Troop strength | |
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total: 60,000 soldiers, 7,000-18,000 partisans |
in all: 50,000 German and 6,900–8,600 Slovak soldiers, 5,000 Hlinka guardsmen |
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Slovak National Uprising ( Slovak : Slovenské národné povstanie , SNP for short ; alternatively also Povstanie roku 1944 , German: The uprising of 1944 ) is the name of a military uprising organized by the Slovak resistance during World War II against the occupation that began on August 29, 1944 of Slovakia by the German Wehrmacht and against the Slovak collaboration regime of Ludaken under Jozef Tiso . Along with the Warsaw Uprising, it was the largest uprising against the National Socialist system of rule and its allies in East Central Europe .
Supported by parts of the Slovak army, the main area of the uprising was in central Slovakia , with the city of Banská Bystrica as the center. The Slovak insurgent army (officially "1st Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia") was under the command of a military headquarters of the opposition Slovak National Council . This represented a coalition of the bourgeois Democratic Party and the Slovak Communists and was in contact with the Czechoslovak government in exile in London. The uprising was also supported by Soviet and Slovak partisan units . At the beginning of the uprising, the rebels controlled over half of what was then Slovakia's national territory, but quickly lost ground as a result of the German advance. After 60 days of fighting, the uprising ended on October 28, 1944, when the military leadership of the rebels gave up the open fight against the Wehrmacht with the fall of Banská Bystrica and went without surrender to pure partisan struggle , which they continued until the occupation of Slovakia by the Red Army continued in April 1945.
As a result of the uprising, both parties to the conflict also committed numerous war crimes . In the areas controlled by the rebels, up to 1,500 people were murdered (mostly members of the German minority ), while the German occupation regime for its part claimed up to 5,000 deaths (of which around 2,000 were Jews) with targeted “punitive measures” against the civilian population, especially after the uprising was put down ). The German leadership also used the uprising as an opportunity to complete the extermination of the Jews in Slovakia , during which more than 14,000 Jews were deported or murdered on Slovak territory by the end of the war. A total of around 30,000 Slovak citizens were deported to German prisoner, labor, internment and concentration camps.
After the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 , the Slovak national uprising experienced major reinterpretations, as a result of which the share of communists and partisans in the uprising was overrated by official Czechoslovak historiography. The bourgeois resistance and the importance of the insurgent army, whose representatives were persecuted by the communist leadership after 1948, was neglected. At the turn of 1989 , a process of re-evaluation began in Slovakia, through which the role of the bourgeois resistance and the insurgent army was emphasized. August 29 is a national holiday in today's Slovakia .
prehistory
Domestic and foreign policy situation
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On March 14, 1939, under strong pressure from the Third Reich , the Slovak state parliament declared independence from the Czecho-Slovak Republic and proclaimed the Slovak state . The political development of Slovakia in the following six years was determined by its status as the “protective state” of the German Empire. In the "Protection Treaty" signed on March 23, 1939, Slovakia undertook to pursue its foreign policy and the development of its army "in close agreement" with the German Reich and the Wehrmacht a "protection zone" in the western part of the country for the establishment of military installations and garrisons to provide. In the "Confidential Protocol on Economic and Financial Cooperation", which was also closed, Germany also secured its interests vis-à-vis the Slovak economy. In return, the German Reich committed itself to “protecting the political independence of the Slovak state and the integrity of its territory”.
Nevertheless, when the state was founded, the independence of Slovakia was far from guaranteed. How flexible the German Reich was to its protection obligations became apparent shortly after independence, when Slovakia was invaded by Hungarian troops and then had to cede eastern Slovak territories to Horthys Hungary. Berlin did not give Slovakia any protection in this conflict, but merely assumed the role of mediator. In fact, a few months after the formation of the Slovak state, the German leadership was still in the dark about its continued existence and viewed it as an object of exchange in negotiations with Hungary and Poland. Since only the German government could give a guarantee of existence for the independent state, good behavior and compliance were called for among Slovak politicians in order not to endanger the protection of the German Reich.
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The Slovak state was ruled by a one-party regime of the dictatorial Ludaks . Historians have sometimes classified it as fascist or - with reference to the close ties between the government and the Catholic clergy - as clerical-fascist , but also simply as totalitarian or authoritarian . The Slovak constitution of July 1939 was based more on the constitutions of Salazar's Portugal and Dollfuss ' Austria than on the dictatorship of the National Socialists. The domestic political situation in Slovakia from 1939 to 1942 was determined by a power struggle between the president and party leader Jozef Tiso on the one hand and the prime minister and foreign minister Vojtech Tuka on the other. While Tuka, out of his admiration for National Socialism, voluntarily gave instructions to the Third Reich, it was Tiso's endeavor to shield Slovak society from German influence. In return, Tiso was ready to cooperate in the field of economy, military participation in the wars against Poland and the Soviet Union as well as in the deportation of the Slovak Jews. In 1942, Tiso was able to overthrow Tuka and its radical party wing by introducing the Führer principle, and subsequently to establish a presidential dictatorship.
Despite its limited sovereignty, the Slovak state initially established itself relatively successfully on the international political scene. Even before the beginning of World War II , he was de jure and de facto recognized by 18 states, including Great Britain ( de facto , May 4, 1939) and France ( de facto , July 14, 1939). After the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, de facto and de jure recognition by the Soviet Union soon followed. In total, the Slovak state has been recognized by 27 states during its existence.
As a result of the Salzburg dictation of 1940, there was an even closer bond with the German Reich. In November 1940, Slovakia joined the Axis Powers , which led to the Slovak declaration of war against the Soviet Union in June 1941 and against Great Britain and the USA in December 1941. As a result of their support for the Third Reich, Slovakia fell into ever greater international isolation and reduced its chances of a possible post-war existence, especially when the Allies accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as one of their war goals in 1941. Since the Allies would not recognize an independent Slovakia after the war, the question no longer arose whether Slovakia would become part of Czechoslovakia again, but only under what conditions.
Collaboration regime and population
The Ludaks of the ruling Hlinka party had been the strongest political force in Slovakia since 1925, but never received more than a third of the Slovak vote within Czechoslovakia. In autumn 1938 they took over the autonomous Slovak state government and until December 1938 they enforced a one-party dictatorship in which only the political representatives of the German and Hungarian minorities remained. The other bourgeois parties were forced to unite with the Hlinka party, and left and Jewish parties were banned. The press censorship was introduced and a concentration camp for actual or supposed opponents of the regime was set up in Ilava . With her organizations - the Hlinka Guard and the Hlinka Youth - she tried to dominate the Hlinka party throughout life in Slovakia. Many Ludaks viewed the establishment of the Slovak state - despite its shortcomings and constitutional restrictions - as the completion of Slovak national emancipation efforts.
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But the overwhelming majority of the Slovak population also took a very positive attitude towards the new state, at least in the first few years of its existence. In contrast to the Czech protectorate , Slovakia was spared German occupation; it remained largely autonomous in terms of domestic and cultural policy. The restriction of civil liberties was seen as tolerable (the regime's brutality was concentrated against the Jews) and the economy benefited greatly from the war. The school system, science and culture also experienced an upswing. Up until the late summer of 1944, the situation in Slovakia was better than in the neighboring countries of Central Europe, so that for years the Slovak government could rely on broad tolerance or even approval of the population for its measures. Above all, the representatives and members of the Protestant Church were dissatisfied with the government. They made up around 17% of the Slovak population, were traditionally oriented towards Czechoslovakia and felt treated as second-class citizens by the Catholic-dominated Ludak regime. Since December 1938, only four Lutherans were represented in the Slovak state parliament, and only one Protestant, Defense Minister Ferdinand Čatloš , made it into the government and further chairmanship of the Hlinka party .
The very unpopular wars against the Slavic states of Poland and the Soviet Union, in which Slovakia participated with its own troops, as well as the establishment of German advisory positions in the Slovak ministries, the one-sided orientation towards Hitler's Germany and the exaggerated, contributed to the resentment of the Slovak population Nationalism. The Jewish policy of the Slovak regime later met with broad social aversion. After the Salzburg dictation in 1940, the strengthened, radical party wing of the Ludaks led by Prime Minister Tuka to rapidly radicalize the so-called "solution to the Jewish question". The Jewish code issued by the government in September 1941 brought about the transition from the religious to the racial assessment of the Jewish question, which was customary up to that point, and was one of the harshest anti-Semitic laws in Europe. On Tuka's initiative, two thirds of the Slovak Jews (around 58,000) were deported to German extermination camps from March to October 1942; of them only a few hundred survived.
After the war situation changed in the winter of 1942/43, the unrest within Slovakia increased. In 1943 the important news of German defeats ( Stalingrad , Kursk , Italy's exit from the war ) and the looming German defeat reached the country. Under the impression of the victories of the Red Army , but also the spread of news about National Socialist war crimes in the Soviet Union, a wave of Russophilia and Slavophilia grew in Slovak society. In the spring of 1944, Slovakia presented the image of an “oasis of peace” from the outside, but inside there had been fundamental changes and a radical change of mood in all strata of the population. Nevertheless, despite the increasing anti-German mood in the population, it took until mid-1944 for the political conditions in Slovakia to change so much as a result of the dramatic events in all European theaters of war that the conditions for a national uprising were in place.
Resistance groups and formation of the Slovak National Council
As in several other countries, there were two main lines of political resistance in Slovakia - communist and non-communist. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) was the first party ever to be banned in 1938 and thus made illegal. After the establishment of the Slovak state, the Slovak communists became independent, resulting in the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). The leadership of the Czechoslovak communists moved to Moscow.
The Slovak communists were the main resistance force in Slovakia from the start and as such were persecuted the most. They were initially active by publishing illegal publications and coordinating strikes. Their attitude towards Slovak independence and Czechoslovakia went through several changes and was dependent on the official politics of Moscow. Until the Soviet Union recognized Slovakia on September 16, 1939, the party leadership advocated the restoration of Czechoslovakia, after which it accepted the idea of an independent Slovakia. After 1940 the Slovak communists again made the establishment of a “Slovak Soviet Republic” their party program. It was only when Stalin recognized Edvard Beneš 's Czechoslovak government-in-exile in 1941 that the KSS accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia, but demanded its federalization.
The bourgeois and social democratic resistance was in contact with the Czechoslovak foreign movement and established contacts with the Czech resistance in the protectorate. Since the establishment of independent Slovakia in March 1939, officials and politicians who remained loyal to Czechoslovakia and Beneš have formed resistance groups. They gathered intellectuals from the military and politics and helped Czech refugees from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (mostly civil servants and resistance fighters) to flee via Slovakia to the Balkans and then to the west. All these groups rejected the idea of an independent Slovakia and advocated the restoration of Czechoslovakia.
The most important of the non-communist resistance groups were the predominantly Protestant agrarians. The relationship between the Slovak agrarians and Beneš, however, was complex, which was due to the fact that the government-in-exile stuck to the idea of a unified Czechoslovak nation - a position that the agrarians considered unacceptable. In their ideas about a renewed Czechoslovakia, the Slovak agrarians no longer assumed Prague centralism and a unified Czechoslovak nation. The majority of them were in favor of respecting the Slovak national independence, from which they also derived appropriate changes in the constitutional position of Slovakia.
Before 1943, there was no planned cooperation between the resistance groups due to different objectives, a lack of coordination and a lack of acceptance among the population. Only because of the rapprochement between the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the Soviet Union, as well as the course of the war, which increased the influence of the Soviet Union in East Central Europe, did the Slovak resistance also begin to change. In 1943 the young generation of communists, led by Gustáv Husák , and the young agrarians under Ján Ursíny began to negotiate a joint program. In December 1943 the “Christmas Agreement” was concluded between the “socialist block” (communists and social democrats) and the “bourgeois block” (mainly agrarian). This agreed on the planning of an uprising and the formation of a "Slovak National Council" as the highest body of the illegal resistance, which consists of three communists (Gustáv Husák, Ladislav Novomeský , Karol Šmidke ) and three non-communists (Ján Ursíny, Jozef Lettrich , Matej Josko ) duration. The fight against the Tiso regime and German supremacy as well as the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia as a democratic federation of two national states in which Czechs and Slovaks should live as equal partners were agreed. Political rapprochement with the Soviet Union was also sought.
Slovak Army and Golian's Military Headquarters
The opposition representatives were aware that the realization of any overthrow or uprising without the army was unthinkable. From this point of view, the involvement of the general and officer corps was decisive for the success of the action. The Slovak army emerged from the ruins of the old Czechoslovak army , in which only a few Slovaks had risen to the rank of officer due to the Czech dominance. The Slovak officer corps was established between 1939 and 1942 after the soldiers of Czech, Hungarian or Carpathian-Ukrainian nationality had been demobilized. The central role in building the army played Ferdinand Čatloš that after the establishment of independent Slovakia General, Minister of Defense and Commander in a person was.
However, the Slovak army did not become a reliable power support of the Ludaken regime. In general, the Slovak military was oriented towards the West, and the former Czechoslovak officers had been brought up in the spirit of the democratic traditions of Masaryk Czechoslovakia . Communism and an orientation towards the Soviet Union were rejected; the Communist Party had practically no influence on the army, police and gendarmerie. The Slovak Army was formally independent, but the Slovak regime had to give up important areas of development, especially with the Defense Industry Treaty of 1939 and the installation of the German Industrial Commission in 1943. The German insistence on participating in the attack on Poland was granted by Slovak politicians, not least in the expectation of being able to prevent further ceding of territories to Hungary and to regain the territories that had been lost to Poland as a result of the Munich Agreement in 1938. But since Slovaks of all political camps hated attacking the closely related Polish people together with the Germans, mutinies among Slovak soldiers broke out in many Slovak cities.
After the declaration of war on the Soviet Union in 1941, an army of 60,000 men was sent to the Eastern Front. Up to the spring of 1943 the reliability of the Slovak units had been satisfactory in German eyes; during the whole of 1942 no more than 210 Slovak soldiers had defected to the Soviet Army or the partisans. From the beginning of 1943, however, after the Stalingrad disaster , the number of Slovak defectors skyrocketed. After two mass desertions by Slovak troops to the Soviets and Ukrainian partisans in October 1943, the Slovak units proved unusable for further combat operations on the German Eastern Front.
The example of the Slovak soldiers on the Eastern Front, but above all the overall military-political situation and the situation in Slovakia, led to a deep differentiation among the cadre officers of the Slovak army. Outwardly, the Slovak army was still loyal to the Tiso government, but it was riddled with dissatisfied officers and soldiers. The most active and influential resistance group within the army was formed by a group of four officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Ján Golian . In January 1944 he was transferred to the command of the field army in Banská Bystrica (German: Neusohl ), where he held the prominent position of chief of staff. This position within the Slovak army opened up great opportunities for Golian to form a conspiratorial network in the garrisons. Against this background, Golian was entrusted in March 1944 by exile President Beneš with the temporary management of military operations in Slovakia.
Immediately after Golian's appointment by Beneš, the illegal Slovak National Council took steps to win him over to their own platform. By establishing contact with the army and subordinating the pro-democratic officer group of Golian, the Slovak National Council finally prevailed over other opposition political groups. On April 27, 1944, after a meeting in Bratislava, two central institutions were created for the uprising: a "military council" at the Slovak National Council, to which Golian and another Slovak officer belonged, and a "military center" as the highest commanding body of an illegal insurgent army, whose commander was Lieutenant Colonel Golian.
Insurgency planning and diplomacy
After the establishment of the illegal military headquarters on April 27, 1944, the initiative for the preparations for the uprising passed completely from the Slovak National Council to the Slovak army. Since Golian had been tied to Banská Bystrica since January 1944, the command of the field army in Banská Bystrica came to the fore in the subsequent preparations for the uprising. In the months of May, June and July 1944, the military headquarters began to make all the necessary preparations for an armed uprising. The task was to fill the leading command posts and staff with reliable officers and to issue general guidelines for the units in the event of an uprising. It started to concentrate strong troop units in the central Slovak triangle Banská Bystrica - Brezno - Zvolen . It was an area that one believed they could hold in any case, but which was also ideally suited to carry out an unnoticed deployment for military action.
The Slovak associations were under German observation in both western and eastern Slovakia. The German military mission was based in Bratislava, and the so-called German protection zone with its main base at Malacky stretched to the north-west of it . Eastern Slovakia, on the other hand, had been declared an area of operations since August 1944 at the request of the Wehrmacht High Command , in which the Germans enjoyed the right to march freely. It so happened that mountainous central Slovakia became the glacis of the military conspiracy.
The Slovak Defense Minister Ferdinand Čatloš developed his own plan of overthrow almost in parallel with, but independently of, the efforts of the military headquarters to work out a military uprising plan. Due to the changed war situation, Čatloš had been considering a change of front since 1943, but he did not include President Tiso in his plans. In early 1944, Čatloš proposed the formation of an East Slovak Army, which would act as one of the pillars of the future revolution. Čatloš's proposal was approved by both the State Defense Council and the German leadership. By securing the north-eastern Slovak border with the domestic army, Čatloš wanted to prevent the occupation of this area by German units over which he had no influence and which would have blocked the passage of the Red Army in the Carpathian Mountains.
At the appropriate moment, Čatloš planned to overthrow the Tiso government, establish a military dictatorship and lead Slovakia to the Soviet side. In contrast to the Slovak National Council, he suggested that the future status of Slovakia should not be decided until after the war. Both the uprising plan of the military headquarters and Čatloš's plan of overthrow basically counted on the exploitation of the East Slovak Army to open the borders in the Carpathians and the passage of the Red Army into Slovak territory. The military headquarters' insurrection plan had been the subject of constant attention and technical support from the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry in London since July 1944, while Čatloš's plan was not politically tied to the government in exile (which Čatloš did not recognize) and remained in a narrow circle of people until the end of July 1944 Known to the initiated.
Apart from the two so-called front formations (1st Infantry Division in Romania and Construction Brigade in Italy), the Slovak army was in fact divided into three parts in April 1944. In western Slovakia, in Bratislava and the surrounding area, there were the remains of the Defense Ministry under General Čatloš, the Bratislava garrison with around 8,000 soldiers and other units with a strength of around 8,000 men, half of which were "military labor corps". In central Slovakia, in Banská Bystrica and the surrounding area, replacement and training units of approx. 14,000 men, plus 4,000 men from the "Military Labor Corps", were concentrated around the high command of the land forces under General Turanec. In Eastern Slovakia, the Eastern Slovak Army finally took up position, which comprised the two active infantry divisions No. 1 and No. 2 with 24,000 men. Equipped with weapons and equipment from the latest German production, these could be regarded as the elite of the Slovak armed forces.
It was particularly important to determine the time for the outbreak of the uprising. At the end of July 1944, the Soviet army had advanced in a narrow wedge as far as the Vistula near Warsaw, thus accelerating the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising on August 1st. The Soviets then did not advance further into Poland and thus enabled the Germans to put down the Warsaw Uprising. The Slovak National Council wanted to coordinate the uprising with the Soviet advance and therefore decided to send a delegation to the Soviet Union. The delegation, which consisted of Karol Šmidke and a Slovak officer, managed to land in Ukraine on August 4th by plane. She carried with her both the plan of the uprising of the military headquarters as well as the plan of overthrow of General Čatloš ("Čatloš Memorandum"), who had made the plane available to them and also wanted to contact the Soviets through the delegation. They were taken to the headquarters of the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front , General Ivan Efimovich Petrov , where they were first interrogated and then sent to Moscow for further interrogations. On September 5, they were allowed to return to Slovakia, but without any indication of Soviet operational plans or a promise to support the uprising.
The military headquarters continued its preparations for the uprising while waiting for the return of the two envoys and the arrival of the Soviet army. Under the pretext of "increased participation of the Slovak army in the fight against the Soviets", she was able to get the Tiso government to issue an ordinance that mobilized other age groups. Under the same pretext, some units of the army were tacitly transferred to the strategically important triangle of the uprising. Finally, the military headquarters transported war supplies, food and medicines to the defended triangle under the pretext of removing them from the areas exposed to the Allied bombing (especially Bratislava). By June 1944, central Slovakia had food supplies for a full three months, 1.3 million liters of gasoline in various storage centers and 3.54 billion Slovak crowns in the Banská Bystrica bank.
Disruptive factor partisan movement and worsening of the situation
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After the fiasco in the attempted coordination of the insurrection plan with Moscow, the situation in Slovakia itself became more complicated. This fact was also connected with the Soviets and the partisans they sent. The partisan movement in Slovakia took two forms - one domestic and one imported, the latter being clearly more important. The first domestic attempts to form armed groups in the forests were made as early as 1942, to which the Slovak communists in particular called for. The partisan associations formed in the mountains of central and northern Slovakia were made up of deserters from the Slovak army, escaped prisoners of war, persecuted Jews, and opponents of the Slovak and Carpathian government. However, partisanism did not take on a mass form in the first period, which was "victorious" for Germany and the Slovak regime, and the armed groups were isolated from the population. A real partisan movement did not develop in Slovakia until August 1944.
In May 1944, Klement Gottwald , the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Moscow, concluded an agreement with Nikita Khrushchev , then General Secretary of the Ukrainian Communists, according to which the partisan movement in Czechoslovakia was subordinate to the Ukrainian partisan movement, which was led from Kiev. Groups trained by the Soviets were dropped off as parachutists over Slovakia, and some partisans also entered the country through eastern Poland. The Ukrainian Partisan Command under Lieutenant Piotr A. Welitschko sent the first Soviet parachute formation to Slovakia on the night of July 25th to 26th, 1944 to take over the leadership of the Slovak partisan movement and to reinforce its cadres with experienced Soviet partisan fighters. With increasing activity, especially acts of sabotage and raids on police stations, the partisans found more and more influx. Their exact number is controversial among historians: Wolfgang Venohr assumes around 2000 partisans at the beginning of the uprising, the number of which increased to 7,000 through influx. Other historians, on the other hand, give 12,000 to 18,000 partisans as the maximum number.
The relationship between the partisans and the Slovak National Council was far from ideal. Despite repeated warnings from the Slovak National Council and the military headquarters that the Slovak army was preparing for a major uprising and needed all functioning communication routes for this, the partisans continued to destroy roads, railways and bridges. They also attacked Germans living in Slovakia, as well as people who were active in the Ludak party and state apparatus. The increasing partisan actions disrupted the coup preparations and drew the attention of the Slovak and German authorities to the center of the conspiracy in central Slovakia. Warnings by the Slovak National Council that such actions could lead to a German occupation of Slovakia and thus to a premature outbreak of the uprising were ignored by the partisans.
In addition to the partisan problem, there was also a tendency from mid-August that ever larger sections of the Slovak army not only sympathized with the liberation organization, but also defected to it. Although the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Turanec, tried to restore the government's authority with repressive measures on August 26, the step was taken too late, as the political leadership in Bratislava had long since lost the loyalty of the army. The activities of the partisans, often supported by the Soviet Union, and the increasingly unreliable Slovak army made Slovakia a factor of uncertainty within the German hegemonic sphere.
Since the precautions taken by the Slovak government against the partisans not only remained ineffective, but rather the resistance groups increased their actions against the German minority and the armed forces of the German Reich, the German ambassador in Bratislava, Hanns Ludin , was forced to send him by Wehrmacht units to fight the partisans. The military situation in all theaters of war initially did not allow the Wehrmacht to intervene and after the situation had temporarily calmed down, Ludin withdrew his request to send German troops on August 27, as the political situation no longer seemed to justify such a measure. As a result, an incident occurred on the night of August 27th to 28th in the central Slovak city of Martin , which escalated the tense situation and triggered the German intervention.
The riot
Incident of Martin and outbreak of the uprising
The successful transfer of Romania from the German to the Soviet side by the Romanian King Michael I on August 23 aroused consternation and fear in Berlin that the example of Romania might find imitators in the other German satellite states in East Central Europe. In Slovakia, Romania's change of front made a big impression, as it was the first time a satellite state in southeastern Europe had fallen away from Germany. On August 27, in Martin, Slovakia, an alliance of partisans under the Soviet partisan leader Velichko and the mutinous local garrison of the Slovak army, without the knowledge of the military headquarters, stopped a train with which the German military commission in Romania was returning to Berlin after the defection of Romania from Bucharest . The 22 German officers were arrested and all of them shot the next morning by the mutinying government troops on Velichko's orders.
Above all, the fact that the Slovak army was involved in the Martin incident, but also the increasing disloyalty of many units towards the government in Bratislava , set in motion a quick and tough reaction by the German Reich . The German Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop called on the German envoy Ludin to immediately persuade the Slovak government to give its official consent to the German invasion. Thereupon Ludin (again) arrived at President Tiso and more or less categorically demanded his approval of the German occupation, which Tiso agreed to after long hesitation. However, the Wehrmacht had already taken steps to intervene in Slovakia before the Slovak leadership had asked Berlin for military support. The intervention of German troops in Slovakia, which had been considered in the weeks before, has now been put into practice. Just 24 hours after Martin's incident, the first improvised Wehrmacht units moved into Slovakia.
An extremely complicated situation had arisen for Golian and his co-conspirators. They had no news whatsoever about the outcome of the Šmidke mission and were unaware of the attitude of the Soviet Union. In the more than three weeks that had passed since the arrival of the Šmidke delegation in the USSR, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London had also not heard a word from the Soviets about their position on the plans for a Slovak national uprising. Moscow was silent. Golian's efforts to postpone the day of the uprising until he had news from the Soviet Union and could coordinate his military measures with the Red Army were now all doomed to failure. In addition, there was the fact that by order of Hitler, the East Slovak Army was subordinated to the German Army Group Northern Ukraine on August 1, 1944 due to the acute danger of the Soviet advance - a scenario that was not expected at all in the original uprising planning. Even for Defense Minister Čatloš, carrying out the uprising according to his plans had become unrealistic since he was deposed as Commander-in-Chief of the Army on August 25.
On the evening of August 29th - only a few hours after the first German advance units had crossed the northeastern border of Slovakia - Defense Minister Čatloš, on the orders of President Tisos, read out his proclamation to the army and the population on the Bratislava radio, according to which the Slovak government should call the German armed forces to combat the Partisans called into the country and the Slovak army should not offer any resistance to the Germans . Forty-five minutes later, the military headquarters in Banská Bystrica telephoned all the garrisons scattered across Slovakia that they were resisting the Germans . The Slovak national uprising began in response to the invasion of the German occupation forces.
Initial situation and disarmament actions
In the first days of the uprising, the insurgents' area comprised around 22,000 km², over half of what was then Slovakia's territory and with a population of 1.7 million, 64% of the total population of Slovakia. On the recommendation of the London government in exile, the leadership of the insurgent army issued an order on August 30, according to which they declared their units to be an integral part of the Czechoslovak armed forces. On September 7, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain officially recognized this status. On August 30th, the military headquarters was transformed into the “Command of the Czechoslovak Army” ( Veliteľstvo československej armády , VČSA for short ). The Slovak troops, which formed the core of the armed uprising, were given the designation “Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia” ( Československá armáda na Slovensku , or ČSAS for short ). Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia ” (1. ČSAS) renamed. This army was regular from day one, had its command staff, regiments, battalions and companies, wore weapons and uniforms and obeyed international martial law.
The 1st Czechoslovak Army initially had 18,000 men, after the mobilization on September 5, 1944, their number rose to 47,000 and later to around 60,000. At its head was Lieutenant Colonel Ján Golian, who was promoted to colonel at the beginning of September and shortly afterwards to brigadier general as interim commander. The headquarters were in Banská Bystrica.
The German troops gradually marched into Slovakia with almost 50,000 men in the late summer of 1944, and the “sovereign” and “friendly” state became a theater of war. The country was divided into two independent military areas: while in the eastern part of the country the Army Group Northern Ukraine led the implementation of the action, the authority in the rest of the country lay with the "German General in Slovakia", who from September 1, 1944 with Gottlob Berger from SS was placed because the action fell into the area of "fighting partisans". Berger were initially almost 9,000 men available, summarized in combat groups newly set up for this mission . The first units came on August 29th, the combat groups Ohlen and Junck, which had about 3900 men and were combined to form the 178th Tatra Division on September 5th. Since September 1, the Schill combat group, more than 2,000 men, has been fighting in Slovakia, and in the first days of September the combat group of Major Otto Volkmann and the Wildner and Wittenmeyer combat groups from the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS operated on Slovak soil . At the end of the deployment, a ring of German troops had formed around the central Slovak insurrection area.
The Martin incident not only triggered the confrontation between the opponents too early and thus nullified any calculation of the conspirators, but above all ensured that the German side came into possession of the operational initiative from the start. As a result of the surprise effect, the German combat groups succeeded in almost completely disarming the Slovak units stationed in Eastern and Western Slovakia, which had hardly any resistance. The greatest initial success for the Germans was the quick disarmament of the best equipped and best trained Slovak soldiers of the East Slovak Army. In the original uprising plans, Golian and the Slovak National Council had assigned these units the main role. The disarmament of the eastern Slovak divisions, which had been prepared by the command of Army Group Northern Ukraine since August 27, took two days and was completed on August 31, 1944. Half of the total of 25,000 Slovak soldiers were disarmed and interned, some escaped and fled to their families or joined the partisans. Only about 2,000 soldiers reached the insurgent area in central Slovakia. Substantial stocks of weapons and military equipment, including artillery, fell into German hands. The Germans achieved another early victory in western Slovakia, as the strong garrisons of Bratislava and Nitra did not join the uprising. Only the military garrison of the western Slovak town of Trnava (Eng. Tyrnau ) ran over with 3,000 soldiers into the uprising area.
First defense of the insurgent army and Soviet offensive
After the initial successes, the German general in Slovakia was convinced that the “atonement” only needed four days to pacify the country in the sense of the “protective power”. Unaware of the actual situation, Berger believed that the raids and actions against the German armed forces were carried out exclusively by partisan groups. The attack by Kampfgruppe Ohlen, however, remained due to the stubborn Slovak resistance and the unfavorable terrain near Žilina ( Sillein ) before it reached the objective of the operation . This first Slovak defensive success had a positive effect on the fighting morale of the insurgents, so that the advance of all German units slowed down considerably and in some cases came to a complete standstill. While the advances of the battle group Ohlen firmly ran to the Slovak defense positions, the task force Mathias in the north and northeast was successful in Ruzomberok (dt. Rosenberg ) advance and threatened the important central Slovakian industrial center with his weapons factories. The battle group Schill operated successfully in Nitra -Tal where it north of the district town on September 5 Baťovany Topoľčany (dt. Topoltschan ) occupied before the Slovak opposition made a further advance impossible. The battle group of Army Group Northern Ukraine succeeded in taking Ružomberok one day later, so that the insurgents lost their indispensable arms factories. Especially in the eastern part of the uprising area, the military leadership in Banská Bystrica tried to build up a strong defensive barrier so as not to have to give up any space here. Because she hoped that a planned offensive of the Red Army on the Beskidy Front , which ran only 120 km northeast, would have quick success and lead to unification.
The Slovak National Council and the military headquarters were not aware of the changes in the Soviet strategic plans, according to which the Red Army should not advance from the north over the Carpathians into the central Danube basin, but from the south through Romania and the Danube valley. While the liberation of Slovakia was postponed to the final months of the war in Soviet war planning, the leadership of the Slovak insurgent army assumed that the Soviet invasion would take place in the summer or early autumn of 1944. Only after the political and military changes in Slovakia did the Red Army correct its operational planning. Although it continued its successful campaign in Romania and on the Balkan Peninsula, it opened its offensive on the Beskid Front earlier than intended. The attack, organized at short notice, however, came at the expense of military strength. The Eastern Carpathian operation of the Red Army lasted from September 8th to October 28th, 1944. Although the Red Army was only 40 km from the Slovak border at the beginning of the military operation, it only managed to reach Carpathian Ukraine and parts of eastern Slovakia by the end of October 1944 conquer, with losses of 21,000 fallen and 89,000 wounded soldiers.
The balance of the German “cleansing campaign” turned out to be rather meager in the first ten days, despite initial success. The main responsibility for this was carried by SS-Obergruppenführer Berger, who had completely misjudged the dimensions of the Slovak uprising and therefore tried to solve the problem with far too little force. But the German general's lack of conceptual warfare in Slovakia also contributed to the poor result. The German attack almost came to a standstill after two weeks due to the stabilizing Slovak defense front.
As the area of the insurgents shrank, warfare by partisans became more important. According to the plan of the military, the partisan units should provide effective support for the insurgents and the army, audibly by acting in the rear of the enemy. Some Slovak partisan groups had placed themselves under army command even before the outbreak of the uprising. Most of the partisan units, however, limited themselves to the absolutely necessary minimum in the support they gave to the army and pursued their own actions in accordance with the orders from the Ukrainian partisan headquarters in Kiev. Since the Slovak communists did not succeed in gaining control of the military, which was headed by non-Marxist officers, they tried to make up their own army from the partisan detachments. The conflict between the army and the partisans led to a crisis during the uprising, which the Slovak National Council tried to resolve on September 12 by establishing a "war council" to coordinate all the activities of the army and the partisans. The council, which included leading democrats and communists, was never able to completely resolve the conflict because of continued communist harassment.
Reorganization and territorial gains for the German troops
In the second phase of operations, which was characterized by successful defensive battles by the resistance associations, Gottlob Berger's units made little progress between September 8 and 19. In the east of the insurrectionary area, Army Group Northern Ukraine limited itself to a minimal defense of the front line, as combat groups Mathias and Rintelen were urgently needed to repel the Soviet offensive. Only in the south-west was the Schill combat group able to drive the front eastward.
On September 14th, SS-Obergruppenführer Berger was replaced by the general of the Waffen-SS Hermann Höfle because of his unsuccessfulness from the post of "German General in Slovakia" . With Höfle, a new stage of combat management began. After Berger had largely improvised and hardly coordinated the armed actions against the insurgents, Höfle had an operation plan drawn up for the first time, which primarily provided for a coordinated deployment of all German forces. After three weeks of fighting the liberation movement, the general intended to seal off the area of the uprising by means of a gapless containment ring and to act concentrically against the resistance. The Tatra division, which had meanwhile been reinforced by two battalions, now had sufficient combat strength to break through the Slovak defensive barrier near Žilina and to take Martin on September 21.
Instead of taking advantage of the attacking momentum of the Tatra division, Höfle stopped the formation to comb the hinterland of the Waag and Turz valleys for partisans. Since the partisans withdrew into the impassable Little Tatras , this action was quite unsuccessful. With his "purge", Höfle gave the Slovak insurgent army ten days to build a new defensive front. Only the 2nd Battalion of Kampfgruppe Schill managed to occupy the town of Handlová (German: Krickerhau ) almost without a fight on September 23 . In the southern section motion came only after three weeks again in the operation after the first battalion Schill Žarnovica (dt. Scharnowitz ) had taken and could make September 28, the contact with the reinforced battalion of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, that advanced from the direction of Nová Baňa (German: Königsberg ). On the other hand, the weak security forces of the Korück 531 east of Telgárt (German: Thiergarten ) suffered further setbacks when they again failed to withstand the onslaught of the insurgents and therefore fell back almost 15 km west of Spišská Nová Ves (German: Zipser Neudorf ).
Between September 20 and the beginning of October, the occupier was able to considerably improve its military situation, although the changed conduct of operations with changing focus of attack had proven its worth. At the end of September the tactical triangle Zvolen - Brezno -Banská Bystrica, the center of the Slovak uprising, was within reach of the German offensive forces and the area of the insurgents had reduced to 6,800 km² with 340,000 inhabitants. In view of the successful actions in the last days of September, Höfle planned a frontal attack on the core of the liberation movement that was only 25 km away from the German lines. The general ordered that the Division Tatra towards Kremnica (dt. Kremnitz ) and the battle group Schill direction Svätý Kríž should start the offensive. However, he weakened the division by withdrawing part of the forces to the battle group Schäfer. The strengthened SS unit received the order to advance from the north in the direction of Liptovská Osada . With his intention of attacking Banská Bystrica from three sides, Höfle believed that he could defeat the rebels in a short time. But the operation failed completely because the individual battle groups were too weak to overcome the massive Slovak defense. Although the Tatra division occupied Kremnica on October 6, the offensive remained an overall failure, so the general broke off the operation on October 8. The insurgents had once again succeeded in defending themselves against the German onslaught.
German final offensive and end of the uprising
In the meantime there had also been a change in leadership among the insurgents. On October 7th, after 40 days, Brigadier General Golian handed over command of the “1. Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia ”to Division General Rudolf Viest , who had flown in from London, and became his deputy. Under the pressure of the German occupation troops, the area of the rebels had shrunk to just under 7,000 km² with around 300,000 inhabitants by the first days of October. The Slovak insurgent army suffered heavy losses. Around 2,180 soldiers were killed, and thousands more were sidelined due to wounding, desertion, capture or overflow to the enemy. In mid-October the insurgent army still had around 36,000 soldiers, but only two-thirds of them were fully armed and operational. In addition, there were a few thousand partisans in the pocket and the partisans and soldiers outside the containment ring behind the German lines, who, however, hardly developed any military effectiveness. Almost 80% of the armored weapons had been destroyed by the Germans, and the Slovak artillery had lost well over half of its inventory.
In the period from October 10 to 17, fighting flattened on all fronts in central Slovakia. The Germans consolidated in the conquered areas and secured their rule and occupation troops. At the same time General Höfle drafted an operational plan for the final offensive. Since it had been shown that the existing formations were not sufficient to defeat the rebels in the mountainous and defensive terrain, the attacking forces had to be increased considerably. After the fall of the Horthy regime in Budapest and the establishment of the Arrow Cross government on October 16, the Germans were able to smuggle a considerable number of soldiers from Hungary into southern Slovakia. From this point on, the insurgents' situation deteriorated. Two new battle groups should contribute to the final decision. On October 16, the notorious SS Brigade Dirlewanger , which had already been deployed to suppress the Warsaw Uprising, arrived with 15,000 men in the north of the operational area. The 18th Panzer Grenadier Division of the SS "Horst Wessel" gathered on Hungarian territory in the southeast . The plan of operations stipulated that the German units should attack concentrically from all sides, with the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division of the SS intervening in the fighting from the neighboring country as a surprise element. With this, Höfle intended to leave the opponent no more options.
After the deployment had essentially been completed on October 17th, the start of the attack was scheduled for the following day. On October 18, the Combat Group Schill and the SS Brigade Dirlewanger opened the final offensive, whereby the Tatra division was only supposed to bind the enemy in its combat zone. Only one day later did the operation begin in the south with the 18th SS Division and the Combat Group Wittenmeier, which consisted of parts of the 14th SS Division and a reinforced army battalion. The security forces of the Korück 531, which had taken over the command in the command area of Eastern Slovakia on October 10, also intervened from the Betlanovce -Spišská Nova Ves area on the final offensive on October 19 and were able to reach the western border of the area within six days Bring the operational area under German control. The units in the south proceeded according to plan against the insurrection center in Banská Bystrica, which was captured on October 27 by Kampfgruppe Schill. With the conquest of Banská Bystrica, the uprising against the “protecting power” and the Tiso regime collapsed.
Although the uprising was crushed, the army did not surrender. On the night of October 27th to 28th, General Rudolf Viest gave his last order to the “1. Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia ”. In it he accepted the defeat of the insurgent army as an organized unit and ordered the soldiers to stop the regular resistance, to retreat into the mountains and to start partisan fighting.
Role of the Slovak collaboration regime
The Slovak government in Bratislava was unpleasantly surprised by the call of the Slovak National Uprising and shocked by the spontaneous reaction of the population. The entire apparatus of power collapsed before their eyes and the continued existence of the Slovak state was only possible under German supervision and with the assistance of National Socialist power structures. On September 5, 1944, a week after the outbreak of the uprising, a new government was installed in Slovakia. Štefan Tiso , a third cousin of President Jozef Tiso, replaced the previous Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and at the same time took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Justice. In addition to the government, President Jozef Tiso was one of the most important actors in Slovakia. In addition to the far-reaching powers enshrined in the 1939 constitution, Tiso enjoyed great popularity and authority among the population, which was based on the well-regarded amalgamation of state and church offices. Outwardly, Tiso knew how to underpin the independence of the Slovak state by performing representative tasks. This position meant that the Germans clung to him even after the outbreak of the uprising, although he was at no time one of the most radical representatives of the National Socialist ideology among Slovak politicians.
The Slovak government remained loyal to its “protective power” until the end of the war, but the Slovak army proved to be completely useless for the German troops advancing into Slovakia in the late summer of 1944. Even if the Slovak regime stood firmly behind the German commander, it could hardly support him with its own fighting troops. Two divisions of the Slovak Army were deployed outside Slovakia in 1944; two others, who were stationed in eastern Slovakia, were disarmed and seized by the Germans immediately after the outbreak of the uprising. In western and especially central Slovakia, a large part of the Slovak officers and soldiers joined the uprising. The Slovak army was disintegrated, and until the end of the war the Slovak regime did not want to succeed in replacing it with a newly formed army. The result of these efforts was the "Domobrana" (German Home Guard ), which in mid-September 1944 was able to fall back on an "army" of 6,900 soldiers loyal to the government, almost 20,000 men in November and one through the mobilization of older cohorts in January and March 1945 The workforce reached 41,000 soldiers. The core formed the garrisons that had remained loyal to the regime, above all the garrison of Nitra, which was the only one that was not disarmed after the outbreak of the uprising. However, the "Domobrana" had a rather symbolic character, since the lack of combat readiness, inadequate training and insufficient equipment of the army (more than two thirds of its men remained unarmed) ruled out a deployment at the front or in the fight against partisans from the outset, so that it could primarily only be used for fortification and repair work in the hinterland.
Since the Slovak army and, to a large extent, the Slovak police had failed, after the outbreak of the uprising the Hlinka Guard remained the only organization on whose cooperation the Tiso regime and the German authorities wanted to rely. Immediately after his appointment as the new head of the Hlinka Guard on September 7, 1944, Otomar Kubala began to reorganize the Guard. What was new, above all, was the formation of the standby units of the Hlinka Guard (Slovak: Pohotovostné oddiely Hlinkovej gardy , POHG for short), special armed units set up in larger cities and subordinated to the responsible district captains of the Hlinka Guard or their main commanders in Bratislava. A total of 38 POHG units were set up, in March 1945 5,867 Slovaks were serving in the POHG. The POHG were organized as military units, but - although they were under the judiciary of the army - were not part of the army organization. Their field companies (Slovak. Poľné roty ) wore German uniforms and collaborated directly with the German security police and the security service . A State Secretariat for security was created under the Defense Ministry, to which all security police bodies (State Security, Police, Gendarmerie, but also the Hlinka Guard) were subordinate. Otomar Kubala was also appointed as its boss on the instructions of the German commander.
Insurgent government and population
For sixty days, Banská Bystrica was the headquarters of the insurgent army and the center of political life and administration in liberated Slovakia. The rebellious Slovakia formed an independent administrative-state entity - the restored Czechoslovak Republic. The revolutionary Slovak National Council, which now had 13 members, was fully established on September 5th after the return of the Slovak communist Karol Šmidke from Moscow. Together with Vavro Šrobár , the representative of the bourgeois-democratic camp, he became one of the two chairmen of the Slovak National Council. The National Council and its organs had in principle the same number of members of the socialist bloc and the bourgeois-democratic bloc. The General Assembly of the Slovak National Council (consisting of 41 members from September 5th and 50 members from October) published decrees with the force of laws. The Slovak National Council took over legislative, state and executive power in Slovakia and repealed laws and decrees that contradicted the “republican-democratic spirit” (including all anti-Jewish laws). In return, the Slovak, German and Hungarian parties and organizations that formed the political system of the Slovak state were banned.
Politically, the bourgeois-democratic camp of the insurgents organized itself in the Democratic Party (DS), the socialist bloc in turn in the Communist Party of Slovakia. The most radical change with regard to the situation in the Slovak state, but also in the previous Czechoslovak Republic, was the coming to power of the Slovak communists, who until 1938 never received more than 10 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections. The uprising did not constitute a “communist coup” , since the representatives of the bourgeois camp were the more important component in the preparation and course of the uprising. Nevertheless, it was precisely during the uprising that the Slovak communists came to power for the first time, became a ruling party and assumed key political positions. The political system newly established through the Slovak National Council was independent of the Ludaken government in Bratislava, as well as of the exile centers in London and Moscow. Their political system was more democratic than that of the Ludaks, but political parties other than the Democrats and the Communists were not allowed. All educational institutions of the national minorities with the exception of elementary schools (elementary schools) were also closed.
The economy of the area controlled by the insurgents was primarily subordinate to military requirements. A key company was the Podbrezovské železiarne (= Podbrezov iron works), which produced two months without interruption for the insurgents, mainly grenade launchers, anti-tank barriers made of steel, etc. The railway works in Zvolen, which managed to build three armored trains in record time, were also important . The branch of the Slovak National Bank in Banská Bystrica took over the financial security of the uprising area, the rest of the economic and social life was subject to the individual commissioners (ministers) of the Slovak National Council. In addition to the requirements of the army, it was also necessary to serve the civilian sector. In terms of infrastructure, the roads were decisive here, with railway lines also being used for the civil sector. In the area of supply, a system of food stamps applied in the uprising area, as in the Slovak state .
The question of information, or in the broader sense of propaganda, was also important. The most important role was played by the insurgent radio, which began its activity on August 30, 1944 as Slobodný slovenský vysielač (= Free Slovak Radio) in Banská Bystrica and served the population of Central Slovakia as a means of mobilization, organization and information. During the uprising, BBC also broadcast in Czech and Slovak for Czechoslovakia and the Moscow radio for Czechoslovakia, organized by the Moscow leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia . In addition, 20 to 30 newspapers and magazines appeared more or less regularly in the insurrectionary area, and the theaters and cinemas typical of peacetime also functioned.
On both sides, the resistance struggle was repeatedly understood not only as a political but also as a denominational struggle “of the Lutherans against the Catholics” . During the existence of the Slovak state, the majority of Catholic dignitaries were loyal to the new regime, and several also worked in its highest political and legislative structures. After the outbreak of the uprising, the Catholic priests within the area of the uprising were identified and persecuted as enemies of the renewed Czechoslovak Republic, and some were also executed. The situation was diametrically different for the Protestant Church, which did not identify with the Ludaken regime and took a negative attitude towards it. During the preparation and creation of the political resistance organization, Evangelicals took over its leading positions, while practicing Catholics were practically non-existent in the Slovak National Council. Later, dozens of evangelical pastors and bishops joined the uprising - the uprising included the most evangelical areas of Turiec , Liptov and Banská Bystrica. Most of the Protestant pastors were active in the field mission of the 1st Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia during the uprising. To speak of an "evangelical uprising" would still be incorrect, as the members of the insurgent army - that is, the decisive force of the uprising - were mostly Catholics.
Allied behavior
For the uprising to be carried out successfully, it was assumed that the Allies would support it quickly and effectively. The Allies, however, took an ambivalent attitude towards the Slovak popular uprising. The Western Allies showed their political sympathies for the uprising, but were not very interested in it from a military point of view, as their armies had no intention of conducting operations in East Central Europe. On the other hand, the Soviets were interested in the insurrection from a military point of view, since it could facilitate the advance of the Soviet army to the west. From a political point of view, however, they viewed the uprising with suspicion because its ruling class were communists and democrats, whereas from a Marxist point of view the democrats were hostile “bourgeois nationalists”. Wolfgang Venohr summarizes the Allied support for the Slovak national uprising as "just as insignificant and inadequate as in the case of the Warsaw uprising".
On August 31, 1944, Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak government in exile, personally addressed the Allied representatives in London and asked them to support the Slovak insurgents. He asked the representatives of Great Britain and the United States that the Allies bomb the German operational targets in Slovakia and, secondly, that the Allies issue a statement granting the domestic Czechoslovak armed forces the rights of combatants so that the insurgents would be protected by the Geneva Convention would. On September 7, the US State Department issued a statement admitting the Slovak insurgents to "portray armed forces fighting the Germans" and warning Germans not to violate "the rules of war" in the form of reprisals against them. The UK Foreign Office made a similar statement.
The British and American command hesitated to comply with Masaryk's request to provide military support to the Slovaks. British and American air forces had already bombed certain targets in Slovakia and had provided assistance to the Warsaw Uprising, which was further from their base in Italy than Slovakia. They also landed twice in Banska Bystrica to evacuate Allied pilots who had found shelter over the area occupied by the Germans. Nonetheless, on September 22nd, the US General Staff decided not to support the Slovaks on the grounds that "this would not be a reasonably feasible operation for the US and British Air Forces". The Americans' reluctance to face the Slovak uprising was due to the often-voiced fear of the chairman of the US General Staff that Western interference in Eastern Europe might jeopardize Soviet support in the Pacific.
The Soviet government never responded to Britain's request, even though it did provide limited aid to the Slovak insurgents. On September 22nd, somewhat belatedly, the Soviet government added a declaration of their own to the declarations of the United States and Great Britain, which "granted the united resistance forces on Czechoslovak territory the right of a belligerent state with all the consequences thereof". Before that, the Soviet command gave the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, which carried out joint operations with the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Soviet armed forces, the order to attempt a breakthrough through the Dukla Pass in the Carpathian Mountains and to establish links with the Slovak insurgents. When the Czechoslovak army reached the pass on September 14, it was no longer guarded by the Slovak army, but by the Germans. The Czechoslovak and Soviet forces were only able to take it on October 6th after major losses.
As a direct support of the Slovak uprising, the Soviet command sent the 1st Czechoslovak Air Force with 21 fighter planes, which was of great help. The Soviet command also dispatched the 2nd Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade, which comprised around 2000 well-trained and well-equipped men. But they only gradually arrived over the course of several weeks. As a result, they could not take part in the fight as a unit. The Soviets also transmitted several smaller weapons and 150 anti-tank guns, but these were ineffective against the German heavy and medium tanks.
Military strategic importance of the uprising
When the Slovak National Uprising began on August 29, 1944, the event threatened not only the Slovak collaboration regime under Tiso, but also the hegemony of National Socialist Germany in East Central Europe. The possibility could not be ruled out that the uprising could pose a threat to the German defensive front between the Vistula and the Southern Carpathians. In the summer of 1944, the Axis powers had completely lost military initiative on the Eastern Front and had been put on the defensive by the Red Army. In the process, the Wehrmacht had lost so much substance by the summer of 1944 that it was hardly able to maintain the connection with the front. At this stage of the war, two factors in particular had an impact on the Axis' operational capacity to act. On the one hand, the invasion of the Anglo-American allies in northern France on June 6th had created a new focal point in the west of German dominion and, on the other hand, the Soviet summer offensive, which was opened in mid-June in the front section of Army Group Center , worsened the military situation of the Third Reich so seriously that the Wehrmacht was at the mercy of the superior forces of the anti-Hitler coalition even more than before.
Therefore, the German historian Klaus Schönherr states that although the Slovak National Uprising at first glance gives the impression that the event was an isolated event behind the German front, on closer inspection the uprising nevertheless turns out to be a factor , which significantly influenced the military situation as well as the operational processes on the south wing of the Eastern Front. The politico-military events in Slovakia caused the military leadership of the USSR to change their operational intentions considerably and to adapt them to the new circumstances. The Red Army wanted to use the national military resistance to bring down the cornerstone of the German front. Moscow intended to occupy Hungary and to advance directly into the southern parts of the "Greater German Reich". As a result of the revised operational planning of the Red Army, the Wehrmacht felt compelled not only to repel the Soviet-Romanian offensive in Transylvania, but also to fully resume defense in the Beskids after a brief period of rest. Ultimately, the Wehrmacht and the Hungarian ally still had the substance both to suppress the uprising in central Slovakia and to repel the Soviet goal of encircling and destroying parts of Army Group A and South .
From a military point of view, the main significance of the uprising was that it disrupted the cohesive, unified German front. From the outbreak of the uprising until the end of the war, Slovakia ceased to be a safe hinterland for the German army on the Eastern Front. The German communications system was interrupted behind the lines of the front. Slovakia was no longer a convenient supply route or a safe haven for the German armed forces. The German troops, which were urgently needed elsewhere to fight the Allies, were detained in Slovakia to fight the insurgents and the partisans. The German plans to use the Slovak army in the war were thwarted. After all, the Germans suffered heavy losses in human life and material while fighting the insurgents and partisans. Nevertheless, the military significance of the uprising remained small in the end. The Wehrmacht withdrew formations from other fronts only to disarm the two Slovak divisions in eastern Slovakia. Otherwise, reserve and replacement units, which were in the process of being set up or being set up again after a front-line deployment, were mainly used for counterinsurgency.
The German ethnic group and war crimes of the insurgents
According to the results of the census carried out in December 1940, there were 130 192 Slovak citizens living in Slovakia who professed their German nationality. Their ancestors had immigrated to what was then the Kingdom of Hungary since the 12th century and had mostly lived in the following three settlement areas since the 19th century: in Bratislava (before 1918 Pressburg ) and the surrounding area in western Slovakia, in Hauerland in central Slovakia and in Spiš in the Eastern Slovakia. After the establishment of the Slovak state, they were given extensive rights as a national minority under the Slovak constitution.
The Germans became politically active in the Slovak state primarily through the German Party (DP) formed in 1938 . It was headed by Franz Karmasin , who was also appointed State Secretary of the newly established State Secretariat for matters relating to the German ethnic group. Specifically, the DP had the task of politically and militarily educating the Germans included in the party on the model of the Reich German NSDAP , to promote the economic and cultural life of the Germans living in Slovakia and to ensure that they were fully equal citizens treated and enjoy the same rights as the Slovaks. In autumn 1941 the DP had 60,997 members and thus included almost half of the Slovak citizens of German nationality . The German military organization was the Freiwillige Schutzstaffel (FS), which had a total of 7,818 members in mid-1944 and was mostly charged with guard duties, but often also took part in various "security measures", e.g. B. the arrests of Jews. On September 2, 1944, the German Homeland Security was set up in Slovakia by order of the German Commander . All members of the German ethnic group between the ages of 16 and 50 who were capable of military service were to be recorded by the SS Einsatzkommando Slovakia and initially deployed as local defense in closed settlement areas. According to a list from January 1945, the German Homeland Security had a total of 8,116 members.
Numerous crimes against the German minority occurred in the liberated area controlled by insurgents. The number of ethnic Germans killed in Slovakia cannot be precisely determined to this day. It is believed that partisans and insurgents murdered between 1,000 and 1,500 people in their actions against the civilian population, the vast majority of whom were of German nationality. Most of the crimes against ethnic Germans were committed shortly after the outbreak of the uprising in central Slovakia, in the Hauerland region. Insurgents and partisans exercised control in this area for more than a month and mostly targeted the German civilian population. In an order from the illegal military headquarters on August 28, 1944, it was stated that after the uprising was declared, all native Germans and their families should be interned in barracks immediately or liquidated in the event of resistance. Ethnic Germans were murdered in several places in central Slovakia in the late summer of 1944 , partly because they were committed to the interests of the Reich, but partly only because they belonged to the German minority.
The largest mass shooting took place on September 21 near the community of Sklené (Eng. Glaserhau ) (see also the Glaserhau massacre ) . On the night of September 17, the village, in which almost 90 percent of the population professed their German nationality, was defeated by around 250 partisans from the “1. Czechoslovak Partisan Brigade Josef W. Stalin ”occupied. On the night of September 21st, these raids conducted house searches and enlisted approximately 300 men between the ages of 16 and 60 in the local community school. From there, most of them were taken to the train station, under the pretext of doing digging work. After a journey of about two kilometers the train stopped. The prisoners had to get out and were shot by the partisans. A total of 187 men were murdered in this way and another 62 were taken to the internment camp in Slovenská Ľupča . Other shootings of ethnic Germans by partisans and insurgents took place in Handlová (German: Kickerhau , approx. 80 murdered) and other places in the Hauerland.
In autumn 1944 the German leadership began preparing for a total evacuation of the Germans from Slovakia in view of the advance of the Red Army. It has not yet been possible to determine the exact number of ethnic Germans who were evacuated; the figures vary between 70,000 and 120,000 evacuees. A total of two thirds of the ethnic Germans living in Slovakia were probably captured by the evacuation. After the war, some of them returned to Slovakia, but were then expelled from Czechoslovakia together with the rest of them in 1946 as part of the resettlement campaigns . In the 1950 census, only 5 179 people in Slovakia claimed to be German. In this regard, the Third Reich and the Slovak state, which existed for six years, effectively meant the end of the coexistence of Germans and Slovaks in this area that had existed since the Middle Ages.
Participation of Jews in the uprising
When the uprising broke out in August 1944, it is estimated that up to 25,000 Jews were still living on Slovak territory. Most of them had a work permit from one of the Slovak ministries as indispensable workers, while the Jews baptized before March 14, 1939 (approx. 3,200) and those living in mixed marriages (approx. 1,000) mostly had a special permit from the President. However, some of them also lived unannounced in Slovakia.
Jews fought as soldiers and officers of the insurgent army and as members of the partisan units on all fronts of the uprising. In the fights u. a. a unit composed exclusively of Jews, which was recruited from 250 combat-capable former internees from the Nováky concentration camp . Your partisan unit ("Nováky Group") became part of the 4th tactical group of the insurgent army. A special position among the Jewish fighters who took part in the Slovak popular uprising was held by the group of four from the British military mission in Banská Bystrica, which parachuted to the area of the uprising. All of them had previously lived in what was then Palestine and completed parachute courses. Immediately after the outbreak of the uprising, all four volunteered to join the military commission that the British High Command intended to send to Slovakia. The mission's task was to mediate contact between the British Army Command and the high command of the rebellious Slovakia. After the German troops occupied the center of the uprising, the Palestinian-Jewish parachute soldiers withdrew into the mountains. Three of the four died as a result of the uprising.
The majority of the Jewish partisans fought in various partisan units - Jewish names were found in 32 of the 46 larger partisan units. The total number determined so far is 1,566 Jewish participants, 1,397 men and 169 women. This means that of the total of around 16,000 partisans, around 10% were Jews, and up to 6.4% of the Jewish population remaining in Slovakia - mostly older due to the previous deportations - took part in the uprising. This means that the percentage of Jews who decided in favor of the uprising was greater than the percentage of Slovak fighters in the total population. 269 Jewish partisans fell in combat or died as a result of the fighting, which corresponds to 17% of all fighting Jews. 166 Jewish participants in the uprising received the award of the Order of the SNP 1st and 2nd class. This means that the participation of Jews in the anti-fascist struggle in Slovakia is at the forefront of Jewish participation in the European resistance movement, not only in terms of numbers, but also in relation to the intensity of their participation.
consequences
German occupation regime and war crimes
At the latest with the beginning of the uprising, the Tiso regime had finally lost support in its own country and had become completely dependent on the German Reich. In the period that followed, SS troops, together with Slovak associations and the “Heimatschutz” recruited from the German population group in Slovakia, brutally attacked partisans and civilians. Retaliation against the insurgents captured and “punitive action” against civilians in the former riot areas increased the number of victims after the uprising ended. Public executions, mass shootings, deportations to extermination and concentration camps, and the burning of communities and villages were now part of everyday life in Slovakia. Most of the actions were organized by Einsatzgruppe H, which was sent to Slovakia shortly after the outbreak of the uprising, and were often carried out with the assistance of locals. The victims were mainly Jews, but also numerous Roma, as well as arrested partisans and insurgents or their supporters. In total, around 30,000 Slovak citizens were deported to German prisoner, labor, internment and concentration camps (around two thirds to prisoner and labor camps).
The places with the most mass shootings were Kremnička (743 victims, 280 of whom were women and 99 children) and Nemecká (at least 400 victims), the shootings being organized by Einsatzkommando 14 of Einsatzgruppe H under Obersturmführer Herbert Deffner and with the cooperation of a troop from the standby units Hlinka Guard were carried out. An important task of Einsatzgruppe H was to arrest the military leaders of the uprising, Generals Viest and Golian. After the occupation of Banská Bystrica on October 27th, they withdrew to the Donovaly mountain pass and reached the village of Pohronský Bukovec , where they were arrested on November 3rd by members of Einsatzkommando 14. Both generals were interrogated in Bratislava and then brought to Berlin on November 9th. There is still no clear evidence of the generals' further fate, but according to the historian Šindelářová, everything indicates that they were shot in the Flossenbürg concentration camp in February 1945 .
In the course of the counter-insurgency, armed forces units and Einsatzgruppen also initiated extensive looting operations without taking into account the artificially maintained apparent sovereignty of the Slovak state. Despite protests from Slovak authorities, these were also extended to non-insurgent areas in Slovakia. At the end of December 1944, a German “economic representative” was appointed, according to which all raw material and food reserves were confiscated and, after the workforce, the industrial plants were also subjected to the full power of the Reich organs. Hoensch (1994) says: "After the national uprising, Slovakia only retained its 'sovereign' facade for reasons of camouflage and was already viewed and treated internally as an 'internal problem'."
Persecution of the Jews and the Holocaust
The uprising that broke out at the end of August 1944 was used by the German leadership as an opportunity to complete the extermination of the Jewish population in Slovakia. In contrast to the deportations in 1942, this time the action was organized and carried out almost exclusively by German authorities from the start. No protection letter was recognized anymore. The fact remains that the highest Slovak authorities had no intention of continuing the deportations of Jews, they even tried to prevent them. Nevertheless, at this point in time they were still anti-Semitic because they did not want to take note of the real cause of the uprising as a general and open expression of rejection of the regime. On the question of the cause of the uprising and the decisive part of the Jews in its preparation, outbreak and course, the Slovak and German government circles were of one mind.
The main role in the now proclaimed radical solution to the “Jewish question” was undoubtedly played by Einsatzgruppe H under the command of Josef Witiska . In practice, their activity meant the arrest of Jews and their subsequent deportation from Slovakia or their murder on Slovak soil. The actions began immediately after the arrival of Einsatzgruppe H or their first two Einsatzkommandos 13 and 14. There were larger raids with numerous arrested Jews in the first days of September, especially in Topoľčany and Trenčín, the largest raid against Jews was in the Slovakian region at the end of September 1944 Capital carried out, at which 1,600 Jews were arrested. The arrests were usually carried out by members of Einsatzgruppe H, often with the support of Slovaks or ethnic Germans. This was followed by the transferring of those arrested to the nearest prison, where they were registered and in some cases (under torture) interrogated in order to find out from them the whereabouts of other hidden Jews.
The majority of the arrested Jews were then transferred to the Sereď concentration camp. The place near Trnava already served as a concentration camp during the deportations in 1942 and after their completion in September 1942 until the end of August 1944 as a labor camp for up to 1,200 Jews and was taken over by German authorities in the first days of September (immediately after the German invasion except for 15 remaining Jews all fled from the camp). Hauptsturmführer Alois Brunner , one of Adolf Eichmann's most important employees in carrying out the genocide of the Slovakian Jews, was ordered to organize the subsequent transport of the Jews from Sereď to the extermination camps . After his arrival in Sereď, the deportations from Slovakia were resumed immediately and were to continue for the next six months until the end of March 1945. By the end of the war (in addition to the approximately 58,000 deportees from 1942), more than 14,000 Jews had been deported or murdered on Slovak territory.
Thanks to the help of fellow Slovak citizens, around 10,000 Jews, some of whom fought in the armed uprising, were saved in this second phase. In terms of their number, the Slovaks are among the most frequent recipients of the Israeli award Righteous Among the Nations , which the State of Israel awards for the salvation of Jews. Nonetheless, the “solution to the Jewish question” in the Second World War, which resulted in the genocide, actually ushered in the disintegration of the closed Jewish community in Slovakia. The waves of emigration in 1945, 1948 and 1968 then brought their definitive end.
Number of victims and war damage
Estimates of the total number of soldiers and partisans killed by the rebels and the fallen German soldiers from the beginning of the uprising up to the liberation assume around 7500 soldiers and 2500 partisans, whereby the Slovak rebels lost around 3000 men during the national uprising (mostly soldiers but also Partisans) and about 1,000 others died in captivity. Through the research work of Slovak historians, around 1500 victims have so far been proven. According to the historian Martin Lacko (2008), the number of German soldiers who perished in the uprising has not yet been quantified objectively. In an anthology published in 1985 in socialist Czechoslovakia on the history of the Slovak National Uprising, the authors give the following German casualties: 4,200 fallen soldiers, 5,000 injured and 300 prisoners.
Information on the number of victims as a result of the National Socialist occupation policy in Slovakia from September 1944 to March 1945 mostly fluctuated between 4,000 and 5,000 people, around 2,000 of whom were Jews. In its publication published in 2009, the Museum of the Slovak National Uprising (Múzeum SNP) assumes that from September 1944 to the end of April 1945 a total of 5,305 people were murdered in 211 mass graves. 102 villages and communities were completely or partially burned down.
In addition, the German occupation forces destroyed or confiscated 800 motorized vehicles and 267 aircraft. The total damage incurred in Slovakia during the uprising and the passage through the front was estimated at around 114 billion crowns after the war. Roads, bridges and rails were destroyed. Of the original 700 locomotives, only 22 remained. The majority of the tunnels and railroad bridges were buried or destroyed, and road communications had a similar experience: around 1,500 bridges were destroyed and another 500 damaged.
Significance for the political position of Slovakia after 1945
The importance of the Slovak National Uprising was less on a military than on a political and moral level. Due to the defeat of the uprising, the political expectations of the uprising politicians were only partially fulfilled. With the realization of the uprising they were able to free Slovakia from the burden of the previous collaboration with the Third Reich, gained significant influence and their political views had to be taken note of in London as well as in Moscow. Nevertheless, they were completely dependent on external forces for the liberation, which significantly worsened their position for the post-war era. In the liberated Slovak territory, which was gradually handed over to the civil administration by the Red Army, the Slovak National Council was in fact able to retain its monopoly of power. Only after the new Czechoslovak government had been fully established in Prague was there a gradual dismantling of all elements of national-political self-government that the Slovaks had achieved through the uprising against Czech politics. The political goals of the bourgeois democrats and communists involved in the uprising were not taken into account in the post-war period. The democrats only managed to protect Slovakia from a communist regime until February 1948. The Slovak communists fared not much better, the majority of whom ended up in communist prisons as part of the internal party purges of the 1950s. Nonetheless, the uprising, with its struggle for political freedom and national self-government, gave Slovakia ideals that it proudly acknowledged after 1989 and still does.
Legal processing
The Slovak state ceased to exist after six years, but in the first years of the re-established republic there were areas that belonged exclusively to the competence of the Slovak National Council, the legislative body of the autonomous administration in Slovakia, and thus to the decision-making power of the Prague central government were withdrawn. One of these areas has been the prosecution of crimes committed since 1938. This was based on the relevant agreements of the Allies, which had been concluded during the war or shortly afterwards. The decree drawn up by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London with the provisions for the prosecution of Nazi and war criminals was rejected by the Slovak National Council, which ultimately led to two different norms being followed in this sphere in Czechoslovakia. In the western part of the republic, the basic norm was the so-called great retribution decree of June 19, 1945, in Slovakia the decree of the Slovak National Council No. 33/1945, which came into force a month earlier.
The following picture emerges regarding the 100 SS leaders of Einsatzgruppe H investigated in the study by the Czech historian Lenka Šindelářová: A total of five SS leaders were convicted by the Czech people's courts. However, none of them were held accountable for the crimes committed in Slovakia - all of them had to answer for their previous activities in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia . Three death sentences and two imprisonment terms of five and twelve years were pronounced. Only one of the 100 SS leaders had to stand trial in Slovakia. Others were investigated, but the results were insufficient to bring the accused to trial. In the Federal Republic not a single SS leader of the Einsatzgruppe H was convicted for his activity in Slovakia. Nevertheless, some of them had to answer for their actions in a German court during the war and in some cases even served a prison term. A total of ten SS leaders of Einsatzgruppe H were convicted in the Federal Republic of homicidal crimes that were committed outside of Slovakia. In addition to Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic, members of Einsatzgruppe H were also brought to justice in other countries and in some cases were convicted with final and absolute judgment. The death penalty was imposed and then carried out on four commanders.
However, other people who are more or less related to the activities of Einsatzgruppe H were finally convicted by the Slovak people's courts. On December 3, 1947, the former German envoy in Bratislava, Hanns Elard Ludin , and the German commander in Slovakia, Hermann Höfle, were sentenced to death by hanging by the National Court in Bratislava . Both were found guilty on a total of 27 counts, the main crimes of which were their involvement in “political, economic and other oppression of the Slovak people. Höfle fought with the German army on the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic against the Red Army, against other Allied armies, the Slovak National Uprising and the partisans in Slovakia; both were in the service of National Socialist Germany, gave orders and participated in the deportation of Slovak citizens abroad ”. The death penalty was carried out on December 9, 1947. On February 27, 1948, the “Commissioner for Jewish Affairs” for Slovakia, Dieter Wisliceny , was also executed in Bratislava. The first German commander, Gottlob Berger, on the other hand, could not be seized by the Czechoslovak authorities.
Another trial before the National Court in Bratislava, namely that of the former President of the Slovak State, Jozef Tiso, caused a greater stir. The former Slovak Interior Minister Alexander Mach and the former Interior and Foreign Minister Ferdinand Ďurčanský were also accused . The controversial judgment was passed on April 15, 1947. Tiso was sentenced to death by hanging and the death penalty was carried out three days later. The court also sentenced the absent Ďurčanský to death. Mach was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, the sentence was later reduced to 25 years and Mach was finally released early in 1968 thanks to an amnesty. In a further trial before the National Court on November 11, 1947, the other ministers who took up their posts on September 5, 1944 were sentenced to death: the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Štefan Tiso to 30 years, the Defense Minister Štefan Haššík to death in absentia by shooting, the Minister of Finance Mikuláš Pružinský for six years, the Minister for Economic Affairs Gejza Medrický for seven years, the Minister of Education and Public Enlightenment Aladár Kočíš for six years and the Minister for Transport and Public Works Ľudovít Lednár for four years. Furthermore, the chief of staff of the Hlinka Guard and State Secretary for Security, Otomar Kubala, was sentenced to death by the national court in August 1946 and then shot.
reception
Contemporary interpretations (1944–1945)
The representatives of the Slovak collaboration regime described the uprising in September and October 1944 as small, unprepared, meaningless and alien - as the work of "non-Slovak elements": the so-called Czechoslovaks , Czechs, Jews, Russian paratroopers and domestic traitors. For President Tiso and the leadership of the Hlinka party, the Slovak National Uprising was a purely communist-inspired conspiracy, to which a small portion of the Slovaks had allowed themselves to be misused by pretending to be false. They could not understand the rebellion against their authoritarian regime, actively supported by the Catholic Church, which, despite the war, had made the country relatively prosperous and had so far only demanded minor material sacrifices. The collapse of their state was a historical misunderstanding that they believed they had to attribute to the intervention of a foreign power and will, imported from Moscow and London. Sympathizers of the ruling Hlinka party and their ideological successors took and understand it to this day as a criminal, anti-national, Pro-Czech, pro-Bolshevik and anti-Christian or Lutheran conspiracy, as terrorism against state sovereignty and fratricidal civil war. After the suppression of the uprising, the German patron's need to proclaim a great victory prevailed - consequently the official Slovak press also qualified the “putsch” as an “uprising”.
Exile President Beneš wanted the Slovak National Uprising to be a confirmation of the loyalty to Czechoslovakia of the pre-war period. But his London government-in-exile also had to accept the self-confident demeanor of the Slovak national organs and after 1945 it proved difficult to return to pre-war centralism. The majority of the Slovak non-communist organizers and participants expected a new common democratic state of Slovaks and Czechs based on the principle of equality.
Assessment in the democratic post-war Czechoslovakia (1945-1948)
On the first anniversary of the SNP, which was celebrated on August 29, 1945, the foundation stone for the memorial to the victims of the uprising was laid with the participation of the Czechoslovakian President Beneš. The celebrations were intended to mobilize the reconstruction of Slovakia, which had been destroyed by war, within the framework of Czechoslovakia and, above all, to convey a message: The war had been "anti-fascist" and "fascists" were responsible for all atrocities and crimes. The following SNP anniversaries reflected the loss of competence of the Slovak national bodies in favor of the Prague institutions. The insurgents' ideas of the federalization of Czechoslovakia had not been implemented - not only because of the unpleasantness of the Czech side, but also because of the political conflict between Slovak democrats and communists, the latter becoming instruments for the renewal of centralism.
Reinterpretations in socialist Czechoslovakia (1948–1989)
After coming to power in February 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia gained the exclusive right to administer the “historical legacy” of the Slovak National Uprising. After the February revolution in 1948, the already insignificant powers of the Slovak National Council, once the highest insurgent organ from 1944, were reduced to a minimum of representative functions. Next, generals of the Czechoslovak army, insofar as they were Slovaks and former celebrities of the uprising, were released and imprisoned. All those uprising leaders who were non-communists were denounced, persecuted and excluded from any worship (such as Jozef Lettrich, Ján Ursiny and Matej Josko). This process was over as early as 1949. On the 5th anniversary of 1949 it was declared that the Communist Party had been the “only leading and organizational force of the uprising” and that Klement Gottwald had “prepared the uprising personally from Moscow and Kiev” and directed it from there. The Slovak National Uprising has strengthened the “brotherly bond between Czechs and Slovaks in a unified and indivisible state”.
According to the Slovak historian Elena Mannová (2011), the assessment of the uprising from 1949 to 1964 in real socialist Czechoslovakia was marked by a denationalization of the memory of the national uprising:
- “The construction of the 'socialist Czechoslovak people' began, who happily built socialism shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union. The initiative of those who already had experience in the fight against an undemocratic regime was not welcome. Political cleansing, intimidation and the political processes of the 1950s, which also affected many of the earlier insurgents, generally did not allow any divergent interpretations of the SNP to be expressed publicly. "
The historical propaganda defined the event as “communist”, internal party competitors were labeled as “bogus communists” and criminalized as traitors. Power struggles between the heads of the Slovak and Czech CPs took place as a variant of the campaign against so-called bourgeois nationalism that took place in all multi-ethnic communist states. After Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union, several leading Slovak communists were accused of (alleged) anti-Czech “bourgeois” nationalism. Demands for a federal order in Czechoslovakia, which had been made during the SNP, were seen as the first step towards the future secession of Slovakia.
On the IX. At the party congress of the Czechoslovak communists in 1950, the communist insurgent leaders of 1944 were also charged with “bourgeois nationalism”. On April 18, 1951, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the KSS, Husák and Novomeský were accused of having been prepared to adopt the position of class enemy during the uprising. Novomeský and Husák were tried, and in December 1952 the former chairman of the Slovak National Council from 1944, the former communist Karol Šmidke, died under unexplained circumstances. The German historian Wolfgang Venohr (1992) writes:
- “Afterwards it became clear that the fact and legacy of the Slovak uprising of 1944 did not fit the Czech Stalinist communists under Gottwald any more than did the Czech bourgeois forces under Beneš. In Prague it was quickly understood that the uprising was given far more than mere historical significance, that it would necessarily have to become the lining for all Slovakian emancipation and equality efforts if its tradition was not quickly brought under control and deformed in the desired sense. [...] Everything that appeared on the Czechoslovakian book market on the tenth anniversary of the uprising in 1954 was nothing but a misrepresentation of the most primitive execution [...]. "
Wolfgang Venohr summarizes the "new binding interpretation of the uprising" in the following six points:
- The uprising was a matter for the whole Slovak people under the leadership of the communists.
- The uprising was only to be seen as a part of the total Czechoslovak resistance.
- The preparation and implementation of the uprising was thanks to the communist Gottwald group in Moscow.
- The uprising was carried out militarily by the partisans and not by the Slovak army units.
- The uprising could never have taken place without the strong support of the Soviet Union.
- The uprising finally failed, thanks to the incompetence of the Slovak army officers and as a result of the intrigues of the Beneš clique in London.
Gustáv Husák and his comrades were released from prison in 1960, but were not morally rehabilitated until the end of 1963 - for fear that after a rehabilitation of the “Slovak bourgeois nationalists” their political program from the time of the SNP could be renewed. The new constitution of 1960 completely degraded the Slovak National Council and subordinated the administration directly to Prague. In addition, the Slovak double cross was replaced in the national coat of arms of the now Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) by a fire on the Kriváň mountain , which should symbolize the Slovak national uprising.
In the second half of the 1960s, the nationalization of the memory of the uprising could no longer be stopped. In 1968, previously hidden aspects of the uprising were freely discussed in the press. For the first time since 1948, representatives of the democratic resistance also appeared in the stands at local celebrations of the anniversary. The Soviet occupation and the subsequent so-called normalization put an end to plural remembering. After 1969, the only official interpretation of the uprising that was binding for historians was the “national communist” Gustáv Husák, which he presented in his 1964 memoir.
Rating in today's Slovakia
The overthrow of the communist monopoly of power brought the end of canonized memory and the possibility of free discussion. The professional world asked the question of the assessment of the uprising in April 1991 at the 10th session of the Slovak Historical Society (SHS), at which the majority accepted the concept of the dissident and historian Jozef Jablonický , as he published it in 1990 in book form under the title Povstanie legiend ( Eng . "Uprising without legends") has presented. It was about highlighting the importance of non-communist bourgeois resistance and the role of the army, while not denying the importance of communists and the partisan movement. The Slovak governments after 1989 and 1993 accepted the uprising as a state tradition. The 50th anniversary was celebrated in August 1994 with the participation of six presidents. The Slovak Army, which was formed in January 1993, acknowledged its tradition. Until 2005 the anniversary celebrations for the SNP took place only once every 5 years, since 2006 the commemorative celebrations have been held annually. Since then, the interest of foreign participants has also increased: while 15 foreign embassies took part in the celebrations in 2006, there were 27 in 2013.
At the same time, there were attempts in the 1990s to establish interpretations that view the Slovak state from 1939 to 1945 as the predecessor and reference value of today's Slovakia. These views, which are represented by Slovak historians in exile, among others, who regard the resistance as “anti-national” and describe the day the uprising began as a “disaster”, sparked heated controversy and were rejected by the majority of historians. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the SNP , the Slovak historian Ivan Kamenec stated in an interview on the relationship of the Slovak National Uprising to the national question of the Slovaks :
- “The uprising did not deny Slovak statehood, only the form of government that existed after 1939 - that is, a state with an undemocratic regime that came into being under pressure from Germany as a result of National Socialist aggression against Czechoslovakia. When the Slovak National Uprising broke out, it declared its goals and one of them was the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic, but not in the form that existed before Munich or after the Constitution of 1920, where it was called a 'Czechoslovak nation'. The uprising clearly demanded an equal position for Slovakia in the renewed republic. "
And the Slovak historian Martin Lacko (2008) also states that the military uprising grew out of local roots, was mainly prepared by local people (economists, generals, officers) and was therefore a primarily Slovak affair. Opinions that have emerged since October 1944 that it is an action by “the Czechs” or “the Jews” are misguided and in no way correspond to the truth. However, one can hardly understand the uprising as a nationwide enterprise in the literal sense, since of the 2.6 million Slovak citizens not even 80,000 armed and actively participated - the majority of them as part of the mobilization. The majority of the nation “did not join the uprising and show no real interest in it”. One could speak of a national aspect of the Slovak National Uprising in terms of its political and moral significance.
Symbolic references to the SNP are always latent in Slovak political discourse. Political problems developed from the issues of the uprising, which still shape the collective memory and the two competing historical cultures of the Slovaks to this day. The Slovak historian Elena Mannová writes about this (2011):
- “In a very simplistic way, the relationship between the SNP and the Slovak State 1939–1945 could be viewed as a dispute over the form of government (dictatorship versus democracy), or as a dispute over the constitutional order (Slovak nation versus statist Czechoslovakism). [...] As the people's liberation struggle against fascism, the SNP turned out to be a “useful past” (Jacques Rupnik) in the search for national and state identity in the 1960s and 1990s. The problem began as soon as the uprising was placed in the historical context, in connection with the previous period with which the Slovak state was to be judged. Many people shorten the ideal message of the SNP to the rejection of German Nazism, but do not feel the need for a critical examination of the local authoritarian-fascist regime of the Slovak state. "
Sociological studies show that for many citizens no difficulties arise from the idea of incompatible pasts - some of the respondents expressed themselves positively about both the SNP and the Tiso regime. In the mid-1990s, when society was strongly polarized due to the conflict between “nationalists” and “cosmopolitans”, the Slovak National Uprising was largely rated positively. In a representative survey from 2003, the Slovak National Uprising ranks fourth among the positive historical events after 1918. The most negatively rated event is the deportation of Jews from Slovakia. Among the most cherished holidays, that of the Slovak National Uprising also ranks fourth. The Tatra Mountains were named as the strongest symbol by 51%, followed by the Christian cross (25%), the Devín castle (23%), the Slovak double cross (21%) - and the monument of the Slovak National Uprising in Banská Bystrica (12th century) %) as the only symbol of contemporary history. In a representative survey conducted by the opinion research institute Focus on the Slovak National Uprising in 2016, a total of 82 percent of Slovaks stated that they consider it to be an event that “we should be proud of”. Conversely, 10 percent of Slovaks thought the uprising was an event they shouldn't be proud of.
The Slovak national uprising in today's Slovakia is criticized in particular by the right-wing extremist party ĽSNS , which praises leaders of the Slovak state collaborating with the Third Reich as national heroes. Her party leader Marian Kotleba raised black flags at the municipal office on August 29, 2015, as the regional president of the country Banská Bystrica, on the anniversary day of the Slovak National Uprising .
International reception
The Slovak historian Stanislav Mičev, head of the Museum of the Slovak National Uprising in Banská Bystrica, regretted in 2014 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary that although it took place almost at the same time as the Warsaw Uprising, more fighters were tied on both sides and the fighting zone was larger, the Slovak National Uprising a "largely forgotten uprising".
The Slovak uprising in autumn 1944 was presented in German historiography - as far as the event was even considered - essentially as a national resistance struggle against the German “protecting power” and the clerical-authoritarian regime Tiso. According to Klaus Schönherr, this approach basically does justice to the events, but in his opinion neglects the classification of the event in the context of the entire military situation in East-Central and Southeastern Europe. Because - according to Schönherr - the uprising could develop in connection with the attack of the Red Army on the Beskid Front a few days later into an eminent danger for the military and political position of the German Empire in south-eastern Europe. The operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which is still in the refresher phase, can only be explained under this aspect. The Red Army would neither have wanted to nor could have missed the chance of being able to form an oversized bridgehead in the rear of the Army Group of Northern and Southern Ukraine when it united with the insurgents.
The German historian Martin Zückert (2013) states that the Slovak national uprising in 1944 was the “largest uprising against the National Socialist system of rule and its allies in East Central Europe”, alongside the Warsaw uprising. According to the Czech historian Lenka Šindelářová (2013), the Slovak National Uprising was "one of the greatest events in Europe in the history of armed resistance against National Socialism and the regimes that collaborated with it".
The German publicist and historian Roland Schönfeld (2000) assesses the significance of the Slovak National Uprising and the dilemma of the Slovak statehood from 1939 to 1945 as follows:
- “Slovakia could not break free from the embrace of its protecting power Germany without giving up on itself. Your government and sections of the population were guilty of collaboration with a foreign, amoral and criminal state. The uprising proved to the victorious powers that large sections of the Slovak people did not agree with this diabolical pact and were ready to give their lives to liberate their homeland from the foreign-controlled, 'fascist' rule. The Slovaks were able to enter the Czechoslovak Republic, which was re-established after the war, as a people who had made their contribution in the struggle of the Allies against the enemy of the civilized world. "
The German historian Wolfgang Venohr (1992) also emphasizes:
- “In a flat historical sense, the Slovaks under Tiso were better off than ever before in their history; materially as well as culturally. It remains all the more admirable and memorable that it was the Slovaks who, in their bold uprising undertaking of 1944, re-established Czechoslovakia and thus achieved the greatest political and military achievement after Yugoslavia within the illegal resistance against fascism. Because while Romanians, Bulgarians and Finns only turned their weapons against the Germans when the Soviet armies were deep in their forests, the Slovak rose before the Soviet tanks rolled through the valleys and villages of his homeland. "
And in the international volume on Czechoslovak history published by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža in 1980, the historian Anna Josko writes on the Slovak national uprising:
- “František Palacký claimed in his 'History of the Czech People' that the peoples engrave their names in history in blood. The Slovak people, through their resistance to German National Socialism and fascism of Slovak origin, and through their struggle for democracy and freedom, described the new pages of their history with fire and blood. The Slovak popular uprising, in which the Slovak resistance movement culminated in World War II, became the culmination of modern Slovak history as well as the history of Czechoslovakia. Together with the Warsaw Uprising, it was the most outstanding act of the resistance movement in Europe. "
According to the Israeli historian Yeshayahu A. Jelinek (1976), the Slovak National Uprising "saved the honor of the nation" which, according to the will of its rulers, was destined to remain the last ally of the German Empire.
Wolfgang Venohr also looked into the question of whether one could really speak of a Slovak national uprising in the 1944 uprising in Slovakia :
- “The conspiracy from the summer of 1943 to the summer of 1944 was in fact only the business of a small Slovak elite, composed of two dozen people, the majority of whom were officers. And the uprising itself was sustained by 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers; not more. But the surprising experience of the small Slovak nation of having revolutionary personalities of stature, of having born a heroically fighting army out of their own bosom, and all of this independently, almost without outside help, made the fall of 1944 into a " National "matter."
The Czech historian Jan Rychlík (2012) states that although the Slovak National Uprising was of course joined by the rest of the Jews who remained in Slovakia, as well as Czechs and members of other peoples (total of 30 different nations), the uprising was actually Slovak, which testify to the number of Slovak soldiers and partisans. In addition, Rychlík also takes a position on the motif of the relationship between uprising and Slovak statehood, which is often discussed in Slovak historiography. Rychlík emphasizes that the Slovak National Uprising did not destroy the Slovak state, as the great powers had already decided on its dissolution. It is true that the Slovak National Uprising announced the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic, but this would not have meant a resignation to the Slovak statehood, which, on the contrary, should be preserved and further developed within the framework of Czechoslovakia.
The American historian John L. Ryder (2014) investigated the question of whether the Slovak national uprising could be referred to as an internal Slovak civil war. Ryder is based on the civil war definition of the American historian Alfred J. Rieber , who characterized the “civil war” as a “battle between two relatively balanced armies, led by two warring governments that lay claim to authority over the same area. Foreign policy is limited to men and equipment and this conflict does not grow into an international conflict. ”Based on this definition, Ryder considers the evidence of a civil war in Slovakia to be unfounded. It is true that both the Slovak National Council and the government of the Slovak state claimed legitimate authority within the state and threw large armies into the fighting. Nevertheless, the role of the Wehrmacht as the main force against the rebels is problematic, since only a few Slovaks (Domobrana, Hlinka-Garde) fought against the rebels and, without the intervention of Germany, there would have been no exaggerated internal conflict. In addition, the German armed forces had clearly not fought for the preservation of the Ludaken regime, but Slovakia had been occupied by a foreign army, which was only interested in the liquidation of a dangerous enemy behind its own lines.
The German historian Martin Zückert (2014) again dealt with the role of the partisan movement in Slovakia. Zückert states that both the leadership of the uprising in Banská Bystrica and the Soviet partisan staff ultimately planned their integration into the military organization, but that this transformation did not succeed because neither the partisans could be integrated into the regular combat structure, nor the uprising had his soldier permanently converted into partisan war.
research
While the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 and the ensuing war events in the Soviet Union have been intensively researched from a German perspective, the Slovak uprising in autumn 1944 and the defense of the Carpathian Passes by the Northern Ukraine Army Group in the same period are hardly of historical scholarship in the Federal Republic been observed. Klaus Schönherr provides a detailed German-language description of the fighting and a description of the individual units in the Slovak uprising. In his contribution The Suppression of the Slovak National Uprising in the Context of German Military Operations, autumn 1944 , he also takes a critical look at the study by Wolfgang Venohr , which has long been a standard work in German historical research , in which he points to numerous factual errors in his work indicates. In another article, Schönherr analyzes how the Slovak National Uprising influenced the military situation on the German-Hungarian defensive front between the Vistula and the Southern Carpathians.
Venohr's publication, which was published in 1969 under the title Uprising for Czechoslovakia. The Slovak struggle for freedom of 1944 and 1983 under the title Uprising in the Tatra Mountains. The fight for Slovakia 1939–1944 , which appeared in 1939–1944 , was also rejected by Tatjana Tönsmeyer as a “justification for the German armed forces”. In 2013, the publication Finale der Destruction was published as a dissertation by Lenka Šindelářová, in which the author, representing the crimes of the late Shoah, deals with Einsatzgruppe H, which came to Slovakia in late summer 1944 to fight the resistance.
The German historian Klaus Schönherr sees two factors as the cause of the low interest of German historiography in the uprising and the defensive battles of the Northern Ukraine Army Group in the Beskids as decisive. First and foremost, the incomplete files of the Army Group Northern Ukraine and the subordinate units as well as the command authorities in the rear operational area, which are in the holdings of the Federal Archives-Military Archives (Freiburg), would make more intensive research into this episode of the Second World War difficult. Second, the fighting in the summer / autumn of 1944 in the other theaters of war - such as in France, the Balkans and in the central and eastern section of the Eastern Front - had such a serious impact on the events in the final phase of the Second World War that the events in Slovakia were hardly noticed found.
Resistance research in Slovakia is very much focused on the national uprising. An important institution is the "Museum of the Slovak National Uprising" (Slovak: Múzeum slovenského národného povstania ) in Banská Bystrica. Under the editorial responsibility of Jan Julius Toth, Pavol Bosák and Milan Gajdoš, military-scientific representations of individual phases of the insurrection history of high technical quality were created, including works by Gajdoš on the 3rd Tactical Group and by Bosák on the 1st Tactical Group of the insurgent army. The unique volume of documents Slovenské národné povstanie by Vilem Prečan should also be emphasized . Research on the historiography of the Slovak National Uprising, for example by Jozef Jablonický, has pointed to the instrumentalization of events and thus demonstrated the political function of these interpretations. In recent years there has been an increasing attempt to place resistance and insurrection in the context of European history. Recent accounts of the uprising, which critically assessed the role of the partisans and the Soviet Union, caused controversy.
Processing in art, culture and society
The memory of the resistance against National Socialism and against its own authoritarian system of rule during the Second World War has great importance in Slovakia to this day, with the Slovak National Uprising at the center of the memory. Numerous cities have named a street or a square after him. The main squares of Banská Bystrica and Zvolen now bear the name of the SNP, as has the former market square in Bratislava since 1962. The SNP bridge , which was built as the city's second Danube bridge , is also located in Bratislava . The 769 km long Cesta hrdinov SNP (German Path of the Heroes of the SNP ) runs from the Devín Castle in Bratislava to the Duklapass as the most important main tourist route across Slovakia and is largely identical to the Slovak section of the European long-distance hiking trail E8 .
But even before 1989, for example, the uprising was a hot topic in Slovak film production, which produced over 100 films (mostly documentaries and around 40 feature films) for the anniversary celebrations. The director Paľo Bielik shot the excellent family legend “Vlčie diery” (Wolf's Holes) with great pathos and clearly from the perspective of the winner, but also with vividly drawn characters beyond black and white thinking and using documentary recordings directly from the uprising. The premiere was planned for the 4th anniversary of the SNP in August 1948, but some scenes had to be reworked due to ideological reservations: The film commission demanded the emphasis on “domestic treason” and the proportion of Soviet liberators. As everywhere in public life, there were also binding ideological dogmas in cinematography from 1949 to 1955: national motives were suppressed in connection with the ghosts of bourgeois nationalism. The subject of the uprising was not legalized until the second half of the 1950s. In the golden era of Slovak film from 1963 to 1970, various moral aspects of this event - including partisan robbery in Juraj Jakubisko's "Zbehovia a pútnici" (Deserters and Pilgrims, 1968) - were artistically processed and published. In the 1970s and 80s only images of the heroic partisan struggle against fascism that were loyal to the state made it to the cinema and television.
Similar to the film, the Slovak National Uprising before 1989 also had priority in the memorial scenery: of the more than 2,700 political monuments of contemporary history that existed in Slovakia in 1976, 1,333 commemorated the uprising. Most were built on the occasion of an anniversary. In November 1989 the largest square in Bratislava (SNP Square) became the stage for mass demonstrations, as a result of which the communist regime overthrew ( Velvet Revolution ). In 2018, after the murder of the Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak, the largest demonstrations in Slovakia since 1989 began again on the square of the SNP .
Movies
Films produced in Czechoslovakia via the SNP (selection):
- Vlčie diery (= The Wolf Holes, 1948)
- Bílá tma (= the white darkness, 1948)
- V hodine dvanástej (= exactly twelve o'clock, 1958)
- Kapitán Dabač (= Captain Dabac, 1959)
- Prerušená pieseň (= The Interrupted Song, 1960)
- Pieseň o sivom holubovi (= The song about the silver dove, 1961)
- Zbabělec (= The Coward, 1961)
- Polnočná omša (= The Midnight Mass, 1962)
- Bílá oblaka (= The white clouds, 1962)
- Organ (= The Organ, 1964)
- Námestie svätej Alžbety (= St. Elisabeth's Square, 1965)
- Zvony pre bosých (= The bells for the barefoot, 1965)
- Keby som mal pušku (= If I had a gun, 1971)
- V tieni vlkov (= In the shadow of the wolves, 1971)
- Horká zima (= The severe winter, 1973)
- Trofej neznámeho strelca (= The trophy of the unknown marksman, 1974)
- Rozhodnotie (= The Decision, 1975)
- Javorová fujarka (= The Maple Fujara, 1975)
- Each stříborný (= a silver man, 1976)
- Súkromná vojna (= The private war, 1978)
- Zlaté časy (= The golden times, 1978)
- Frontové divadlo (= The Front Theater, 1979)
- Povstalecká história (= The insurgent history, 1984)
- Čierny slnovrat (= The Black Solstice, 1984)
Films produced in present-day Slovakia through the SNP:
- Rozhovor s nepriateľom (= Conversation with the Enemy, 2006).
- Moje povstanie (= My uprising; short film 2014)
- Moje povstanie 2 (= Mein Aufstand 2; feature film 2019, online )
Younger documentaries
- Príbehy z Kališťa (= Stories from Kalište), director: Drahomíra Kyslanová, Slovakia 2014, duration: 52 minutes, language: Slovak
- Neznámí hrdinovia (= Unknown Heroes), director: Dušan Hudec, Slovakia 2014, duration: 52 minutes, language: Slovak
Picture gallery
In red the Cesta hrdinov SNP (= Path of the Heroes of the SNP), the most important tourist route in Slovakia
The bridge of the SNP in Bratislava
Large view of a street art on one of the pillars of the bridge of the SNP in Bratislava (2018).
The Štadión SNP in Banská Bystrica
The square of the SNP in Banská Bystrica with the memorial house of the SNP
Triple memorial in Dolné Vestenice : victims of the First World War (left), the Second World War (center) and the SNP (right)
The Social Democratic party leader and then Prime Minister Robert Fico laying the wreath on the 67th anniversary of the SNP (2011)
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swell
- Jörg K. Hoensch (Introduction and Ed.): Documents on the autonomy policy of the Slovak People's Party Hlinkas. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich / Vienna 1984, ISBN 3-486-51071-1 .
- Enclosed documents in Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Ullstein Verlag, Frankfurt / Berlin 1992, ISBN 978-3-548-33156-0 , pp. 351-418.
literature
Monographs
- Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. 2nd edition, DALI-BB / Múzeum SNP, Banská Bystrica 2009, ISBN 978-80-89090-60-0 . (Slovak)
- Martin Lacko : Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Slovart Verlag, Bratislava 2008, ISBN 978-80-8085-575-8 ( review in German ). (Slovak)
- Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Múzeum SNP, Bratislava 2009, ISBN 978-80-970238-3-6 . (Slovak)
- Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. (= Publications of the Ludwigsburg Research Center of the University of Stuttgart; Vol. 22), Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2013, ISBN 978-3-534-25973-1 ( review ).
- Wolfgang Venohr : uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Updated new edition, Ullstein Verlag, Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, ISBN 978-3-548-33156-0 ( review of the previous edition ).
Articles in edited volumes and scientific journals
- Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. (= Research on the history of the Danube region; Vol. 3) Böhlau Verlag, Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, ISBN 3-205-07114-X , pp. 385–408.
- Elena Mannová: Anniversary campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. (= Mainzer Contributions to the History of Eastern Europe 4), LIT Verlag, Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-643-10816-6 , pp. 201-240.
- Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-80253-6 , pp. 206-228.
- Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-80253-6 , pp. 193-205.
- John L. Ryder: Civil was in Slovakia? Outlining a theoretical approach to the Slovak national uprising. In: Marek Syrný et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie. Slovensko a Európa v roku 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising. Slovakia and Europe in 1944]. Múzeum SNP, Banská Bystrica 2014, ISBN 978-80-89514-30-4 , pp. 423-428.
- Klaus Schönherr : The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39-61.
- Klaus Schönherr: The Effects of the Slovak National Uprising on the Southern Eastern Front. In: Miroslav Pekník (ed.): Slovenské národné povstanie 1944. Súčast európskej antifašistickej rezistencie v rokoch druhej svetovej vojny [= The Slovak National Uprising in 1944. Part of the European anti-fascist resistance in the years of the Second World War]. Ústav politických vied SAV VEDA / Múzeum SNP, Bratislava 2009, ISBN 978-80-224-1090-8 , pp. 194-202.
- Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2011, ISBN 978-3-598-11767-1 , p. 243 -254.
- Martin Zückert: Partisan movements in Europe - fundamental considerations on the Slovak case. In: Marek Syrný et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie. Slovensko a Európa v roku 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising. Slovakia and Europe in 1944]. Múzeum SNP, Banská Bystrica 2014, ISBN 978-80-89514-30-4 , pp. 410-416.
Overview representations and further literature
- Gila Fatran: The Deportation of the Jews from Slovakia 1944–1945. In: Bohemia . Volume 37, No. 1 (1996), pp. 98-119.
- Jörg K. Hoensch : The development of Slovakia in the 19th and 20th centuries and its relations with the Bohemian countries up to the dissolution of the common state. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. (Publications of the Collegium Carolinum, Volume 93), Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-486-56521-4 , pp. 1-26.
- Jörg K. Hoensch: The Slovak Republic 1939–1945. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. (Publications of the Collegium Carolinum, Volume 93), Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-486-56521-4 , pp. 221-248.
- Jörg K. Hoensch: Basics and phases of the German policy towards Slovakia in the Second World War. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. (Publications of the Collegium Carolinum, Volume 93), Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2000 [Essen 1994], ISBN 3-486-56521-4 , pp. 249-280.
- Jörg K. Hoensch: Slovakia in 1945. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. (Publications of the Collegium Carolinum, Volume 93), Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-486-56521-4 , pp. 299-350.
- Yeshayahu A. Jelinek : The Parish Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1939–1945. (= East European Monographs. No. XIV). East European Quarterly / Boulder, New York / London 1976, ISBN 0-914710-07-9 .
- Ivan Kamenec : The Slovak state, 1939–1945. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-80253-6 , pp. 175-192.
- Ivan Kamenec: Slovenský štát v obrazoch (= The Slovak State in Pictures). Ottovo nakladatelství, Prague 2008, ISBN 978-80-7360-700-5 . (Slovak)
- Ivan Kamenec: The Jewish Question in Slovakia during World War II. In: Jörg K. Hoensch, Stanislav Biman, Ľubomír Lipták (eds.): Jewish emancipation - anti-Semitism - persecution in Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Bohemian countries and Slovakia. (= Publications of the German-Czech and German-Slovak Historians' Commission, Volume 6; Publication of the Institute for Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe, Volume 13) Klartext Verlag, Essen 1998, ISBN 3-88474-733-9 , p. 165 -174.
- Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939–1945. Schiffer Publishing, Atglen 1997, ISBN 0-7643-0589-1 .
- Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 (= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945). Perfect / Ústav pamäti národa, Bratislava 2008, ISBN 978-80-8046-408-0 . (Slovak)
- Ladislav Lipscher: The Jews in the Slovak State 1939–1945. (= Publications of the Collegium Carolinum , Volume 35) Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich / Vienna 1980, ISBN 3-486-48661-6 .
- Ľubomír Lipták: The political system of the Slovak Republic 1939–1945. In: Erwin Oberländer (Ed.): Authoritarian Regime in East Central and Southeast Europe 1919–1944. 2nd edition with an afterword, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2017, ISBN 978-3-506-78585-5 , pp. 299–336.
- Stanley Payne : History of Fascism. The rise and fall of a European movement. Tosa Verlag, Vienna 2006, ISBN 978-3-85003-037-3 .
- Jan Rychlík: Češi a Slováci ve 20th století: spolupráce a konflikty 1914–1992 [= Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th century: Cooperation and conflicts 1914–1992]. Vyšehrad, Prague 2012, ISBN 978-80-7429-133-3 . (Czech)
- Jan Rychlík: Slovakia. In: David Stahel (Ed.): Joining Hitler's Crusade: European Nations and the Invasion of the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-316-51034-6 , pp. 107-133.
- Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Verlag Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg 2000, ISBN 3-7917-1723-5 .
- Tatjana Tönsmeyer : The Third Reich and Slovakia. Political everyday life between cooperation and obstinacy. Ferdinand Schönigh Verlag, Paderborn 2003, ISBN 3-506-77532-4 .
Web links
- Slovakia celebrates largest uprising against Nazi Germany. In: welt.de, August 28, 2014, accessed December 26, 2019, 12:43 am.
- Berthold Seewald: Slovakia 1944: The greatest uprising against Hitler's regime. In: www.welt.de, August 29, 2014, accessed October 23, 2014, 4:06 pm.
- Christoph Thanei: The almost forgotten uprising against Josef Tizo. (sic!) In: diepresse.com, August 29, 2014, accessed on October 23, 2014, 4:08 pm.
- Christoph Thanei: Slovakia is reminiscent of an uprising against the Nazis. In: http: //science.orf.at, / August 28, 2014, accessed on January 1, 2015.
- Wilhelm Honig: Uprising in Banská Bystrica: The Slovak prelude to the “Prague Spring”. In: diezeit.de, October 10, 1969, accessed on October 23, 2014.
Remarks
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 60; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 187.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 64; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 272.
- ^ Jörg K. Hoensch: Slovakia in 1945. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000, p. 301; Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939–1945. Atglen 1997, p. 25.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 24.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: AufsJozef Tiso on Nový svet (1941) .pngtand of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 18.
- ^ Jörg K. Hoensch: The development of Slovakia in the 19th and 20th centuries and its relations with the Bohemian countries up to the dissolution of the common state. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000, p. 16.
-
^ Jörg K. Hoensch: The Slovak Republic 1939-1945. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000, p. 226.
For the literal wording of the two treaties, see Jörg K. Hoensch (Introduction and Ed.): Documents on the autonomy policy of the Slovak People's Party Hlinkas. Munich / Vienna 1984, Document 59, pp. 259-261. - ^ Ivan Kamenec: The Slovak state, 1939-1945. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 180; Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 102 and 105; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 23; Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 11.
- ^ Ľubomír Lipták: The political system of the Slovak Republic 1939–1945. In: Erwin Oberländer (Ed.): Authoritarian Regime in East Central and Southeast Europe 1919–1944. Paderborn 2017, p. 331; Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 207.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr describes Slovakia as a "model case of so-called clerical fascism" ; see. Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 28–29. The term itself and the question of whether the regime of the Slovak state can be classified as “fascist” or “clerical fascist” are controversial among historians, cf. Tatjana Tönsmeyer: The Third Reich and Slovakia. Political everyday life between cooperation and obstinacy. Paderborn 2003, pp. 95-96.
- ^ Ivan Kamenec: The Slovak state, 1939-1945. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 182; Jan Rychlík: Slovakia. In: David Stahel (Ed.): Joining Hitler's Crusade: European Nations and the Invasion of the Soviet Union. Cambridge / New York 2018, p. 111.
- ^ Stanley Payne: History of Fascism. The rise and fall of a European movement. Vienna 2006, p. 494; Jörg K. Hoensch: The Slovak Republic 1939–1945. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000, pp. 228-229; Tiso's path from separatism to collaboration. ( The standard on December 15, 2001).
- ^ Tatjana Tönsmeyer: The Third Reich and Slovakia. Political everyday life between cooperation and obstinacy. Paderborn 2003, p. 106f and 111f; Hoensch: Documents on the autonomy policy of the Slovak People's Party Hlinkas. P. 69.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 12.
- ^ Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 [= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945]. Bratislava 2008, p. 87.
- ^ Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 [= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945]. Bratislava 2008, p. 91.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 [= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945]. Bratislava 2008, pp. 93-95.
- ^ Ivan Kamenec: The Slovak state, 1939-1945. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, pp. 181f.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 203.
- ↑ This voter support refers to the total population of Slovakia. In the case of the voters of Slovak nationality, the Ludaks' share of the vote was almost 50%, cf. Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 86; Tatjana Tönsmeyer: The Third Reich and Slovakia. Political everyday life between cooperation and obstinacy. Paderborn 2003, p. 35f; Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 [= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945]. Bratislava 2008, p. 11.
- ^ Tatjana Tönsmeyer: The Third Reich and Slovakia. Political everyday life between cooperation and obstinacy. Paderborn 2003, p. 94.
- ↑ Ivan Kamenec: Slovenský štát v obrazoch [= The Slovak government in pictures]. Prague 2008, pp. 22-23.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 35f.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 11; Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 200.
- ^ Ľubomír Lipták: The political system of the Slovak Republic 1939–1945. In: Erwin Oberländer (Ed.): Authoritarian Regime in East Central and Southeast Europe 1919–1944. Paderborn 2017, p. 324; Jan Rychlík: Slovakia. In: David Stahel (Ed.): Joining Hitler's Crusade: European Nations and the Invasion of the Soviet Union. Cambridge / New York 2018, p. 115f; Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, pp. 143-144; Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 38-39; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 21-23, 26 u. 56.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, pp. 22-23.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 39 and 41–42.
- ^ Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 108; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 32; Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 21.
- ↑ Ivan Kamenec: The Jewish question in Slovakia during the Second World War. In: Jörg K. Hoensch, Stanislav Biman, Ľubomír Lipták (eds.): Jewish emancipation - anti-Semitism - persecution in Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Bohemian countries and Slovakia. Essen 1998, p. 169f; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 33–34; Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 21.
- ↑ Jörg K. Hoensch: Basic features and phases of the German policy on Slovakia in the Second World War. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000 [Essen 1994], pp. 249-280, here pp. 272 f; Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, pp. 12-13; Ivan Kamenec: Slovenský štát v obrazoch [= The Slovak State in Pictures]. Prague 2008, p. 143.
- ↑ Jörg K. Hoensch: Basic features and phases of the German policy on Slovakia in the Second World War. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000 [Essen 1994], pp. 249-280, here p. 273; Ivan Kamenec: Slovenský štát v obrazoch [= The Slovak State in Pictures]. Prague 2008, p. 146.
- ↑ Jörg K. Hoensch: Basic features and phases of the German Slovakia policy in the Second World War. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000 [Essen 1994], pp. 249-280, here p. 276.
- ^ Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 [= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945]. Bratislava 2008, p. 170.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 51.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39-61. here p. 44.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 24 u. 27; Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 142.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 202; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 65.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 246.
- ↑ Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. Banská Bystrica 2009, p. 58; Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 202.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 245.
- ↑ Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. Banská Bystrica 2009, p. 43; Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 201.
- ↑ Rychlík: The Slovak question and resistance movement , p. 202.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 202.
- ↑ Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. Banská Bystrica 2009, p. 25.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 396; Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, pp. 203f; Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 246f.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 40.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 14; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 37.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 66.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 14; Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 25.
- ^ Tatjana Tönsmeyer: The Third Reich and Slovakia. Political everyday life between cooperation and obstinacy. Paderborn 2003, p. 306; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 39.
- ↑ Jörg K. Hoensch: Basic features and phases of the German Slovakia policy in the Second World War. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000 [Essen 1994], pp. 249-280, here p. 252; Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939–1945. Atglen 1997, p. 61.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 391.
- ^ Ivan Kamenec: The Slovak state, 1939-1945. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 181.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 46.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 47ff.
- ↑ Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. Banská Bystrica 2009, p. 178f .; Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 397.
- ↑ Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. Banská Bystrica 2009, p. 185 f.
- ↑ Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. Banská Bystrica 2009, p. 186.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 204.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 86.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 89f.
- ↑ Jozef Jablonický: Z ilegality do povstania. Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja [= From illegality to uprising. Chapter from the bourgeois resistance]. Banská Bystrica 2009, p. 185f.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 90.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 81.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 129; Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 46.
- ^ In his monograph, Wolfgang Venohr describes the East Slovak Army as "I. Slovak Army Corps ” , cf. Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 81.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 44 f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 399, footnote 27.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 79 ff.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 44; Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 81.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 80f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980 ,; Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 53.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 398.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 90.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 59.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 60ff; Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 145.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 400.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 92; Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 145 f.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 187.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 105; Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 206.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 60.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 205.
- ^ Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 146f.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: The Slovak question and the resistance movement during the Second World War. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 205.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 45.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 248.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 45.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 46.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 400.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 152.
- ↑ According to Martin Lacko, there were 24 officers. Anna Josko writes that the military commission had a total of 28 members; see. Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 77; Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 401.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 401; Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 147; Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 46; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 169f.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 46; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 175; Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 248.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 167.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 173 f.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 172.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 84.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 45 f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 401; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 175f u. 179.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 92.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 158; Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 206.
- ↑ a b Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 185f.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 124.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 61.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 190.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 47; Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 64.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 65f.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 49.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 179.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), p. 39–61, here p. 50.
- ^ Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, pp. 216f.
- ^ Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 217; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 186.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), p. 39–61, here p. 50.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 398.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 56.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 (= The Slovak National Uprising 1944). Bratislava 2009, pp. 165-168.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 51.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 404.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 404f.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 51.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 52.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 52.
- ^ Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 206; Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), p. 39–61, here p. 52f.
- ^ Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 220; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, pp. 258f.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 158.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 270.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here p. 53.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 407.
- ^ Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 219; Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), p. 39–61, here p. 53.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr erroneously names October 28th as the day on which Banská Bystrica fell. However, the center of the uprising fell the day before, cf. Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 295.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), pp. 39–61, here pp. 53f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 408.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 108; Wolfgang Venohr: uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 296.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 17.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 136.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 138.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 137.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 142.
- ^ Jörg K. Hoensch: Slovakia in 1945. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000, p. 301; Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 142f.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 149f.
- ^ Charles K. Kliment, Břetislav Nakládal: Germany's First Ally: Armed Forces of the Slovak State 1939-1945. Atglen 1997, p. 24.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 145.
- ^ Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 220.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 201; Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, pp. 220f.
- ^ Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising: the most dramatic moment in the nation's history. In: Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.): Slovakia in History. Cambridge et al. 2011, p. 221.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 155f.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 158.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 159f.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 161; Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, pp. 132-136.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, pp. 162-164; Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, pp. 140f.
- ^ A b Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 405.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 228.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, pp. 405f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 406f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Böhlau, Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 407.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Effects of the Slovak National Uprising on the Southern Eastern Front. In: Miroslav Pekník (ed.): Slovenské národné povstanie 1944. Súčast európskej antifašistickej rezistencie v rokoch druhej svetovej vojny [= The Slovak National Uprising in 1944. Part of the European anti-fascist resistance in the years of the Second World War]. Bratislava 2009, pp. 194–202, here pp. 194f.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Effects of the Slovak National Uprising on the Southern Eastern Front. In: Miroslav Pekník (ed.): Slovenské národné povstanie 1944. Súčast európskej antifašistickej rezistencie v rokoch druhej svetovej vojny [= The Slovak National Uprising in 1944. Part of the European anti-fascist resistance in the years of the Second World War]. Bratislava 2009, pp. 194–202, here p. 202.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 196.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 408.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 74.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 158ff.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 160f.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 165f.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 186ff.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 169.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 190.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 169f.
- ↑ Šindelářová incorrectly names the unit "Lenin", in fact it was the 9th unit of the nearby 1st Czechoslovak Partisan Brigade of Josef W. Stalin, cf. Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 186; Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 119.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 186.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 170f.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 163f.
- ↑ Ivan Kamenec: The Jewish question in Slovakia during the Second World War. In: Jörg K. Hoensch, Stanislav Biman, Ľubomír Lipták (eds.): Jewish emancipation - anti-Semitism - persecution in Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Bohemian countries and Slovakia. Essen 1998, p. 172; Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 81.
- ↑ Ladislav Lipscher: The Jews in the Slovak State 1939-1945. Munich / Vienna 1980, p. 169.
- ↑ Ladislav Lipscher: The Jews in the Slovak State 1939-1945. Munich / Vienna 1980, p. 171f.
- ↑ Gila Fatran: The Deportation of the Jews from Slovakia 1944–1945. In: Bohemia. Volume 37, No. 1 (1996), pp. 99f; Ladislav Lipscher: The Jews in the Slovak State 1939–1945. Munich / Vienna 1980, p. 172f u. 175f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 408; Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 249.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 46 u. 105f.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 170.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 114–118.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 78f.
- ↑ Jörg K. Hoensch: Basic features and phases of the German Slovakia policy in the Second World War. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000 [Essen 1994], pp. 249-280, here pp. 278 f.
- ↑ Ivan Kamenec: The Jewish question in Slovakia during the Second World War. In: Jörg K. Hoensch, Stanislav Biman, Ľubomír Lipták (eds.): Jewish emancipation - anti-Semitism - persecution in Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Bohemian countries and Slovakia. Essen 1998, p. 173; Ladislav Lipscher: The Jews in the Slovak State 1939–1945. Munich / Vienna 1980, p. 178f; Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 82.
- ↑ a b Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 82, 88f, 93-98.
- ↑ Gila Fatran: The Deportation of the Jews from Slovakia 1944–1945. In: Bohemia. Volume 37, No. 1 (1996), p. 119; Ivan Kamenec: The Jewish Question in Slovakia during World War II. In: Jörg K. Hoensch, Stanislav Biman, Ľubomír Lipták (eds.): Jewish emancipation - anti-Semitism - persecution in Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Bohemian countries and Slovakia. Essen 1998, p. 173; Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 [= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945]. Bratislava 2008, p. 85.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 408; Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, pp. 200f; Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 249.
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 196.
- ↑ Vilém Plevza et al .: Dejiny Slovenského národného povstania 1944 - 5th zväzok [= History of the Slovak National Uprising 1944 - 5th volume]. Nakladateľstvo Pravda, Bratislava 1985, pp. 428-431.
- ↑ Gila Fatran: The Deportation of the Jews from Slovakia 1944–1945. In: Bohemia. Volume 37, No. 1 (1996), p. 119; Ivan Kamenec: Slovenský štát v obrazoch [= The Slovak State in Pictures]. Prague 2008, p. 224; Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 201; Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, pp. 105f; Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 249.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 163.
- ^ Martin Lacko: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 [= The Slovak Republic 1939–1945]. Bratislava 2008, p. 183.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 74.
- ↑ Stanislav Mičev et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2009, p. 131f.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 224f.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 233.
- ↑ a b c d Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 248.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 289.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 299.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 248f.
- ^ Jörg K. Hoensch: Slovakia in 1945. In: Hans Lemberg, et al. (Ed.): Studia Slovaca. Studies on the history of the Slovaks and Slovakia. Munich 2000, p. 302; Elena Mannová: Anniversary campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 202.
- ↑ a b Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak national uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 202.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, pp. 204f.
- ↑ a b Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak national uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 208.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 308.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 209.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 210f.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 308f.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 309.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 309f.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 211.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 215.
- ↑ Vladimír Jancura: Ako sa prepisovali dejiny [= How history was rewritten]. In: zurnal.pravda.sk, September 1, 2014, accessed on April 4, 2016, 00:10. (Slovak)
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 217ff.
- ↑ Miroslav Pekník: Slovenské národné povstanie a verejnosť po roku 1989 [= The Slovak National Uprising and the Public after 1989]. In: Miroslav Pekník (ed.): Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. ÚPV SAV / SAV, Bratislava 2009, p. 425f. u. 441.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 218.
- ^ Lecture by Stanislav Mičev, director of the SNP Museum in Banská Bystrica for the Slovak magazine “Nové Slovo” on October 2, 2014, ASA, Bratislava.
- ↑ Daniel Vražda: Na oslavy SNP treba prísť Skôr, lístok na vlak bude za polovicu . In: nasabystrica.sme.sk, August 26, 2014, accessed on May 15, 2016, 4:06 pm.
- ↑ Milan S. slowurica , František Vnuk and Jozef Kirschbaum are among the most important Slovak historians in exile . Cf. Tatjana Tönsmeyer: The Third Reich and Slovakia. Political everyday life between cooperation and obstinacy. Paderborn 2003, p. 16f; Elena Mannová: Anniversary campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, pp. 218f; Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, pp. 250f.
- ↑ Original text: Povstanie však nepoprelo slovenskú štátnosť, len tú formu štátu, ktorá existovala po roku 1939 - teda štát s nedemokratickým režimom, ktorý vznikol pod nátlakom Nemeckedišký vznikol pod nátlakom. Keď vypuklo SNP, deklarovalo svoje ciele a jedným z nich bola aj obnovená ČSR, no nie v tej podobe, aká bola pred Mníchovom, respectíve podľa ústavy z roku 1920, kde sa hovorilo o ‚českodeoslovenskom nár. ' Povstanie jednoznačne žiadalo rovnoprávne postavenie Slovenska v obnovenej republike. see. Radovan Krčmárik: History Ivan Kamenec: Povstaniu uškodilo, že si ho privlastnili komunisti [= Historian Ivan Kamenec: The uprising was damaged by the fact that the communists appropriated it]. In: Aktuell.sk, August 28, 2014. (Slovak)
- ↑ Martin Lacko: Slovenské národné povstanie 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising 1944]. Bratislava 2008, p. 197 u. 200.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 236f.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 236f.
- ↑ Slováci sú hrdi na SNP, ukazuje prieskum agentúry Focus. Výrazná väčšina respondentov je o hrdosti na SNP presvedčená [= Slovaks are proud of the SNP, shows a survey by the agency Focus. An overwhelming number of those questioned are convinced of their pride in the SNP]. In: sme.sk, August 26, 2016, accessed on February 22, 2020.
- ↑ Radoslav Štefančík, Miroslav Hvasta: Jazyk pravicového extrémizmu [= The language of right-wing extremism]. Ekonóm, Bratislava 2019, ISBN 978-80-225-4642-3 , p. 217 (Slovak); Daniel Vražda: Kotleba. Second, expanded edition, N Press, o. O. 2020, ISBN 978-80-999251-5-2 , p. 83. (Slovak)
- ↑ Christoph Thanei: The almost forgotten uprising against Josef Tizo ( Die Presse on August 28, 2014)
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), p. 39–61, here p. 60.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 243.
- ↑ Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 60.
- ^ Roland Schönfeld: Slovakia. From the Middle Ages to the present. Regensburg 2000, p. 141.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 312f.
- ^ Anna Josko: The Slovak Resistance Movement. In: Victor S. Mamatey, Radomír Luža (ed.): History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1980, p. 408.
- ^ Yeshayahu A. Jelinek: The Parish Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1939–1945. New York / London 1976, p. 126.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 313f.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: Češi a Slováci ve 20. století: spolupráce a konflikty 1914–1992 [= Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th century: cooperation and conflicts 1914–1992]. Prague 2012, p. 251; Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, 60f.
- ^ Jan Rychlík: Češi a Slováci ve 20. století: spolupráce a konflikty 1914–1992 [= Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th century: cooperation and conflicts 1914–1992]. Prague 2012, p. 268.
- ↑ John L. Ryder: Civil was in Slovakia? Outlining a theoretical approach to the Slovak national uprising. In: Marek Syrný et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie. Slovensko a Európa v roku 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising. Slovakia and Europe in 1944]. Banská Bystrica 2014, p. 424.
- ↑ John L. Ryder: Civil was in Slovakia? Outlining a theoretical approach to the Slovak national uprising. In: Marek Syrný et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie. Slovensko a Európa v roku 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising. Slovakia and Europe in 1944]. Banská Bystrica 2014, p. 427.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Partisan movements in Europe - basic considerations on the Slovak case. In: Marek Syrný et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie. Slovensko a Európa v roku 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising. Slovakia and Europe in 1944]. Banská Bystrica 2014, p. 413.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The suppression of the Slovak uprising in the context of the German military operations, autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), p. 39–61, here p. 39.
- ↑ a b Lenka Šindelářová: Final of the extermination: The Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia 1944/45. Darmstadt 2013, p. 17.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Effects of the Slovak National Uprising on the Southern Eastern Front. In: Miroslav Pekník (ed.): Slovenské národné povstanie 1944. Súčast európskej antifašistickej rezistencie v rokoch druhej svetovej vojny [= The Slovak National Uprising in 1944. Part of the European anti-fascist resistance in the years of the Second World War]. Bratislava 2009, pp. 194–202, here p. 194.
- ^ Review of Šindelářová's dissertation by Tatjana Tönsmeyer.
- ↑ Klaus Schönherr: The Suppression of the Slovak Uprising in the Context of the German Military Operations, Autumn 1944. In: Bohemia 42 (2001), p. 39–61, here p. 39 f.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 251.
- ↑ Wolfgang Venohr: Uprising of the Slovaks. The fight for freedom of 1944. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1992, p. 312.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Partisan movements in Europe - basic considerations on the Slovak case. In: Marek Syrný et al .: Slovenské národné povstanie. Slovensko a Európa v roku 1944 [= The Slovak National Uprising. Slovakia and Europe in 1944]. Banská Bystrica 2014, p. 411.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, pp. 250f.
- ↑ Martin Zückert: Slovakia: Resistance against the Tiso regime and National Socialist domination. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.): Handbook on Resistance to National Socialism and Fascism in Europe 1933/39 to 1945. Berlin / New York 2011, p. 250.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 228f.
- ↑ Elena Mannová: Jubilee campaigns and reinterpretations of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In: Rudolf Jaworski, Jan Kusber (ed.): Remembering with obstacles. Eastern European memorial days and anniversaries in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Berlin 2011, p. 230f.
- ^ Gerhard Schubert: Biggest protests since 1989: A journalist murder stirs up Slovakia. In: derstandard.at, March 11, 2018, accessed on February 22, 2020.
