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Ancient Greek warfare

Ancient Greek warfare is the term used to describe to warfare of the Hellenic poleis (the city-states of ancient Greece) between the hoplite revolution of the 8th century BC and the emergence of the Macedonian empire in the 4th century BC. Most city-states were allied with either Sparta or Athens, the two military powers.

Ancient Greek warfare was dominated on land by the phalanx formation, a deep line formation consisting of hoplites equipped with heavy shields, spears, and swords. The hoplite gets his name from his equipment, collectively called the hoplon. The phalanx's plan was basically to advance toward the enemy with each phalangite's spear stretched toward the enemy. When the phalanx got within sword range, the phalangites would draw their swords and start fighting that way. If enemy archers shot arrows at the phalanx, the phalangites would hold up their shields, so the unit was co-dependent for defense. This Greek phalanx was the ancient world's best heavy infantry, demonstrated by the Greek victory at Marathon. 10,000 Greek hoplites organized in a phalanx decisively defeated a much larger Persian army of about 26,000 with few losses. Another type of soldier was the peltasts which were lighter infantry than the hoplites and were equipped primarily with several javelins. The peltasts were usually used as skirmishers.

The ancient Greek state of Macedon perfected the phalanx with the use of the unusually long sarissa pike. In addition to the phalanx formation, the Macedonians under King Philip II began using organized cavalry units and tactical skirmisher units in battle. Another change brought by King Philip II was the creation and maintenance of a professional army. Early on, the Greek phalanges had been populated by citizen-soldier hoplites. Now, however, heavily trained professional armies became the norm, especially after Philip's son Alexander III conquered the vast Persian army and, with his death, left the several Diadochi states. It was not until the evolution from the phalanx of the more flexible Roman Legionary style of organization and equipment, combined with the more wide-spread use of light cavalry, that the Greek phalanx lost on the battlefield. Another form of phalanx, the Oblique Phalanx , was used when opposing armies tried to flank the phalanx, or attack the vulnerable sides. To defend against flanking, the right and center parts of the phalanx would merge with the left side to form a fifty man deep phalanx.

Around this time the Greeks developed a ship called a trireme. The Athenian strategy of naval engagement proved successful at the Battle of Salamis, where a smaller Athenian fleet based on the principle of ramming, burning, and capturing enemy ships soundly defeated the Persian fleet. After the by and large defeat of the Persians in the Aegean, the Athenians used their navy as defense against pirates and other dangers in an effort to promote trade within the Delian League. The naval side of war proved decisive in the Peloponnesian War when Athens' strategy again turned to naval superiority and the Athenians attempted to just sit inside their walls and use their fleet to block the harbors of Sparta's allies, limiting trade. After an ill-advised military venture in Sicily, however, Athens lost a large portion of its fleet and many of its finest soldiers. The Spartans took advantage of this crushing blow, and rapidly created their own navy with support from Persia. With an unquestionably dominate army and a passable navy, Sparta inspired many Athenian colonies to revolt, depriving Athens of the funds necessary to build more ships. It wasn't long before Sparta captured Athens, tore down the famed city walls and ransacked the city.

The rise of the hoplite

The hoplite phalanx

See also main article Phalanx formation

The hoplite was a very important infantryman which was the primary combat unit used in Ancient Greece. The word hoplite (Greek ὁπλίτης, hoplitēs) derives from hoplon (ὅπλον, plural hopla, ὅπλα) meaning an item of armor or equipment, and consequently the entire equipment of the hoplite. The circular shield, which is sometimes incorrectly referred to as a hoplon, was in fact called an aspis.

These soldiers probably first appeared in he late seventh century B.C. They were a citizen-militia, and so were armed as spearmen, and assumed a phalanx formation. They were primarily drawn from the middle class, who could afford the cost of the armaments. Almost all the famous men of ancient Greece, even philosophers and playwrights, fought as hoplites at some point in their lives.

The (hoplite) phalanx was a formation in which the hoplites would line up in ranks, ranging from eight to sixteen rows deep, in very close order. In this formation, the hoplites would lock their shields together, and the first few ranks of soldiers would project their spears out over the first rank of shields to try to gain the upper hand in the battle early on. This allowed the first three or so ranks of spearmen to engage their spears against the enemy. The hoplites formed a barrier in this way which is sometimes referred to as a shield wall.

The effectiveness of the phalanx depended upon how well the hoplites could maintain this formation while in combat, and how well they could stand their ground. Moral and steel played an important part in maintaining the formation when faced with large numbers of opposing forces or an oncomming cavalry charge. One Ancient Greek theory was that the more disciplined and courageous the army, the more likely it was to emerge victorious. Disputes between the various city-states of Greece would often be resolved by one side fleeing before the engagement. The Greek word dynamis, meaning the "will to fight", expresses the drive that kept hoplites in formation.

Before the advance, both sides would sing the 'paean', the battle-hymn (notably, the Spartans rejected the use of a battle-hymn, thinking it needless bravado), then advance to the cadence (a marching beat) - on trumpets, pipes or drums. When nearing the enemy, the phalanx would break into a run that was sufficient enough to create momentum but not too much as to lose cohesion. Both sides would collide viciously, breaking many of the spears of the front row. The battle would then rely on the valor of the men in the front line and the rear men to maintain a push forward with their shields.

“Now of those, who dare, abiding one beside another, to advance to the close fray, and the foremost champions, fewer die, and they save the people in the rear; but in men that fear, all excellence is lost. No one could ever in words go through those several ills, which befall a man, if he has been actuated by cowardice. For ‘tis grievous to wound in the rear the back of a flying man in hostile war. Shameful too is a corpse lying low in the dust, wounded behind in the back by the point of a spear.” [Tyrtaeus: The War Songs Of Tyrtaeus]

The natural tendency during battle would be to drift towards the right side, or even for both lines to "wheel" as one side gave ground and the other advanced. This is because the individual hoplites carried their shields on their left arm, protecting not themselves but the soldier to the left (thus giving an incentive to stand very close together). Battles were won when the exposed right side (carrying spears) could overpower the opposing army's left side (carrying shields).

When in combat, the whole formation would consistently press forward trying to break the enemy formation; thus when two phalanx formations engaged, the struggle essentially became a pushing match, in which, as a rule, the deeper phalanx would almost always win, with very few recorded exceptions.

Since the hoplites were a militia force and did not receive permanent wages, campaigns were short and mainly confined to the summer. Armies marched directly to their target. There, the defenders could hide behind city walls, in which case the attackers generally had to content themselves with ravaging the countryside (as siegecraft was undeveloped), or meet them on the field. Battles were usually set piece and intended to be decisive. These battles were short, bloody, and brutal, and thus required a high degree of discipline. Both forces lined up on a level field, usually in a rough phalanx formation around eight ranks deep (though this varied). Other troops were less important; hippeis (cavalry) generally protected the flanks, when present at all, and both light infantry and missile troops were negligible. The best known hoplites were the Spartans, who were trained from birth to become well trained, professional warriors.

The Greco-Persian Wars

See also main article Greco-Persian Wars

The Pelopennesian War

The emergence of the light infantry

Agrianian Peltast. This Peltast holds three javelins, one in his throwing hand and two in his Pelte hand as additional ammunition

Light infantry began to appear with the rise of professional armies. They were used to hold opposing forces in place while cavalry or foot troops attempted to flank them.

Spartan & Theban Hegemonies

The end of the hoplite era

The rising importance of the cavalry

The Phalanx had a reputation for invincibility in ancient Greece, a reputation contributed to by the formidable Spartan Army. The Phalanx won campaigns against Persia and many barbarian tribes. The Thebans, however, evetually defeated Sparta with a powerful force of cavalry, claiming supremacy throughout Greece. The Cavalry tactics used had probably been inspired by the Persians, who took all manner of horseman to a battlefield, and often emerged victorious.

When the Macedonians invaded, their army was largely composed of Phalanx but the elite troops were the Companions - a powerful cavalry unit which had been adapted into a royal guard. The Macedonians proved to be one of the most effective conquerors in Europe for over 1000 years.

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References

External links

The Place of Archery in Greek Warfare
The Five Great Battles of Antiquity by David L. Smith, Symposion Lectures, 30 June 2006.